China Days were held for the first time on April 11-12, 2006 at the Faculty of World Economy of the State University - Higher School of Economics (HSE). The Faculty of World Economy has been part of the Higher School of Economics since 2002.The faculty's curriculum includes studying at least two foreign languages, as well as an in-depth specialization in the economy of one of the world's countries. About 50 students of the faculty are currently studying Chinese.

At the opening ceremony of the Days of China on April 11, 2006, Dean of the Faculty I. P. Faminsky and Minister Plenipotentiary - Adviser for Education of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Russian Federation Pei Yufan addressed the gathered students, staff and guests with greetings. Russian and Chinese students from Moscow universities took part in the amateur concert that followed. The business section of the Days of China included presentations by Russian companies that actively cooperate with their Chinese partners. The General Director of the Russian-Chinese Communication Agency made reports on the activities of their companies "RusChina.net" S. V. Smirnov and Commercial Director of the Ochakovo Transport Company (distributor of Chinese Greatwall and Brilliance Auto cars on the Russian market) V. V. Okunev.

The final event of the China Days was a round table of experts on the topic "China in the modern world economy". In his opening remarks, the moderator of the round table, P. M. Mozias (HSE), outlined the key issues for discussion. According to P. M. Mozias, the quantitative parameters of China's achieved involvement in the world economic processes look very impressive. Since China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), China's foreign trade turnover has almost tripled: from $ 509.8 billion in 2001 to $ 1,422. 1 billion in 2005. According to this indicator, China ranked third in the world, second only to the United States and Germany. Since 1993, China has been the leader among developing countries in terms of the annual volume of attracted foreign direct investment. In turn, the export of Chinese capital abroad has also been growing rapidly in recent years, and by the end of 2005, the total amount of legally registered Chinese investments in other countries alone exceeded $ 50 billion. At the end of the first quarter of 2006, China's gold and foreign exchange reserves reached $ 853 billion, and China ranked first in the world in this indicator, ahead of Japan.

All this allows us to speak about the transformation of China into a new, fourth "center of power" of the world economy, along with the traditional "triad" of the United States , the European Union , and Japan. And if earlier researchers of China's foreign economic relations paid attention mainly to the influence of the rest of the world on the processes of Chinese modernization, now we can talk about the ever-increasing impact of China on the state of affairs in the world economy. The presence of Chinese exports in the world markets of manufacturing products became significant by the end of the 1980s, but then they were mainly technologically simple light industry goods. Over the past decade, China's exports have undergone structural changes, with mechanical engineering and electronics products now accounting for the largest share. It became clear that Chinese imports also largely determine the situation on world markets, especially for raw materials: after 2003, it was China's growing demand that became one of the main factors in maintaining high world prices for oil, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy products, etc.

Moreover, it can be argued that China's involvement in global economic relations has already had a profound impact on the macroeconomic dynamics in the world and has largely modified it, and this also applies to the course of the macroeconomic cycle in the developed countries of the West. The inclusion of Chinese resources, primarily labor resources, in international circulation has dramatically increased the production capacity of the world economy. Competitive pressure from cheap Chinese labor has contributed to a slowdown in the growth of real incomes of employees in the United States and other developed countries, which has led to an increase in the profitability of companies and stimulated their investment activity. The presence of cheap Chinese manufactured goods on global markets has had a slowing effect on the global economy.-

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As a result, new opportunities for implementing a stimulating monetary policy have opened up. The central banks of Western countries, especially the US Federal Reserve, were able to keep interest rates at an all-time low level in the face of a slowdown in economic growth at the beginning of the first decade of the XXI century, without fear of causing a sharp acceleration in inflation. Finally, it is largely through the investment of Chinese state foreign exchange reserves in US Treasury securities that the US foreign trade deficit is financed. In this sense, the influx of Chinese money keeps the dollar's exchange rate against other world currencies from a large-scale correction that would threaten the stability of the international financial system. And if we take these circumstances into account, it makes sense to ask who is more dependent on whom in modern conditions: China on technological and financial borrowing from developed countries or, on the contrary, Western countries - on the state of affairs in the Chinese economy?

