Vietnam-China relations and South China Sea issues¹

The article by a prominent Vietnamese political scientist, a specialist in Vietnam-China relations, is devoted to the sensitive and acute problem of Vietnam-China differences in the South China Sea. According to the author, the problem of the South China Sea is not only the" most sensitive " in relations between Vietnam and China, but also the "hottest point" in terms of regional security in Southeast Asia, and its solution is related to the peaceful development conditions in the region and world peace.

Keywords: South China (East) Sea, Vietnam-China relations, crisis, territorial waters, exclusive economic zone, continental shelf.

A study of Vietnam-China relations after their normalization (from 1991 to the present day) shows that there are five main problems that differ in nature, but have an unfavorable trend in terms of the development of these relations:

- first, political trust between the two parties and states is constantly declining;

- Secondly, Vietnam's trade deficit is constantly growing;

- Third, Chinese investment in Vietnam has many consequences that hinder its development;

- Fourth, China's "soft power" has an impact on all aspects of life, society and culture in Vietnam;

- fifth, historically inherited problems of territorial borders, and the main one - the problem of the South China Sea - are increasingly plunging relations between the two countries into a state of crisis.

The changing situation in recent years shows that of these five problems, the primary cause and main factor causing tension in relations between Vietnam and China is their conflict in the South China Sea.

South China Sea in China's plans: step up actions to assert its sovereignty

As new successes were achieved, China moved step by step into East Asia, relying on a well-thought-out, large-scale strategy. In almost 40 years of openness and reform, it has achieved many successes that have become an important basis for its entry into the twenty-first century. Its transformation into the second largest and most important power in the world after the United States determined its position and power, and created the prerequisites for

Nguyen Dinh Liem, PhD, Deputy Director of the Institute of Chinese Studies, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences. E-mail: nguyendinhliem99@yahoo.com.

significant regional and global influence. China's strategic plans run until 2025.

The political course outlined by the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of China assumes that the main task of the PRC is to develop the economy on the basis of openness and broad economic cooperation with the region and the rest of the world. But in fact, China's actions in recent years have caused concern around the world, especially in view of its disregard for international law in the South China Sea.

By strengthening its economic potential and military might, China has abandoned its so-called stealth biding its time and stepped up actions aimed at asserting its sovereignty. Our "good neighbor" clearly showed the desire for monopoly dominance in the South China Sea.

China has consistently supported the resolution of disputes in the region through bilateral negotiations, and has always protested against any attempt to do so through multilateral mechanisms. In the year when Vietnam presided over all ASEAN forums, China exerted strong diplomatic pressure to prevent these issues from being included in the agenda of the 17th ASEAN Summit and other related forums.

On June 21, 2012, the National Assembly of Vietnam adopted the Maritime Code. Immediately, the Ministry of Civil Administration of the People's Republic of China issued "An announcement approving the creation of the city of county significance of Xisha, which is responsible for the administration of the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Archipelago and the Pratas Islands (Jungsha) with the administrative center on Fulam Island as part of the Paracel Islands." On July 19, 2012, the Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China officially decided to establish a" military command " on Fulam Island.

On June 23, 2012, the China National Petroleum Company (CNOOC) announced an international tender for 9 blocks for oil production with a total area of 160,129.38 square kilometers, which are completely located in the EEZ and offshore Vietnam.

On November 29, 2012, the People's Council of Hainan Province (PRC) adopted the "Regulations for Maintaining the Security of the maritime Border of Hainan Province". According to this regulation, since January 1, 2013, the provincial border Police has been granted the right to check, detain and expel any foreign vessel that "illegally entered the sea area under the control of local authorities". Public opinion in many countries assessed this action as audacity and arbitrariness.

On May 2, 2014, tensions in the South China Sea increased significantly when China unilaterally moved the Okean 981 drilling rig into Vietnam's EEZ and offshore. About two weeks later, on May 13, 2014, the Philippine Department of Defense released photos showing China urgently building artificial islands on rocky cliffs and coral reefs in the Parsel Islands and Spratly Islands.

