The situation in the South China Sea in recent years has acquired the features of a Pacific-scale risk zone. However, no one is crossing the dangerous line yet. Apparently, this is not just a matter of territorial disputes between China and a number of Southeast Asian countries that are members of ASEAN. In some aspects, the South China Sea problem goes beyond the regional framework.

Keywords: South China Sea, Southeast Asian countries, territorial disputes, freedom of navigation, USA, Russia, China.

The situation in the South China Sea( SCM), which was once considered a local "irritant", as if closing the "East Asian arc of conflict" from the south, has recently acquired the features of a Pacific-scale risk zone. There are frequent cases of spikes in political temperature, bursts of harsh rhetoric and demonstrations of military muscle. However, despite the growth of alarming moments, no one crosses the dangerous line.

There is a noticeable expansion of the range of interpretations of the situation that has developed in the South China Sea. Until recently, the conflict was interpreted as a clash of positions between China and a number of Southeast Asian countries-members of ASEAN (the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and partly Indonesia) regarding the ownership of several groups of uninhabited islands, reefs, and shoals scattered throughout the South China Sea, as well as the limits of their exclusive economic zones and continental shelf. Taiwan also makes similar claims.

However, it seems that the background of the current situation is not so one-line, it takes on a multidimensional character. In some aspects, the South China Sea problem spills out beyond the narrow regional framework. Today, there are significantly more actual actors than direct participants in territorial disputes.

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First of all, the disputes themselves, which are mainly going on around two large groups of islands - the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands (generally accepted names), are complex. There is a overlapping overlap of claims. China and, in different combinations, the countries listed above, which also disagree with each other over the same island lands, call the same territory their own at the same time.

ASEAN, which began more than 40 years ago with six countries, and now has ten, was created to a certain extent and now serves as a kind of shock absorber.-

Vitaly Vorobyov, Chief Researcher, Center for East Asian and SCO Studies, MGIMO University Russian Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. E-mail: asia@mgimo.ru.

This paper presents a wide range of territorial and border problems that have been and continue to be present in Southeast Asia at sea and on land to varying degrees of severity.

It seems, for example, a curiosity, but the fact remains that the Philippines, which considers the question of belonging to the Malaysian state of Sabah (the northeastern tip of Borneo (Kalimantan)) to be unresolved, still receives a symbolic annual tribute from the Malaysian government in favor of the Sabah Sultan living in the Philippines. The same Sabah, as well as another Malaysian state in Borneo, Sarawak (both formerly British possessions), formed a vast Brunei state in pre-colonial times, which later turned out to be compressed to its current meager land territory. Malaysia also has border issues with Indonesia in Borneo, and Thailand in the north. There are quite a lot of examples of the actualization of "historical memory" among the countries of Southeast Asia, take Thailand and Cambodia. This also applies to competing versions of the ownership of the islands in the South China Sea from very ancient times.

In other words, there is a permanent factor in the region in the form of mutual territorial claims and grievances, and no noticeable reciprocal steps towards their removal on a bilateral basis are yet visible. The desire to keep the situation under control brings the disputants closer together. ASEAN structures make it possible to moderate outbreaks or stop them through internal political procedures. A kind of brake for the disputing countries of Southeast Asia is the fact that in the territorial aspects of the South-East Asia problem, they seem to be forced to confront China together. In this case, ASEAN is used by them as a collective cover, allowing them to form a kind of general-principle platform that resists the looming pressure from China. At the same time, the Chinese preposition serves as a "patriotic" reference to explain the growing costs and efforts to increase and improve its own military capabilities, which no effort can counterbalance the Chinese one. Thus, a tendency to militarize thinking is formed, which can quickly overwhelm everything else.

China presents its "historical trump cards". He claims that in the annals of ancient imperial dynasties, the islands in the South China Sea are not only mentioned two thousand years ago, but even then they were given Chinese names that have been preserved to this day. In China, maps are widely used showing the country's long-accepted ideas about the territorial content of the Chinese state during the periods of successive dynasties. The land borders of the empire on them get different outlines - for example, if in the Yuan era (XIII-XIV centuries) Eastern Siberia up to the Arctic and Pacific coasts is included in China, then the borders of the empire are much further south and west, on the line just north of Lake Baikal. However, since the first Qin Dynasty (III century BC), almost the entire water area of the South China Sea is consistently shown to be Chinese. Exactly as it looks on modern official maps of the People's Republic of China, namely-not a solid line adopted to mark the state border, but in the form of an intermittent "line of nine dotted lines".

