1In the second half of the 13th century, the Mongol conquests covered a significant part of the Old World. Some countries surrendered to the brutal invaders almost without a fight, others resigned themselves after fierce resistance, and others did not submit under any conditions. Among the latter were Vietnam, Tyampa, Mamluk Egypt, and the Delhi Sultanate.

This article analyzes the behavior of the Vietnamese during the Mongol-Chinese invasions in the second half of the 13th century, examines the understanding of this behavior recorded in ideological standards (presented in chronicles), and then compares it with the types of behavior and ideological standards of the Orthodox civilization in its Russian version, which was also subjected to Mongol aggression in the 13th century.

Keywords: Daiwet, Yuan, Mongol-Chinese, Kublai, Toghan, Champa, scorched earth tactics.

It should be noted that the model of resisting Mongol aggression "to the death" did not arise suddenly for the Vietnamese, but was developed gradually, during successive stages of the struggle against aggression [Ryabinina, 2009]. So, during the first attack on Vietnam in 1257, the courageous behavior of the Vietnamese elite (namely, the behavior of the highest strata of society - relatives of the emperor, high officials, mountain princes is described in sources) was combined with acts of cowardice and cowardice shown by its representatives.

The first type included: 1) the brave behavior of the Emperor Chiang Thai Tong (1226-1258), who "led the regiments and led the battle in the vanguard, not paying attention to the flying arrows and stones" [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 22a] (later the emperor and his heir won a victory over the Mongols in the battle near Dongbodau) [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 22a]; 2) the courage of the Vietnamese military official Le Phu Tran, who refused to retreat and "rode alone among the enemy battle formations" [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 22a], then "covered the emperor from arrows with ship planks", and when Still, it was time to retreat - " following the emperor

1 From 1218 to 1259, Mongol forces invaded Korea. Finally, in 1259, the Korean ruler personally came to the court of Kublai and expressed submission: wang Wonjong not only recognized the rule of the Mongols, but also used their help in the fight against his opponents. The Burmese state of Pagan in 1287 was captured by the troops of Yunnan Province alone, the capital was destroyed, and in place of Pagan a new administrative unit of the Mongol Mianzhong was created. A vassal ruler was placed on the throne. Only 16 years later, in 1303, the Mongol-Chinese occupation forces were withdrawn from Burma. In Java, one of the pretenders to the throne, Prince Vijaya, in 1293 took advantage of the invasion of the 20-thousandth Mongol army to seize the throne, after which he recognized himself as a vassal of the Yuan dynasty. However, Vijaya soon led the fight against the aggressors, defeated the posts and garrisons of the Mongols, who divided their forces, and, taking advantage of the remoteness of Java from China and the inability to quickly send reinforcements, in the same year, 1293, forced the Yuan troops to return home. Japan, despite two military expeditions of Mongol-Chinese troops in 1274 and 1281, was never conquered. But the Japanese were helped by the elements.

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and held a secret council with him "2 [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 22b]; 3) a decisive statement by the military commander Chan Thu Do, who firmly assured the ruler:" Until my head falls to the ground, Your Majesty does not need to worry about these misfortunes " [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 22b]; 4) the same category of" heroes "includes the mountain prince Ha Bong, who gathered a detachment of" barbarians " and inflicted a heavy defeat on the Mongols during the retreat [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l.22b].

The second type of behavior can be attributed to the cowardice of the warlord Chan Nhat Hieu, who wrote the hieroglyphs "run [to] the Sunnah" on board the ship [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 22b]. Not so much cowardly as offended was the warlord Hoang Ky Da, who did not get the "imperial mango" (mango fruits distributed among the soldiers by the emperor himself). Holding a grudge, when the Mongols advanced, he "took to flight in a light boat" and mocked the Vietnamese soldiers who sailed towards him [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 23a]. It should be noted that the Emperor Chiang Thai Tong was very lenient about the weakness of Hoang Ky Da and replaced the death penalty and the extermination of his family with atonement for military merit and victories over the enemy in future battles [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l.23a]. Apparently, the intensity of the anti-Mongol struggle in Vietnam in 1257 did not yet lead to the degree of bitterness that did not involve pardoning traitors.

