The civilizational method of studying history is one of the most widespread in modern science. Starting with A. Toynbee, who believed that the study of civilizations is an "intelligible field of historical research", this method was used to describe civilizations. Moreover, it should be noted that this applied to the analysis of already established civilizations. The novelty of the study is that the author uses this method to understand the phenomena associated with the formation of a new civilization that unites the countries of Southeast Asia (SE). It examines the issues of civilizational formation, the relationship of this process with globalization, as well as obstacles to the formation of regional identity. The research is in line with the most important directions developed by the Institutes of the History and Philology Department of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

This problem is also relevant for Russia, where today the task of strengthening the all-Russian identity within a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional country is acute.

Before moving on to the main content, you should determine your understanding of the very concept of civilization. If we accept that a civilization is a community connected together by a set of basic meanings and united by a political or religious idea, then the justification of the civilization of Southeast Asia requires only evidence. If by civilization we mean a certain level of material and spiritual culture and social development, then we mean others, respectively. If the concept of civilization is based on elements of unconscious sympathy (reciprocity) and altruism of interacting communities, then - third.

Such a variety of scientific ideas about the term "civilization" itself greatly complicates the study of the issue, because we are faced with the use of the same concept in different and sometimes poorly comparable contexts. I have tried to adhere to the first of the above-mentioned definitions of civilization, because it seems that this definition most fully expresses the very essence of the concept of civilization in its historical context.

Based on this approach, it is possible to structure numerous studies on the history and culture of Southeast Asian countries, identifying at least two oss-

The article was written in the framework of the research project RGNF 07-01-00081a.

Materials provided by A. A. Agadzhanyan, I. V. Podberezsky and D. V. Deopik at the scientific conference on the problems of civilizational development of Southeast Asia held in IMEMO RAS in 2004 were used in the preparation of the article. The author also expresses his gratitude to G. F. Murasheva, V. A. Tyurin, and A.M. Khazanov for valuable advice in preparing the final version of this text.

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new concepts that are widely spread among researchers in this region.

Proponents of the first concept proceed from the fact that Southeast Asia is a heterogeneous and disconnected region, which has been characterized by a civilizational mosaic since time immemorial. They see Southeast Asia as a chaos of peoples and languages, a mixture of religions, races, civilizations, economies, and polities. Their general opinion is that Southeast Asia is divided into spheres of influence of Indian and Chinese cultures, and there is no single cultural field in the region, and there is no single artistic style, which in other regions just indicates a civilizational unity. In addition, it is difficult for Southeast Asia to find a general idea that should permeate the historical path of any significant civilization: (Hall, 1958; Acharya, 2000; Geertz, 1980; Wolters, 1999).

This concept is closely related to some other approaches, in which the history of Southeast Asia is considered as an endless confrontation and struggle of local states, as a zone of clash of world religions. Naturally, the proponents of these concepts do not even want to hear about the continuous existence of a special civilization in Southeast Asia. When applied to the present day, they usually claim that unification processes in the region are fragile, that serious contradictions remain between the ASEAN member countries, and that no new South-East Asian identity can be formed.

The weakness of all these concepts is that the objective reality of the past forty years in the history of Southeast Asian countries does not support these conclusions. During these years, Southeast Asia has evolved from a global periphery to one of the fastest growing regions in the world. Local elites have managed to formulate goals, interests and principles that unite them, and on this basis have taken a huge step towards mutual integration, peacefully resolving most of the long-standing regional conflicts. Without deep foundations of internal unity, it is impossible to achieve such results in countries whose populations profess different, sometimes competing religions(Buddhism, Islam and Christianity), and the type of state power varies from a democratic republic (the Philippines) to a communist (Vietnam) or military (Burma) dictatorship.

The concept that I put forward can be called the concept of primordial unity. Its essence lies in the fact that, despite the diversity of peoples, languages, and religions, Southeast Asia has something in common that connects all the ethnic groups living here.

In the economic sphere, it is an irrigation-based rice farm, which has been used since ancient times by the population of the valleys of large and medium-sized rivers.

In the social sphere, it is an exceptionally strong community based on a common type of economy - rice production. The communal organism gave rise to an extremely important and most numerous social group for all the countries of the region - the free peasants. Southeast Asia has always been characterized by great social mobility, where a peasant could become a military officer, an official or a monk.