In a generalized form, the problem of China's influence on the world economy is embodied in the question of the real scale of the Chinese economy, which has been actively discussed in recent years. Experts offer various methods of calculating Chinese GDP for international comparisons - at the current exchange rate, purchasing power parity (PPP), etc. But even if we take the optimists ' point of view and recognize that China has already become the "second economy" in the world in terms of absolute GDP, second only to the United States, and that it has a chance to quickly come out on top, the question of the future remains relevant. If China is, as many people believe, the "superpower of the future," then it should be borne in mind that the status of a superpower implies not only military and political power and significant economic potential, but also a certain civilizational mission, the ability to offer the rest of the world certain socio - cultural values for borrowing and copying, and they, in particular, should be considered as a In turn, they should be supported by technological advantages. Can we say that China is capable of becoming one of the world's technology leaders in the near future? Or will its expansion occur mainly at the expense of low-tech, resource-intensive industries, and in this capacity it will generate an ever-increasing burden on the world economy, redistributing in its favor the world's raw materials and polluting the common environment for all?

These questions are all the more legitimate because China's emergence as a global "power center" has taken place at a time when the Chinese economy is still in transition, and when the fundamental problems of its market transformation remain unresolved. Moreover, there are good reasons to argue that the institutional mechanisms that were developed in the previous stages of Chinese reforms and which provided the country with high economic growth rates in the 1980s and 1990s are already running out of capacity, and that they themselves create problems and imbalances that threaten China's further progressive development. In recent years, this has also been recognized by the top Chinese political leadership, which announced the beginning of the implementation of a new "scientific development concept", which implies a transition to mainly intensive growth factors, a social orientation of the economy, an emphasis on resource conservation and reducing the burden on the environment.

How will the social and economic reform processes in China continue? Is it even realistic to switch to intensive methods of economic growth under the existing structure of the Chinese economy? It is obvious that the model of economic growth does not change simply by political decisions; this requires fundamental changes in economic institutions and mechanisms of economic policy. In this regard, P. M. Mozias noted, it is advisable to pragmatically assess the current economic policy of the Chinese authorities. Is it really a question of" turning to the left", of activating the state's efforts to redistribute resources and incomes in favor of social outsiders? Or, by proclaiming socially oriented slogans, does the government channel and thereby weaken the discontent of low-income groups of the population and, as a result, create political prerequisites for further economic liberalization? A simple list of new reform measures initiated in 2005-2006. (the sale of significant shares of authorized capital in Chinese state-owned banks to foreign financial institutions, the sale of state-owned shares in companies that have passed the exchange listing, the sanction for the repurchase of state-owned assets by state-owned enterprise managers, etc.), gives reason to believe that in reality, rather, there is a WTO-

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a swarm of the described options. But it is also clear that as market reforms deepen, social tensions in the country are likely to increase even more. And if China's further involvement in global economic processes takes place against the background of the entry of domestic reforms into a new, high-risk stage, how can this affect China's foreign economic and foreign policy behavior?

The question of the real scale of the Chinese economy also makes sense in view of the deepening integration of the national economy of the People's Republic of China and the economy of Taiwan. There is a massive transfer of production facilities from the island to the mainland, accompanied by the flow of Taiwanese technological, financial, and entrepreneurial resources to the PRC. Are the prospects for the formation of a "Greater China" realistic, given the obvious complexity and ambiguity of the situation in relations between China and Taiwan? What are the possible consequences of developing cooperation or, on the contrary, conflict within the "Greater China" framework for the rest of the world?

Finally, in the context of China's economic rise, the development of an adequate line of behavior towards its eastern neighbor remains an urgent task for our country. Is China a promising and reliable partner for Russia, and perhaps an ally, or will it increasingly act as a rival whose expansion is fraught with threats to Russia? Although bilateral relations are now as good as ever, China experts are "on duty" to ask this question and give forecasts of possible developments in the future.