The situation was different 28 years later, when in 1285 the Mongol-Chinese troops of the Yuan dynasty made a decisive attempt to capture Vietnam.

In 1279, Mongol troops conquered Southern China. The Southern Song Dynasty fell, and the Mongols moved to the border with Vietnam [East in the Middle Ages, 1995, p. 386].

From 1257 to 1285, the Mongols did not invade Vietnam. During this period, the relationship between the Yuan and the Changs underwent changes: from a tough confrontation to a significant easing of tension, from formal concessions made by the Vietnamese in the sphere of state sovereignty (while not compromising real independent policy), to obtaining certain privileges and again to recognizing a higher degree of ritual submission to the Mongols (Ryabinina, 2009).

At the end of 1282, Emperor Kublai demanded that the Vietnamese authorities grant passage through the territory of Daiviet to Tyampu to the land Mongol-Chinese army (the 200-thousandth Yuan army had already been put on 350 ships and sent to the borders of its southern neighbor - Vietnam). The ruler Tran Nyan Tong not only refused the Mongols ' request, but also sent Vietnamese combat troops and ships to Tyampu to fight the Mongols. The RMB army was also denied food supplies due to the scarcity of crops and the small size of the Daivet (Ryabinina, 2009).

In the 10th month of 1282, Chang Niang Tong held a council, inviting representatives of the family nobility, as well as senior military and civil officials. It was decided to deploy Vietnamese troops at strategically important points on the Vietnam-China border. At the end of the year, Vietnamese troops were concentrated there under the command of the talented military leader Tran Quoc Tuan. Some representatives of the landowning tribal nobility formed private fighting squads at their own expense, sometimes numbering thousands of people. However, the military alarm of the end of 1282 was not continued. In 1283-1284, the Sagatu army became bogged down in Champa, as a result of which the Mongol government made peace with the Cham king, setting as a condition the visit of his grandson to Dadu (Beijing). In fact, this was a victory for the Cham patriots, which was achieved not least due to the fact that the Vietnamese did not allow the Mongolian expeditionary force to pass through their territory, and the Yuan had no experience in transferring troops by sea. In addition, the world was

2 For this, Le Phu Tran was later granted the position of a high-ranking official of ngishi daifu, given as a wife the last ruler of the Li dynasty, the former wife of the founder of the Tran dynasty, thanks to which the first Tran emperor received the Vietnamese throne; in addition, Le Phu Tran received the honorary post of ambassador to China [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 22b].

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It was concluded by Kublai on very favorable conditions for the Cham ruler Indravarman V, also because the Mongols urgently needed troops for the war with Daivet [Ryabinina, 2009].

At the end of 1284, a half-million-strong Chinese army was concentrated on the northern borders of Vietnam, led by the heir to the throne and many Mongol warlords. The task of this army was to invade Vietnam, and the pretext for this invasion was a campaign against the recalcitrant Champa [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 44a].

Vietnam was in a state of danger that it had not been in since the time of the "northern dependency" (from the first century BC to the end of the ninth century AD). In this regard, the Daivet government took extraordinary measures that the authorities did not resort to before or since. Usually, the emperor sought approval for his actions only from the ancestral nobility and high dignitaries. Now he called "the old men and fathers of the Middle Kingdom (Vietnam in the official Vietnamese ideology was also considered a "Middle Kingdom" along with China, only "its own", with the center in Thanglaung. - I. R.) and gathered them at the steps of the Zienhong Palace, gave them food and asked: "What are we going to do?". Everyone shouted, " Fight." Many people uttered this word at the same time, as if it came out of one mouth" [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 44a].