In the spiritual sphere, these are traditions, customs, archetypes of consciousness, especially the cult of ancestors. It is from them that a person who professes Islam, Buddhism or Christianity still receives the main sanction for their behavior. Equally important is the cult of the community's guardian spirits, which is common to most Southeast Asian peoples. This is a supranational cult that is always tied to a specific village-community and does not combine into more complex structures. Even today, among the common cultural and religious dominants, the cult of ancestors and spirits is not just a type of early religiosity, but a fundamental form of religious beliefs and practices that has survived despite all influences.

Moreover, at the level of power, this cult was transformed into the cult of royal ancestors, as well as into the cult of the sacred, and in some cases even deified,

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the tsar. The cult of ancestral spirits, as well as the cult of the deified ruler associated with them, form the original general ideological and spiritual substrate that can be found almost everywhere in Southeast Asia.

Later, world religions (first Buddhism, then Islam, and even later Christianity) overlapped with this substrate. At the same time, world religions did not suppress or displace traditional cults, but rather supplemented them, dramatically expanding the boundaries of the worldview and the level of spiritual culture of the Southeast Asian ethnic groups. The basic sacred layer-the cult of ancestors and spirits continues to actively exist today and is recorded, as a rule, in oral form (folklore, myth, folk theater). The world's religions, as well as the literary and artistic traditions associated with them, are based on written practice and are built around sacred texts. The interaction between these two layers generates mixed forms that combine oral and written traditions, and indicates the immanent ability of local cultures to borrow new knowledge without destroying the old one. This is also evident now, when the process of modernization - the assimilation of the meanings of Western civilization - does not displace established religious and spiritual views, but rather finds its niche, determining behavior in the field of business and labor relations.

In the field of family and business relations, what is common for the entire region is the system of counting relatives on both lines, and traditional mutual assistance in the community, and the habit of making a decision after a long and thorough discussion, in which everyone participates with the intention not to argue and prove their case, but to reach agreement and compromise.

Evidence of the historical unity of the countries of the region can be considered the general looseness and instability of the elites. Despite all the splendor of elite culture, its status symbols and attributes, the mechanism of status retention and inheritance was not developed, and where it was tried to create (Panji in the Javanese-Malay world, Khloni and Comraten ani in Angkor Cambodia), the result was rather negative. In historical retrospect, we can say that there was practically no aristocracy as a class in the region, dynasties changed quite often, and the elite was formed on the basis of blood-related proximity to the ruler. The elite here has always been a hierarchy of people close to power and serving the ruler. All her property was granted in feeding state land or state revenue places (port duties, tax collection), the right to which depended on the position.

At the same time, one cannot help but wonder whether the above-mentioned examples are a sign of a common civilization, or whether they constitute only a certain historical foundation that does not correspond to a full-fledged civilization in any way. The fact is that it is impossible to deny the fact that in Southeast Asia, traditional cults have not been transformed into some common global worldview and religious concepts that would emphasize the unity and independence of the region. Here, borrowed world religions were superimposed on their foundation. The reasons why this happened are still the subject of lively discussions, but for me it is important that a civilization like the Chinese or Indian one, capable of independently generating new meanings and religious ideas, has not appeared in Southeast Asia. Rather, we can speak of three main types of socio-political structure: Vietnamese (feudal-bureaucratic), maritime or Malay (military-feudal), and Indochina-Javanese (state-patriarchal) [Mosyakov and Tyurin, 2004, pp. 60-73]. In this regard, when studying the history of Southeast Asia, there is a feeling of a civilization that is not fully built, a certain house in which the builders built the foundation, but the upper floor was never completed.

By the way, this feeling arises not only among the outside European observer, but also among politicians and scientists in the Southeast Asian countries. At one time Nurdin So-

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fie, head of the Malaysian Strategic Planning Center, told me that the weakness of Southeast Asia has always been that the peoples of the region have not been aware of their unity and cultural affinity, that they have not been united by any common goal or religious idea. He argued that if the Southeast Asian countries want to take their rightful place in the world, this weakness must be eliminated and the future built on the model of the European Union. To achieve this goal, in his opinion, it is necessary to "reach" the community of Southeast Asia to a full-fledged modern civilization with a common view of the world, a common identity and a common historical mythology, a common understanding of goals and a sense of common destiny, a common market, common rules and regulations.

Another well-known politician in Southeast Asia, long-time chairman of the National Assembly of Cambodia Chea Sim, referring to the same problem, noted that "we (Khmer) should overcome old prejudices against Thais and Vietnamese, should not cultivate resentment, but highlight all the common things that unite us."

