INDONESIAN INTELLIGENCE1

During the entire period of the "new order" regime in Indonesia, which took shape in 1965 - 1968, ensuring internal and external national security was the exclusive prerogative of the military and intelligence establishment, directly subordinate to President Suharto. Its original core

1 Zulkifli Lubis, who gained his first experience in this field as a Japanese military intelligence officer during the occupation, was one of the founders of the Indonesian special services. After the declaration of independence of the republic, he initiated the creation of the State Secret Directorate of Warfare, the prototype of the national Security and Intelligence Service. In 1952, it was transformed into the Information Bureau of the Armed Forces Headquarters (BISAP). In the future, the paths of Z. Lubis and the then President of Indonesia Sukarno diverged diametrically. The first turned out to be in the ranks of anti-government rebels, surrendered to the authorities after their defeat, and was imprisoned. He was released in 1966 after Suharto came to power. After unsuccessful attempts to return to the special agencies, he retired from active work.

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It was formed on the basis of a narrow group of senior officers who served under Suharto in the Central Java military district "Diponegoro", in the command for the liberation of Western Irian and the strategic reserve of the ground forces (KOSTRAD). This group included Yoga Sugomo, Ali Murtopo, Leonardus Benjamin (Benny) Murdani, and other less prominent figures. The members of this group maintained relations with Suharto mainly on an individual basis. But they all shared similar points of view on key national security issues and showed a willingness to work together in critical situations at the initial stage. Suharto owed much to their advancement in the military hierarchy and rise to power. In particular, there is an opinion that Yoga Sugomo, who headed the KOSTRAD intelligence service, was the figure who planned and implemented the defeat of the "September 30, 1965 movement" [Memori..., 1990, hal. 19].

Three days after the events of September 30, 1965, Major General Suharto created the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (KOPKAMTIB), which lasted for more than 30 years. Under the de facto state of emergency, it became the main punitive body for suppressing the Communist Party and other leftist forces, a kind of state secret police. It included the commanders of all military districts and a network of local informants at their disposal. In the command structure, a special intelligence department was formed, which was entrusted with the task of identifying and arresting Communists who had gone underground and sympathized with them.

In parallel, in August 1966, after eliminating the previously existing Central Intelligence Bureau of Indonesia, Suharto created the State Intelligence Command (KIN), also subordinate to him personally. The function of the new body was determined to ensure the internal and international security of the "new order" regime, including its socio-political aspects. Suharto appointed Major General Sudirgo, the chief of the military police, as his deputy in the KIN, who supported him during the events of September 30, 1965. Brigadier General Yoga Sugomo became the Chief of Staff of the KIN, and Lieutenant Colonel Ali Murtopo became the head of the foreign Intelligence department. B. Murdani also started working under his direct supervision.

As the leading intelligence agency of the New Order, KIN did not last long. Already in May 1966, Suharto liquidated it and created the State Directorate for Intelligence Coordination (Baku). General Sudirgo was again assigned to lead it. All former heads of KIN divisions retained their posts in the new department. As before, the upper echelon of management consisted of active-duty army officers. However, there was a sufficient number of civilians at the middle level, and Baku was positioned as a civilian structure. This gave him the opportunity to establish contacts with related services of "friendly states". According to an unwritten rule adopted by the international intelligence community, only civilian, not military, intelligence agencies have the right to establish contacts with foreign colleagues. A group of international relations was established in Baku immediately.

The first related organization of the "friendly country" turned out to be the US CIA, relations with which began to be built on the basis of mutual interest. BAKU was in dire need of financial support, modern technical means and familiarization with the rich experience of conducting covert operations accumulated by the Americans. For the CIA, cooperation with Indonesian intelligence was of interest from a geopolitical point of view - as an ally in preventing the spread of communism to the island part of Southeast Asia. In addition, the CIA had access to a thorough survey of samples of Soviet military equipment, in abundance-

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lii supplied to Indonesia under President Sukarno. Beginning in 1967, CIA officers operating under the" roof " of the US Consulate General in Surabaya began to study the SA-2 anti-aircraft missile used to shoot down American aircraft in Vietnam, submarines and warships, and the Soviet-made Tu-16 bomber [Conboy, 2004, p. 63].