Tran Thanh Tong's actions were so unusual for traditional Vietnam that they prompted the comment of medieval Vietnamese historian and historiographer Ngo Chih Lien: "An attack by northern barbarians is a great calamity for the state. But both emperors (meaning Chan Thanh Tong, who ceded the throne to his son in 1258, and his successor Chan Niang Tong) had already checked their plans, and all the dignitaries were already meeting for a council. Didn't they already have a plan to repel the enemy!? What other advice did they expect from the elders who were invited to the feast? Obviously, Thanh-tong wanted to be convinced of the sincerity of the love and respect of the common people. And [he wanted] that [the people], after listening to his question, would be filled with determination... " [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 44a]. In 1285, the authorities of Daiwiet clothed the struggle against the aggressor, who conquered China, Korea and Burma, in the form of a national war.

In early 1285, a huge Mongol-Chinese army invaded the northern regions of Daivet. Leaving the capital Thanglaung and destroying the archives, suffering serious defeats, the Vietnamese troops left for the Red River Delta and concentrated in the fortress of Vankiep [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 44b]. When retreating, the Vietnamese used a "scorched earth" tactic. The Vietnamese general Tran Hung Dao requisitioned rice from the rich and distributed it to his soldiers. As a result, the advancing Mongol-Chinese troops immediately began to experience a shortage of food, which the interventionists had almost nowhere to get. As part of a "scorched earth" tactic, the Vietnamese authorities forced local farmers to leave their villages and go into the forests. Those who dared to violate this order were subjected to the most severe penalties - they were executed. Shocking measures were taken as a demonstration effect: rafts were launched along the rivers with executed peasants who dared to disobey the order for forced evacuation [Deopik, 1994, p. 154]. Brutal repressive measures deprived the occupiers of food and human resources. This was the centuries-old Vietnamese policy towards invaders, applied in cases where the existence of the state is at stake.

Military defeats, retreat and withdrawal from Thanglaung did not shake the spirit of the Vietnamese elite. The emperor fled to Haidong (the future Kuangien) in a "small boat "and" by evening he had not even eaten his morning meal " [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l.44b]. Chang Hung Dao mobilized the local population in the territories not yet occupied by the Mongols and Chinese. Having selected "brave" soldiers from among the peasants, he formed shock detachments from them and transported them by sea to the south. Medieval chroniclers estimate that the military situation has temporarily improved. I must say that in an environment of universal

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to encourage the soldiers, they even got tattoos on their hands - hieroglyphs meaning "death to the Tatars". Other military leaders followed the example of Chang Hung Dao : in a short time, they gathered an army of two hundred thousand people and arrived in Wankiep (Deopik, 1994, p. 154). It should be noted that Chang Hung Dao enjoyed respect and love among his subordinates. In the face of a common enemy, the whole nation rallied: even the slaves in this difficult situation showed loyalty to their masters [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l.45a].

In the north, the military situation was extremely unfavorable for the Vietnamese. A new offensive by the Mongol warlord Omar led to the capture of Wankiep, which was defended by Chang Hung Dao. As a result, the Vietnamese army fled [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 45b]. The invaders committed atrocities in the occupied territories. After the capture of the Vietnamese fortresses, they staged a bloody massacre of prisoners of war [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 45b].

In this difficult situation, the Vietnamese leadership tried to contain the enemy's offensive by diplomatic methods. However, negotiations between the Vietnamese representative and the Mongolian warlord Omar did not yield any results. Immediately after, the Mongol general continued his offensive.

At the same time, the Mongol army under the command of Sagatu became more active, invading the southern regions of Vietnam from Tyampa and capturing the territory of Ngean and Thanh Hoa. Despite the difficult military situation in the north, Chiang Hung Dao was forced to pay great attention to the situation in Ngean, demanding that military leaders restrain the pressure of the Mongols in the south [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 47a].

The difficult situation of Daiviet's army in Nguyen is evidenced by the treachery of the Vietnamese nobility. Sagatu sent such traitors to China, but on the way some of them were intercepted by local residents in the border areas. In these skirmishes, some traitors died, but some managed to go abroad 3 [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 47a].

Taking all possible measures to "alleviate the suffering of the state," Emperor Tran Nyan Tong decided to "send as a gift" to the Mongol military commander Toghan his aunt, the younger sister of the still-living emperor-mentor Tran Thanh Tong [Dai Viet su ky, 1697, l. 45a]. A specific "gift" was supposed to appease the Mongol military leader, but this did not give significant results.

