More recently, less than two months ago, relations between the United States and the member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have undergone important changes. During the regular session of the ASEAN Regional Security Forum (ARF) held in Phuket, Thailand, on July 23, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the Foreign Ministers of ten member countries signed a Protocol on the United States ' accession to the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. (Treaty of Bali). This act was characterized by X. Clinton as "the return of the United States to Southeast Asia"1. This, of course, historic event is a tectonic shift in the American strategy of international security, which can make serious adjustments to Washington's policy in the entire Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, the US accession to the Bali Treaty is hardly unexpected. The factors that prompted American diplomacy to take this step have been maturing for decades.

The development of the association's institutionalization process and its promotion by the middle of the first decade of the 2000s to the position of a generally recognized moderator of the macro-regional dialogue in Greater East Asia2 made the interaction of the United States with the association more balanced, purposeful and multidimensional.

To date, relations between the United States and ASEAN combine interests and contradictions in the field of diplomacy, regional security, economy and trade, being in a complex interdependence with the policies of other dialogue partners of the association, primarily the PRC.

For ASEAN itself, interaction with the United States in the late 1990s and 2000s was a test of the strength of its declared unity, its ability to act as an independent subject of international relations in the context of the formation of a new, post - bipolar world order and the globalization of the world economy.

* Roman SENIN-PhD in Political Science, Senior Researcher at the Center for Vietnam and ASEAN Studies, Institute of the Far East, Russian Academy of Sciences. Copyright © 2009.

The author expresses his gratitude to Professor O. V. Evgrafov for the materials provided.

1 Cit. по: Press Availability at the ASEAN Summit. Phuket, Thailand, 22.07.2009 (http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/july/126320 .htm).

2 The term "Greater East Asia" has been actively used since 2005 in connection with the first East Asian Summit of the dialogue format, which brought together not only the Southeast Asian countries and the three leading NEA countries (China, Japan, the Republic of Korea), but also three countries in geographical, cultural and civilizational terms India, Australia, and New Zealand, which have never been included in East Asia proper.

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US-ASEAN relations in the 1990s

Relations between the United States and ASEAN experienced a certain decline in the 1990s, which was noted by many researchers. The main reason for this, apparently, should be considered a strategic miscalculation of the Clinton administration. In the "violent outburst" of unipolar" emotions, " according to Russian researcher O. N. Bykov, after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States recklessly excluded ASEAN from its foreign policy priorities and underestimated it (unlike China). its integration potential. At that time, the need to support regional groupings that act as a counterweight to other great Powers did not seem so urgent to American leaders.

Within the framework of the National Security Strategy for Engagement and Expansion, the core document of the 1995 Clinton Doctrine, Washington's main focus in East Asia was on the" constructive engagement "of China as a growing regional power that poses a threat to the establishment of US global hegemony. In this context, the international situation in Southeast Asia was seen as a derivative of the state of US-China relations, and ASEAN was seen as a disparate group of small passive states that follow in the wake of these great powers and depend on maintaining the balance of power between them. Relations with them developed mainly at the bilateral level. It is very significant that the text of the" Strategy " does not even mention ASEAN as a regional organization.

This approach of the American foreign policy establishment, not far removed from the Pacific "Ford doctrine" of 1976, was also reflected in conceptual developments, in particular, in the theory of "sub-regional bipolarity" by R. Ross. In the article "Geography of the World" published in 1999, the researcher noted that after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, Southeast Asia turned into an arena of confrontation between the largest non - regional actors-the United States and China. At the same time, according to R. Ross, the states of the continental part of Southeast Asia (Indochina Peninsula) are more inclined to China, while the island states - Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines and Brunei - tend to approach the United States, thus delineating the spheres of influence of each of the powers. Given the specific geographical location, economic interests, and military capabilities of the PRC and the United States, Ross considered the redistribution of these spheres of influence, especially in the form of a military-military confrontation, unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Such a relatively stable bipolar power distribution structure between the two great Powers was seen as the basis for the future regional subsystem of international relations in Southeast Asia.3

In practice, the decline in the importance of Southeast Asia in the system of US national interests has resulted, on the one hand, in the reduction of its permanent military presence in the sub-region and the distancing of Washington from the territorial interests of the United States.-

3 Rоss R. The Geography of Peace. East Asia in the Twenty-First Century - "International Security", vol. 23, N 4 (Spring 1999).

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disputes in the South China Sea. On the other hand, it is the State Department's unwillingness to properly differentiate its global course in relation to ASEAN, taking into account the civilizational features and diplomatic culture of this heterogeneous region. 4

The latter was a source of serious controversy. They were associated with a sharp rejection by almost all states in the region of such a key component of the " Clinton doctrine "as the Messianic idea of building a" democratic world " based on Western (American) liberal values, bypassing international law.