Meanwhile, radical internal personnel changes have taken place in Baku. In November 1968, Suharto removed Sudirgo from the management of the department. He and several other generals were sent to prison on charges of sympathizing with Sukarno. In March of the following year, Major General Sutopo Yuwono, who had served in various intelligence agencies in the country since Indonesia's independence struggle, was appointed Baku's new chief. A special unit for conducting intelligence operations (SATSUS INTEL) is being formed, in the further formation of which the CIA played a major role. In addition to replenishing its budget, assistance was provided in the form of staff training. In particular, among others, CIA veteran and experienced intelligence officer Richard Fortin was sent to Jakarta as an instructor. Its functions included training employees of the new BAKU division in the methods of covert surveillance of operational development objects and their movement, as well as recruiting agents.

The Americans were not the only sponsors of the formation of SATSUS INTEL. The British secret service MI6 also had a hand. Its instructors trained Indonesian army officers who were being trained for overseas work as military attaches. The Israeli intelligence service Mossad, whose instructors periodically visited the headquarters of Baku, did not stand aside. However, since Indonesia did not maintain official relations with the Jewish state, contacts with the Mossad were surrounded by a triple veil of secrecy.

At the end of 1969 SATSUS INTEL started practical work. Its main object was the representative offices of the USSR and other socialist countries. Personal dossiers were compiled on all employees of the embassy and other Soviet organizations. This was due to the fears of the new order authorities that after Indonesia broke off relations with the PRC, which maintained the closest contacts with the Communist Party, the Soviet Union would try to fill the political and ideological vacuum that had arisen. The diplomatic missions of North Vietnam and North Korea were also not overlooked [Conboy, 2004, p. 62-63].

After another reorganization in 1970, a new division was created in BAKU-the Special Operations Directorate (OPSUS). It was headed by Brigadier General Ali Murtopo, who was by that time Suharto's personal adviser on socio-political issues. The scope of activities of the created structure was very extensive: from ensuring a favorable outcome for Jakarta of the plebiscite in West Irian to staging the farce of the general elections in Indonesia in 1971, in which, of course, the pro-government Golkar party won a crushing victory.

OPSUS paid close attention to the development of the situation in Indochina. So, when the Lon Nol regime that came to power in Cambodia turned to the ASEAN countries for help, a special mission was sent to Phnom Penh, consisting mainly of OPSU officers. She returned with the disappointing report that Lon Nol would not be able to stand for long and that it would be pointless to support him. Nevertheless, Ali Murtopo ordered the secret transfer of several hundred AK-47 assault rifles that were still in service with the Indonesian army to Phnom Penh [Conboy, 2004, p. 77].

In October 1973, Baku underwent another structural reorganization. General Sutopo Yuwono remained in the same capacity. But the management structure has been revised. Six main divisions were created. Directorate-I was assigned the task of conducting domestic intelligence, and Directorate-II was assigned the task of conducting domestic intelligence.

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State security, Directorate-III became responsible for special operations, Directorate-IV took over foreign intelligence, Directorate-V provided secret intelligence operations, including counterintelligence, and finally Directorate-VI took over internal administrative matters. The functions of a number of directorates intersected and overlapped with each other. Ali Murtopo had to agree to reassign his department and even put the OPSUS intelligence network in Asian countries at the disposal of Directorate-III. Nevertheless, the general managed to defend the autonomy of his unit and its leading role in the internal affairs of the political life of the state.

The reorganization of Baku took place against the backdrop of growing rivalry and tension in the top generals. One camp was led by Ali Murtopo, the other by General Sumitro, deputy commander of KOPKAMTIB. BAQIN mostly liked Sumitro. On his side were the chief of the department Sutopo Yuwono and his first deputy Niklani Sudarjo. They were annoyed by the quarrelsome, arrogant demeanor of the OPSUS chief, his unwillingness to obey orders from above. On Niklani's instructions, listening devices were installed at the OPSU headquarters in order to collect compromising material.

