The political life of the People's Republic of China in the last decade is inextricably linked with the name of Jiang Zemin. After taking up the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in June 1989, Jiang Zemin soon took over the top military posts (in November 1989 - Chairman of the Central Military Council of the CPC and in March 1990 - Chairman of the Central Military Council of the PRC), and after being elected in March 1993. The official head of state also became the Chairman of the People's Republic of China. However, it was only after the death of the country's informal leader Deng Xiaoping in February 1997 that Jiang Zemin finally emerged from the shadow of the " architect of Chinese reforms "and fully claimed to be the" core of the third generation of Chinese leaders " (according to the official version adopted in the PRC, the first generation of leaders was headed by Mao Zedong, the second - by Deng Xiaoping). It is quite natural that since 1997, the solution of China's internal and external problems has been closely linked to the activities of Jiang Zemin, who actively sought to establish himself as a leading ideologist and theorist of the party, the initiator of a strategy for China's revival that meets modern requirements, and an influential international figure. Jiang's desire to quickly make a mark on history was also fueled by the very limitations of his leadership term. There is a general consensus in the country and in the world that in the near future the third generation of Chinese leaders should be replaced by a fourth one, led by Hu Jintao, who was allegedly recommended for this mission by Deng Xiaoping and his associates. This view was finally reinforced after Hu Jintao, who had been a member of the top party elite since 1992 as a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, took up positions in the party and state central military councils in late 1999 (in fact, it is one body with "two signs"). At the 16th CPC National Congress (November 2002), Jiang Zemin officially handed over to Hu Jintao the highest party authority, and at the 1st session of the 10th National People's Congress (March 2003), the highest state authority. In general, it can be stated that the last few years, which by chance coincided with the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, were a kind of transition period for the PRC, during which the process of preparing and implementing the transfer of power from one group of leaders to another was going on. This qualitative peculiarity was manifested in many specific aspects of China's political life during this period, including Jiang Zemin's promotion of theoretical innovations in the field of party building, forcing China's accession to the World Trade Organization, increasing emphasis on ensuring social stability in the country, and the specifics of the first political actions of the new party and state leadership, etc.

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This publication is devoted to the analysis of the main features of the political life of the People's Republic of China during this peculiar transition period.

One of the first major events in China's domestic political life in the "post-Deng period" was the 15th CPC National Congress (September 12-18, 1997). The Congress played an important role in consolidating Jiang Zemin's leadership in the party and state, and in shaping Jiang's own political style, which is characterized by a skillful combination of adherence to party traditions with dosed innovation, designed to demonstrate the willingness and ability of the CCP and its leadership to respond appropriately to the challenges of the time. The report to the congress, very symbolically titled " Holding high the great banner of Deng Xiaoping's theory, comprehensively promote the cause of building socialism with Chinese characteristics in the twenty-first century," emphasized the CCP's loyalty to Deng Xiaoping's political course. A provision on the guiding significance of Deng Xiaoping's theory for the CCP's activities was included in the party's charter. Jiang Zemin's reliance on Deng Xiaoping's ideas was far from accidental. First, by doing so, he made an unequivocal request to continue the country's policy of modernization, reform and openness, and to lead the overall process of "reviving China" in the new historical conditions. In addition, the political leadership of Jiang Zemin, who became General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee in June 1989 at the suggestion of Deng Xiaoping, was once again reinforced. Finally, there was a long shot: since Deng Xiaoping's theory was the result of a significant development, and sometimes a serious adjustment, of the ideas of Mao Zedong, who preceded him as the country's leader, its inclusion in the CPC Charter set a precedent, opening up the potential for a new and subsequent expansion of the formulation of the ideological and theoretical foundations of the party's activities.

Already at this congress, Jiang Zemin demonstrated an innovative approach to the interpretation of the leading role of public property. It was stated that it is necessary to actively use pluralistic forms of realization of public property in order to accelerate the development of productive forces as much as possible. Jiang Zemin's policy of restructuring the public sector meant the active corporatization of most large state-owned enterprises and the transfer of small state-owned enterprises to private hands through the mechanisms of contracting, leasing, and even direct sale [ XVth CPC National Congress..., pp. 27-31].