Of course, the maps of the" ancient possessions " in their current form are largely speculative products of much later times than the periods of the existence of the imperial dynasties. However, by Chinese standards, they have acquired the status of authentic historical evidence, almost an official document. Apparently, this kind of "historical" map was submitted to the UN in 1947 by the Kuomintang government in support of the now well-known Chinese position regarding the ownership of the islands and the sea area in the South China Sea. Thus, the essence of Beijing's current policy on this issue is not so much a manifestation or consequence of the policy of rapid "rise" and strengthening of China's power over the past three decades. Rather, we should talk about the continuity and stability of historical stereotypes in Chinese society, regardless of the change of epochs and the nature of power structures.

A striking feature of disputes between China and a number of southeastern countries over islands in the South China Sea is that they do not include treaty acts that could unequivocally confirm the territorial ambitions of any of the participants or indicate that someone violates the title documents on this topic or does not take them into account. It turns out that everyone is playing on a rather shaky field of "historical" references and vague precedents, interpreted by everyone in their favor. With the longest written chronicle sources and the continuity of its sovereign history, China has a clear advantage here. Another thing is that in territorial disputes, excursions into history are mainly emotionally-mobilizing. For an international legal solution, they are optional, auxiliary in nature, yielding, ultimately, priority to considerations of political expediency, and sometimes even conjuncture. The main thing in all this is that the battle of "historical memories" does not turn into real battles, which, unfortunately, sometimes happens.

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It is widely believed that the South China Sea is not only and not so much a source of valuable natural fertilizer (bird guano) and fish resources. The region's prospects are associated with large gas and oil deposits. In billion cubic meters. they are estimated in terms of m and mln tons, but the figures are usually very tempting. With the expansion of utilitarian attention in the South China Sea to energy-bearing bottom spaces, the ownership of islands, regardless of their size and habitability, in addition to strategic importance, also takes on commercial significance. Islands play the role of defining criteria in the division of this space by states adjacent to the South China Sea and located near it. And almost all of them, without waiting for the final settlement of disputes, have actively started exploration and development of marine resources in the South China Sea with the involvement of non-regional players, including Russia.

The southern tip of the Spratly Islands, which are the subject of a cross-cutting multilateral dispute, is located almost 1000 km south of the coast of China, which, unlike the south-eastern countries, claims the entire group (along with Taiwan). China already occupies all the Paracel Islands, which Vietnam strongly disagrees with, considering them completely its own. In other words, the implementation of the Chinese approach implies that China obtains the sole right to control almost the entire water area and sea floor of the South China Sea, that is, it unilaterally legalizes what is designated by China on "ancient" and modern maps.

However, this approach is unlikely to find support from the international community. The South China Sea is used for intensive international shipping, as well as for maritime communications that are vital for a large number of countries located on different continents. The recent shift in the dynamics of global economic activity to the Asia-Pacific zone implies strict freedom of navigation in and through the South China Sea. This is an independent factor in the South China Sea issue, and it cannot be ignored. It becomes another motive and justification for stimulating military preparations in the South China Sea region, which is manifested not only in a noticeable shift to the military needs of the forces and assets of the coastal countries of Southeast Asia, relying on extra-regional states, but also in the latter's increasing various forms of military presence and activity in East Asia and in the South China China's military preparations, which are carried out taking into account the nature of the actions of "all players", are interpreted by observers not as a consequence of smoldering territorial disputes, but as a threat to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

What happens in reality? There is a kind of vicious circle of arms race and accumulation of destabilizing elements, which externally looks like

countering the concerns of the international community about the state and prospects of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and hypothetical encroachments on it by China.

Of course, you can assume anything, despite the lack of relevant precedents or signals about such intentions. Such a "forecast" becomes a convenient excuse for playing the "card" of internationalization of the South China Sea theme. It does not matter that for modern China, one of the leading global exporters, tightly tied to the continuous supply of raw materials and energy resources, sea communications, especially through the South China Sea, play a vital role. It is not for nothing that China has developed several of the world's largest commercial ports and a powerful ocean-going shipbuilding industry on its coast.It forms free trade zones in the south with ASEAN, and in the northeast with Japan and South Korea. Disruptions in the functioning of sea routes would have the most devastating impact, first of all, on the Chinese economy, with far-reaching socio-political consequences.