On the tidal-flooded Subi Reef in the Spratly Archipelago, where the original area was approximately 100 square meters, China now has a construction site of 76 hectares ( 760,000 square meters) - 760 times the original area of the island, built there an airstrip and a harbor for fishing and patrol vessels. On Johnson Reef (Viet Nam) Gakma) with an area of 4128 sq. m. m China has built an artificial island with an area of 10.9 hectares (109,000 square meters). m) with an earth surface of 4128 sq. m and 6 different objects, with a harbor capable of receiving vessels up to 130 m long.

The same pattern on a number of other rocks and reefs ².

Attempts to encourage tourism development

As in the past, China is now trying to encourage tourism to the Paracel Islands in every possible way, trying to bring all the infrastructure on the islands closer to the mainland

by providing transportation services for travel to these islands, establishing Bank of China branches there that are officially connected to the mainland banking system of the PRC, expanding the television broadcasting network to the established city of Xisha, etc.

Strengthening the Marine Watch service

In order to use the paramilitary forces for defense and control in the South China Sea, China has created a whole flotilla under the leadership of the General Directorate of the Marine Watch. On May 8, 2011, China decided to transfer a new ship with a displacement of 1,500 tons and a length of 88 meters to the squadron conducting patrol service in the South China Sea, thereby bringing the number of ships of its patrol service to 13. China's marine patrol forces are expected to increase from 9,000 to 15,000 by 2020. The number of patrol vessels will increase from 350 in 2015 to 520 in 2020. It was decided to reinforce these forces already in 2015. 16 aerial reconnaissance aircraft.

Growth of capital investment in geological exploration and mining

China's lifespace expansion strategy aims to strengthen and develop the marine economy by increasing oil and gas production and implementing a "deep sea exploration"strategy. The State Oil Corporation of the People's Republic of China (CNOOC) has offered foreign companies 19 blocks for cooperation in oil and gas production in coastal areas, including 12 blocks located in the eastern part and 7 in the western part of the South China Sea. According to the plan, 350 billion yuan ($54 billion) will be invested in the development of these blocks over 5 years. In May 2011, CNOOC commissioned a huge drilling rig, which received N 981. On May 9, 2012, the rig officially started drilling in areas with a depth of 3000 m. This was an extremely important event, marking a new step forward for China in the history of oil and gas exploration, which was transferred from the continent to the sea and from shallow water to deep water areas. It is known that about 70% of oil and gas reserves in the South China Sea are located in deep-water areas (with an area of 1.54 million square meters. km). China became the first country to start independent oil and gas exploration in these areas. Prior to that, exploration drilling on the bottom mainly involved contracts with American and Norwegian companies.

The increase in fish catch was achieved after the introduction of a fleet of ships in the South China Sea, including the floating base "Hai nam bao sha 001" ("Sands of the South Sea"). There are only four such floating bases in the world. It has 4 processing plants on board, where 600 workers work for two weeks. It is accompanied by a tanker with a displacement of 20 thousand tons and a detachment of auxiliary ships. This allows Chinese fishermen to conduct continuous fishing for 9 months. Currently, there are about 27,000 fishing vessels operating in Hainan Province, including about 2,000 with a displacement of 100 tons and above. The director of the Hainan Province Fisheries and Marine Service believes that it is necessary to abandon the outdated attitude "sovereignty is ours, disputes are postponed, used together" and switch to a new formula: "sovereignty is ours, used independently, act actively".

Activation of exploration activities, measurements and mapping of the South China Sea

This is a new policy that China attaches particular importance to and has been actively implementing since 2012. A special department has been created to manage and coordinate the promotion and control of the national card market. This cartographic department publishes all maps related to the South China Sea and maps of the islands of this sea, which are published to promote the political course and at the same time disseminate information about its territory to the masses.

South China Sea in Vietnam's relations with China

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, public opinion was dominated by an optimistic belief that a new period of peace, stability and cooperation in Vietnam-China relations would begin in the South China Sea. This was especially evident immediately after the signing of the Agreement between Vietnam and China on the borders of Territorial Waters, exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf in the Gulf of Bakbo (Tonkin) and the Agreement between the Governments of Vietnam and China on cooperation in fishing in the Bay of Bakbo. At the same time, a joint Statement on comprehensive cooperation between Vietnam and China in the new century was adopted. The real events of recent years have shown that, although the general trend towards peace and stability has so far persisted, the situation in the South China Sea has developed extremely difficult, posing a threat to international relations in the region and the world in general, and in particular to Vietnam-China relations and cooperation between the two countries in maintaining security in East Asia.