Another important innovation was Jiang Zemin's statement about the need to govern the country on the basis of the law and create a "legal socialist state". In fact, it was at the same time that Jiang's fundamental approach to political system reform was formulated. Its goal was declared to increase the viability of the party and the state, to identify the advantages of the socialist system, to ensure the unity of the country and the stability of society. The main directions of political reform were seen in improving the institution of People's representative assemblies and the activities of the People's Political Consultative Conference of China, which unites small democratic parties and non-party figures created before the formation of the PRC, as well as the National Federation of Industrialists and Merchants. It was emphasized that the improvement of the country's political system should proceed gradually and under the leadership of the CPC [ XV National Congress of the CPC..., pp. 35-39].

On December 18, 1998, Jiang Zemin's next conceptual speech on the general problems of the country's development was timed to coincide with the twentieth anniversary of the 3rd Plenum of the CPC Central Committee of the 11th convocation (December 1978), which launched the Chinese policy of reform and openness. It is notable for its inclusion in the list of major historical events.

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the lessons of the reforms launched 20 years ago stipulate the priority nature of the task of developing the productive forces and the implementation and protection of the interests of the "broadest masses of the people" as the starting point for economic reform and construction [People's Daily, 19.12.1998]. And the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China (October 1, 1999) was actively used to consolidate Jiang Zemin's status as a recognized leader of the third generation of leaders of the country. A symbol of the passing of the baton of power was the demonstration during the festive processions in Beijing of three identical huge portraits of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. If the first of them, according to the explanation of Chinese propaganda, gave the Chinese people the opportunity to "rise", the second provided people with prosperity, then Jiang Zemin will pave the way for the upcoming "rise of the Chinese nation".

Undoubtedly, the growth of Jiang Zemin's real authority at home and abroad during this period was facilitated by such events as the effective actions of the Chinese leadership in the context of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, the skillful fight against one of the largest floods on the Yangtze River in the country's history in the summer of 1998, and the deprivation of the right to For example, Beijing's metered-out but rather harsh reaction to the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by US planes in May 1999, the return of Macao (Macao) to Chinese sovereignty after more than four centuries of Portuguese rule (December 1999), and the completion of negotiations with the United States on the terms of China's accession to the WTO.

At the same time, Jiang Zemin's achievements in theory were still modest. The attempt to rectify the situation by reviving the internal party campaign of "three accents" (in a different interpretation of "three interviews") in 1999 - on politics, on education, on the right style of work - clearly did not change the situation here. Meanwhile, a number of new phenomena and processes in the internal life of China not only required prompt intervention by the authorities, but also urgently needed a deep theoretical understanding.

First of all, with increasing financial difficulties in state-owned enterprises, the number of people "released from production" ("xiagang") began to increase rapidly. In total, for the period 1997 - 1999, it was 19 million people. Difficulties with finding employment (only half of the workers in this category were able to find a new job quickly), dissatisfaction with the size of severance payments or monthly payments led to a noticeable increase in dissatisfaction with the policy of the country's leadership, and increased leftist and protest moods in the working environment, which formally continued to be considered the mainstay of the ruling Communist Party.

The tendency to lower market prices for grain, which was manifested in the conditions of overproduction of the main types of agricultural products, including grain, significantly slowed down the overall growth of farmers ' incomes, accelerated the formation of an army of rural migrants in cities with extremely low social and legal status. On the contrary, the authorities ' sympathies for the scientific and technical intelligentsia became more and more obvious, since it was with them that the possibility of implementing Jiang Zemin's declared strategy of reviving the country based on education and science and developing new niches of high-tech products on the world market was associated.

The history of the Falun Gong sect was an indirect sign of the CCP's weakening ties with the masses and its influence on the people. Created in 1992 by a certain Li Hongzhi, who moved to the United States, the sect, using the Chinese population's craving for health-improving gymnastics "qigong" and masquerading as officially allowed religions-Buddhism and Taoism, grew by 1999 into an extensive organization with 2 million members. active members, including many CCP veterans. On April 25, 1999, Falun Gong members held a massive sit-in outside the Zhongnan government compound-

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high school in Beijing. Although the sect-among other "heretical cults" - was banned by the NPC Standing Committee in October 1999, the activities of its adherents have not completely ceased. The very fact of an open challenge of some members of society to the country's leadership could not but be alarming.