The Association's member countries were particularly concerned about the" humanitarian intervention " of the NATO bloc in Yugoslavia during the 1999 Kosovo campaign. This precedent of military intervention by the United States and its allies in the affairs of a sovereign state under the pretext of protecting human rights and democratic norms went against all the principles of the "ASEAN method", negating the experience of its conciliation mechanisms. It is no coincidence that even in such a strictly consensual document as the statement of the President of the sixth ARF session, "concern was expressed... the "consequences" of the events in Kosovo for the international situation in the Asia-Pacific region 5.

Following the principles of ASEAN, the Association's member countries reacted negatively to the Clinton administration's criticism of the policy of" constructive involvement " of the Myanmar military regime in the Association. Other examples include the demarche of Malaysian leader Mahathir over the speech of then US Vice-President Gore at the APEC summit in Kuala Lumpur in 1998 in support of Ibrahim and the Reform Movement led by him, as well as the cooling in US-Indonesian relations in 1999 in connection with the actions of the Indonesian National Army in East Timor.

Ideological differences were complemented by economic ones. In the late 1990s, many ASEAN politicians, first of all M. Mahathir, declared that globalization in the American scenario was unacceptable. In the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, he harshly criticized international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, calling them instruments of the "Washington Consensus" economic policy leading to the establishment of global American hegemony.6

4 Rowan J. The U.S. - Japan Security Alliance, ASEAN, and The South China Sea Dispute. -"Asian Survey", 2005, vol. 45, Issue 3.

5 Chairman's Statement. The 6th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Singapore, 26.07.1999 (http://www.aseansec.org/708.htm).

6 The "Washington Consensus" refers to the United States and the leading Western European countries that control the activities of international financial institutions and dictate the terms of their loans to States. The term was first used in 1989 by the American researcher J. R. R. Tolkien. The report is based on an article by J. Williamson describing a package of ten basic requirements of the IMF for macroeconomic liberalization, put forward when granting loans to countries with economies in transition. These requirements ignored the national specifics of the recipient countries and made key sectors of their national economy dependent on foreign capital.

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The United States, in turn, responded with a wary attitude towards the Asean integration model, an alternative to the APEC process. This has led to US indifference to the problems that the ASEAN countries faced during the crisis. In October 1997. Thailand appealed to the US authorities to provide financial assistance in order to stabilize the exchange rate of the baht. Washington's sudden refusal to help its old ally was seen by many Thai and Asean politicians as a gesture of disdain.

This wariness was apparently also evident when the United States refused to support the candidacy of Thai Deputy Prime Minister S. Panichpakdi for the election of WTO Secretary General in 1999.

In general, as one analyst notes, during the eight years of Clinton's presidency, " Washington's traditional low assessment of the importance of ASEAN has not changed significantly... and it began to be considered [by the Southeast Asian countries] as a lack of interest in them. " 7

Post-September 11, 2001 relations: ASEAN and the Bush Doctrine

The arrival of George W. Bush in the White House. Initially, I did not connect the political elites of ASEAN with any fundamental changes in American policy towards the association. The situation in East Asia was viewed by the" hawks " of the Republican administration through the prism of classical political realism. Thus, as early as early 2001, A. Friedberg, an adviser to US Vice President Robert Cheney, believed that " the future of Asia will resemble the past of Europe; in other words, it will be marked by the confrontation of the policies of great powers, the conclusion of alliances, an expensive arms race, periodic crises and sometimes wars."8. The Bush administration's worsening relations with China over the Taiwan issue, the launch of the Theater Missile Defense initiative, and increased attention to the situation on the Korean peninsula seem to have once again condemned the US-ASEAN dialogue partnership to a miserable existence in the shadow of bilateral strategic alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington were an important turning point in relations between the United States and ASEAN, an impetus for mutual rapprochement. This was due to the partners ' awareness of the common interests of the fight against Islamic extremism. Even before the 2002 Bali attacks, an ASEAN official noted that international terrorism is probably the most serious threat in the region since the end of the Indochina conflict.

The sharp increase in US attention to ASEAN was based on the presence of a wide network of terrorist Islamic organizations directly linked to Al-Qaeda in the region established by the US special services.-

7 Sukma R. U.S. - Southeast Asia Relations after the Crisis: The Security Dimension. Asia Foundation Workshop on America's Role in Asia. Bangkok, 22 - 24.03.2003.

