"...we cannot imagine anything connected in an object that we have not previously connected ourselves..."
I. Kant [KRV, In 130]
"Even the ordinary, ordinary historian, who perhaps thinks and asserts that he passively perceives and trusts only the given, is not passive in his thinking, but introduces his own categories and examines the given through them."
G. V. F. Gegel [2000, p. 65]
This article continues the discussion of the state in the history of the traditional East. Some of its empirical and theoretical aspects were covered in a recent publication on Southeast Asia in the fifth and seventh centuries. [Zakharov, 2005, pp. 7-24]. The current research is inspired by the statements of two of the greatest minds of Modern times, cited above as an epigraph. The phenomenon of the state has been studied by representatives of the humanities for more than two millennia, starting with Plato and Aristotle. But there are still more questions than answers, and the arguments are now subsiding, then breaking out with renewed vigor. In this article, I would like to focus on the problems of individual concepts of the state in the traditional East, proposed in the domestic historiographic tradition in recent times, and analyze the methodological consequences that follow from this consideration.
First of all, a number of terminological clarifications are necessary. The traditional East is a conventional designation for societies that existed in Asia and North Africa at the end of the IV millennium BC - XVIII / beginning of the XIX century AD, which were "civilizations" according to the schemes of Philo-Philo. Engels and G. Child. During the analysis, the existing theories will be tested both from the point of view of their internal consistency and from the point of view of their compliance with the existing empirical data. Since historians sometimes believe that their discipline does not need theories, it is necessary to refer in advance to D. Fischer's statement, which quite clearly refutes this approach: "Scientists still seriously argue about whether the historian should generalize. One might as well ask whether a historian should speak in words. Generalizations are deeply rooted in his language, in his thinking, in his ways of explaining the world " [Fisher, 1970, p. 103; cit. by: Kolosov, 2000, p. 32]. Among the Soviet historians who noted the important role of theory in historiography, it is impossible not to mention I. D. Kovalchenko [Kovalchenko, 2003, p. 25-36].
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Accepting Kantian critical philosophy, it is necessary to consider what forms of reason historians bring to research. But it is also necessary to emphasize that experience itself, according to I. Kant, is possible only as the interaction of reason with empiricism; we are affected by "things in themselves". Therefore, it is impossible for Kantianism to believe that reason can be eliminated from cognition: "Without sensibility, no object would be given to us, and without reason, no object could be thought" (KRV, P. 75). What follows will show what categories of reason and reason historians use in their research. It is only necessary to separate two more concepts, namely history and historiography, which is based on the statement of G. V. F. Hegel: "The word history in our language means both the objective and the subjective side, both historiam rerum gestarum and res gestas itself, it means both what was done and historical narration"[Hegel, 2000, p. 109]. The term "history" will refer to "what happened", being posited in the past; historiography can refer to "knowledge about the past", which includes the very practice of historians (the activity of knowledge production), texts in which this knowledge is formulated.
It is advisable to start with the concept of the state, which prevailed in Soviet historiography, dating back to the time of the Russian Revolution. According to Engels, it is "an organization of the propertied class to protect it from the poor class", characterized by the presence of territorial divisions, public power separated from the people, taxes, and the existence of a professional army [Engels, 1948, pp. 194, 192-193; Struve, 1941, pp. 5-6; Avdiev, 1953, p. 7, 52; IDV, 1983, p. 19, 23, 129]. This is undoubtedly a theory, since in this case there is no indication of spatio-temporal aspects. But another argument of F. Engels defines the conditions under which the state appears: "The state is a product of society at a certain stage of development; the state is the recognition that this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, has split into irreconcilable opposites, which it is powerless to get rid of. And so that these opposites, classes with conflicting economic interests, do not devour themselves and society in a fruitless struggle, a force that seems to stand above society, a force that would moderate the clash, keep it within the boundaries of "order", has become necessary for this. And this force, which has sprung from society, but which places itself above it, alienating itself more and more from it, is the state "(Engels, 1948, pp. 191-192). I have already written about the internal contradictions of this definition [Zakharov, 2005, p. 7-8], but here something else is interesting: the state is placed in a broader context of the evolution of society; it is conceived as a characteristic of society at a certain stage of its development. Accordingly, society is the subject of judgment, and the state is its predicate. Society in this case is changing: from the pre-state state to the state. Before I draw the obvious conclusion, I will also point out the discussion about the emergence of the state in ancient Rome.
In 1989, E. M. Shtaerman came up with the concept of a very late emergence of the state in ancient Rome - only in the era of Octavian Augustus (30 BC - 14 AD), which caused numerous objections from other historians [Shtaerman, 1989, pp. 76-94]. E. M. Shtayerman herself followed a completely Marxist concept in the spirit of F. M. Shtayerman. Engels (regarding the definition of the state). During the discussion, the idea was expressed that the state is a historically changing form of power organization (R. Gunter), and state education does not necessarily mean one in which the apparatus of suppression and the taxation system were formed (A. O. Bolshakov) [for discussion materials, see VDI, 1989, N 4; 1990, N 1 - 2]. In this case, of course, the question arises: what allows us to talk about a particular political structure of society as a state (otherwise, what are the cris-
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territories of statehood)? If this is a historically changing form, then its evolution should be developed, although if something evolves (changes), then it must remain unchanged in its basis, otherwise we can only talk about two or more institutions that show continuity in relation to each other, but not about one, although changed phenomenon.
Thus, "the general idea, the category that first appears in this continuous change of individuals and peoples that exist for some time and then disappear, is change in general" (highlighted by G. V. F. Hegel - A. Z.) [Hegel, 2000, p. 119]. The representative of a completely different philosophical tradition-analytical philosophy-A. Danto emphasizes: "In discussions about historical explanations and explanations in general, although it was noted, but not appreciated the fact that the explanandum describes not just an event - what happened, but a change" (emphasis added by A. Danto - A. Z.) [Danto, 2002, p. 221].