So, maybe it's not so much the reality of the Chinese threat to freedom of navigation, but rather the fact that under this "brand" non-regional players are trying to get hold of additional levers and excuses for building their own military-political combinations with an eye to "containing the ambitions" of the PRC?

When the Democrats came to power in the United States in 2008, Washington almost immediately identified as a priority the task of restoring, and in fact strengthening, its military and political leadership and competitive positions in the Pacific basin. It was as if the "home-made preparations" that had been worked out in advance and linked together were quickly reviving and streamlining traditional allied ties, reviving and modernizing the old ones, as well as establishing new partnerships, and building new political and economic configurations on this basis. Including the Asian missile defense system, which is being developed at a pace that is not inferior to the European one.

In this sense, the arguments of US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in an article published in the journal "Foreign Affairs" No. 3 for 2010 are indicative. Its leitmotif is that the United States should try to avoid direct military intervention and focus on developing and using the potential of partners - "helping others, protecting themselves." At the same time, the most important element of the American national security strategy is the security and strengthening of state structures in other countries. The implementation of this line is clearly visible on the example of the Philippines. They began to tilt again noticeably in the American direction. A course has been practically set for forced military modernization based on the United States, for the creation of modern armed forces, which until now were inferior in size and technical equipment to the police and internal troops, and were also mainly focused on suppressing opposition and separatist forces. The United States is being provided with additional capabilities to deploy its mobile forces, long-range radar reconnaissance points, and underwater tracking equipment, primarily targeting the South China Sea and Chinese coastal waters. Isn't that why Manila has been so brisk and pugnacious over the last year or two about the islands in the South China Sea?

Geographically, American activism almost coincides with the East Asian arc of conflict-related factors mentioned above. This is very noticeable, but not perplexing. After all, the US policy in the Pacific Ocean, and in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole in all its manifestations, is primarily focused on securing the position of a dominant figure in the context of an escalating competition with China as it turns into an original pole in the global balance of power. If relations between China and the United States can be described as a dialectically mobile coexistence of two dimensions, then the South China Sea, once again in the focus of Washington's attention in recent years, is becoming a place of direct contact between the two countries in their naval component. The United States, therefore, purposefully wants to play a non-supporting role in the South China Sea.-

a non-regional state, and act as a subject that gives itself "directing functions". This should be seen as a significant part of the overall US Pacific strategy, which everyone who wants the South China Sea not to become a hotbed of fire danger will have to reckon with.

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The multicomponent nature of the South China Sea problem does not make it possible for anyone to offer a universal key that would provide a one-time integrated solution. This seems far from reality, both in terms of expectations and in terms of the vector of efforts.

In the South China Sea area, we can state that there are two large segments that are not identical in meaning, but are not isolated from each other. First, the tangle of territorial disputes over islands and the resulting topic of establishing sea and bottom borders, which in itself carries the charge of serious disagreements. Secondly, the international community's well-founded concern to ensure that the conflict situation in the area is kept under control and does not affect the freedom of maritime communications.

With regard to the second segment, we can talk about a broad convergence of interests (but not necessarily about the coincidence of motives) of a large number of states, including non-regional ones, including Russia. That is, there is an objective prerequisite for considering the issue in an international projection with the tools inherent in this approach. It has been discussed in general terms for quite some time at the annual ministerial meetings of the Asean Regional Security Forum (ARF), and more recently at the East Asian Summits (EAS), in both cases with the participation of Russia. It is always addressed at ASEAN meetings with dialogue partners, which are regularly held in various formats. The positions of all participants are fairly well known, as is the key in which they are voiced. These positions are reproduced each time in approximately the same way with a certain amount of phraseological nuance. Therefore, there is no need for another special mechanism for the South China Sea.

As for the first segment, there is a confrontation of claims on a specific topic of a subjective order - territorial-delimitation. A topic that in the South China Sea has no external sources of origin, and therefore should be attributed to the subject of settlement, first of all, between the disputants themselves. The role of the international community is precisely to prevent them from using force against each other, and not to "interfere" in the negotiation process.

It should be emphasized that the South China Sea is not about settling border issues. In such cases, through complex negotiations, the parties compare their views on the compliance of the line of the existing and generally internationally recognized border established earlier on the basis of legal acts that remain in force. The ownership of a particular district is determined not in advance, but depending on the location of the border on the ground.