Beijing seems to have realized that formally favorable indicators of the size and structure of the ruling Communist Party can no longer be satisfied (at the end of 2000, the CCP consisted of 64.51 million people - 5.2% of the population of the PRC, of which 31.66 million were workers and peasants, 5.92 million-personnel workers and 6.18 million-management personnel of enterprises and organizations). The objective task of informally confirming the CCP's legitimacy, its ability to effectively express the interests of the people and ensure the achievement of the most important national goals - modernization, reunification with Taiwan, and the country's international security-has become increasingly urgent in the new historical conditions. And this required a certain renewal of the ideological and theoretical baggage and style of the CCP's activities, the search for new forms of implementing the functions of the ruling party that were adequate to the requirements of the time, and the modification of its social base. The period 2000-2001 was marked by the expansion of theoretical research and the first practical steps in this direction.

Noteworthy are the rather frank, by Beijing standards, analysis of the social contradictions of modern Chinese society carried out under the auspices of the Organizing Department of the CPC Central Committee [2000-2001 Zhongguo diaocha baogao...], proposals to change the methods of implementing the ruling role of the Communist Party in China and to clearly distinguish the rights and competence of party and administrative bodies [ Liaowan, 25.06.2001] , the study of the theory and practice of world social democracy, the calls of individual scholars to resolve internal party factions and transform the CCP from a class party to a party of the whole people [ Zhongguo Guoqing goli, pp. 43-45].

The general "renewal algorithm" was set by Jiang Zemin himself, and in several directions at once. In February 2000, during an inspection trip to Guangdong Province, he first put forward the position of the Communist Party of China as a representative of advanced productive forces, advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the people of the country. In the same year, Jiang Zemin stated the need for a comprehensive understanding of the history of socialism and capitalism, as well as the changes that have taken place in China under the influence of reform and opening-up policies and the process of global economic globalization. In early 2001, at a meeting of heads of regional propaganda departments, Jiang called on the party to implement "the spirit of relentless struggle for the implementation of socialist modernization." In its expanded form, the new attitude directed party members to "liberate their minds and act in accordance with real factors; keep up with the times and boldly renew themselves; despite difficulties, go steadily forward; fight hard, achieve efficiency in business; do not chase honors, serve selflessly." The multi-faceted formula that has come into political use as the "five spirits rule" has essentially defined the CCP's methodology for dealing with the large - scale challenges it faces at the present stage, namely, to act in accordance with the spirit of the best traditions of the party and the nation and the spirit of renewal and innovation dictated by the requirements of the era. In the propaganda, traditionalism was emphasized by parallels with Mao Zedong's famous verse line "there are no difficult things in the world for those who dare to take the top", and innovation was emphasized by a special emphasis on the need for a new "liberation of consciousness" (this slogan in China is consistently associated with the beginning of the Dengxiaoping reforms).

Among Jiang Zemin's theoretical innovations of this period, a very wide public response was caused by the call to " keep up with the times." It soon became an integral part of the triune formula that characterizes the overall political course

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The CCP at the present stage: "act in accordance with real facts, liberate consciousness, and keep up with the times." The symbolic meaning of this triad was obvious to every literate Chinese: the first part of the slogan belongs to Mao Zedong, the second to Deng Xiaoping, and the third to Jiang Zemin, who was trying to stand up to them.

However, central to proving the CCP's ability to update its ideological and theoretical platform and substantiating its "legitimate right" to retain its leadership role in the country for the foreseeable future has been the position of the CCP's role in Chinese society as a representative of advanced productive forces, advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the people.

Jiang Zemin's speech on the occasion of the CCP's 80th anniversary (July 1, 2001) was devoted to detailing the "triple representation" formula, showing its "organic connection" with Marxism, Mao Zedong's ideas, and Deng Xiaoping's theory, while at the same time being innovative.

The Secretary General placed special emphasis on the party's commitment to developing productive forces and building up the total power of the state "in order to improve the lives of the people." This initial approach made it quite logical to justify the need to expand its social base. As Jiang Zemin emphasized, the CCP, while remaining the vanguard of the working class, also represents the interests of new layers of Chinese society that contribute to the development of productive forces. Indirectly objecting to leftists who claimed that the Communist Party had already been infiltrated by the" new bourgeoisie "formed during the reform period, Jiang Zemin specifically emphasized that the size of personal property" cannot be simplistically considered as a criterion of people's political consciousness " - here it is necessary to judge by their contribution to the construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics. In practical terms, this statement meant that people engaged in entrepreneurial activities agreed to join the party (by the beginning of 2002, there were 113,000 entrepreneurs in the CPC, but 90% of them joined the party before they went into business).