Along with the facts of treason of the local nobility, the chronicle also records cases of unprecedented heroism of the Vietskian elite. A descendant of the founder of the Le dynasty and the husband of Princess Chang Bin Chong, after a heavy battle, was captured by the Mongols and interrogated. He refused not only to answer questions, but also to take food; after insulting the invaders, Tran Binh Chong finally heroically accepted death [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 47a].

The situation of the Vietnamese in North Vietnam was very difficult - both emperors (Tran Thanh Tong and Tran Niang Tong) were constantly threatened with captivity. To confuse the enemy, they constantly changed the direction of movement and let the enemy on a false trail. Among the courtiers who accompanied them, from time to time there were suspicions of treason [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l.47a]. The situation around the rulers was extremely tense.

In the spring of 1285, both emperors left North Vietnam for Thanh Hoa [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 47b]. In this extremely difficult situation, when it seemed to many representatives of the family nobility that the Mongol-Chinese troops had won a complete and final victory, some people went over to the side of the invaders.-

3 In early 1285, the future chronicler Le Tak surrendered to the Mongols along with his close imperial relative Chang Kien. After sending traitors to China in the border areas of Sagat, Tran Kien was killed by local Vietnamese residents, and Le Tak," putting Kien's corpse on a horse, " managed to reach Chinese territory [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l.47a].

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They are the closest relatives of both emperors and top officials. Among the first was the brother of the emperor's mentor Chan Thanh Tong, who was granted the title of An-nan go-wan by the Yuan [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 47b].

However, by the beginning of the summer of 1285, the Vietnamese strategy began to produce results. Unaccustomed to the tropical heat, the starving Mongols and Chinese began to get very tired and lose strength, as a result of which they often got sick. The military actions of the Vietnamese in the North were so effective, and the damage inflicted on the Mongolian troops was so great, that the commander-in-Chief Toghan ordered the Mongolian military commander Sagat, who was operating in Champa, to urgently move to the Red River Delta [Deopik, 1994, p.156; Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 48a]. At the same time, the Chinese fleet under the command of the Mongol commander and naval commander Omar was to enter the delta. Toghan did everything possible to restore the former strategic advantage of the Mongols, which existed before the beginning of the summer of 1285 [Deopik, 1994, p. 156].

Even before the arrival of Sagatu troops in the delta, the Vietnamese "imposed a counter battle on the enemy on the coastal strip near Taiket." In addition, other locations of the Mongol-Chinese troops were also attacked [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 48a]. At the same time, the fighting Chinese, who moved to Vietnam after the Mongols defeated the Song Empire and formed part of the squad of the warlord Tran Nhat Zuat, are mentioned in the ranks of the Vietnamese troops for the first time. Apparently, the role of these Chinese in the military victory of the Vietnamese was quite significant, since the Vietnamese chronicle specifically notes: "The credit for the defeat of the Yuan was largely due to (Chang) Nhat Zuat" [Dai Vietsu ky..., 1697, l. 48b].

The appearance of the Chinese in the ranks of the Vietnamese troops indicates, in my opinion, the following: first, all available resources were already mobilized in Daiviet - the war took on a total character; secondly, the risk of treason by the "Sung" Chinese and their transition to the side of the Mongols was less great for the Vietnamese authorities than the benefit from their actions. third, the" Sung "Chinese felt the beginning of a change in the military situation and therefore resolutely took the side of the Vietnamese elite that" sheltered " them at the time.

The first successful counterattacks encouraged the Vietnamese. Both emperors took part in the military operations [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 48b]. Fearing the approach of Sagatu from Thanh Hoa, the Vietnamese military leadership launched a series of strikes against the enemy in the capital, won the victory at Tiong Zong and in other strategically important places.