In a territorial dispute, the opposite is true. Specific delineation plays a subordinate role. The parties first divide territories, sometimes in large chunks, and then re-draw the border. At the same time, they can take into account a variety of points, including historical ones. But still, the final formula is usually dictated by the political will of the participants, bears the stamp of the" weight category " and the intentions of each of them.

There are three main ways to resolve the issue of land ownership, whether on land or at sea. The first is when, usually as a result of a war, a group of victorious states agrees on the territorial structure of the world (or its significance).-

parts), including specific prescriptions on the future limits of jurisdiction of the losing countries. Such fundamental decisions include the Peace of Versailles in 1919 after the First World War, and the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements after the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945. The latest agreements also affect Japan, as Germany's main Asian ally. They are confirmed in the UN title documents.

So, for example, the dispute between the PRC and Japan over the small uninhabited Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku) in the East China Sea is essentially not only historical or purely territorial. The case concerns the issue of strict compliance with the outcome of World War II as it relates to regulations regarding restrictions on Japan's territorial jurisdiction. The post-war territorial distribution does not affect the problems of the South China Sea.

The second method is when a group of states records the rejection of mutual territorial claims or undertakes to respect and respect the inviolability of borders existing at the time of the agreement. These are purely political decisions based on voluntariness. This is the basis on which NATO and the European Union are built. Such a modern approach is laid down in the Helsinki Treaty Act of 1975. It is significant that, despite the subsequent perturbations on the European continent, the collapse of a number of signatory states of the act, the borders of the newly formed countries do not go beyond the external contours of the former states.

The third is when the interested parties agree among themselves. This can be done directly or with the involvement of intermediaries chosen by the participants in the person of a third State, an international organization or the International Court of Justice in The Hague. In this case, it is impossible to reach a decision and make it if you constantly look back, look back at antiquity, and do not turn around to face the future and shape it yourself.

It has already been noted above that disputants do not appeal to strict legal documents that can convincingly confirm their claims. All of them refer to the historical background, but rather to their own ideas about it. Such a disposition leads to the conclusion that the search for solutions to territorial disputes in the South China Sea can go mainly on the political field, and solutions can depend on long - term strategy considerations, be variable in the composition of participants and step-by-step in time. In other words,it would be reckless to expect that everything will be resolved in a comprehensive, one-time, "big package". One way or another, we must be prepared for the fact that this search will not be a quick process, with a high probability of failures, demonstrative changes in mood, and rollbacks from seemingly firmly stated positions.

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The option in which all the disputants declare their rejection of their claims and express their readiness to negotiate from a "clean slate" seems absolutely unrealistic. For China, this would be tantamount to a geopolitical retreat, setting a precedent for redefining its own version of history, which is fraught with shaking up the foundations of the country's foreign policy in all azimuths. Suffice it to recall that all groups of islands in the South China Sea under Chinese names are listed in the Law on Territorial Sea (Waters)adopted in 1992 The People's Republic of China as a Chinese territory, and also included in the island province of Hainan specially formed for this purpose. Almost the entire area of the South China Sea is referred to in Beijing as "Chinese historical waters". With such initial positions, China's references to the application of the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea are "suspended in the air", because it proceeds from the existence of internationally recognized state limits, including the question of what can be considered historical waters.

Southeast Asian countries also appeal to the Convention, arguing not only with China, but also among themselves. At the same time, they are trying to "stretch" the provisions of the Convention in relation to their interests, trying to incorporate the disputed island areas into their own provinces. So, for example, the Philippines, consisting of more than 7 thousand islands, trying on the special status of" archipelagic waters " provided for by the Convention, for a long time sought the opportunity to bring under it the part of the Spratly Islands occupied by them under the local name "Kalayan". Although this did not fit into the established convention criteria, Manila declared the area to be part of Palawan Province as a special administrative division, and then began to avoid the name "South China Sea", replacing it with "West Philippine". Vietnam, resentful of China's occupation of the Paracel Islands, has consolidated its views in the 2012 Maritime Law and is also choosing its own name for the South China Sea. Taiwan firmly follows the imperial Chinese views on the South China Sea, that is, it is de facto in solidarity with Beijing. But despite the ebb and flow of relations with the Chinese mainland, it keeps to itself in order to indicate its independence in this aspect as well.