Change as such can only be conceivable if two conditions are met: the presence of a subject that undergoes it (otherwise we have two different subjects1 ), and the presence of two states of this subject - A and B, different from each other and separated in time (if this is not allowed, but assumed that such states are different from each other). states are inherent in the subject at the same time, then we will violate the law of contradiction). I. Kant notes that change is "a sequence of determinations in time", and writes: "The correct interpretation of the concept of change is also based on this concept of constancy. Arising and disappearing are not changes in what arises and disappears. Change is one way in which the same object exists. Therefore, what changes while remaining changes only its states" [KRV, B 149, 230]. Let us quote another of his arguments: "... the concept of change and at the same time the concept of motion (as a change of place) are possible only through the representation of time and in the representation of time: if this representation were not an a priori (internal) intuition, then no concept could comprehend the possibility of change, i.e., the connection of contradictory elements with each other.opposite predicates in the same object (for example, the existence and non-existence of the same thing in the same place). Only in time, namely after each other, can two contradictory definitions be in the same thing" [KRV, B 48-49]. Therefore, outside of it (time), changes do not exist.
However, time cannot be understood as a quantitative measure of changes, because for quantitative calculation they must be assumed to be homogeneous and atomic. Moreover, it is only possible to assume the existence of one object only in thinking; in experience we always encounter many different objects. In addition to what I have just said, I must add one more remark: in order to think about the change (the transition of an object from state A to state B in a certain period of time), one must assume another time position - the time of the researcher who will fix these states, for which he must be outside the time t 1 corresponding to A, and outside the moment of time t 2, correlated with B. Thus, without the subject/historian of history, there can be no object of knowledge. This, in turn, negates the idea of the possibility of knowing History with a capital letter, History sub specie aeternitatis, since no one has the right to claim to go beyond time, from where he can establish both the moment of the beginning and the moment of the end of time. 2 Such a Story also presupposes the essential unity of all changes in reality.-
1 " ... to speak of change is to implicitly assume the continuous self-identity of the subject of change. ...This is the implicit reference to a continuous subject that gives unity to the historical narrative" (Danto, 1965, p. 235-236; cf. Danto, 2002, p. 223).
2 The history of sub specie aeternitatis should be formally defined as all the changes of people and their associations in time; since they have not yet ended, it is impossible to know them in totality.
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what is metaphysical, and therefore beyond the reach of reason for cognition, is speculation.
But the next question arises: what is time? Following I. Kant, I believe that time is an a priori form of intuition, a way of organizing (ordering) the results of sensory perception, inherent in our mind before any possible experience. I do not presume to judge whether time is inherent in the world of things in itself or not (according to Paul Riker, "Augustine does not have a pure phenomenology of time" and "perhaps it will never be after him" [Riker, 2000, p. 16]). But it should be noted that from time itself, from the recognition of the very fact of its existence in our mind, it is impossible to deduce any specific objects that have states A and B: time is not a concept denoting a general feature of any phenomena .3 Indeed, when I say " it is red, "I do not mean that"it is red in time." The last sentence doesn't make sense at all, unless we assume (and this is quite logical) that we are looking at two separate statements: "This is red" and "this is not eternal" (but their synthesis is not necessary at all). This is not surprising, since the quality of "red" or" redness " does not have a temporal dimension at all, which is entirely derived from the ability of our mind to synthesize ideas.
It is necessary to dwell on one more circumstance. What happens when we point to two object states A and B? We define two forms of a phenomenon in time and record them using a language protocol: we assign names or at least some designations (in our case, A and B). This, firstly, creates a scheme imposed on the material (for we have two different forms), and secondly, translates the object of contemplation into a mental (conceptual) form. But the object itself, in order to be conceivable, requires a designation - a name 4 (it is possible to think of an abstract object, but it is itself created by the transcendental unity of apperception and "is that in the concept of which the manifold covered by this intuition is united" [KRV, P.137]). And since it is assumed to be constant (as the subject of change), it is possible thanks to the category of substance, the scheme of which is "the constancy of the real in time, that is, the idea of it as the substratum of the empirical determination of time in general, which, therefore, is preserved, while everything else changes" [KRV, B 183].
Consequently, historiography is possible only because of such a form of contemplation as time. In the previous article, the author of these lines, following N. E. Kolosov, also drew attention to the fact that historians ' thinking necessarily takes place in space, which, like time, is an a priori form of contemplation [Koposov, 2001; Zakharov, 2005, p. 11; KRV ]. Further, in the above definition, F. According to Engels, we find another category that creates a synthesis of representations - causality. According to F. According to Engels, the state arises from the need to "keep within the boundaries "of the order" the opposite of classes"; always, when on the territory of the state, it is necessary to keep the "opposite of classes".-
3 " Every concept... it is necessary to think as a representation that is contained in an infinite set of different possible representations (as their common feature), so they are subordinate to it... "[KRV, P. 40]. I. Kant considers the concept as "the unity of a rule", which " defines everything diverse and restricts it to the conditions that make unity possible apperception... the concept in its form is always something general, serving as a rule " [KRV, A 105-106]. He goes on to say that "the idea of a universal condition according to which a manifold can be posited (i.e., in the same way) is called a rule; it is called a law if, according to it, the manifold must be posited" (KRV, A 113).
4 Bertrand Russell observed that "we cannot completely dispense with proper names using only coordinates" and "we cannot dispense with them in any part of history or geography" [Russell, 2000, p. 81]. Here, history is historiography.
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there are classes with conflicting economic interests, and this organization is emerging. Causality is one of the categories [KRV, In 106, 123-124, 183], the scheme of which "is the real, which, whenever it is posited, is always followed by something else."
Let us turn to the ideas of Russian Orientalists about the state. At present, the concept of V. A. Yakobson, which became one of the foundations of the First volume of the History of the East, is greatly influenced [IV, 1997]. It is most clearly formulated in a special paper [Yakobson, 1997 (1)]. The historian believes that " the state, apparently, can be defined as a form of organization of a society, the structure of which, in the course of its natural development, has reached such a degree of complexity that specialists and organizations consisting of such specialists who solve specific tasks are needed to manage the affairs of this society "[Yakobson, 1997(1), p. 6] This conjunction of propositions includes both universal utterance and temporal localization. The object through which the defined concept is revealed is society, or rather, the form of its organization. The defining feature is "organizations that solve specific tasks" in managing the affairs of this society. And the time localization (singular in nature) is set by indicating that this form of organization of society arises in the course of natural development, in other words, the definition contains a reference to the previous state of the object. The emergence of the state is the result of the division of labor and property inequality. Jacobson also gives another definition: "the state is not only a new social structure, but also a new social psychology" [Jacobson, 1997(1), p. 7]. The disintegration of primitive behavioral monorms and their replacement by law are the most important indicator that the state has developed: "It can even be said that the existence of a state it can be stated only if a given society has made a transition from custom to law" [Yakobson, 1997(1), p. 7].