8 Friedberg A. Introduction. In: Strategic Asia: Power and Purpose. Seattle, 2001, p. 7.

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Al-Qaeda", which allowed Washington to proclaim Southeast Asia the second most important front in the global war on terrorism after Afghanistan. According to US National Security Council analysts, citizens and territories of several States in the sub - region-Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand,and the Philippines-were involved in Al-Qaeda's plans, including the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen and the September 11 attacks in the United States. 9

For the ASEAN countries, the current international political situation presented both new opportunities and new challenges. The association's leaders were naturally apprehensive about the adoption in the United States in 2002 of the "doctrine of preventive action" ("Bush doctrine"), which involves identifying and eliminating terrorist threats around the world, and not necessarily with the consent of other members of the international community. In the light of the proclamation of J. R. R. Tolkien, Under Bush's slogan "Those who are not with us are against us", the ASEAN states are in a situation "between a rock and an anvil". Their leaders were faced with the task of finding a precarious balance between demonstrating support for US actions and maintaining the loyalty of the predominantly anti-American population of their countries.

At the beginning of 2002, there were frequent reports in the American press about the possibility of the US administration extending anti-terrorist actions to those Southeast Asian countries where terrorist strongholds were located-primarily Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as Malaysia, which was declared "an important springboard for the September 11 attacks." Although none of the ASEAN countries met the criteria of "target States" of the "doctrine of pre-emptive strikes" (possession of WMD, tyrannical regime and support for terrorism at the state level), most of them considered such a scenario to be quite realistic.

As a result, as the Australian scholar M. Beeson notes, "despite the fact that the fact of cooperation with the United States in their self-proclaimed war on terror was fraught with internal complications for all the major states of Southeast Asia, it turned out that all of them were forced to demonstrate their desire, if not enthusiasm, in this endeavor"10. Indeed, exactly one month after the terrorist attacks, a Joint Communique was signed following the Third ASEAN Foreign Ministers ' Meeting on Transnational Crime, which identified terrorism as the main international threat.11

Less than a year later, on August 1, 2002, the United States and ASEAN adopted a Joint Declaration on combating Terrorism. The document provided for the continuation and improvement of the "exchange of intelligence information and data on

9 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004 (http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf).

10 Beesоn M. The United States and Southeast Asia: Change and Continuity in American Hegemony. In: Crisis and Change in Regional Governance. Ed. by Jayasuriya K., London, 2005, p. 12.

11 Joint Communique of the Third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) Singapore, 11.10.2001 (http://www.aseansec.org/5621.htm).

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financing of terrorist activities"; joint development of "more effective counterterrorism policies" in the ASEAN countries; strengthening contacts between partner law enforcement agencies; expanding American support for relevant ASEAN training and educational programs; conducting consultations between managers, analysts and intelligence operatives; conducting joint operations; cooperation on migration and customs issues to effectively counter the trafficking of materials and financial resources related to terrorist activities 12.

At the same time, the deployment of the global war on terrorism that followed the terrorist attacks in the United States had a serious destabilizing effect on the development of the association, activating centrifugal processes in it. Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan has become a litmus test for the declared unity of ASEAN. While traditional formal and informal allies (Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore) have supported U.S. action against the Taliban, countries with predominantly Muslim populations (Indonesia and Malaysia), as well as Vietnam, have denounced it. Other countries in Eastern Indochina, as well as Myanmar, have adopted a cautiously neutral stance.13

The anti-terrorist campaign under the auspices of the United States indirectly affected the aggravation of intra-Asean contradictions. Thus, a major international scandal occurred in February 2002, when Singapore's minister-mentor Lee Kuan Yew accused Jakarta of inaction and connivance of the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist organization, which was preparing a terrorist attack against the American embassy in Singapore.

At the same time, all ASEAN countries have somehow tried to extract some of their own benefits from the global war on terrorism, bypassing regional institutions. Explicit (in the case of the Philippines, Singapore) or undisguised (in the case of Malaysia and Indonesia) support for the global anti-terrorist campaign was used by them to solve their internal problems at the expense of the United States. First of all, this was the case in the Philippines: the multi-million dollar US financial assistance allowed Manila to start modernizing the national armed forces, and the deployment of US special forces units in the south of the country in January 2002 allowed it to effectively fight Muslim rebel groups. 14 Some other ASEAN countries also received significant financial assistance from cooperation with the United States in this area (see Table. 1).

12 ASEAN - United States of America Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism (http://www.aseansec.org/7424.htm).

13 Подробнее см.: Chow J. ASEAN Counterterrorism Cooperation since 9/11. - "Asian Survey", vol. 55, N 2, March-April 2005.

14 Chin Kin Wah. Southeast Asia in 2002: From Bali to Iraq - Cooperating for Security. - "Southeast Asian Affairs 2003". Singapore, 2003, p. 18.

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Table 1

US defense and security assistance to some ASEAN Countries in 2002-2003, million US dollars

ZVF*

FES**

International Military Training Program

Combating drug trafficking

MD***

Combating WMD proliferation and terrorism

Total

Indonesia

60

8

8 + 0.5 from 10****

76.5 + part of 10

Malaysia

0,8

-

0.3 + part of 10

1.6 + part from 10

Philippines

25

15

2,4

-

0.5 + part of 10

82.9 + part of 10

Thailand

2

-

1,75

3,75

-

0,05 + 0,5*****

8,05

* Foreign Military Financing Program.