As for the South China Sea, the Statement of Vietnam and China in 2000 clearly stated: "The parties undertake to strictly implement the relevant agreements reached between the two countries, actively cooperate, and strive to turn the border between them into a border of peace, friendship and lasting stability. The parties confirm that they will maintain the existing mechanisms of negotiations on maritime issues and will patiently seek through negotiations a fundamental, long-term solution acceptable to both sides. Before the problem is solved, the parties will actively discuss and seek all opportunities for cooperation in such areas as marine environmental protection, meteorology, hydrology, and protection from natural disasters, based on the principle of easy first, and difficult later. At the same time, the parties will not do anything that may further complicate or expand the dispute, will not use force or threaten to use force. The parties should discuss in a timely manner and take the necessary measures to resolve their differences appropriately in a calm and constructive spirit, without allowing these differences to affect the development of normal relations between the parties. " ³

The mutual obligations of Vietnam and China regarding the problems of the South China Sea were fulfilled at first. For a number of years, the situation there remained peaceful. Economic cooperation between Vietnam and China in the Baekbo Bay has been developing. On the other hand, the practice of the past 10 years has shown that the parties ' compliance with their commitments was not easy at all, and this increasingly complicated relations between the two countries.

The experience of the first 10 years of the XXI century has shown that the solution of disputed sovereignty problems and the development of normal cooperation mutually affect each other. Successful solution of one problem creates favorable conditions for solving another and vice versa. Over the past 10 years, the leaders of both countries have generally tried to "discuss and resolve their differences in a timely and dignified manner in a calm and constructive spirit, without allowing these differences to affect the development of normal relations between the parties" in accordance with their obligations under the joint "Statement on Comprehensive Cooperation in the New Century". However, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, the South China Sea has increasingly become a "hot spot" in relations between the two countries, and, as mentioned above, it was the root cause that brought Vietnam's relations with China to the lowest level.

Vietnam and China in dispute over sovereignty in the South China Sea

First of all, we must recognize that the Agreement on the border of territorial Waters, the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf in Bakbo Bay has been signed-

The agreement signed by the Governments of Vietnam and China on December 25, 2000, marked a new stage in the process of dispute resolution in the South China Sea and cooperation between the parties on the use of its resources.

The aforementioned agreement between the Governments of Vietnam and China was an event of great historical significance in relations between the two countries. It is in line with Vietnam's position and the general trend in the world to delineate water areas together with exclusive economic zones and the limits of the continental shelf in cases where the width of this area does not exceed 400 miles. The Agreement established the boundaries of the territorial waters, as well as the EEZ and continental shelf of both sides in Bakbo Bay along the 21st parallel of north latitude, sequentially connected with each other by straight lines. The dividing line left Vietnam with an area approximately 8,000 square kilometers larger than China (in the ratio of 1.135:1). This was a fair and acceptable result for both sides. Although there have been some misunderstandings and minor incidents since the conclusion and entry into force of the Baekbo Gulf Delimitation Agreement, overall peace and stability between the two sides have been maintained, which has contributed to Vietnam-China economic cooperation in the Gulf belt.

The main problem of the South China Sea at present is connected with two archipelagos - the Paracel and Spratly. The Paracel Islands have been completely occupied by China since 1974. The Spratly Archipelago is not only the subject of a bilateral dispute between Vietnam and China, but also the subject of a multilateral dispute between 5 States and 6 parties - Vietnam, China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. Naturally, peace and stability in the South China Sea concern the interests of many states, including the United States, Japan, etc., but first of all, it affects the interests of the Southeast Asian states.

Cooperation for security and development is an important necessity and a natural aspiration of all the South China Sea littoral States in their relations with each other. Since China claims its "undisputed sovereignty" and other States also view their sovereignty in this sea as "of strategic importance that does not allow for any compromise", it seems that in the long term, disputes over sovereignty will not be resolved either through direct negotiations between these States or through the International Court of Justice. Under these circumstances, peace and stability in the South China Sea are not only a vital interest of coastal States, but also affect the interests of countries such as Japan, Korea, the United States, India and others in terms of freedom of navigation and international trade.

The Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea, adopted in Phnom Penh in 2002, was aimed at preserving the status quo, maintaining peace and stability for the sake of cooperation and development in an environment where there was no legally binding code of conduct for the parties. The declaration read: "The parties concerned shall participate in the settlement of territorial disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to threats or the use of armed forces, through a friendly exchange of views and negotiations between the parties directly involved, and based on generally accepted norms of international law, including the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea"⁴. The Declaration also affirmed the freedom of navigation and air traffic in the South China Sea. The participants pledged to refrain from any actions that could complicate or increase disputes and affect peace and stability in the region.

For some time after the adoption of this Declaration, there was not a single military clash between the parties in order to establish sovereignty over the islands. Although the Declaration was not legally binding, and "trust" between the parties was very limited, the preservation of peace and relative stability still created conditions for some progress in security and stability cooperation among the countries of the region.

The problem is that until recently, the 2002 Declaration did not have any specific directives for its application. Everyone is eager to see the East Sea Parties ' Code of Conduct, adopted by ASEAN and China and binding on both sides, finally emerge. The significance of the 2002 Declaration must be confirmed, but it must also be seen that its implementation is indeed difficult. Since 2009 All discussions on the implementation of this Declaration have stalled because of the position of China, which has only been in favor of bilateral negotiations and does not want any multilateral discussions with ASEAN.⁵

From 2007 to the present, China has taken a number of actions that have significantly weakened security in the South China Sea region, and Vietnam-China relations have become more tense. Special attention should be paid to May 2009, when China reacted extremely harshly to the fact that Vietnam and Malaysia jointly submitted their claims to the South China Sea shelf to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. On this occasion, for the first time, China submitted an official note to the UN demanding sovereignty over the sea area within the so - called bull tongue line, which covered more than 80% of the entire water area and included both the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos of Vietnam. Most seriously, from 2011 to the present, China has intensified its hostile actions in the South China Sea, which has led to a complication of the situation in the region at the beginning of the second decade of the XXI century.

Looking back at the Vietnam-China sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea over the past period, we see:

- first, although the expert-level talks between China and Vietnam on the South China Sea issues did not bring the expected results, the very existence of this negotiation mechanism was of some importance and was useful for maintaining stability in relations between the two countries;

- secondly, a full resolution of the sovereignty dispute in the South China Sea in a way that is acceptable to both sides is not possible in the near future due to the complexity of the problem itself. Therefore, all parties, especially China and Vietnam, should take temporary measures that are acceptable to them, based on the principle of "maintaining the status quo" and at the same time ensuring peace and stability, creating conditions for cooperation and development, in order to reach a final solution to the problem through peaceful negotiations in the long term.

Vietnam and China: Economic cooperation in the South China Sea

Vietnam-China economic cooperation in the South China Sea began with the "Baekbo Bay Fishing Cooperation Agreement", which was signed by the Governments of Vietnam and China on December 25, 2000. On this basis, the parties have established a joint seafood fishing area with a width of about 30 miles from the dividing line, lying below 20° north latitude. In the early years of the implementation of the Agreement, coordination between the parties was still weak, and therefore there were several incidents and regrettable clashes. But from 2008 until now, the situation here has started to improve.

In 2004, Prime Ministers Phan Van Khai and Wen Jiabao agreed on a plan for Vietnam-China economic cooperation based on the "one belt and two corridors" model, which opened up a new perspective for trade and economic cooperation between the two countries in the "Baekbo Bay Belt". Bakbo Bay is part of the South China Sea ⁶. On its shores are the Chinese provinces of Guangxi, Guangdong, Hainan and the Vietnamese province of Quang Ninh, the city of Haiphong, the provinces of Thaibin, Nam Dinh, Thanh Hoa and Ngean. These provinces of China and Vietnam have rich oil fields and favorable geographical and natural conditions for development. If mutual relations are established-

As a result, a favourable environment can be created for cooperation between them and complementarity for development.