A. I. Salitsky (IMEMO RAS) noted that the choice of an adequate methodology for comparing the GDP of individual countries depends on the answer to the questions of which prices are more reasonable - Western or Chinese, and, accordingly, whose money better performs the function of a measure of value. Until relatively recently, most developing countries experienced a shortage of foreign exchange earnings in their economies, and then the recalculation at current exchange rates was justified, since it allowed us to take into account when calculating GDP, first of all, those sectors of the economy that were really competitive by international standards.

But after China and many other developing countries had fundamentally solved the problem of accumulating foreign exchange reserves, it became possible to more reliably estimate the size of their economies based on purchasing power parity. If you use this method, it turns out that prices in China are about four times lower than in the developed countries of the West. And in this regard, the thesis about the high energy and resource intensity of the Chinese economy does not look indisputable. If recalculated by PPP, the volume of Chinese GDP will be about 70% of the corresponding indicator of the United States. But at the same time, in China, industry accounts for about 52% of GDP, and the share of services in Chinese GDP in recent years was about 32% and practically did not increase. While in the structure of American GDP, service industries account for about 80%, and industry-only 18%. Hence, it turns out that China produces more industrial products with less resources, which, generally speaking, means that the Chinese economy is already developing along an intensive path, although economic growth is clearly labor-intensive.

The situation with China's influence on international commodity markets is also very ambiguous. The fact is that China's behavior as an importer is determined not only by the logic of the country's spontaneously developing trade specialization, but also by the meaningful policy of the Chinese authorities to increase the level of national resource self-sufficiency. For this reason, the alarmist forecasts expressed by economists, especially Western ones, that China's demand for imported resources, including food, will increase uncontrollably, are often inadequate. In any case, A. I. Salitsky concluded, the further development of China will be very original. It is desirable that it does not bring unpleasant surprises to our country, since economic cooperation with China can become an important component of Russia's own modernization.

Z. A. Muromtseva (IDV RAS) agreed with A. I. Salitsky that the stereotype of resource extravagance of the Chinese economy, which is ingrained in scientific publications, should not be taken as an axiom. People who have been to China usually note that the inhabitants of this country, even at the domestic level, tend to pay attention to resource conservation. However, the growing China feels its limited natural resources more and more acutely, and this is primarily reflected in the progressive deterioration of the environmental situation. Therefore, it is no accident that in

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The scientific concept of development proclaimed by the new Chinese leadership is precisely the idea of moving to a less resource-intensive type of economic growth that occupies a pivotal place.

The main components of the "scientific concept of development" include, firstly, industrial modernization based on the introduction of new technologies; secondly, urbanization, accumulation of human capital with a focus on the development of education; formation of the middle class; and thirdly, mitigation of the burden on the environment. By 2020, China should enter the circle of "innovative states", which means that the share of scientific and technological technologies in the structure of economic growth factors should exceed 70%, and among the technologies used, the share of imports should not exceed 30%. The following are intended to help achieve these goals: state programs for the development of R & D and dissemination of their results; increasing the competitiveness of national production by "growing" their own TNCs through active capital exports; changes in the social structure that occur during urbanization, which should promote the spread of innovations not only in production and management, but also in everyday life.

However, the pace of transition to an innovative economy cannot but be affected objectively by the existing structural dualism of the Chinese economy. On the one hand, the development of knowledge-intensive industries should, in principle, save resources, including labor. But, on the other hand, for China, an equally urgent task is to ensure the employment of a huge array of low-skilled labor, which acts as a brake on the introduction of labor-saving technologies. The prospects for developing China's independent technological potential are still unclear. Today, according to many experts, the task of becoming a global technology leader is unsolvable for China. Nevertheless, according to Z. A. Muromtseva, the discussion of this problem should take into account the historical traditions of China. This country in the past was the birthplace of many famous inventions, and it is quite possible to expect surprises from it in the future.

It is also quite difficult to predict the further course of institutional reforms in the Chinese economy. Painful restructuring of the public sector can only be carried out in the context of consolidation of Chinese society, and the civilizational features of China can play a decisive role in its achievement, so the situation in this regard can develop completely unexpectedly for external observers. Z. A. Muromtseva expressed doubts about the reality of the "left turn" in the policy of the modern Chinese leadership, drawing attention to recently announced by the authorities plans for new cuts in production capacity and employment in the public sector.