At the beginning of 1974, the struggle in the general leadership spilled out on the streets of Jakarta and a number of other major cities in Indonesia. Both Ali Murtopo and Sumitro tried to attract the capital's students to their side. BAKU Chief Sutopo Yuwono also began to establish contacts with student leaders, in particular, he established contacts with Tawfiq Kemas, the future spouse of President Megawati Sukarnoputri. The sympathies of the students were clearly on the side of Sumitro, who was not devoid of oratorical talents and the ability to easily make contact. Among the main demands of the demonstrators, which were socio-economic in nature, was the elimination of KOPKAMTIB and the unconstitutional Institute of Personal Advisers (ASPRI) Suharto, in which Ali Murtopo played a leading role. Demonstrations were also directed against the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka to Indonesia and Tokyo's "economic imperialism". In Jakarta, a number of representative offices of Japanese companies and banks were destroyed. However, two days later, the protests, dubbed the "January 15 disaster" in official propaganda, were suppressed.

Seriously alarmed, Suharto immediately called to account the perpetrators who, in order to please their personal ambitions, allowed mass street demonstrations that are extremely dangerous for the"new order". The head of Sutopo Juwono, who was sent to an honorary exile as ambassador to the Netherlands, was the first to "fly". Sumitro lost his post in KOPKAMTIB, repented of his sins, asked to resign, but politely declined the president's offer to go as ambassador to one of the Western European countries. The sunset of Ali Murtopo's star began. He was forced to eliminate the autonomous status of the OPSU and completely merge his brainchild into the structure of Baku, focusing mainly on issues of public opinion formation. At the same time, among the generals there were also those who received significant dividends from the January events. Major General Yogi Sugomo's career began to rise sharply again. He was recalled from the post of Deputy Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the UN and appointed the new, third chief of Baku.

On the foreign policy front, after the successful conclusion of the confrontation with Malaysia, the first major regional action was Baku's participation in mediation services to resolve the Malaysian-Philippine territorial dispute over Sabah. Jakarta's diplomacy has sought to reconcile its antagonistic neighbors, believing that their prolonged conflict threatens the first ASEAN summit, which Indonesia has pinned high hopes on as it seeks to regain its position as a regional leader. BAKIN was entrusted with contacts with the official representatives of Kuala Lumpur and Manila, as well as the establishment of cooperation between the two countries.

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relations with the leaders of the South Philippine Muslim rebels. During the contacts that began in January 1975, it was agreed to hold a meeting between President Suharto and Nur Misuari, the leader of the Moro National Liberation Front, with the aim of resuming the inter-Philippine dialogue and then resolving the Sabah problem. The beginning seemed promising, but because of the tough stance taken by the then President of the Philippines, F. Marcos, the Indonesian efforts were not destined to be crowned with success. Yogi Sugomo was sent back to Manila in early 1976. Although negotiations on the Philippine South failed to produce results, Marcos was persuaded to show understanding of the concepts presented by Jakarta's diplomacy at the first ASEAN Summit. This made it possible to solve the main task-to successfully hold the Bali summit in February 1976.

Next in Baku's spotlight was East Timor , a Portuguese colony whose fate began to change dramatically after the "carnation revolution" in the metropolis in April 1974. Ali Murtopo was tasked with developing Indonesia's approach to addressing the issue of decolonization of the Territory. On his instructions, Colonel A. Sugianto was sent there to collect information about local political parties and their leaders. At the same time, a Komodo special forces unit was deployed to Kupang, the capital of the Indonesian part of Timor, to conduct a strategic reconnaissance operation. An anonymous radio station was broadcast, calling on the people of East Timor to integrate with Indonesia. At the beginning of 1975, the diplomatic talent of General Ali Murtopo was again in demand. He made a number of unofficial shuttle trips to Lisbon and the capitals of several other Western European countries. By that time, there was still no consensus among the Portuguese leadership on the future status of the colony. One part of it was sympathetic to Jakarta and even allowed its control over East Timor to be established, while the other part was in favor of the colony's independence after the necessary preparatory period was completed.