According to K. Popper, a theory should be considered falsified if we accept as true certain statements that contradict it (according to the modus tollens of classical logic) [Popper, 2004, pp. 63, 69-70]. In the constructions of V. A. Yakobson, the "nomes" of Sumer were city-states, which also represent the characteristic features of early antiquity [Yakobson, 1997 (2), p. 23]. But" the first written laws known to us "in history were created during the third dynasty of Ur:" The Laws of Ur-Nammu/Shulgi "(IDV, 1983, p. 274; Yakobson, 1997(3), p. 92). Consequently, there were no states in Mesopotamia before the third Dynasty of Ur. Even if we refer, as V. A. Yakobson does [Yakobson, 1997 (3), p. 92], to the legislative activities of Enmetena and Uruinimgina, the question of the political formations that preceded them remains valid. Therefore, it is already possible to state the internal inconsistency of V. A. Yakobson's concept (if we accept K. Popper's theory of falsification).
Let us continue the characterization of V. A. Yakobson's views. The state " performs organizational, economic, administrative, legislative, and military functions in order to maintain the homeostasis (equilibrium ) of a given society "[Yakobson, 1997(1), p. 8]. Considering the ancient polis, V. A. Yakobson writes: "The ancient polis is so devoid of almost all the generally accepted features of the state (public power and the army separated from the people) that many researchers refuse to recognize it as a state at all or recognize it as such only with great reservations... However, the Greeks themselves, without the slightest doubt, considered the polis the same state as the states of any other peoples, only better arranged. Other peoples did not share the opinion of the superiority of the polis, but the title of state was not denied to it. It follows that, contrary to generally accepted ideas,
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the state is not so much a certain administrative structure, but rather a certain group mentality - a sense of belonging to a civil collective, connected not by tribal, but by political, economic and cultural values" [Yakobson, 1997(1), p.11]. But a few pages later, the orientalist notes that "the very concept of 'state' did not yet exist in the ancient Near East "(Yakobson, 1997 (1), p.14). How it is possible to "not refuse the title of state" without knowing it remains completely incomprehensible .5 In addition, in the above quotation there is a curious preservation of the features of the state according to F. Engels, which, apparently, can be interpreted in the spirit of I. Lakatos: an indication of a unified research program that is common to both Soviet and (some) Russian researchers .6 The reference to the "feeling of belonging to a civil collective" is also problematic: how can one recognize a feeling that does not belong to the historian himself?
Let us analyze the concept of V. A. Yakobson. From his first definition of the state as a "form of organization of society", it follows that the state is a form of society. Consequently, it coincides with it: one cannot assume that society has a different form at the same time. But then two statements in his article are incomprehensible: "So, the state issues laws and ensures their implementation"; "Thus, the state performs organizational, economic, administrative, legislative and military functions in order to maintain the homeostasis of a given society" [Yakobson, 1997(1), p.7, 8]. How can society as a whole make laws? Were the well-known "Laws of Hammurabi" the result of the entire ancient Babylonian society? It also follows from the above that the "form of organization of society" performs a number of functions for this society, which means that V. A. Yakobson hypostases the form, which in itself needs justification. It is also reasonable to ask what this form is expressed in. But from the point of view of V. A. Yakobson, the administrative structure is less important than "a certain group mentality". The question arises as to how such contradictions are possible. The answer to this question is as follows: the term" state "has another meaning in the historian's constructions -" the apparatus/organization of government, or public power separated from the people", which goes back to F. A. Kropotkin. To Engels. Consequently, in the language of historians (and not only them), there is an overlap of many meanings of the term "language games", according to L. Wittgenstein. In the very definition of the state given by V. A. Yakobson quoted above, the term "organization" is used in two different meanings.
But these are not all inconsistencies of V. A. Yakobson's hypothesis. Rightly noting that "another reason for the very early (for a given society) emergence of certain functions of the state or their entire complex, that is, the state itself, may be cultural contacts with more developed societies," the researcher further writes: "It would therefore be appropriate to divide all states into primary ones, that is, those that arose in the first place. only as a result of internal development, and secondary ones, that is, those in which the natural and inevitable process of the emergence of the state was stimulated, and in some cases modified.,
5 The question of whether the Greek polis was a State is very complex. The negative answer is given by M. Berent [2000, p. 235-258].E. M. Shtaerman believes that in ancient Rome, the state was formed only in the Augustan era, and thus the Roman civitas, identified by most ancient historians with the Greek πολις, was not a state [Shtaerman, 1989, p. 76-94].
6 In a posthumously published article by E. A. Grantovsky, he seems to accept the definition of f. Engels, although it does not give a strict definition of the state. But the phrase " the first class societies and states in world history "allows us, on the basis of its similarity with the thesis of the" History of the Ancient East " of 1983, to draw the following conclusion. See: [Grantovsky, 2004, p. 10, 11; IDV, 1983, p.19-23].
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economic and political environment" [Yakobson, 1997(1), p. 8]. How this is consistent with the original definition of a structure that has reached such a degree of complexity "in the course of its natural development" is not very clear. The only way out is to recognize the influence of an external factor as natural as all the others, but then the difference between them is not clear.
The most vulnerable thesis of V. A. Yakobson, which he put forward together with I. M. Diakonov, is the proclamation of ancient society - both the East and antiquity - as civil (or even communal-civil) [Diakonov and Yakobson, 1998, pp. 22-30]. First, since the civil community of antiquity in Egypt was "completely destroyed, which was caused by specific geographical conditions..." [Dyakonov, 1997, p.38-39; Dyakonov and Yakobson, 1998, p. 26-27], ancient Egypt (logically) does not belong to the "ancient society". Even this statement, accepted by its creators, is sufficient to falsify (in the Popperian sense of the word) their theory.