The Bakbo Bay Economic Belt occupies a very favorable geographical position on the routes between the ASEAN countries and China. Here you can take advantage of large and diverse resources for development. There is a maritime transport system connected to land transport routes. All together, this creates good conditions for economic ties between the surrounding regions.

In July 2006, at the Bakbo Bay Economic Cooperation Forum, organized in Nanning, China, the idea of China - ASEAN economic cooperation based on the "one highway, two wings" model was put forward, in which one of these most important "wings" should be expanded economic cooperation in the Bakbo Bay. According to Chinese experts, the "one belt and two corridors" formula is an important component of the "one highway - two wings"formula⁷. From this, it can be concluded that for China, economic cooperation in the "Baekbo Bay belt" is an integral part of economic cooperation in the extended Baekbo Bay area. For Vietnam, economic cooperation with China in the "Bakbo Bay belt" is also extremely necessary and useful.

The formation of this economic belt will expand all areas of cooperation between China and Vietnam in trade and economic relations, investment, tourism, transport, as well as cultural exchanges, environmental protection, and the exploitation and conservation of the resources of the Baekbo Bay.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, China attached particular importance to the economic development of the South China Sea coastal areas. Therefore, it was forced to actively cooperate with the countries of the region, primarily with Vietnam. Trade and economic relations with the ASEAN countries are of particular importance to China. First of all, they are necessary for further economic growth in the southern provinces of the country. During the first 20 years of the reforms, the opening of coastal areas took place. Their economy grew rapidly. The gulf began to create better conditions for development, although this happened almost 10 years later than in other coastal areas. China has been increasing trade and economic cooperation with Vietnam and with ASEAN in general.

For the coastal States of the "extended Bakbo Bay Area", cooperation in the use of marine resources is of great importance. There is even an opinion that in terms of hydrocarbon reserves, the South China Sea can be compared with the Middle East region. It is obvious that China and the Southeast Asian countries are experiencing an increasing and rapidly growing need for oil and gas. According to the US Energy Information Agency, the demand of the South China Sea littoral states for crude oil in 2025 will amount to 15.1 million barrels. per day ⁸. The development of oil and gas fields in the South China Sea is the most important motive that encourages the countries of the region to defend their sovereignty here. But this issue will take a long time to resolve, during which the" thirst " for oil and natural gas in China and other countries in the region will increase more and more.

It is necessary to find some temporary ways of "joint development" of these resources. But an insurmountable obstacle in this regard was the question of the location of such joint production of hydrocarbons. In principle, the parties may share only those parts of the sea that they consider to be disputed. But in practice, there are areas that some countries consider their own, while others, on the contrary, consider them disputed. Therefore, the formula "temporarily postpone disputes and develop them together" proposed by China is actually difficult to implement. This was clearly demonstrated by the practice of its application in joint geological surveys of the three parties in the South China Sea in 2005-2008. China has put forward the "put disputes aside and develop them together" policy, meaning that it will retain its sovereignty.

Cooperation on fisheries in Bakbo Bay has also not escaped the influence of sovereignty disputes. The South China Sea is considered one of the richest places in the world in terms of seafood resources. It has up to 2,500 species of seafood and 500 species of coral. The total amount of annually produced products reaches 8 million tons and accounts for 10% of global production. While sovereignty was delineated in Bakbo Bay, sovereignty disputes in other remaining areas of the South China Sea have become a major obstacle to seafood production, especially for Vietnamese fishermen who traditionally fish in the Paracel Islands and Spratly regions. China, at its own discretion, detains Vietnamese fishing vessels, and even fires at fishermen (events of 2005), unilaterally declares a ban on fishing in a number of areas of the South China Sea for an arbitrarily set period. Thus, the fishing moratorium imposed by China in 2010 was implemented for 10 weeks from May to July. Therefore, cooperation between Vietnam and China in the development of South China Sea resources is very limited. It can be expanded if the current tense situation there improves.

In short, relations between Vietnam and China have alternated between warming up and becoming tense again in recent years, depending on the problems of the South China Sea. This was reflected in two areas: disputes over islands and sea areas, and trade and economic cooperation.