Ali Murtopo initially opposed outright armed annexation and insisted on continuing clandestine operations to win the East Timorese over to Indonesia in favor of reaching an agreement with Portugal. Suharto was also inclined to this point of view out of fear of a negative reaction from the United States and Australia [Urlyapov I. V., Urlyapov V. F., 2005, pp. 64-65]. However, the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and Security, including B. Murdani, later supported the plan of open intervention. Military intelligence has set up a military training camp for members of pro-Indonesian parties on the East Timor border. In mid-August 1975, the Jakarta-based Democratic Union of Timor (UDT) party attempted to seize power in Dili, the capital of East Timor. Within a month, the mutiny was crushed, and the scattered remnants of the UDT retreated to West Timor under the protection of the Indonesian army.

While events on the island were taking an increasingly dramatic turn, Baku conducted an important operation on its own territory. He managed to gain access to secret documents delivered to Dili by the emissary of Lisbon, Major António Soares. They indicated that Portugal had decided to withdraw itself from participating in East Timor affairs; in particular, among the documents was a directive to the military governor of the colony to evacuate the garrison to the nearby island of Ataura [Conboy, 2004, p. 94].

Portugal's position gave Jakarta a free hand, and it took decisive action. At the end of August 1975, the first open intervention of Indonesian troops took place, landing troops in Dili to evacuate employees of the Indonesian consulate, and in early December, an open military intervention began. After that, the role of Baku on the island was reduced to a minimum, giving way to the monopoly activity of military intelligence.

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At that time, the main focus of cooperation between Baku and the CIA was the training of Indonesian personnel in anti-terrorist operations techniques. According to American instructors, the Indonesians were the most capable among all other foreign cadets. The only hitch was the use of an Israeli Uzi submachine gun. In political terms, there was a danger of publicizing the use of Israeli-made weapons. The CIA helped to get out of this situation by setting up the supply of a similar type of weapon, but with the US marking [Conboy, 2004, p. 128].

In March 1978, another change of top management took place in Baku. Ali Murtopo, who lost his position as a favorite in the president's inner circle, was sent to the civilian post of Information minister. His office was taken over by a long - time rival, Major General B. Murdani, who took on a comprehensive strengthening of military intelligence, including the personnel of KOPKAMTIB, weakened after Sumitro's removal, as well as the involvement of ground forces officers and civilian specialists.2
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Indonesian security services paid special attention to local Islamic fundamentalists, who raised their heads after the victory of the Iranian revolution and the intensification of international activities of some radical Arab regimes.

In March 1981, members of Imron Zeynal's Islamist group, which had ties to the Middle East, hijacked and hijacked a domestic flight of the Indonesian airline Garuda to Thailand. The hijackers demanded the release of their associates who had been arrested shortly before, payment of $ 1.5 million in cash and unhindered flight abroad, presumably to Libya. Immediately, Baku Yoga chef Sugomo flew to Bangkok. However, it was B. Murdani who quickly put together a capture group from the army special forces, which under his leadership successfully freed the plane and hostages. On the occasion of the successful completion of the operation, Yoga Sugomo received a congratulatory telegram from CIA Director Wu. Casey. However, what was left out of the brackets was that during the operation, for every non-professional hijacker, there was an Indonesian general who came in, except for B. Murdani, at a safe distance, and during the exchange of fire there were significant victims, including members of the plane's crew (in Indonesian Muslim circles, there was an opinion that the hijacking of the plane was a provocation provoked by [Ali Moertopo..., 2003].

Two months later, B. Murdani carried out another reorganization of Baku. The number of directorates was reduced from seven to four, and the functions of Directorate-IV (processing public opinion) were completely transferred to the hands of military intelligence. This allowed Murdani to raise the status and expand the functional tasks of the special services of the armed forces and transform them from the Strategic Intelligence Center to the Strategic Intelligence Directorate( BAIS), to which a significant share of the prerogatives of KOPKAMTIB passed. The BAIS, which has become the main link in the structure of the special services, also began to control the military attaches at Indonesian embassies abroad.