Secondly, even if the terms "Aryavarta", "Madhyadesa" and "Bharatavarta" are presented in the Indian tradition, it does not follow that the Varnovo-caste system of India in any form correlates with civil society and the state, if a "certain group mentality - feeling" is necessary to establish the existence of the latter belonging to a civil collective". Numerous terms denoting various social associations of ancient India and found in the dharmashastras show that the ancient Indians primarily identified themselves with very specific social groups (castes and the like), organized on the principle of "communality" (Samozvantsev, 2001, p. 259 sl.; Samozvantsev, 1999), and not with any other social groups. N. A. M. Samozvantsev also points out that " in essence, the behavior of the ruler-regardless of whether he led a peaceful or aggressive policy - in all cases should have remained the behavior of the head of the community, within the community and within a certain agreement (agreement. - A. Z. ) "[Samozvantsev, 2001, p. 280]. This means that ancient Indian thinkers did not oppose the state to society, moreover, there was no such concept (although the Indians do not have a term for the community as such [Vigasin, Samozvantsev, p.130; Samozvantsev, 2001, p. 262]). In addition, remembering the Varna-caste system, it is necessary to ask the question: which of the varnas and / or castes will be a "civil collective" in relation to the entire society. If all together, then the fundamental differences between varnas and castes from each other should be presented as insignificant, which indologists are unlikely to agree with. If there is only one, then not a single Varna (not to mention castes) can withstand such a test. If each, but separately, then this is comparable to the statement that the Western European feudal society of the Middle Ages was civil.
According to V. A. Yakobson, already quoted above, "the existence of the state can be established only if the transition from custom to law has taken place in this society." At the same time, A. M. Samozvantsev writes that ancient Indian law "did not know the concept of law in the form in which it was formed in the system of European law" [Samozvantsev, 2001, p.280]. If we accept this fact, we should conclude (within the framework of V. A. Yakobson's theory) that there was no state in ancient India. Further, the existence of the concept of law as such in the traditional East is very problematic - and only its presence allows us to talk about citizens. The main collections of" laws": "Laws of Hammurabi", "New Assyrian laws", "Laws of the New Hittite Kingdom" - formulate their provisions in the form of precedents " if..., then...", this is obviously not an abstract ius of the Romans. There is no elaboration of specific legal concepts in them [see, for example: Chrestomatiya..., 1980, p. 151 - 178, 195 - 208, 271 - 291]. Indian shastras are written in the desired slant-
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research institutes are also recommended in nature (this does not mean that they do not tell about reality at all).
The last thing you should pay attention to in the concept of V. A. Yakobson is the completely unclear relationship between the state and civil society. If the former is defined in his concept as a form of organization of society and thus coincides with it, then civil society cannot be opposed to it in any way, because with any definition it will be part of the whole. If it is also synonymous with society as a whole (which is incorrect), then the predicate "civil" looks superfluous. In general, it is possible to talk about citizens only if there is a generally valid right in society - a right that proclaims the formal equality of all people before the law. The existence of such a right is problematic even for Greece and Rome, because it is not without reason that in the classic example of a democratic system in Athens, the Meteks and "δουλος" did not have political rights. Finally, if the recognition of the existence of the state requires "a certain group mentality - a sense of belonging to a civil collective", then it turns out that the state and civil society coincide! The presence of all these contradictions allows us to conclude that the concept of the state of V. A. Yakobson is internally inconsistent. The question of what makes it possible to talk about citizens in the ancient East, I would like to discuss below.
Another concept of the state in the East was proposed by the well-known sinologist L. S. Vasiliev, who drew on the developments of Western anthropologists, primarily E. Service [Service, 1962; 1975]. It is necessary to recall the main idea of the Russian historian: The East and the West represent two different paths of development. They form a dichotomy of two different structures, one of which - the eastern one-is based on power-ownership, redistriction ("centralized redistribution") and the leading role of the state; the second is based on private property and the institutions it has created for one's own existence: democratic governance, civil society, and a system of social psychology focused on the flourishing of the individual's creative abilities [Vasiliev, 1993, p.13, 17]. "The early state is a multi-stage hierarchical structure based on clan and extra-clan ties, familiar with the specialization of industrial and administrative activities... The early state "grows" into the developed one gradually-although not everyone succeeds in this. The fundamental differences between the developed political state structure and the early one are reduced to the appearance of two new institutions - a system of coercion and an institutionalized law, as well as... towards further development of private property relations "[Vasiliev, 1993, pp. 75-76]. The pre-State chiefdom is characterized by the absence of a multi-stage structure. I will immediately note that the "clan and non-clan connections" attribute logically forms "any connections", since all "non-clan" ones will be "different" in relation to the clan ones. A multi-stage political structure implies, according to L. S. Vasiliev, three levels: national, regional and local [Vasiliev, 1993, p.71]. If these are signs of any developed state, then it should be recognized that in history there are often cases of the absence of a state as such (ancient poleis, including Sparta, did not have such a large number of hierarchy levels; in Western Europe, during the era of feudal fragmentation, there was a hierarchy, but the presence of administrative specialization is very doubtful). True, L. S. Vasiliev writes specifically about the formation of the state in the East, and not in general, but then we will have to think about why he characterized the polis as a state [Vasiliev, 1993, p. 17]. In Russian antiquity studies, the identification of a polis and a city is currently considered erroneous [Koshelenko, 1980, pp. 3-28].
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The peculiarities of the political structure of India hardly agree with the theses of L. S. Vasiliev, as well as the societies of early medieval Southeast Asia (Lelyukhin, 1989, 2001; Zakharov, 2005). Specialization of administrative activity implies the existence of officials, but D. N. Lelyukhin showed that the terminology of "Arthashastra" is very vague and does not give grounds for concluding that there is a centralized and bureaucratic apparatus, the existence of which in India of the Mauryan era was postulated by L. S. Vasiliev [Vasiliev, 1993, p. 165 sl.]: "The essence of relations in the state reflected in the KA ("Arthashastra" by Kautilya - A. Z. This seems to be the case: the ruler gives a private person the right to use mines, land, workshops, and collect taxes, and the" employee " for this gives him a part of his income. But such simplicity makes it impossible to have any permanent effective control. The treatise suggests no other means than the use of " secret agents "to ensure the" integrity " of employees. ..the officials that we find in the SC are similar to full-fledged masters in their respective fields of activity, and their positions are similar to "profitable places"... The state apparatus reflected in the CA is by no means centralized and bureaucratic, but rather looks like a rather amorphous conglomerate of" tsarist " servants. Statements about the existence of special "departments" seem unrealistic; the CA lacks information about the hierarchy and staff of officials " [Lelyukhin, 1989, p. 78; Lelyukhin, 2001].