The South China Sea and regional security challenges

Disputes in the South China Sea have arisen since the beginning of the 20th century, but have become particularly acute and complex since about the second half of the 20th century. During this period, disputes over sovereignty over the islands were closely linked to the development of the law of the sea (from the 1958 Geneva Convention to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea), with the development of oil production from the seabed and the growing international importance of transport links passing through this sea. From a geopolitical, geostrategic and economic point of view, the South China Sea is not only a dispute over islands and sea areas between Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei, on the one hand, and China and Taiwan, on the other, but geostrategic contradictions between the powers that have interests in the region, primarily the United States, are growing. and China. Its military activities, especially recent measures to strengthen control over the South China Sea, seriously threaten peace and regional security.

China's regional security plans

The South China Sea is both a shield protecting China's security from the south, and its sea gate, through which, bypassing India, it enters the Middle East and Africa. It is seen by China as a springboard where its military control is necessary in order to eliminate any external threat. Military bases in the southern part of mainland China, linked to bases in the South China Sea and along the shores of the Indian Ocean, form a "pearl necklace" of reference points stretching to the Middle East. China is well aware of the importance of access to the sea and that China's rise and prosperity should be based on the use of the seas, as has been the case in the past with many countries such as Spain, Portugal, Holland, England, Japan and the United States. With the idea of becoming the master of the ocean, building a powerful maritime power, the XVIII CPC Congress officially approved the country's maritime strategy, which declared its determination to strengthen the development of marine resources, develop the marine economy, protect the environmental environment, rights and state interests at sea.

China is expected to achieve its goal of becoming a maritime power around the period 2030-2035. One of the plans of the leaders of China related to this status is that countries such as Japan, the Philippines

and Vietnam, "could no longer make the weather" and " gradually got used to using the prosperity of the economy of greater China for their own development in the conditions of economic and political dependence on China."⁹ The grandiose plan to build a powerful maritime power is aimed at making China the master of the Pacific Ocean, establishing economic and geopolitical dominance on the mainland.

Almost all ASEAN forums and the East Asia Summit, despite China's protests, discuss the South China Sea issue. There have been times when China has been isolated in these international forums, which has harmed Chinese diplomacy. China is encouraging the world's major powers, especially the United States, to rapidly re-strengthen their positions in Asia. The fact that China is increasing the power of its navy also encourages countries in the region and beyond to strive for greater connectivity.

At present, China is facing contradictions in the South China Sea on three levels:

- with the States that have declared their sovereignty in this sea;

- from the USA;

- with countries that have "related interests", such as Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, and Australia.

China has pushed its closest partners towards unilateral rapprochement, encouraging them to form a bloc, and has led to the formation of a "soft" alliance with them in the South China Sea. At the same time, his actions led to the fact that some countries that do not want China's intervention, formed an unfriendly environment against him.

US return to Asia-creating balance or strategic confrontation?

The "return of the United States to Asia" under the Obama administration also means its " return to the South China Sea." The goals of this "return" were clearly shown in the speech of then US Secretary of Defense P. M. Gates at the IX Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore ¹⁰. In it, Gates made it clear that the United States will intervene if a country "uses force" to resolve disputes or obstructs freedom of navigation.

The" return " of the United States to Asia looks like a real chance to implement the idea of strategic balance in the region. Although no one can predict whether the 21st century will become the "American century of Asia-Pacific" or the Chinese one with the return of the United States to Asia, everyone can easily see that the main trend in the region is related to Sino-American relations of cooperation and at the same time fierce geopolitical and economic competition between them.

In fact, the United States has never left Asia. "Returning to Asia" for the United States in practice means resuming and strengthening its role in the Western Pacific. The United States expanded trade and economic relations, completed negotiations on the creation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and strengthened its military presence. Objectively, the "return of the United States to Asia" is aimed at easing China's pressure on the countries of the region, which also had to make appropriate adjustments to their policies in order to get the maximum benefit from this. In this regard, the Philippines and Myanmar are two examples of fairly significant strategic changes.