The idea that a sense of shared history and culture should spread among all the peoples of Southeast Asia has dominated the views of intellectual elites and the spiritual atmosphere of the region for many years. Thus, as early as 1981, prominent historians and politicians of the ASEAN countries expressed the opinion that " there should be an ASEAN culture that is materialistic, but subject to the restraining influences of Asian spirituality, scientific, but without hostility to religious life and traditions, rationalistic, but appreciating folk art, customs and mores." The spread of this common culture and the associated common identity should be similar to the way world religions were established in the region at one time, within the framework of the universal principle of complementarity for Southeast Asia, without in any way displacing national and state identity [ASEAN..., 1981, p. 327; ASEAN..., 1999, p. 217].

Hopes for the success of this project are reinforced by the fact that a new system of attitudes and self-identification is being implemented in the context of an obvious transition of societies in Southeast Asia. Major social changes (the growth of the middle class and urban population), noticeable changes in the field of education (an increase in the number of literate and educated people), other living and working conditions for millions-all this undoubtedly contributes to the introduction of new ideas and ideas. Obvious progress has already been made on the integration path. This includes the sense of regional community and solidarity demonstrated by all countries of the region during the devastating financial and economic crisis of 1997-1998, pride in the transformation of ASEAN into one of the most successful and influential international organizations, and successful efforts aimed at increasing mutual exchanges and trade, as well as joint cultural and economic projects. All this makes us take a fresh look at the problem of the formation of civilizations, which usually developed without the conscious efforts of their carriers and creators.

I would like to elaborate on the complex of measures for the formation of a common identity, because this issue is very relevant for the modern world torn by contradictions and is especially important for Russia, where the problem of civilizational identity of all ethnic and cultural communities that are part of the Russian Federation has not yet been solved.

Modern civilizational construction in Southeast Asia is based on a clear understanding of the need for this process by the elites of the Southeast Asian countries. As The Straits Times, one of the region's most respected newspapers, has pointed out, "economic integration and security cooperation are impossible without building a common sense of the ASEAN member states 'shared socio - cultural consciousness" [The Straits Times]. Two groups of processes can be distinguished in the formation of this "general feeling":: a) directly related to changes in state policy and b) related to changes in the public consciousness of national societies.

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The first group includes formalized processes of political and economic rapprochement, signing documents on the development of common trade, and foreign policy coordination.

It is more interesting to study the second group of processes related to the actual civilizational construction and the formation of regional identity. At the same time, special attention is paid to the idea of compromise as a kind of global civilizational reality inherent in all Southeast Asian countries. This compromise manifests itself in strict non-interference in the internal affairs of the countries of the region, in the rejection of strict criteria regarding the observance of human rights or the nature of the political regime in a particular country. Everything can be resolved at the negotiating table, you can always find a mutually acceptable compromise, make mutual concessions-these are some general principles that are approved in the policy of the ruling elites of the countries of the region.

An equally significant role is played by outright myth-making about the common past of the countries of the region. It is argued that their historical development was initially based on common values. Wars in Southeast Asia are declared not so much interstate as civil, which took place within the same country. This is how the wars of the Vietnamese and the Tam, the Burmese and the Mon, the Malays and the Thais are now interpreted. Everything that concerns common destinies (for example, the fight against colonialism) is emphasized; everything that concerns enmity between countries is obscured. The task is to create a sense of common historical destinies among new generations.

Attention is also paid to educating the younger generation within the framework of a new historical mythology, in an atmosphere of cooperation and understanding of their neighbors. Neighbors - close relatives - this is the motto of most textbooks on history, built from the standpoint of cultural and historical proximity of the countries of the region and aimed at demonstrating this community. So, in modern Cambodian textbooks, Vietnam's annexation of the so-called Kampuchea krom (Saigon region) is mentioned only in passing, although for decades this topic was one of the most acute in the Khmer national consciousness. Similarly, issues of territorial claims and historical grievances of other countries in the region are increasingly relegated to the background (the Philippines 'claims to Sabah, the Indonesians' claims to Sarawak, and the Malaysians ' claims to Southern Thailand, etc.).

The project of forming a common identity of Southeast Asian residents is being implemented under the supervision of the Committee on Social and Cultural Activities of the ASEAN countries, as well as the Committee on Media. The expansion of mutual contacts is financed from a special cultural fund established in 1978.