Returning to the analysis of the concept of L. S. Vasiliev, let us compare his statements about specific societies and his theoretical constructions. Here are a few separate statements: "... it is King Hammurabi's Babylonia that can be considered the first developed state in Western Asia in the full sense of the word. We are not talking about centralized effective administration over a large area -this has been the case in the Two Rivers since the time of Sargon of Akkad. The point is different: the Babylonian state was already a complex structure that was later characteristic of all sufficiently developed societies of the traditional East, and not only the East" [Vasiliev, 1993, p. 91-92]. First, L. S. Vasiliev himself is aware of the existence of an" institutionalized law " in Mesopotamia during the third Ur dynasty - the laws of Ur-Nammu (Vasiliev, 1993, p.90). Secondly, he also knows about the existence of a professional army already under Sargon of Akkad [Vasiliev, 1993, p. 88]. The author even notes (only about the times of the third Ur dynasty): "Along with the army, other elements of coercion have already emerged, in particular the court, for the needs of which the Ur-Nammu judicial code was developed" (Vasiliev, 1993, p. 90). Why, then, does the "developed state", as defined above, appear in its concept only in the era of Hammurabi?
In L. S. Vasiliev's description of the state, a special place is occupied by the discussion about the history of the Middle Eastern antiquity of the first millennium BC, marked by the creation of great "world" powers/empires: "The fundamental difference between empires and large states of earlier times was a new quality of the political structure: it not only continued to expand by including various types of tribes and peoples opposed to each other and connected with each other economic and cultural zones, farmers and nomads, but also became more rigid from the point of view of internal administration. Whereas previously the newly conquered territories were usually semi-autonomous, and were governed by their former rulers, who lost their independence and had to pay tribute, now more and more often the new regions were transformed into official-run centers of the province. The population of the empire was largely leveled by mass movements, as was first practiced by the Assyrians. From the point of view of the general dynamics of evolution, the emergence of such empires was also natural in Russia.
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In a sense, it is the highest and final stage of the genesis of a developed political structure..."[Vasiliev, 1993, p. 133-134]. So after all, the state of Hammurabi is "a developed state in the full sense of the word" or not? And was its structure (in which officials of the center were not yet appointed provincial governors) typical for all subsequent states? In addition, we note that the" new quality "of a political structure is defined by the fact that it has become" more rigid", and this is a quantitative definition.
According to L. S. Vasiliev, " the state, represented by the social leaders involved in power, not only performed the functions of the ruling class ("state-class"), but also was the leading element of the basic structure of society"; "it absolutely dominated society, subjugating it" [Vasiliev, 1993, p.223]. What in this case L. S. Vasiliev means by the "basic structure of society" is also unclear. If this is the basis in its Marxist understanding, i.e., the dialectical unity of the productive forces and their corresponding production relations, then it is necessary to prove that there are productive forces that correspond exclusively to the" state " of L. S. Vasiliev's concept. It has already been noted that in the above statements there is a curious overlap of spatial images (and thus concepts) of the state: on the one hand, it is an element of the basis, i.e., the basis on which everything else stands, and thus is thought to be located from below; on the other ,it "dominates society" [Zakharov, 2005, p. 11]. Perhaps the term "basis" (if we strive to develop the constructions of L. S. Vasiliev) is more appropriate to replace the "structure-forming component". The society referred to in the second of the quoted statements by L. S. Vasiliev is a civil society. In fact, we are faced with a confusion of two meanings of the term "society", since the phrase " state... was a leading element of the basic structure of society "refers to the well-known Marxist concept of society as" the sum of connections and relations in which... individuals are close to each other" [Marx and Engels, 1968, p.214]. Thus, we can once again observe the "language games" of historians and their spatial logics.
The thesis that there was a class state in the East is also shared by Yu. I. Semenov [Semenov, 1999, p. 245], but the data from the Ancient Eastern collections of "laws" suggest that a certain part of the land was in the possession of community members who could dispose of it. Thus, in the Laws of Hammurabi, paragraphs 35 to 39 read:: "If a man buys oxen or sheep from the hands of the redum, which the king gave to the redum, [then] he loses his silver. A field, house, or garden belonging to a redum, bairum, or income payer cannot be sold for silver. If a person has bought a field, garden, or house belonging to a redum, bairum, or income payer, [then] his document must be broken, and he loses his silver; he must return the field, garden, or house to its [former] owner. A redum, bairum, or payer of income may not assign to his wife or daughter anything from a field, garden, or house that is part of his ilk, nor may he give it away for his promissory note. From the field, garden and house that he bought and acquired, he can unsubscribe to his wife or daughter, and also give for his debt receipt " (translated by L. A. Lipin and V. A. Yakobson) [Chrestomatiya..., 1980, p. 156 - 157]. Thus, property that was not given by the king (mentioned in the last quoted fragment) and, thus, belongs to the lands of community members (the"person" of the quoted fragments, avilum, is a community member [Yakobson, 1983, p.374]), redum, bairum or an income payer are quite capable of bequeathing and alienating.
There are also private legal documents on the purchase and sale of real estate in the old Babylonian era: "42 sar of a garden planted with date palms, near [the garden] Taribum of Manni, Nushakhtum of his wife, and Ilimaabi of his son, Balmunah
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bought. 5 shekels of silver, the full price of which he weighed out. (List of witnesses, date)" [YOS, VIII, 38; translated by N. V. Kozyreva]; " 1 iku virgin land next to [field] Apil-Amurru, next to the tax field, next to [field] Bitumrabi and Shep-Sena, his brother, virgin land of Sinublam, from Sinublam Apil-I bought Amurra. He paid the full price, 3 shekels of silver. He swore to God Naina, God Shamash, and Rim-Sin, the king, that he would not break the covenant in the future. (List of witnesses, date) " [SVD, 16; translated by A. B. Riftin; Chrestomatiya..., 1980, p. 179, 180] 7 .