By pursuing a policy of expanding allied ties, the United States has strengthened the Philippines ' self-confidence by encouraging a tougher response to Chinese pressure. The easing of Chinese pressure also allowed Myanmar to decide to renew its political and economic institutions through reforms and openness, to start democratizing and creating a market economy, and to integrate into the regional and global community.

The consequences of the American "return to Asia" in each country have their own characteristics, but in general they have two sides: positive and negative, they give a chance and at the same time they are a challenge. The return of the United States to Southeast Asia is part of their overall "return to Asia". Unlike the NEA, where the US has important military allies-Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in addition to them-in Southeast Asia, the US has only the Philippines and Thailand as "non-NATO allies", as well as close ties with Singapore. In addition, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei and the three countries of Indochina all have their own peculiarities in relations with the United States and China.

Over the years, China has rapidly increased its influence in ASEAN. At the same time, it cannot be said that the US position in Southeast Asia has greatly weakened or become weaker than China's. Politically, the United States has allies, but China has none. In military terms, the advantage clearly remains on the side of the United States. In trade and economic relations, China occupies a strong, but not strong position. The United States strengthens and promotes trade and economic relations with the ASEAN countries. The geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China in Southeast Asia has a comprehensive impact on all Southeast Asian countries. Countries allied to the United States continue to rely on their support, but at the same time limit the confrontation with China. Myanmar is opening the door wide for rapprochement with the United States and the West, but at the same time does not interrupt its relations with China. Other countries also maintain a balance in their relations with the United States and China. The ASEAN foreign policy course as a whole as a regional organization is also aimed at maintaining this balance in relations with the United States and China.

Vietnam is a special case. It maintains its traditional relations with China, with which it shares a common political system, but at the same time feels serious pressure from it regarding the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The United States is an important partner of Vietnam, but cooperation with the United States also presents Vietnam with challenges that require caution and vigilance. Vietnam's policy is based on an attitude of independence, self-reliance, flexibility of political course, appropriate response and changes depending on the situation in each area and in each specific case.

The shift of the center of gravity in the US strategy and economy in the Asia-Pacific region directly affected China's policy in the South China Sea and significantly increased the geopolitical and economic contradictions between them. In order to avoid conflict, both sides try to steer the relationship towards harmony in order to meet mutual interests.

Conclusion

The South China Sea has not only geopolitical and geo-economic, but also important geostrategic significance. The South China Sea problem has become an urgent global problem. That is why disputes in this area for China are not limited to the framework of Vietnam-China relations and regional security.

Countries such as the United States, Russia, India, Japan, and Australia have certain interests in the South China Sea. Therefore, in disputes over its problems, there is always their participation. When disputes reach a global scale, their resolution requires multilateral methods with the participation of many parties and with certain rules of conduct that comply with international law. The role of major Powers in disputes and clashes in the South China Sea is extremely important. They serve as a counterweight to China, create a balance of power, and are also a force standing between the participants in the confrontation. In practice, there is a dispute between China, as a newly emerging power with its own plans for global strategy, on the one hand, and on the other - a number of Southeast Asian countries, which are significantly weaker compared to China. The fact that a number of other-

The participation of all major Powers in this dispute, although on a limited scale, helps and promotes the resolution of the dispute and the entire conflict.

For Vietnam, the problem of the South China Sea is currently and will continue to be the most sensitive in relations with China and the most "hot spot" in terms of regional security. Vietnam faces the challenge of clearly defining its short -, medium-and long-term goals in the South China Sea in the economic, political and military fields. It should work out a diplomatic course in relations with China, the United States, and the ASEAN countries, including those that participate and do not participate in the dispute with China. In the long term, defining the scope of Vietnam's sovereignty in the South China Sea is also of paramount importance. After specifying the specific boundaries of sovereignty, the goals of the struggle for the return or protection of this sovereignty can also be determined. In the medium term, based on the current situation and possible developments, it is necessary to develop domestic and foreign policies, economic, political and military measures that will serve these goals.

In the short term until 2020, Vietnam's goal in the disputed areas is to "maintain the status quo". In terms of its content, this goal is also divided into three tasks::

- Strengthen and reliably protect the areas in which Vietnam already has sovereignty;

- persistently seek the return of the islands that were under the sovereignty of Vietnam, but are currently occupied by our opponents (first of all, these are the Paracel Islands);

- Cooperate with all parties (China, the United States, and ASEAN) in protecting peace, stability,and joint development in the South China Sea.