The threat of encirclement forced Toghan to start retreating to the north, across the Losiang River [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 49a]. As a result of the heroic and very skillful defense of the coastal rivers by the Vietnamese, the fleet under Omar's command was never able to connect with the Mongolian garrison that occupied the capital [Deopik, 1994, p. 156-157; Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, p.49a]. After some time, this fleet was defeated and turned to flight. According to the chronicle, as a result of the pursuit, more than fifty thousand Mongols were captured, and Omar himself escaped "on the only remaining ship" [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 49b].

At the same time, Sagatu troops from Thanh Hoa were defeated in Taiket. A huge number of Mongols and Chinese were killed and wounded in the battle, and Sagat himself was beheaded [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 49b].

After Omar's defeat and Sagat's execution, it was Toghan's turn to oppose him, and Chan Hung Dao himself caught up with the retreating Mongol and Chinese soldiers in the Wankiep area. Here the Vietnamese commander-in-chief gave a general battle, and the defeat of the Mongol-Chinese army was crushing. In this battle, the Vietnamese used poisoned arrows, from which one of the Chinese commanders, Lee Heng, died.

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Another Chinese general, Li Guan, gathered the remnants of a force of fifty thousand men and," hiding Toghan in a bronze vessel, " fled to the north. On the way to the border, the troops of Chang Hung Dao overtook the fleeing Mongols and Chinese and defeated them. Li Guan was killed by a poisoned arrow, but Toghan managed to lead the remnants of the army to China [Deopik, 1994, p. 157; Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, p.49b]. So ingloriously for the interventionists ended the most terrible campaign of the Chinese army to Vietnam after the period of "northern dependence".

The Mongol-Chinese invasion caused enormous damage to Daiviet. Although the sources do not give exact figures of losses, judging by the subsequent difficult situation (the devastation and famine of 1290-1291) [Deopik, 1994, p.157; Dai Viet sy ky..., 1697, p. 50a], they were huge. It is no accident that the Emperor Chang Niang Tong at the end of 1285 gave an order to draw up new poll lists in order to " see... losses of our people " [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 50a].

After expelling the invaders, the Vietnamese authorities could not focus on restoring the destroyed economy, as it was necessary to prepare for repelling a new aggression.

The Mongol authorities were very belligerent. In the spring of 1286, Kublai Khan issued an order to put a half-million-strong army on alert, build 300 ships on the Yangtze in Huguang Province (Hunan), and gather local troops from three southern provinces and move them to Vietnam to accompany the new "legitimate" ruler of go-wan, Tran Yit Tak [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 51a]. The Mongolian government sent all its forces to the war with Daivet. In 1286, preparations for another invasion of Japan were suspended, and in 1287, the capital authorities did not give permission for a war with the Burmese Pagan. The provincial administration of Yunnan was forced to wage war in Burma at its own risk [East in the Middle Ages, vol. II, 1995, p. 403].

The Vietnamese reacted quickly and decisively. In the summer of 1286, the entire local nobility was ordered to recruit troops. The Vietnamese Emperor assigned Tran Hung Dao to command the troops [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 51a]. In the winter of 1286, an exercise was held for Vietnamese troops, who were constantly on alert in the border areas [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 51b]. In the spring of 1287, the Vietnamese learned that in addition to the troops of the three southern provinces of China, soldiers from the southwestern province of Yunnan, as well as "foreigners from the four overseas regions", were recruited to invade Daiwet. Given the experience of the 1285 campaign, during which the Vietnamese used the "scorched earth" tactic and deprived the interventionists of food, the Mongol authorities ordered the Chinese official Zhang Wenhu to carry huge supplies of food by ship after the army.

The threat of such a powerful invasion caused a proposal among Vietnamese officials to recruit all those fit for military service into the army. Chang Hung Dao tried to reject this initiative, saying: "The army is valued by skill, not quantity" [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, p. 52]. This tactic could hardly be implemented, since the Vietnamese could only repel the invasion of the powerful army of their northern neighbor "with the whole world". In the late spring of 1287, the Vietnamese authorities granted amnesty to criminals, and in the early summer, they finished reviewing court cases and conducted military exercises [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 52a].