Ya. M. Berger (IDV RAS) at the beginning of his speech highlighted the points on which his position differs from the points of view of other participants in the discussion. According to J. M. Berger, it is advisable to calculate the dollar equivalent of Chinese GDP on the basis of current exchange rates, because domestic prices for goods and services are still largely formed in isolation from the trends of international markets. He did not agree with the thesis about the intensification of the Chinese economy that has already taken place. Chinese economic growth remains extensive, although in everyday life the Chinese are really characterized by peasant economy and economy.

According to J. M. Berger, China is currently undergoing a transition to a new model of market economy. The previous model was the result of the extremely liberal economic policy pursued by the authorities since the early 1990s. In those years, even such social institutions were drawn into market relations, which, generally speaking, are contraindicated, for example, the army. In combination with the preservation of the relics of the command economy, such a liberal model has led to deep social stratification, the prosperity of industry monopolies, the merging of business elites with the state, and the impoverishment of the urban lower classes, who previously received income in the public sector. The liberal model was based on China's borrowing of Western consumer society standards. In this sense, it is significant that the real estate sector and the automotive industry have been leading economic growth in recent years. If they continue to grow at the same high rate, the world's raw material resources will not be enough to meet the demand they generate.

The social situation in China is currently unstable and explosive. Economic policy needs to be changed in the direction of increasing spending on education, medicine, R & D, etc. In other ways

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In other words, the economy needs to be made truly socially oriented, but so far it has not been so. The course adjustment implemented by the new Chinese leadership therefore has a very real content: a new market model is being created, and the liberal economy is adapting to China's traditions. New measures announced recently by the authorities aimed at reducing the direct state presence in the economy, in particular the sale of joint-stock units in Chinese banks to foreign financial institutions, have caused sharp criticism within the country. Moreover, dissatisfaction is expressed not only by ideological orthodoxists, but also by economists who protect the interests of national private capital. The latter object to granting foreign investors new preferences, this time in access to purchases of state-owned banking assets. Undoubtedly, attracting foreign strategic investors to restructure the Chinese financial sector is largely a necessary measure. It is connected with the fact that in the near future, in accordance with China's obligations given when joining the WTO, the country's domestic market should be opened to foreign banks. The restructuring of Chinese banks had to be carried out very quickly, since in its existing form, the national banking system was obviously uncompetitive. But under the influence of the recent controversy, this course may well be adjusted.

China's influence on the global economy has so far been achieved mainly through the use of the country's cheap labor resources. But now this advantage is being lost as wages rise, especially in the eastern provinces. The new socio-economic model will focus on innovation rather than cheap labor. So far, China's NTP has largely been based on borrowing from other countries through the channels of attracting foreign direct investment, which was primarily invested in export production. Its focus on the external market has allowed the Chinese economy to grow even in the face of internal deflation. But the increase in Chinese exports is facing opposition in Western markets, as evidenced by a wave of anti-dumping procedures initiated against Chinese enterprises. Further economic growth under the export-oriented model is highly problematic. The main task now is to stimulate domestic demand and develop a potentially large, but still very narrow, domestic market. But this is counteracted by deep social differentiation.

Neither Chinese nor foreign experts yet undertake to give forecasts of China's foreign policy and foreign economic behavior in the medium and long term. In any case, it is clear that the most likely direction of Chinese expansion is Southeast Asia, which is a natural extension of the Chinese economy. The North (Russia) is therefore in a winning position, it needs to be used in Russian politics, it needs to be able to benefit from China's interest in Russian energy resources and technologies. J. M. Berger expressed the opinion that China's impact on the rest of the world can be civilizational, it can consist in creating a living, efficient example of a social market economy based on based on traditional Chinese values.

L. P. Chihun (Economist) MSU Faculty) noted that the specifics of the Chinese version of systemic reforms are largely determined by the country's location at the stage of industrialization. China launched reforms based on the potential of the agrarian society, and managed to take advantage of the opportunities for economic growth associated with the consistent creation of separate industrial complexes in the industry. Therefore, the reform of property relations and asset redistribution processes in China could have been gradual, and, generally speaking, the division of property in the course of market transformation of the economy is a fundamental reason for increasing income differentiation.