Based on these requirements, it is necessary to build foreign policy relations with China and the ASEAN countries, especially with those who are involved in disputes in the South China Sea, with the United States and with other countries that have their own interests there.

With China's increasingly powerful rise, Vietnam needs even stronger national consensus and clearer and more unified policies to create better conditions in its relations with China.

We can say that the problems of the South China Sea are the key to Vietnam-China relations, which China holds in its hands. But you can be sure that under any conditions, Vietnam will have enough intelligence and wisdom, the ability to combine the national strength of the people with the driving forces of the era for reliable protection of the Motherland, development and construction of a rich country.

Based on the unified position of the Vietnamese Government outlined above, the solution of disputed problems in the South China Sea is related not only to state and national interests, but also to peaceful development conditions in the region and world peace. As for future years, the following conclusions suggest themselves::

It is necessary to use all means to eliminate the factors causing unrest in the South China Sea. Peace, cooperation and stability in this sea are in the interests of all related States and the whole world. In no case should we allow the solution of the South China Sea problems to cause contradictions within our people and lead to the undermining of social stability. To do this, we believe that Vietnam should conduct direct negotiations with the participating countries, both for the sake of common interests and for the sake of the interests of each country individually. It is necessary to apply the principle of "you sit in my seat, and I'll sit in yours" to discuss and find an acceptable solution for both parties. In solving every problem in the South China Sea, international law must be respected.

It is necessary to strengthen diplomatic activity, ensure that the whole world supports Vietnam's position on the South China Sea issues, and adhere to the principle of maintaining the status quo. It is possible to consider the possibility of sharing the resources of the South China Sea in disputed areas on the basis of joint sovereignty of the disputing parties.

China may very well disagree with our diplomatic strategy on South China Sea issues. However, the success of relevant international scientific conferences held in Hanoi in recent years has shown high appreciation for this policy. Therefore, it is necessary to continue to introduce it even more widely, both in the consciousness of the world community and within the country. It is necessary to create an organizational framework for the participation of informal organizations and the exchange of opinions, building consensus between the party and the people, and not allowing the problems of the South China Sea to turn into internal national contradictions that lead to the undermining of social stability. Due to the complexity and importance of these problems, we should calmly look for the most profitable and feasible ways to solve them.

1. The author uses the Vietnamese name "East Sea" in the original article, which has been changed to "South China Sea" (SCM). - Editor's note.

2. URL: http://vietnamnet.vn/vn/tuanvietnam/240162...

3. Tuyen bo chung ve hop tac toan dien trong the ky moi giua nuac CHXHCN Viet Nam va nuoc CHND Trung Hoa: [General Declaration on Comprehensive Cooperation between Vietnam and China]. 26.12.2000.

4. Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. URL: http://www.aseansec.org.

5. Adiplomatic viclong for China // South China Morning Post. 31.10.2009.

6. Bakbo Bay has an area of more than 126,000 square kilometers. In the widest part, it extends for 310 km, and in the narrowest - 207 km.

7. Vi Thu Tien. "Mot truc hai canh" va "Hai hanh lang, mot vanh dai" // Ky yeu Hoi thao. Hanoi: Nxb Khoa hoc Xa hoi, 2007, tr 61-62: [Vi Thu Thien. "One axis - two wings" and "One belt-two corridors" / / Proceedings of the symposium. Hanoi: Publishing House "Social Sciences", 2007. pp. 61-62].

8. URL: http://www.cia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/south China Sea/ Back ground.html.

9. URL: http://www.biendong.net/binh-luan/1118-trong-1-trinh-tr-thanh-cng-quc-bin-trung-quc-s-khong-tha-hip-v-ch-quyn.html; http://nguoilotgach.blogspot.com.au/2013/01/trung-quoc-xay-dung-cuong-quoc-bien.html.

10. Robert M.Gates. Strengthening Security Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific. [Speech at the 9th High-level Conference on Asian Security. The Shangri-la dialogue. Singapore. June 5, 2010].

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