At the end of 1287, the Mongols captured the mountain outpost of Fulyong. The Mongol-Chinese army advanced into the country with much greater difficulties than in 1285. It is interesting to note that from the very beginning of the border battles, the Vietnamese used poisoned arrows. In some cases, the Vietnamese managed to counterattack, cause significant damage to the enemy, force them to retreat, capture prisoners, boats, ships, horses, carts and weapons. It should also be noted that at the bend of the Damo River, many enemy soldiers were sunk [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 52a].

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And yet, under the pressure of the Chinese, the Vietnamese army was forced to retreat. An army of interventionists led by Toghan approached Vankiep and stormed it [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 52b]. The Vietnamese again evaded the general battle.

At the beginning of 1288, Omar's fleet (without transport ships) sailed up the Red River and headed for the junction with Toghan. The latter, having decided to finish the campaign faster, crossed the Red River and, with the help of reinforcements coming from Yunnan, took the capital, where the Vietnamese destroyed food supplies before leaving [East in the Middle Ages, vol. II, 1995, pp. 403-404; Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 53a].

The Chinese could not stay in Thanglaung for long without food. Having sent Omar with the fleet to the sea to meet cargo transport from China [East in the Middle Ages, vol. II, 1995, p. 404], Toghan was soon forced to leave the capital and move to Wankiep, which became his base [East in the Middle Ages, vol.II, 1995, p. 404]. Before leaving the capital, Toghan burned it down [Deopik, 1994, p. 159].

The burning of the capital, the occupation of North Vietnam by Toghan and Omar caused hesitation among the tribal nobility and high officials - "calls for peace began to be heard at the court, Vietnamese supporters of the Yuan showed some activity" [Deopik, 1994, p. 159], "many Vyong, Khou and officials sent petitions to the barbarian camp" [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 58a]. Subsequently, a whole box was found in the interventionist camp with petitions from the Vietnamese ancestral nobility and high officials to switch to the Yuan side [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 58a].

Chang Hung Dao and his supporters were determined to be irreconcilable towards the enemy, and they managed to inspire the wavering people with confidence in victory. Meanwhile, the situation for the Vietnamese was gradually changing for the better. Omar was forced to return to Toghan, but he found it not in the capital, but in Vankiep (Deopik, 1994,p. 159; East in the Middle Ages, vol. II, 1995, p. 404; Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, p. 53a).. The arrival of new military contingents only complicated the food supply situation for the invaders, and epidemics were added to the famine [Deopik, 1994, p. 159]. Thus, it was clear that before the start of the rainy season, some urgent action was needed.

In this situation, Toghan again sent Omar's fleet down the Batdang River, and in the late spring of 1288, together with the main troops, he began to retreat overland in the direction of Langshon, although this retreat was more like an organized flight [East in the Middle Ages, vol.II, 1995, p. 404]. The Vietnamese set up pit traps and ambushes for the retreating troops in narrow gorges, where Mongols and Chinese died en masse. Interventionists were forced to leave by inconvenient and dangerous roads, since the main routes were occupied by the forces of the Vietnamese Army [Vostok v srednykh vekakh, vol. II, 1995, p. 404]. No more than 100 thousand people from three hundred thousand troops reached the border [Deopik, 1994, p. 159].

The losses of the Mongol-Chinese land army were nothing compared to the tragedy that befell Omar's fleet, which at low tide "sat" on pointed tree trunks dug into the bottom of the river. As a result, 400 warships were captured, Omar and many Mongol and Chinese warlords were captured. Many Chinese sailors drowned in the waters of the Batdang River [East in the Middle Ages, vol. II, 1995, p. 404; Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, p. 54b].

Thus ended the last Mongol-Chinese invasion of Vietnam. After the victory, the Vietnamese authorities duly punished the traitors: the nobles were deprived of belonging to the imperial family and given derogatory nicknames [Dai Viet su ky, 1697, l. 58a]; commoners were sent to hard labor or donated to officials as disenfranchised dependents [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 58a]. The Vietnamese authorities resolutely rejected Kublai's demand for Tran Niang Tong to personally report to Dadu (Beijing) [Dai Viet su ky..., 1697, l. 61a].