While the military intelligence was gaining strength, Baku tried to hold on to the conquered bridgehead. The only success that accompanied him was the foreign one

2 By that time, the special services had literally penetrated state structures. The Foreign Ministry is no exception in this regard. A good example was the career of Brigadier General Yono Hatmodjo, who was a relative of the "first lady" of the country. Having served under Suharto's command in the early 1960s, he was then sent to Tokyo as a military attache. After returning to his homeland, the general became a representative of the OPSUS in the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, and then a resident of the OPSUS under the" roof " of the Indonesian Embassy in Japan. In 1975-1980. Yono headed the Directorate-IV BAKU, and later served as head of the Directorates of Security and Socio-Cultural Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia. In 1984, he headed the Indonesian Embassy in Yugoslavia (Jenkins, 1984, p. 26).

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activities, especially in the Middle East. Using Israeli-trained cadres, BAKIN opened stations in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey with the right to recruit local agents.

In East Timor, intelligence operations were fully controlled by BAIS. Military intelligence has also completely monopolized control over events in West Irian and Aceh.

In June 1989, Yogi Sugomo was replaced by Major General Sudibyo, who had extensive experience in military intelligence, including BAIS. However, the latter circumstance also had a negative side. His appointment of a group of army officers to senior positions in Baku caused dissatisfaction among the civilian staff of the department. The retirement of 64-year-old Yogi Sugomo was arranged as a consequence of a natural generational shift. However, this only partially explained Suharto's motives for pouring fresh blood into Baku.

By all indications, Yoga was the central figure in a group of generals who opposed the hasty normalization of relations with the PRC. General Subiyakto, head of the National Defense Institute (LEMHANAS), a think tank of the armed forces, spoke openly on its behalf and called for a review of the February 1989 decision to "unfreeze" relations with China. The reason was the opinion that after the well-known events in Beijing's Tiananmen Square, leaders who considered Southeast Asia a zone of exclusive Chinese influence were established in the Chinese leadership. Thus, the position of Yogi Sugomo himself was voiced, whose entire professional career was marked by the struggle against the internal and external "communist threat", especially from"red China". After retiring, the general remained true to the previous point of view. Speaking in October of the same year at a seminar on the prospects of Indonesian-Chinese relations, he again urged not to rush to restore official contacts with Beijing [Contemporary..., 1990, p. 241]. In his memoirs, Yogi Sugomo compared himself to a traditional Javanese shadow theater puppet, wayang, which the dalang puppeteer puts in a box at the end of the performance along with other characters who played the role [Soedibjo..., 1989, p. 5].

With the end of the Cold War, the CIA's interest in continuing cooperation with Baku significantly declined. The number of American instructors who trained Indonesians in counter-espionage techniques gradually began to decline and by 1997 had completely disappeared. Contacts with MI6 became sporadic, and training of local personnel was mostly theoretical.

Throughout the years of Baku's existence, one of the most important areas of his foreign activities included monitoring Indonesian citizens who found themselves in long-term emigration after the new order came to power. Naturally, the main concern was caused by quite numerous communist and left-wing nationalist groups scattered across European countries. BAKIN sought to build a picture of the impact of the communist ideology crisis on Indonesian leftist emigration. Thus, in February 1990, under the pretext of participating in an international conference on detente, one of the deputy heads of Baku, who had known the Soviet capital since the early 1970s, when he was a military attache at the Indonesian Embassy, visited Moscow. Meeting with representatives of the" Moscow faction " of the CPI, he was interested in the question of whether perestroika in the USSR prompted the leaders of the faction to abandon the installation of violent methods of political struggle.

At the beginning of 1990, Baku had five independent operational divisions (OP): OP-1 - special operations, OP-2-intelligence gathering through technical means similar to the US National Security Agency, OP-3-administrative functions, OP-4-training, training and retraining of personnel, OP-5 - documentation division.

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In April 1996, another change of leadership took place in the leadership of Baku. Lieutenant General Sudibyo, after seven years of service at the head of the department, relinquished command to Lieutenant General Mutojib. Suharto found this choice odd. After graduating from the military academy in 1962, Mutojib slowly rose through the ranks, mostly in administrative positions and not previously involved in intelligence. Apparently, the lack of obvious ambitions and close ties to the intelligence community determined the choice of an aging, increasingly suspicious Suharto.