Nevertheless, the issue of consolidating the territorial status quo in the South China Sea does not look hopeless. On the model of Europe, everyone could remain committed to their own interpretation of historical events, leaving it to the payback of the scientific community. Why not, for example, consider separately the two main groups of islands - the Paracel Islands (China - Vietnam) and the Spratly Islands? If we take the Spratly Islands, the Philippines currently occupies 8, China-9, Vietnam-21, Malaysia-3, Taiwan-1 (the largest). Moreover, we are talking about a turnout procedure, which does not cancel the overlapping claims. It is difficult to imagine what negotiations on this group of islands on a bilateral basis might look like with such a configuration of applicants. Indeed, the classical approach implies a two-pronged approach to solving territorial problems. But who will talk to whom and about what? China offers its own path and insists on it. If he is referring to the prevention of interference by non-regional forces, whether it is the convening of a broad international conference that would deal with territorial disputes in the South China Sea or the imposition of arbitration institutions from outside, then we can agree with him. But then, taking into account his "weight category" of a great power, it is desirable to get from him a specification of his own point of view, at least in relation to the"negotiation technology". Otherwise, his position looks formal and extremely general, detached from real circumstances.

A kind of bipartisanship with China could develop if the contending ASEAN countries agreed, under the auspices of the association, to fix the current status quo on the Spratly Islands among themselves. Such a course of action would be in line with the ASEAN development agenda, which sets itself the ambitious and far - reaching goal of creating an integration community-economic, socio-cultural, political and security-by 2015. ASEAN also believes that by moving along this path, the association will consolidate its position as the central organization of the Pacific basin. This is exactly how it positions itself now.

In the framework of this logic, the persistence of territorial and border disputes between its members within ASEAN in principle becomes a heavy burden, a hindrance, a foreign phenomenon in relation to the stated goals, especially in the field of politics and security. Alarming signs of disunity in this area are beginning to make themselves felt, as happened in 2012 in Phnom Penh, when for the first time in the Association's history it was not possible to agree on the final document of the annual meeting. Formally, it was about the wording affecting the territorial disputes with China of a number of its member countries, but there is a much broader subtext behind this. At some stage, ASEAN will have to realize that the overall goal of creating a strong internal connectivity is unlikely to be achieved without SIA-

It is important to avoid such burdensome and irritating factors as territorial and border disputes throughout the Association's territory. Whether this will be done immediately or gradually is a matter of time and political will. You can start with the Spratly Islands, which would become a symbol of the great Assean consensus.

This kind of consensus implies breaking down stereotypes and overcoming serious mental barriers. But it would serve as an indicator of the maturity of ASEAN, extinguish unnecessary erosive manifestations, and strengthen its international authority. In turn, a consolidated approach of the ASEAN countries involved in disputes with China would strengthen their individual positions in the bilateral dialogue with this country on territorial issues in the South China Sea.

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Moving in this direction does not mean replacing or rejecting the development of such a document that would codify the norms of behavior in the South China Sea. That is, it would develop and supplement the provisions of the Declaration adopted in 2002 by ASEAN and China, but it would only do so in a more strict contractual form. This task has been consistently on the agenda of Asean-China relations for several years now, without raising objections from either side. Its positive solution would help defuse the overall situation in the South China Sea and create a healthier atmosphere around territorial disputes, and would work to ensure freedom of navigation. Therefore, it can be argued that there is a strong interest of the international community in the appearance of such a document.

It is clear that the preparation of a binding code is a responsible and complex task, whether from the point of view of conceptual ideas or in terms of content. The 2002 Declaration seems to be a very good foundation. It contains sufficient prerequisites and solid legal foundations to become the framework of the intended document. It seems that the drafters of the document could benefit from drawing on the experience of other countries, for example, with regard to the need to specify the concept of"confidence-building measures". They are generally mentioned in the Declaration. However, this situation deserves special attention, given the alarming symptoms of the situation in the South China Sea.

There are precedents for such documents involving China. They were developed and signed in relation to the areas of land borders between China and Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and India. It is noteworthy that the relevant agreements were concluded when the border issues were not yet fully resolved. In other words, two negotiation processes may well run in parallel, complementing, and sometimes pushing and stimulating each other. At first glance, these documents refer to the military sphere, which is very sensitive in itself. But in fact, they affect the deep political aspects of relations, the fundamental national interests of the participating States. Therefore, the basic elements of the confidence-building measures formulated in them can be considered in a much broader context, both geographically and substantively.