The theory of economic development asserts that there is no linear relationship between indicators of social inequality, on the one hand, and economic growth, on the other. But there is a correlation between inequality and structural changes in the developing economy, which consist in the transfer of resources from the traditional sector of the economy to the modern one. In China, the traditional sector actually includes not only agriculture, but also inefficient state-owned industrial enterprises created in the pre-reform period. The Gini coefficient, which measures income inequality, is noticeably higher in China than in Russia. This is due to the fact that the concentration of wealth in the" upper " social strata in China is more significant, and the lower strata there are much poorer than in our country

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country. Moreover, the main factor determining the social status and income level in China is belonging to the traditional or modern sector of the economy.

In the late 1980s, China switched to an export-oriented version of industrialization, and this corresponds to the general trend typical of developing economies: the main generator of demand in the transition from a traditional society to a modern one is the external market, which cannot be otherwise given the existing low level of income within the country. Like other developing countries, China is going through a stage of imitation in its technological development, borrowing technological developments from the outside. China's technological lag behind the most advanced international level will continue in the foreseeable future. Industrialization is now taking place in China in clusters formed around enterprises controlled by TNCs. And here there is potential for a possible conflict between the interests of foreign capital and national economic interests, although so far Chinese investment policy has been quite successful in balancing them.

From the point of view of the endogenous theory of economic growth, the tasks of the state in a developing economy are, first, creating the necessary infrastructure and, secondly, investing in human capital. China has now come to the second of these tasks, without which it is impossible to optimize the trajectory of economic growth. But speaking about the possibility of building a socially-oriented economy in China, L. P. Chihun noted: world experience shows that such a development of events became real either with a very high level of economic development of the country and the readiness of society to go for large-scale redistribution of income through the channels of the fiscal system, or with an overconcentration of state power in a very poor country. None of these options are relevant for China right now.

Yu. G. Litvinova (Institute of International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences) noted that the problem of forming a "Greater China" with the participation of the PRC and Taiwan includes almost the entire range of issues raised at the round table. The economic integration of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait has different consequences for its participants. In theory, Taiwanese investment on the mainland should not only have a modernizing effect on the Chinese economy, but also change it in a direction that is beneficial for Taiwan. However, in fact, the strong influence of Taiwan on the ongoing transformation of Chinese society is not felt. On the contrary, a strong pro-Chinese lobby has developed among Taiwanese businesses themselves, which can have a significant impact on the political situation on the island.

The development of the Chinese economy now largely follows the path taken by Taiwan and other newly industrialized Asian countries-the path of export orientation and technological borrowing from more developed economies. But when assessing the possible technological impact of Taiwan on the mainland economy, it should be borne in mind that even in the computer industry, the most competitive branch of Taiwanese industry, local companies have only medium-level technologies by international standards. This limits the opportunities for the entire "Greater China" to become a global technical leader.

The "Hong Kong model" is unlikely to serve as a prototype for the future reunification of the PRC and Taiwan, although in policy towards the island, the Beijing authorities use methods previously tested in establishing ties with Hong Kong - they encourage Taiwanese investment on the mainland with fiscal benefits, turn a blind eye to the development of illegal trade exchange, etc. After the almost simultaneous accession of China and Taiwan to the WTO, bilateral relations began to develop even faster. But while China's WTO membership has had an obvious stimulating effect on its economy, in contrast, Taiwan's economic growth has slowed. In any case, rapidly developing economic ties are already having a stabilizing effect on the political situation in the Strait, keeping the authorities on both sides from sudden movements.

Yu. G. Litvinova stated that the export orientation of the East Asian economies and the export dependence of the modern Russian economy cannot be equated: in the first case, we are talking about the export of manufactured goods, and in the second-about the export of mainly raw materials. Using the Asian experience of labor-intensive export specialization in Russian conditions is not realistic. But China and Russia are already becoming direct competitors in areas where both countries have promising technological developments - in the space services market, in energy engineering, metallurgy, etc.

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