In 1993, B. Murdani, who was the commander of the armed forces and at the same time the chief of KOPKAMTIB in 1983-88, was dismissed from the post of Minister of Defense and Security. The general was so strong that he had the courage to openly criticize the unbridled appetites of the members of the" first family " in the field of business. In order to undermine the general's influence in the intelligence community, Suharto cut the functions and staff of the Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS), which was renamed the Armed Forces Intelligence Agency (BIA) in 1994.

As a result of constant personnel and organizational upheavals, by May 1998, when Suharto was forced to leave the presidency, the Indonesian security services were completely disoriented and could not play a significant role in the final act of the "new order".

The technocrat who succeeded Suharto, Habibi, did not fit the Javanese stereotype of a wise ruler. Unexpectedly taking the presidency, he had no authority in the eyes of the population, did not find the support of the generals and the ruling Golkar party. In October 1998, Habibi appointed retired Lieutenant General Zaini Azhar Maulani, Secretary General of the Ministry of Transmigration, to the post of head of Baku. Zaini enjoyed the confidence of the new Indonesian president, having previously been his personal secretary. Adhering to orthodox Muslim views, Zaini began by firing a number of senior Christian officers from Baku and ruining relations with the CIA. However, the general's career ended in October 1999, when Abdurrahman Wahid was elected President of the republic. This was the final act of the "new order", and a completely new page opened in the history of the Indonesian special services.

With the coming to power of A. Wahida chief of Baku was appointed Lieutenant General Ari Kumaata, a native of North Sulawesi, a Catholic by religion. Such a choice was seen as a slap in the face of the new president to the top generals, who are mostly Javanese by nationality and Muslim by religious affiliation. This was followed by the extraordinary proposal of A. Vahid to create a State Intelligence Institute (LIN) under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense and Security. He was supposed to hand over the entire apparatus of military attaches to Indonesian diplomatic missions. By that time, the BIA was disbanded and again became known as BAIS. At this stage, the intelligence services rapidly became so degraded that many of their units turned into independent commercial enterprises. The President even considered creating his own state security service (Conboy, 2004, p. 204).

In early 2001. Ari Kumaat presented to the head of state a plan for the reorganization of Baku. According to it, the I, II and III directorates of the office were assigned to oversee foreign intelligence, internal security and analytical support, respectively. The fourth Directorate was aimed, as in the time of Ali Murtopo, at processing public opinion, including Muslim circles, the media, and students. BAKU changed its name and became known as the State Intelligence Directorate (BIN). Demonstrating a break with the "new order", from now on a civilian became the first deputy head of the department. They were appointed As'at Said, an employee of Baku, who had worked for a long time in the Middle East. Another step in the ongoing process of democratization in the country was the elimination of Governance

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National Stability Coordination (BACOSTRANAS), a punitive body created in 1988 to replace COPCAMTIB.

The assessment of internal and external threats to Indonesia's national security has been revised. The intelligence community agreed with the Parliament that the main threat was coming from outside, coming from the United States and Australia. These powers chose the course of weakening and disintegrating Indonesia according to the Yugoslav scenario. This was openly stated in October 2000 by the Minister of Defense and Security, Mahfoud, who represented the civil administration [Ingo, 2000].

In July 2001, Wahid was impeached by Parliament and ceded the presidency to Megawati Sukarnoputri. The military establishment took revenge for the lost positions, which affected the composition of the new government. Lieutenant General Susilo Bambang Yudoyono became Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Lieutenant General Hari Sabarno was appointed Minister of the Interior, and Lieutenant General Abdullah Mahmoud Hendropriyono became head of the BIN, a post comparable to that of National Security Assistant in the US Administration. In 1993, the 48-year-old general became the youngest commander of the military district, and the capital, which has the most important strategic importance. But the following year, the charismatic general, who enjoyed the sympathy of nationalist circles, was sent to Bandung to head the command and staff college of the armed forces.