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Kublai's successor, Oljeitu-Timur, disbanded the troops stationed on the border with Daivet [Vostok v srednykh veka, vol.II, 1995, p. 404 - 405] and restored traditional relations with it [Deopik, 1994, p. 161]. Thus, Vietnam withstood the anti-Mongolian struggle, which many other states could not do. In addition to Vietnam and Tyampa, the Mongols suffered a military defeat only at the hands of the Mamluks, who defeated the Mongol army in Syria at Ain Jalut in 1260. [The East in the Middle Ages, vol. II, 1995, p. 519].

The cult of the "god-king" played an important role in preserving the strength of the Vietnamese state. Loyalty to the ruler, who had both secular and (to varying degrees) religious power, combined with the idea of the impermanence of human life, gave the Vietnamese emperors the opportunity to dispose of both the " body "(poll and land taxes, participation in labor and military duties) and the" soul " of the bulk of the population (in the rite of the ruler's ritual plowing, the cult unity of the emperor's deeds and the well-being of his people was embodied). In the case of a complete separation of secular and religious power, the defeat of one of them, namely the secular one, was not perceived as a religious catastrophe. In this regard, religious power could easily be combined with another secular system and even under certain conditions be integrated into it. When secular and religious power, in whole or in part, was represented in one subject, namely, the Vietnamese emperor, the collapse of this subject was not only the collapse of secular power, but also (in whole or in part) a religious catastrophe.

In Christianity, for example, if, of course, it was not built into the state system, the change of power did not mean a religious tragedy. The well-known biblical saying "There is no authority but from God" (Ap. Paul, Rom. 13) made it possible to recognize any authority in principle. The victorious opponent was perceived as a "scourge of God", as a "punishment of the Lord", which it was a sin to resist.

During the Mongol invasion, this reconciled the Transcaucasian peoples to the invaders. After the Tatars attacked Transcaucasia and captured many fortresses and cities, and the great Vardapet Vanakan was taken into slavery along with his disciples, "the wise princes of Armenia and Georgia learned that the Lord had granted the Tatars strength and victory over our country (emphasis added). - I. R.). Therefore, they humbled themselves and submitted to them: they agreed to pay tribute to them... "[Monk Magakia, [b. g.], p. 5].

This was also the reaction of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Mongol conquest. According to the historian I. N. Danilevsky, " the defeat at Kalka was clearly regarded as a punishment for the Russians: either as a payment for their sins that had already taken place (Lavrentievskaya and Novgorod first chronicle); or as a kind of warning about the need to improve (Ipatievskaya chronicle)... A special feature... According to the stories of the Novgorod first and Lavrentiev chronicles, the union of Russian princes with the "filthy" Polovtsians is assessed extremely negatively, while the Tatars are not yet perceived as "godless". Apparently, therefore, the defeat on Kalka does not seem to be a catastrophe, and the actions of the South Russian princes are critically evaluated. However, the chroniclers condemn not so much the disunity of the Russian forces as the unseemly nature of their participation in countering the " scourge of God "(i.e., the Tatars - I. R.)" [Danilevsky, 2001, p. 131, 132].

Early descriptions of Batu's invasion of Russia in 1237-1240 also inspire humility before the Tatars as before "the scourge of God", before "God's punishment" [Danilevsky, 2001, p. 181]. For chroniclers in the first century and a half after the invasion of Batu, a "conciliatory attitude towards Tatar rule" is characteristic [Kargalov, 1967, p. 219].

Only over time does the image of the" Tatar " in the Russian chronicle acquire clearly negative connotations. In the short chronicle story "about the great battle that took place on the Don",