In the "Middle Assyrian laws" there is also evidence of the existence of communal lands: "... he can buy with money. Before he buys a field and a house with money, he must make a crier proclaim three times in the city of Assyria within one month. And three times in the village, the field and the house that he buys, he must make them cry out. [Namely] thus:"I buy the field and house of so-and-so, the son of so-and-so on the [communal] lands of this city with money." Those who have rights or claims, let them present their tablets and put them in front of the officials (?), let them challenge, let them clear the property of claims and take [it]. Those who during this month, while there is still time, without delay bring their tablets and place them in front of the officials (?), [that] person will receive satisfaction regarding his field and take [it]. When the herald in Assur announces this, one of the king's councillors, the city scribe, the herald, and the king's officials must be present, and if a field and house are bought in another city, the mayor and three elders must be present. They must make the crier shout, they must write their tablets and hand them over, saying: "During this month, the crier has shouted three times. Those who did not bring their sign during this month, did not put it in front of the officials, lost the right to the field and house. For the one who makes the crier shout, they are pure." Three tablets of the proclamation of the herald, which the judges will write, one... " (translated by V. A. Yakobson) [Chrestomatiya..., 1980, p. 204]. The presence of officials does not mean that we are looking at state-owned land: legal control over the means of production by government structures remains to this day. Rather, we have evidence of communal control over land alienation. In any case, it is clear that the concept of L. S. Vasiliev contains contradictions in itself and hardly agrees with the existing empirical evidence.
How did we review the concepts of V. A. Yakobson and L. S. Vasiliev? Certain particular statements were accepted, and truth values were assigned to them (for one reason or another). These propositions were not necessarily specific to the concepts being analyzed; in this case, one might wonder what makes it possible to connect different statements to each other. I. Kant pointed out that "if the understanding is generally proclaimed to be the ability to establish rules, then the ability of judgment is the ability to bring under the rules, that is, to distinguish whether something is subject to a given rule (casus datae legis) or not" [KRV, B 171]. This is the result of productive imagination. It is unlikely that anyone will claim that history is contemplated by us (in the Kantian sense). What is no longer there can only be imagined (I emphasize that imagination is not the same as fiction). "Imagination is the ability to visually represent an object as well as an object.without its presence in intuition"; but since the object is given synthetically (as the connection of a manifold of intuitions, subsumed under the unity of apperception), it follows that "imagination is the faculty of determining sensibility a priori, and its synthesis of intuitions is in accordance with the category of perception."
7 Sar = 35.28 m2; icu = 3528 m2 ; shekel = 8.4 g.
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goriyam must be a transcendental synthesis of the faculty of imagination "[KRV, B 151-152].
Perhaps some will argue that historians do not imagine. The truth of such a universal statement seems impossible [there are various approaches to the role of imagination in historiography, see: Collingwood, 1980, pp. 229-239; Pro, 2000, pp. 173-193; Kovalchenko, 2003, pp. 267-268]. How do L. S. Vasiliev and V. A. Yakobson (and not only them, including the author of these lines) construct their concepts? They place the manifold, summed up under their chosen concepts, in a certain space-time sphere, which is characterized by both simultaneity and consistency. The evolution of the state in the constructions of L. S. Vasiliev is located in the narrative of the East, which has a temporal dimension. The early state precedes the developed one; some specific states satisfy the first concept, others - the second, and others-remain problematic from the point of view of definition. But since we are talking about the history of the East, these states coexist with each other. For example, in the middle of the first millennium BC, the Achaemenid Empire existed in the Middle East, and early states were formed in India [Vasiliev, 1993, p. 137, 161]. Even if we assume that we can contemplate a state (which seems impossible), how can we contemplate two different geographical regions at the same time?
In addition, in the Russian historiographical tradition, starting with V. V. Struve, ancient Indian societies are referred to as "ancient East" (Struve, 1941, p. 389-425; Avdiev, 1953, p. 567-614; IDV, 1983, p. 18; IV, 1997, p. 389-432), which allows us to apply empirical data on them to theories designed for this phenomenon. And L. S. Vasiliev in his" History of the East " also applies to South-East Asia [Vasiliev, 1993, pp. 415-427]; therefore, the use of empirical materials on this region is also quite justified.
Let us return to the consideration of theories of the state. In 1997, the collective collection "The State in the History of Society (on the problem of criteria for statehood)" was published, where it was proclaimed a universal form of social organization, " different from the clan, tribe, community, etc.", but its criteria were declared controversial (?! What is the universality then) [GIO, 2001, p. 5, 6].The state is also defined as a "special type of social organization" [GIO, p. 5]. Of particular interest is the position of D. N. Lelyukhin, who reviewed the data from ancient Indian sources to address the question of the peculiarities of the political structure of ancient and early medieval India (Lelyukhin, 2001). Some of the results of the indologist's research were given above when analyzing the concept of V. A. Yakobson.
D. N. Lelyukhin proceeds from the fact that the meaning of his work does not consist in arguing that "ancient and early medieval India did not know the 'state' from the point of view of generally accepted ideas about the characteristics and features of this institution." "The formation of a special administrative apparatus (bureaucracy) and administrative-territorial divisions is a much more recent phenomenon and is not... Thus, the absence of such institutions cannot lead to a conclusion about the absence of statehood)" [Lelyukhin, 2001, p. 14]. D. N. Lelyukhin proves in detail that ancient and early medieval India did not know these institutions, and asserts that political formations of the I-V centuries AD, as well as "the" ideal kingdom "of the "Arthashastra", "was built as an association of traditional social organizations that maintain their structure and administration within the framework of the considered kingdoms" [Lelyukhin, 2001, p.15, 9-148]. The latter include communities, community associations, tribes, and similar collectives. The state, according to D. N. Lelyukhin, is a universal form of social organization, one of its types [Lelyukhin, 2001, pp. 104, 147, note 313].
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The following reasoning is very important for the researcher's concept: "To a special extent... the creation of unequal associations based on relations of domination and subordination between different collectives (both territorial and tribal) contributed to the increase in the role of public power. With the emergence of such associations, which were initially very fragile, a new type of relationship emerged between the collectives and their leadership (the winners 'collective - the leadership of the winners' collective - the leadership of the losers 'collective - the losers' collective), in which the key position was occupied by those who exercised public power. ..Since the creation of such associations, we can speak about the first trends in the transformation of public power into an administration, about the formation of the state... [the state was] at this stage a single hierarchical complex of organizations with a common leadership, designed to regulate social relations in society " [Lelyukhin, 2001, p. 108]. The historian once described public power as "recognized".