The new Chief BIN was one of a group of political generals who became part of Indonesia's civilian-military elite that came to power, with the armed forces playing a prominent role in determining the state's course. On this basis, he had conflicts with representatives of another group of generals (mandiri), who called for concentrating on solving army problems and ensuring national security by their own forces. However, both groups agreed on the ineffectiveness of the civilian government and the need to maintain the leading role of the armed forces in preserving the " united and indivisible unitary Republic of Indonesia."

The events of September 11, 2001 in the United States led to a sharp expansion of BIN's contacts with the CIA and the Australian SAS intelligence service in terms of training its employees to work in the anti-terrorist field. In October 2001, Hendropriyono agreed with Washington and Singapore's claim that Indonesia had become a nest of an international terrorist network led by al-Qaeda. The U.S. proposal to send counterterrorism personnel to Indonesia has strained Chief BIN's relations with the Mandiri group, which strongly opposed foreign interference in the country's internal affairs. In her eyes, Hendropriono began to look distinctly pro-American. These views were reinforced by a visit to Jakarta in March 2002 by FBI Director Robert Miller [Tapol Bulletin, 2002, p. 9-10].

A. M. Hendropriyono's tenure as a senior member of the BIN coincided with a sharp increase in the terrorist activities of local radical Islamists, who had extensive contacts with like-minded people abroad. On September 12, 2002, the Bali bombings killed 202 people, including 167 foreign nationals. Explosive devices were then detonated in the lobby of the capital's Marriott Hotel (August 5, 2003) and in front of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta (September 9, 2004).

The fight against terrorism has become the main activity of the BIN. He received a new unit "Alpha Group", formed on the basis of the army special forces. Overall, the Department was tasked with monitoring the entry of Middle Eastern citizens into Indonesia, as well as the activities of the agency formed in August 2000. The Mujahideen Council of Indonesia (IMI), created by Indonesian participants in the Afghan war, voe-

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those who worked on the side of anti-government forces. From the point of view of the local special services, it was the Afghan veterans who received not only military training, including skills of sabotage and subversion, but also a Wahhabi worldview, who were particularly dangerous.

With the coming to power of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the BIN's tasks continued to include conducting intelligence operations involving special forces of the armed forces, collecting and analyzing operational information. In December 2004, retired Major General Shamsir Siregar, who was the head of the BIA in 1994-1996, was appointed Chief of the BIA. The head of the department became the President's chief national security adviser. BIN has its own internal and foreign network, monitoring domestic threats of terrorism and subversive activities. BIN and BAIS do not interact structurally, but periodically hold joint meetings to analyze issues of mutual interest.

BAIS, headed by Brigadier General Zaki Anwar Makarim, does not carry out operational activities, concentrating on the information and analytical direction. Structurally, the office consists of seven directorates: domestic Policy, Foreign Policy, defense, security, psychological warfare, budget and administration, as well as a division for preparing consolidated intelligence documents for the Commander of the Armed forces.

The history of military intelligence institutions in Indonesia is closely linked to the changing domestic political situation in the country. Changes in the political course, as well as personal movements, played a crucial role in the development and character of the Republic's special services during both the Sukhart and post-Sukhart periods.

list of literature

Urlyapov I. V., Urlyapov V. F. Vostochny Timor: Ternistyy put ' k nezavisimosti [East Timor: A Thorny Path to Independence].
Ali Moertopo dan Dunia Intelijen // http:swaramuslim.net. 16.08.2003

Conboy B. Inside Indonesia's Intelligence Service. Jakarta-Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2004.

Contemporary Southeast Asia. Singapore, December 1990, N 3.

Ingo W. Indonesia's New Intelligence Agency. Now? Why? And What for? // http:home.snafu.de., 01.11.2000.

Jenkins D. Soeharto and his Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975 - 1983. Ithaca, 1984.

Memori Jenderal Yoga. Seperti diceritakan kepada Penulis B. Wiwoho dan Banjar Chaeruddin. Jakarta: PT Bina Rena Pariwara, 1990.

Soedibjo Menganti Yoga // Tempo. Jakarta. 10.06.1989.

Tapol Bulletin. N 166 - 167, April-May 2002.

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