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which appeared as a monument at the end of the XIV-beginning of the XV century, and acquired a completely extant form as a result of the chronicle work carried out by the compilers of the "code of 1408" [Danilevsky, 2001, p. 272; Rudakov, 1999, p. 110], there is "the godless and pious Horde Prince Mamai the filthy", against which was made by Prince Dmitry Ivanovich, "although he fought for his fatherland and for the holy churches and for the Orthodox faith of Christ and for the whole Russian land" 4 [Danilevsky, 2001, p. 277]. Only in this source of the beginning of the XV century. the confrontation between Mamai and Dmitry Ivanovich is considered by the author of the story not as a consequence of "God's permission" and not as a "punishment of the Lord", but "as a personal conflict between the "Horde prince" and the "grand Duke": the "Russian land" is no longer opposed by God, but by a very specific " Polovech land and Tatarskaya Street"... Finally, the Russian princes, it seems, for the first time during the Horde rule in Russia, "help God" "[Danilevsky, 2001, p. 278]. Thus, it took more than a century and a half for the Russian political elite to comprehend the need to resist the Mongol power, which could only be done with the help of God5. Such an attitude was completely impossible in the Vietnamese political and ideological tradition, in which the cult of the "god-king" occupied a huge place, which later transformed into the cult of imperial ancestors and earth spirits, which formed a complex state cult that allowed the supreme ruler to have monopoly power not only over the body, but also over the soul of his subjects. This combination (in one way or another) of secular and religious power in Vietnam was a significant factor contributing to the intensity of the anti-Mongolian struggle and the victory of the Vietnamese people in this struggle.

list of literature

Bokshchanin A. A. Attempts of Mongol-Chinese aggression in the countries of Southeast Asia // Tatar-Mongols in Asia and Europe, Moscow, 1977.
Danilevsky I. N. Russian lands through the eyes of contemporaries and descendants (XII-XIV centuries). Course of lectures, Moscow: Aspent Press, 2001.

Deopik D. V. Istoriya V Nama [History of Vietnam], Part 1, Moscow: Moscow University Press, 1994.

Monk Magakia. History of the Strelkov people (Mongols) / B. M./, / B. G./ // http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/rus10/Magakija/frametext.htm

History of the East in 6 volumes. Vol. II. The East in the Middle Ages, Moscow: Vostochnaya Literatura Publ., Russian Academy of Sciences, 1995.

Kargalov V. V. Vneshnepoliticheskie faktory razvitiya feodal'noi Rus': Feodal'naia Rus ' i kochevniki [Foreign Policy Factors in the development of Feudal Russia: Feudal Russia and Nomads].
Murasheva A.V. History of Vietnam. Vietnam-China relations in the XVII-XVIII centuries. Moscow, 1973.

Rudakov V. N. Mapping of the Mongol-Tatars in the Old Russian literature of the middle of the 13th-15th centuries: Evolution of representations, plots and images. Dis. kand. filolog, nauk. The manuscript, Moscow, 1999.

Ryabinina I. A. Periodization of the Mongol-Vietnamese confrontation in the second half of the 13th century (1257-1294). Postgraduate collection. Moscow, 2009.

Svistunova N. P. Gibel yuzhnosunskogo gosudarstva [The Death of the Southern Sunni state]. Tataro-mongols in Asia and Europe, Moscow, 1977.
Dai Viet su ky loan thu. Chapter 5. Quoted from the woodcut of the Tsinghua era (1697) SA / PD2310, preserved in the library of the Asiatic Society in Paris.

Dai Viet su ky toan thu (Complete collection of historical Records of Great Viet). Chapter 5. Quoted from the woodcut of the Tsin-hua era (1697) SA / PD2310, preserved in the library of the Asiatic Society in Paris.

(Dinh Van Tuan. Powerful rooster style or fighting power based on rooster fighting) / (Tai Shon Nguyen Hue. Committee of Literature and Information. Nghia Binh Province). 1978.

4 A similar negative image of the" Tatar "is also present in the" Tale of the Murder of Mikhail Tversky", recorded in the Sofia first chronicle of the senior platoon (the second half of the 15th century): "the blood drinker Kavgady" (Danilevsky, 2001, p. 250).

5 From the point of view of the compilers of the short chronicle story "about the great battle that took place on the Don", it was possible to fight Mamai only because he was a "prince" who usurped the power of the legitimate "tsar" Tokhtamysh, who was (unlike Mamai) a born khan, a descendant of Genghis Khan, and an ally of the Russian princes [Danilevsky, 2001, p. 277].

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