Let's take two documents that, admittedly, are of a "pioneer" nature for the Asia-Pacific region and immediately caused a great resonance in the world.

The first is the 1996 Agreement between Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and China on confidence-building measures in the military field near the border, which gave an impetus to the development of multi-faceted constructive cooperation between the participating countries and stimulated the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001.

The second is the Agreement signed in 1990, then between the USSR and the People's Republic of China, on the guiding principles of mutual reduction of armed forces and confidence-building measures in the military field in the border area. It gave rise to the aforementioned 1996 Agreement, and then to the 1997 Agreement between the five States on the Mutual Reduction of WMD-

armed forces in the border area (the latter is of interest as a tool for continuous monitoring of military activity in agreed geographical areas, including the institute of mutual inspections).

It can be noted that, firstly, the substantive discussion of the topic of confidence-building measures proceeded in stages-from developing general guidelines to agreeing on specific points, and, secondly, a creative approach was shown when the parties agreed to fix agreements as they were reached. In other words, the very negotiations on developing confidence-building measures served the function of building trust between countries and mutual understanding between their military circles, and this is always important, often decisive.

As for the agreements themselves, it seems that such formulas as "mutual non-use of force or threat of force", "refusal to obtain unilateral military superiority", "increasing the level of transparency in the military field" (1996 Agreement, preamble), the fact that " the armed forces will not be used to attack the other Side, to conduct any military activity that threatens the other Side." (1996 Agreement, article 1). The 1996 Agreement also provides for the annual exchange of information on the agreed components of the armed forces and border troops, the sending of notifications on large-scale military activities and troop movements, the invitation of observers to military exercises, and the strengthening of friendly military contacts. All these measures are strictly implemented by the signatory countries. A special mechanism, a joint monitoring group of diplomatic and military experts, has been established and is continuously operating to monitor the implementation of the 1996 Agreement (as well as the 1997 Agreement). It is symbolic that the 1996 Agreement on Confidence-building Measures has an unlimited period of validity.

The Establishment Agreement of 1990 is filled with an important political meaning. The guiding principles laid down in it have their own face and remain important as an example and example of a constructive approach to unraveling complex knots in interstate relations.

The legal declaration of the basic principle of "mutual equal security"is of far-reaching importance. The commitment that states that the forces of the parties will be "deprived of the ability to carry out a surprise attack and conduct offensive operations" sounds innovative. The provision of article 7 that "until border issues are fully resolved, the parties shall strictly observe the status quo (at the border)"could have a practical refraction.

Of course, this is not an automatic transfer or direct borrowing of everything that the two agreements contain, but these documents could be a useful tool for the developers of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.

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Russia, being a Euro-Pacific power by its geographical position, is really interested in ensuring that the existing tensions in the Pacific area, including territorial disputes in the South China Sea, do not take on a confrontational appearance, much less escalate into military actions. The remoteness of Russia within nautical miles from the South China Sea region cannot and should not be perceived as its detachment from what is happening in it and where events may go there.

Russia has smooth, normal, partnership relations and contacts with all countries located in East Asia, and a respectful attitude towards ASEAN as an established organization with great prospects. Comprehensive and trusting strategic partnership with China is the most important priority of Russia's foreign policy in general and in the Asia-Pacific region in particular. It has an understanding of the nature of the US interaction with its traditional counterparts in the region, and its own assessment of the Va policy-

Shington, aimed at consolidating and strengthening its presence in East Asia, especially near China's maritime defense perimeter.

Together with the entire international community, Russia wants to ensure that the South China Sea does not experience any aggravations that undermine the peaceful situation in the region and threaten the freedom of navigation. It so happens that the resolution of territorial disputes in the South China Sea is connected with the mode of navigation, that is, the interweaving of problems that are usually solved in a bilateral sovereign manner, as if turns out to be on the same plane with multilateral concerns. But this does not mean mixing them into one artificial node, which can only become more and more confusing and dangerous.

It is necessary to build a framework outline of the Russian position on the South China Sea, based on all the parameters of the development of the situation. Of course, it should have internal mobility, be adequate to the circumstances, and moreover, be able to influence them, including through friendly recommendations based on its own experience and best practices in cultivating an atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding between countries.

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