Despite all the success and thoughtfulness of this program, it is impossible not to point out obvious threats that can undermine the chances of ultimate success. These threats have nothing to do with the unwillingness of intellectual and political elites to deepen the integration process or play the national card. The main challenges to the process of forming a South-East Asian identity come from outside, from other civilizations, primarily Chinese and Islamic.

The reason for this is that the cultural and political attitudes of both the majority of ethnic Chinese (Huaqiao) living in the Southeast Asian countries and millions of local Muslims have changed dramatically recently. They are increasingly identifying themselves with the Chinese and Islamic civilizations, respectively. As for the Chinese, sociologists and cultural scientists have observed that they have become much less willing to integrate into the cultural world of Southeast Asian countries. Previously, the Chinese tended to emphasize their desire to become members of Thai, Khmer, or Indonesian societies. They married local women, learned local languages, and took local surnames. Now all that has changed. New Chinese expats do not

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they strive to integrate into local societies, often do not know local languages, and live in rather closed national communities. Moreover, against the background of China's success in economic construction, strengthening its economic and political positions in the region, Chinese nationalism is growing and confidence that sooner or later the Chinese yuan will become the currency of the Southeast Asian countries, and the Chinese language will become generally accepted within the emerging common market of the Southeast Asian countries and the PRC. If we take into account that there are more than 30 million Chinese in Southeast Asia and they dominate the local economy, it is obvious that without solving the problem of integrating Chinese people into the Southeast Asian community, the success of integration processes is problematic. The Chinese in Southeast Asia are more likely to use all their power to accelerate the integration of China and the ASEAN countries than to achieve intraregional rapprochement.

The problem is even more complex with Muslims, especially in areas such as Aceh in Indonesia, Mindanao in the Philippines, or among the Malays of Southern Thailand. According to most researchers, the influence of this religion has increased dramatically in recent years, thanks to the infusion of Arab money in support of various Islamic educational, educational and political funds. This was not due to an increase in the number of adherents, but due to the fact that the influence of Islam deepens and undermines the traditional cult of ancestors and spirits, the common foundation on which a new regional identity is largely built. There are more and more devout Muslims in the region who sympathize with Salafists and Wahhabis, opposing themselves to the Muslim traditions of the Southeast Asian countries. The so-called new Muslims who were educated in Saudi Arabia and the Arab East, or in local madrassas taught by the same Saudis and their students, increasingly relate their civilizational identity to the world of Islam, and not to the traditional world of Southeast Asia. Moreover, today it is the supporters of radical Islam who, under the slogan of the autonomous movements of Aceh, Moro and Malays of Southern Thailand, have actually launched a guerrilla war against the existing regimes, putting forward demands not only for independence and autonomy, but also for a full-scale transition to Sharia law, which directly contradicts the policy of regional integration. All this fully confirms the well-known judgment of Ortega y Gasset that in the modern world the masses are more clearly aware of their civilizational affiliation than of the state, and are guided more by the former than the latter, more by instincts than rationality. In the context of growing Muslim extremism and intolerance towards non-Believers, it is hardly possible to talk about positive prospects for a common self-identification of local Buddhists, Christians, Muslims and Confucians.

Thus, today there is a twofold process in the region: on the one hand, the efforts of local ruling elites to form a regional identity and strengthen mutual integration and unity on the common foundation of political and economic interests and traditional values, and on the other - obvious threats to this process from strong and established civilizations (Chinese and Islamic). The historical paradox is that in the early Middle Ages in the IV-VII centuries, similar external influences prevented the formation of a full-scale civilization within the Southeast Asian region. Today, at a new stage of development, the situation repeats itself. Perhaps such a collision is the historical fate of the Southeast Asian civilization.

list of literature

Mosyakov D. V. Tyurin V. A. Istoriya Yugo-Vostochnoy Azii [History of Southeast Asia]. Moscow, 2004.

Hall D. J. E. Istoriya Yugo-Vostochnoy Azii [History of Southeast Asia], Moscow, 1958.
Acharya A. The Quest for Identity. International Relations in South East Asia. Oxford University Press, 2000.

ASEAN: Identity, Development and Culture. Queson City, 1981.

ASEAN: Path to Identity. Bangkok, 1999.

Geertz A. Negara the Theater State in XIX Century Bali. Princeton University Press, 1980.

The Straits Times. 21.01.2007.

Wolters O.M. History, Culture and Religion in Southeast Asian Perspectives. Ithaca: Cornell University. N.Y., 1999.

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