Recalling the party's commitment to the "great ideal of communism," Jiang Zemin simultaneously called for avoiding fantasy and stated that at the initial stage of socialism, where China will remain for a long time, the immediate practical task is to improve the "system of a socialist market economy" and the system of "joint development of various sectors of the national economy with the leading place of public property." This confirmed the immutability of the policy of market reforms and foreign economic openness, as well as the policy of strategic restructuring of the public sector.

While declaring the CCP's commitment to improving internal party democracy, improving its working style, and rooting out corruption, Jiang Zemin also called for "resolutely resisting" the influence of Western models of political system and separation of powers.

Immediately after the anniversary celebrations in China, Jiang Zemin's speech was widely promoted as "a program for further building socialism with Chinese characteristics under new historical conditions." A special place was given to the provision on the "triple representation" of the CCP, which, as it was declared, "has firmly entered the theoretical treasury of the party and the Chinese people." (In August, a collection of Jiang Zemin's speeches on "triple representation" was published.) The main points of Jiang Zemin's anniversary speech were quite transparently presented in propaganda as a prototype of the political platform of the upcoming 16th CPC Congress.

However, it soon became clear that not everyone in China was particularly positive about Jiang Zemin's anniversary speech. Supporters of orthodox views on socialism

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they opposed the very essence of the proposed innovations. For example, the magazine "Zhengli de Zhuiqu" ("In Search of Truth"), which ceased to exist shortly after the CCP's anniversary - formally due to the withdrawal of funding, consistently pointed out the inadmissibility of accepting private individuals into the CCP. And some influential CCP veterans don't seem satisfied with Jiang Zemin's overly obvious claim to include his theoretical innovations in the party's program and charter documents.

The situation was partly balanced by the 6th Plenum of the 15th CPC Central Committee (September 24-26, 2001). On the one hand, the plenum officially approved Jiang Zemin's anniversary speech, which was described as a "program document of Marxism". The need for the party to rally around the CPC Central Committee with Jiang Zemin as the "core" was emphasized. Special emphasis was placed on the observance of "political discipline" in the party, subordination of the entire party to the decisions of its Central Committee. For the first time during Jiang Zemin's tenure as Secretary General, the main task in the ideological sphere was called the fight against leftism, which is expressed at the present stage in "frozen thinking and identifying the policy of reform and openness with the borrowing and promotion of capitalism."

At the same time, the decision adopted by the plenum "On strengthening and improving the construction of the party style" paid a significant tribute to the traditional values of the CPC, which found a concentrated expression in the generalizing formula "eight for "and eight against". "For" means the need to defend the emancipation of consciousness, the connection of theory with practice and the connection of the party with the masses, to follow the principle of democratic centralism, to strengthen party discipline, to form honest and incorruptible leadership structures, to adhere to the spirit of persistent and selfless struggle, and to implement the principle of nominating cadres in accordance with their merits. Accordingly, "against" implies the rejection of endless clinging to outdated dogmas, from book worship and mechanical borrowing of other people's experience, the fight against formalism and bureaucracy, arbitrariness and laxity, liberalism, greed, hedonism and incorrect style of solving personnel issues (in the Chinese original, the tasks of the struggle "for" and "against" are formulated in pairs, for example"to strengthen ties with the masses, to fight formalism and bureaucracy," etc.).

A combination of careful innovation and commitment to the country's basic traditions also permeated the "Program for Building Civic Morals"published on behalf of the CPC Central Committee on October 25, 2001. It sets out the tasks of both preserving the best moral and ethical standards that go back to the millennial traditions of the Chinese people and the period of the revolutionary struggle, and borrowing the most worthy from the advanced culture and moral and ethical baggage of other countries of the world. The traditional attributes of" socialist morality " (collectivism, love for the Motherland, for the people, for work, for socialism) were supplemented by such market values as the spirit of innovation, the spirit of competition and efficiency, and adherence to the principles of democracy and the rule of law. In a concentrated form, the program was summarized in the formula "20 hieroglyphs" - "Love for the Motherland and respect for the law, cultural behavior and sincerity, solidarity and benevolence, hard work and steady striving for progress, professionalism and giving what they deserve".