But D. N. Lelyukhin repeatedly notes that "most ancient kingdoms were characterized by the fragility of their existence, the amorphous nature of their structure", and that "one of the most important features of any Indian "empire" of antiquity and the early Middle Ages, a large trans - regional association, is the short-term nature of their existence" (Lelyukhin, 2001: 110, 112). He also asserts that " the king in KA ("Arthashastra" by Kautilya - A. Z.) and epigraphy is most often a" politician", constantly engaged in forming (i.e., ensuring submission, loyalty, etc.) his" mandala"," group of his supporters", eliminating recalcitrant" traitors and criminals", in the form of a political system. as such, the KA also interprets persons who conceal income that should be transferred to the tsar"; "the tsar, according to the KA's information, should be constantly engaged in ensuring the integrity of the kingdom" [Lelyukhin, 2001, p.113, 43]. Consequently, the power of the king is personal, and it has not yet become an institution independent of the personality of the ruler. The description given by D. N. Lelyukhin also does not allow us to distinguish the head of state from an ordinary leader maneuvering between different groups of a chiefdom or tribe.
With regard to public power, which D. N. Lelyukhin considers as a sign of the state, it should be noted that, according to the researcher himself, it is present "at any level of social integration" [Lelyukhin, 2001, p.107] and thus is a necessary, but not sufficient sign of the existence of the state. The historian does not give any other criteria for the state. If we recall the thesis that the state is a universal form of social organization, then its combination with the judgment about public power gives a truly sensational conclusion: any individual social organization that is characterized by public power is the state. D. N. Lelyukhin's statements can also be used to demonstrate the" opacity "of the historian's language, the existence of"language games" in it. Thus, it has already been said that the king "is constantly engaged in forming (i.e. ensuring submission, loyalty, etc.) his "mandala", but above the researcher emphasized: "Mandala" in KA is the principle on the basis of which the structure of any power, kingdom is formed. This is the unification of the territories of the dominant ruler and his family.allies (the number of them does not matter here), a political, up to a certain level, unified structure (power)... " (emphasis added by D. N. Lelyukhin - A. Z.) [Lelyukhin, 2001, p. 29].
In general, the last fragment is enough to see the" reification " of the idea and thus their confusion: the principle becomes a thing (the unification of territories; what the king is striving for). But it is important to point out that here the principle turns out to be both a structure to which objective being is attributed, and a structure to which objective existence is attributed.
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it does not remain only the guiding idea by which certain relations between individuals are conceived (whether by the authors of the Arthashastra and the inscriptions and/or by their modern interpreters). In other words, words and things are implicitly assumed to be identical. The state of D. N. Lelyukhin's concept, in the light of all the above, turns out to be synonymous with "civilization" from the scheme of F. V. Lelyukhin. Engels, as it is a universal form of not only political, but also social organization. But this is vulnerable logically, since there is no clear formulation of the characteristics/criteria of the state, and in fact, since the work of D. N. Lelyukhin himself shows that the ancient and early medieval kingdoms of India were thought of as "households", associations of traditional organizations, primarily of the communal type.
In 2000, a group of researchers published the book "Alternative Paths to Civilization" [APC, 2000], one of the central ideas of which was the rejection of the theory of political evolution by E. Service "local group - community - chiefdom - state". According to A. V. Korotayev and his colleagues, the chiefdom is not necessarily replaced by the state: These can be tribes, "multipolitism", "inter-political communication networks" , etc. [Korotaev, Kradin, Lyn'sha, p. 24-83]. De facto, the State is seen only as one of the various evolutionary alternatives. However, the article in this collection, which analyzes alternatives to social evolution and most consistently carries out the idea cited above, completely lacks a strict definition of the state [Korotaev, Kradin, Lyn'sha, p. 24-83]. However, in another article by one of the authors, published in the same collection, a well-known set of F is accepted as differentiating features. Engels: "the presence of a regular, formal administrative apparatus, artificial territorial division, or a regular system of taxation" [Korotaev, 2000, pp. 265-266].
Why, despite all the empirical and theoretical difficulties, do historians try to define the concept of the state and use the concept of civil society in relation to the ancient East? The answer to this question can probably be found in the following way: the conflict between the logic of necessary and sufficient conditions and the logic of the prototype (type, ideal type) in the classification of phenomena. N. E. Koposov considered the theory of classification and the theory of names in sufficient detail [Koposov, 2001, pp. 88-128], which allows us to focus only on those subjects that are relevant to the problems of the traditional East. Any definition of a state is a universal statement that represents a combination of a number of statements that are signs/attributes of the phenomenon to be defined. It is therefore given based on the logic of necessary and sufficient conditions. But then it turns out that empirically we call (this already applies to the theory of names) states are those phenomena that do not possess these attributes (recall that in the concept of D. N. Lelyukhin, the state is both a "universal form of social organization" and its type). In order to "save phenomena", one could adopt the prototype theory, but it is extremely doubtful from a scientific point of view [Koposov, 2001, pp. 97 - 102]. It seems to me that this problem can be solved using the mathematical logic of B. Russell. The class must be defined intensively: it is set as a condition a common feature that all members of the class must meet [Russell, 1903, Chapter 6, Sec. 71; cit. by: Kassirer, 2002, vol. 3, p. 240]. This approach was used to discuss the political organization of early medieval societies in Southeast Asia (Zakharov, 2005). Taking any definition of a class (state in this case), we can find out whether a particular phenomenon belongs to it. Thus, it is better not to proceed from the software volume-
page 18
Instead, it consists of the content that is pre-embedded in the object being studied. The difference from the ordinary formation of concepts will then be a conscious synthesis, which is why it is possible to call such selected definitions "working hypotheses". And this will not be the logic of the prototype, because if the phenomenon does not correspond to the concept, we refuse to bring it under this concept.
It is necessary to focus briefly on one more question: about civil society and citizens in ancient times. These concepts are applied to the studied phenomena of antiquity clearly according to the logic of the prototype: citizens are characterized by equality before the law (formal), and community members, according to I. M. Diakonov and V. A. Yakobson, were full-fledged [Diakonov and Yakobson, 1998, p. 23, 25]. However, full rights and equal rights are not isomorphic concepts. Consequently, the transfer of a specific common name-a citizen-is carried out transitively.