It is worth mentioning that after the 6th plenum of the CPC Central Committee of the 15th convocation, the "promotion" of Jiang Zemin's anniversary speech was noticeably muted for about two months, and the dominant place in the ideological sphere was occupied by propaganda of the most traditional aspects of improving the party style and, above all, the need to deepen the" blood connection " of the CPC

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by the masses of the people. It is not entirely clear whether this was done by Jiang Zemin himself for tactical reasons - to allow his opponents to "cool down", so to speak - or whether it was the result of a real desire of fairly influential forces in general to change the emphasis of party politics. However, the fact remains that only after the publication in late November 2001 of Jiang Zemin's collection of speeches" On Party Building", covering the period 1989-2001, did broad propaganda of the July first speech and its main provisions resume on a full scale, although most often in "tandem" with the decisions of the plenum. Apparently, this collection was intended to demonstrate Jiang's unwavering commitment to the party's core values and the validity of his claim to develop Marxist theory creatively. It is symptomatic that propaganda literature devoted to the study of the collection "On Party Building", as a rule, opened with a lengthy presentation of "Jiang Zemin's contribution to the development and enrichment of the Marxist theory of party building".

However, in the period 2000-2001, the positive image of China and its leadership was influenced not only by party propaganda activities, but also - to a decisive extent-by the country's real success in the economy, social sphere and in the international arena. The goal of improving the financial situation in the public sector, which was set for 1998-2000, was fulfilled: the share of large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises operating profitably increased from 40% to 70% during this period. A social and economic development plan for China for the 10th five - year period (2001-2005) was developed and adopted, which provides for a 7% average annual GDP growth and a deep structural restructuring of the national economy. The country's official accession to the WTO (December 11, 2001) became a new factor in deepening market reforms and China's interaction with the world economy.

China's international position and prestige were boosted by events such as the 2001 summit of Heads of State of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Organization in Shanghai, Beijing's winning the right to host the 2008 Summer Olympics, and the first-ever appearance of the Chinese national football team in the World Cup final.

At the same time, after the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, the Chinese leadership intensified its fight against the potential danger of national separatism, religious extremism and terrorism, especially in areas where national minorities live. Increased attention was paid to Tibet, both in connection with the 50th anniversary of its "peaceful liberation" celebrated in 2001, and because of the sharp increase in the geopolitical significance of the Central Asian region.

In the context of the revival of Islamic fundamentalism, the situation in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region has been interpreted in a new way. Beijing has declared supporters of the creation of the so-called East Turkestan an integral part of international terrorism and religious extremism, and to some extent made it easier for itself to fight Uighur nationalism. At the same time, the Criminal Code of the People's Republic of China was amended to toughen penalties for crimes classified as terrorism, separatism and religious extremism.

To clarify the official policy on religion, a national meeting on religious work was held in December 2001 with the participation of senior leaders, representatives of the regions and the army, the first event of its kind since 1990. Beijing has made it clear that it would like to see believers of all officially sanctioned faiths (Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism) as an influential patriotic force that does not encroach, however, on the exercise of state prerogatives, especially in the field of education and justice. The principle of "independent, independent conduct of affairs" of religion was highlighted in particular.-

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China's political circles, the inadmissibility of any interference by external forces here. This was explained both by the use of religious problems in the past for the imperialist enslavement of China, and by the "choice in favor of independence, already made by the religious masses of the country" (the hint was intended primarily for the Vatican, but could also be addressed to any other external clerical circles in case of their excessive zeal to strengthen their presence in the PRC).

In the face of serious social problems (low incomes of a significant part of the population, high unemployment, the spread of organized crime, massive economic offenses, etc.), Beijing was forced to pay special attention to maintaining an acceptable level of social stability. The successful completion of the 1993-2000 rural poverty reduction program was important in this regard.. It has reduced the number of farmers below the official poverty line from 80 million to 30 million (although this line itself-now about 640 yuan of income per person per year-is four times lower than the internationally recognized poverty criterion of one dollar per person per day). A new similar program was adopted for the period up to 2010, and assistance to the poor in cities was also increased. Serious hopes for improving public order were pinned on a special campaign to combat organized crime, called "Severe Blow". The beginning of the publication of the first human rights journal in the history of the People's Republic of China, Renquan, at the end of 2001 can also be regarded as a landmark event.

From the first months of 2002, direct preparations for the 16th Congress of the ruling Communist Party became the dominant feature of the political life of the People's Republic of China. Already in spring, the Hong Kong media, in particular in the May issue of the well-known Zhengming magazine, published lists of the most likely candidates for membership in the new composition of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee and its Standing Committee. The main points of the political platform of the upcoming congress were reflected in Jiang Zemin's speech at the central party school on May 31, 2002, which was published in the Chinese press under the very symptomatic headline: "Holding high the great banner of Deng Xiaoping's theory, comprehensively implementing the requirements of the three representative offices, keep up with the times and do everything possible to create a new with Chinese characteristics " [ People's Daily, 1.06.2002]. The program speech of the Chinese leader focused on the development of the country's productive forces and the new stage of its modernization in general, the tasks of establishing a "socialist political culture" in society and improving the leadership role of the CPC as a ruling party in the spirit of the "three representative offices"provision.

Meanwhile, the answer to the main intrigue of the upcoming congress - whether Jiang Zemin will remain as general secretary of the CPC Central Committee or Hu Jintao will take this position - remained unclear for quite some time, at least for outside observers. Apparently, the issues of the degree of renewal of the highest party bodies and their personal composition were also resolved "with a creak". An unambiguous signal from Beijing was received only in the last decade of August. First, the opening date of the congress was announced - November 8, 2002 - which allowed Jiang Zemin to make a planned visit to the United States on October 22-25 as the full-fledged head of the party, state and army. This was immediately followed by the publication of an apparently final collection of Jiang's statements on various aspects of the country's life during his entire period in power. It became clear that the decision on the upcoming departure of Jiang Zemin from the top party post at the congress was made. At the same time, the publication of a collection entitled "On the Construction of Socialism with Chinese characteristics" launched an intensive pre-congress propaganda of the achievements of the PRC "over the past 13 years", i.e. from June 1989 to mid-2002.

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What did the People's Republic of China come up with at the 16th Congress of the ruling Communist Party? There is no doubt that since the 15th CPC National Congress, the country has significantly strengthened its international position. The current and strategic tasks of socio-economic development were solved quite consistently. The relentless efforts of the leadership made it possible to maintain an acceptable level of socio-political stability.

The supporting structure of the country's political system remained the Communist Party, which took the path of a certain expansion of its social base and renewal of its ideological and theoretical platform. Its leadership role was unequivocally recognized by all those state institutions that could theoretically compete with the CCP for power - the parliament, the army, and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. The National People's Congress functioned in a stable mode, actively working to strengthen the regulatory framework of public life in the country. The People's Liberation Army of China, having lost the right to conduct independent economic activities, received more generous budget funding in return and focused its main efforts on modernizing combat equipment and in-depth study of the features of modern wars. The State Council of the People's Republic of China, as the main body of executive power, along with solving current and future economic problems, has noticeably increased attention to national, religious and social problems. A system of so-called "three lines of defense" was introduced in the field of social benefits (unemployment benefits, benefits for those "released from production", benefits to ensure a minimum standard of living in cities).

As a result of the administrative reform initiated in 1998 to reduce the size and increase the efficiency of the administrative apparatus, the number of staff structures and the number of employees (in party bodies - by 20%, in administrative bodies - up to 50%) was reduced at the central and provincial levels; but at the most difficult grassroots level - in counties - these structures were reduced by a significant amount. events are clearly stalled.

The main argument in favor of retaining the CCP's ruling functions for the foreseeable future remains the progressive economic development of the PRC. The inter-Congress five-year period is marked by the successful completion of the second of the three stages of modernization of the country (which was designed for the 1990s), strengthening of market principles of economic functioning, and deepening interaction with the world economy. In 2001, China passed such important milestones as $ 1 trillion. annual GDP, $ 500 billion. annual foreign trade turnover, $ 400 billion. total volume of foreign direct investment actually used. In terms of the standard of living of the population in the cities of the PRC, it has come out, and in the countryside it has approached the criteria of "xiaocang" - "modest prosperity" - outlined two decades ago (according to Deng Xiaoping, the level of" xiaocang " corresponds to the average per capita GDP production in the country of about $ 1,000).

By stimulating exports and domestic demand, and relying on a "proactive fiscal policy" that includes large-scale issuance of government-issued bonds for investment purposes and a concomitant increase in the budget deficit, China has managed to maintain dynamic economic growth-according to the official version-above 7% annually. According to the State Statistics Administration of the People's Republic of China, for 1998-2001. The country's GDP grew by 33.9% , while budget revenues increased by 89.2%, exports - by 45.6%, and imports-by ^71.1%. The course of streamlining the property structure proclaimed by the 15th CPC Congress was carried out quite consistently. The number of people employed in the public sector decreased from 110.4 million in the previous year.