Completing the work, you can draw the following conclusions. Historiography is possible only because of such forms of intuition as space and time, and such categories of the understanding as causality. Their connection is made by productive imagination. Despite the rejection of the Marxist concept of the state by many scientists, the features of it, highlighted by F. Engels, continue to be used as a tool of cognition. At the same time, the analyzed concepts contain serious internal contradictions and sometimes do not agree with the data that are intended to explain. The presence of" language games " of historians requires clarification of the terms used, if we strive for scientific historiography. As a practical recommendation, you can suggest working with any theory, provided that its provisions are clearly defined. The fact that the material can be consistent with more than one hypothesis is not surprising. But if there is no reason to choose from some hypotheses one that is more convincing, then the most useful is the falsification of others - those that cannot be used in relation to this empiricism.
Our article itself was possible thanks to time and space as a priori forms of intuition, because we were talking about recently formulated concepts that were compared with the earlier theory of F. Schulz. Engels and were placed in the context of the Soviet and Russian historiographical tradition. No less important is the fact that the problems of the state were discussed in the "traditional East" -the conventional designation (deictic act) of space-time phenomena. Since it was pointed out that some authors retain the characteristics of the state according to F. However, if the authors do not agree with Engels, but sometimes develop their own concept, then it can be argued that in the empirical study of these approaches, the category of change "worked". The object of the study was the ideas about the state, primarily of Soviet and Russian Orientalists, as well as the theory of the State theory of the Russian State theory. Engels, adopted in the Soviet historiographical tradition. By placing them at various spatio-temporal points, we act thanks to the productive faculty of imagination, which in this case is a priori (as an ability), but the result of its activity is not arbitrary, since each of the phenomena studied is given empirically and is subject to a priori forms of intuition.
list of literature
Avdiev V. I. Istoriya drevnogo Vostoka [History of the Ancient East]. 2nd ed., reprint. Moscow, 1953.
Berent M. Bezgostatstvennyy polis: rannee gosudarstvo i drevnegrecheskoe obshchestvo [The Stateless Polis: the Early State and Ancient Greek Society]. 2000.
Vasiliev L. S. Istoriya Vostoka [History of the East]. Vol. 1. Moscow, 1993.
Vigasin A. A., Samozvantsev A.M. "Arthashastra" (problems of social structure and law). Moscow, 1984.
Gegel G. V. F. Lectures on the philosophy of history. Translated by A. M. Voden. St. Petersburg, 2000 [1837].
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Grantovsky E. A. State and society in the countries of the ancient East // A state in the ancient East. Collection of articles, Moscow, 2004.
Danto A. Analytical philosophy of history. Translated from English by A. L. Nikiforov and O. V. Gavrishina, Moscow, 2002 [1965].
Dyakonov I. M. The emergence of agriculture, cattle breeding and crafts. General features of the first period of the history of the ancient world and the problem of development paths // IV. 1997.
Dyakonov I. M., Yakobson V. A. Grazhdanskoe obshchestvo v drevnosti [Civil Society in ancient times]. 1998. N 1.
Zakharov A. O. Problema politicheskoi organizatsii ostrovykh obshchestv Yugo-Vostochnoy Azii v rannem srednevekovye (V-VII vv.) [The problem of political organization of island societies in Southeast Asia in the Early Middle Ages (V-VII centuries)]. 2005. N 1.
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Kolosov N. E. On the impossibility of microhistory. Individual and unique in history-2000. Moscow, 2000.
Kolosov N. E. How historians think. Moscow, 2001.
Korotaev A.V. Tribe as a form of socio-political organization of complex non-primitive societies (mainly based on the materials of North-Eastern Yemen). 2000.
Korotaev A.V., Kradin N. N., Lyn'sha V. A. Alternatives to social evolution (introductory remarks). 2000.
Koshelenko G. A. Polis i gorod (k postanovke problemy) [The Policy and the City (to the problem statement)]. 1980. N 1.
Lelyukhin D. N. Some features of the structure of the ancient Indian state according to the" Arthashastra " of Kautilya // Bulletin of the Moscow University. Episode 8. History. 1989. N 2.
Lelyukhin D. N. Gosudarstvo i administratsiya v "Arthashastra" Kautil'i [State and Administration in the "Arthashastra" of Kautil'i]. 2000.
Lelyukhin D. N. The concept of an ideal kingdom in the" Arthashastra " of Kautilya and the problem of the structure of the Ancient Indian state. 2001.
Marx K., Engels F. Sochineniya [Works], Moscow, 1968, Vol. 46, Part I.
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Samozvantsev A.M. Problemy organizatsii indiskogo obshchestva v kontse I thys. B.C. - pervykh vekakh AD [Problems of organization of Indian society at the end of the first millennium BC-the first centuries AD]. 1999. N 2 - 3.
Samozvantsev A.M. Socio-legal organization of Indian society at the end of the first millennium BC-the first half of the first millennium AD. 2001.
Semenov, Y. I. Philosophy of history from the origins to the present day: the main problems and concepts. M., 1999.
Struve V. V. Istoriya drevnego Vostoka [History of the Ancient East], Moscow, 1941.
A textbook on the history of the ancient East. Ch. I. M., 1980.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
APC-Alternative Ways to Civilization, Moscow, 2000.
VDI-Vestnik drevnoi istorii [Bulletin of Ancient History].
GMO - The State in the history of society (on the problem of criteria of statehood). 2nd ed., ispr. and dop. M., 2001 [1997].
IV-Istoriya Vostoka [History of the East]. V. A. Yakobson, Moscow, 1997.
IDV-History of the Ancient East. The origin of the oldest class societies and the first centers of slave-owning civilization. Part I. Mesopotamia. Edited by I. M. Diakonov, Moscow, 1983.
SVD-Riftin A. P. Old Babylonian legal and administrative documents in the collections of the USSR. Edited by V. V. Struve, L., 1937.
KRV - Kant I. Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 1 Aufl. Riga, 1781. 2 Aufl. 1787.
YOS - Yale Oriental Series. Babylonian Texts. Vol. VIII. Faust D. E. Contracts from Larsa. Dated in the Reign of Rim-Sin. New Haven, 1941.
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