¹ Calculated from: Zhongguo tongji zhaiyao 2002, pp. 17, 63, 148.

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1997 to 76.4 million in 2001. An even sharper decline in the number of employees was observed in the collective sector in urban areas-from 28.8 to 12.9 million people (Zhongguo Tongji Zhaiyao 2002, p.38). On the contrary, the individual and private sectors and enterprises with the participation of foreign capital developed at a faster pace. Thus, at the beginning of 2002, 47.6 million people were employed in the individual sector, and 22.5 million in private enterprises. Together, they accounted for about 20.5 % of the country's GDP and over 47% of retail trade turnover [ Zhongguo jinrong shibao, 8.06.2002]. As of mid-2002, the creation of 405,000 enterprises with foreign investment was approved in China.

Among other achievements of the inter-congress period in the economy, we can note the beginning of the reform of monopoly industries (electric power and transport).

With its accession to the WTO, the PRC has entered a qualitatively new stage of its policy of reform and openness. Its distinctive features are a general sharp increase in the level of competition for Chinese producers in the domestic and global markets, stricter requirements for the quality of management, a steady decline in the role of specifically Chinese and an increase in the importance of universal market forms and methods of management.

Particularly noteworthy is China's success in developing the physical economy, primarily in the construction of infrastructure facilities and the formation of a modern telecommunications system (by the middle of 2002, China ranked first in the world in terms of the number of landlines and mobile phones). It seems that it is the focus on the development of the physical economy that largely allows China to compensate for the weaknesses of the country's monetary system and increase the stability of its economy in the face of shocks in the global economy.

As part of its focus on pursuing an independent foreign policy, the PRC actively promoted the idea of a multipolar world and a more equitable distribution of the positive and negative consequences of globalization. Among the obvious foreign policy achievements of Beijing during the inter-congress period are: the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2001), the conclusion of the Sino-Russian Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation (2001), the settlement of the border problem with a number of neighboring states (with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, the land border with Vietnam), active participation in the activities of The United Nations and its Security Council, and international forums such as ASEM (Asia - Europe) and ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea).

At the same time, the development of the PRC was not free from problems. During the entire inter-congress period, the situation with corruption, criminality, and drug addiction remained very acute (for example, in 1999, 680 thousand drug addicts were identified in the country, and in 2001 - over 900 thousand). Social stability in the society was negatively affected by the high level of accidents in production and transport (more than 100 thousand people die every year in China for this reason). The activities of the Falun Gong sect remain a serious irritant for the authorities. A relatively new problem for the PRC was the mass protests of workers, especially in the depressed cities of the Northeast. The social situation in the village is also periodically complicated.

High growth rates in the economy have not eliminated all the existing problems and, moreover, have exacerbated the disparity between accumulation and consumption, the gap in the levels of urban and rural development. The strategy of raising the backward western territories has so far yielded modest results: the gap between them and the developed Primorye region continues to grow. China's intractable and very large-scale environmental and demographic problems still have a complicating effect on the entire development process of the country. More acute than ever before, was the task of ensuring the safety of the population.-

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baking the PRC economy with oil. Overall, on the eve of the 16th CPC National Congress, China was still a relatively poor country with a per capita GDP of about one-fifth of the global average. Guidelines and methods for implementing modernization in the long term needed to be significantly refined and specified. The question of ways to improve the political system more effectively and dynamically was also waiting for a clear answer. The prospects for a satisfactory solution to the Taiwan problem also remained unclear.

Accordingly, the 16th CPC National Congress was expected not only to start a radical renewal of the top party and state leadership of the People's Republic of China, but also to answer the question of China's choice of strategy for solving the main tasks of national development.

list of literature

2000-2001 Zhongguo diaocha baogao. Xin xingshi xia renmin neibu maodun yanjiu (China Survey Report 2000-2001. Research of contradictions within the people in a new situation). Beijing, 2001.

Renminzhibao. 1997 - 2003.

The 15th National Congress of the CPC is a solemn event on the threshold of a new century. Beijing: Xin-xing Publishing House, 1997.

Liaovan. 25.06.2001.

Jiang Zemin. Speech at a solemn meeting on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the establishment of the CCP (July 1, 2001). Beijing: Xinxing Publishing House, 2001.

Zhongguo guoqing goli. 2001. N 5.

Zhongguo tongji zhaiyao 2002 (Brief Statistics of China-2002). Beijing, 2002.

Zhongguo jinrong shibao. 8.06.2002.

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