** (FES) Program of the United States Agency for International Development's Economic Assistance Fund.

*** (MD) Peacekeeping support.

**** In 2003, the Administration requested an additional $ 10 million from Congress for the implementation of a Program to Prevent Terrorist Activities (in border areas), which was distributed among the following countries: Afghanistan, Greece, Jordan, India, Indonesia, Yemen, Kenya, United Arab Emirates, Tanzania, Malaysia. Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, and South Africa.

***** In 2003, the Administration requested $ 10 million from Congress for a Counterterrorism Assistance Program for 19 States that, according to the US State Department, have the weakest monitoring system for terrorist financing.

"War on Terrorism" Security Assistance Table. Federation of American Scientists (http://fas.org./terrorism/at/docs/WaronTerroraid.html).

The actions of individual ASEAN countries interested in attracting additional financial assistance from the United States have had a negative impact on the formation of the ASEAN Security Community. A clear manifestation of this disunity was the inability of the association in 2003 to adopt a consolidated position on the American military action against Iraq, aimed at overthrowing the regime of Saddam Hussein. Three ASEAN member countries-Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore - officially joined the anti-Iraq coalition, while Muslim Malaysia, Indonesia, and the association's "new" members, most notably Vietnam, strongly opposed it, describing the US actions as "aggression" against a sovereign state. ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong could only shrug his shoulders in this situation, stating that "each of the association's members has the right to formulate their own position that best suits their national interests" 15.

15 Cit. по: ASEAN Split over Iraq to be Expected. - "Straits Times", Singapore, 27.05.2003.

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Relations in 2005-2008: transition to more balanced cooperation

The events of September 11, 2001, which caused an increase in the number of contacts between the United States and ASEAN countries, became a kind of "shock therapy", which awakened political cooperation between the partners from a long-standing stupor. At the same time, the direction in which this cooperation began to develop - the restoration of full-scale military-political ties mainly on a bilateral basis-did not meet the long-term interests of the association, which entered a fundamentally new stage of its development.

By the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the system of military-political partnership between the United States and Southeast Asian countries, on which dialogue relations were based for many years, had become an anachronism. This system did not take into account the actual transformation of ASEAN into a strong regional structure, which has already gained critical mass for projecting its influence and values on the Asia-Pacific region as a whole through such multilateral dialogue formats as the ARF and, especially, ASEAN+3 and the East Asian Community formed on its basis.

For a long time, the Asean vector of China's diplomacy was also underestimated in the United States. In 1996 - 1997, Beijing made a bet on the most active support for the processes of economic integration in Southeast Asia. In 2002-2003, while the eyes of the US leadership were focused on the situation in the Middle East, a number of agreements were concluded between ASEAN and China, among which it is necessary to highlight the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation of 2002, which contained a fundamental decision on the creation of the ASEAN - China Free Trade Zone (CAFTAAs well as the protocol on China's accession to the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (October 2003). It can be said that at the beginning of the XXI century, China, by adopting (albeit selectively) the rules of the ASEAN game, seized the strategic initiative in the region from the United States, acting as a natural and constructive partner of ASEAN in the building a new regional order.

The weakness of the US position in ASEAN in comparison with China's in the changed regional situation becomes noticeable when comparing the programs of dialogue cooperation between the two countries. As Singapore's Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong pointed out in 2005, " Over the past 10 years, China has successfully launched 27 different mechanisms of interaction with the association. At the same time, in the 28 years since the establishment of the formal US - ASEAN dialogue in 1977, only seven bodies of mutual cooperation have been established, most of which have not met on a regular basis."16

As a result, a unique and generally favorable situation has emerged for ASEAN, in which the United States, as the guarantor of the external security of the association and the macro-regional international missile defense mechanisms created under its auspices, is being created.-

16 Goh Chok Tong. Constructing East Asia. Presentation at the visiting conference of the Asian Society. Bangkok, 9.06.2005 (http://app.sprinter.gov.sg/data/pr/20050609995.htm).

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At the same time, they were not represented in them and were deprived of the possibility of unilaterally promoting their interests in them.

A theoretical model describing this situation was proposed by Professor E. Guo of Oxford University. It describes the current formation of a hierarchical international order in the Southeast Asian region, which provides for the following distribution of forces at four levels (overlays):

1) the superpower level that the US occupies;

2) the level of a great regional power assigned to China;

3) The level of major regional powers shared by Japan and India;

4) the level of other important regional actors-ASEAN, Australia and the Republic of Korea.

At the same time, the United States, being the foundation of this pyramid and ensuring its stability, is deprived of any effective levers for its reconfiguration for its own purposes. This is explained by the fact that ASEAN "programs" the actions of non-regional states through a two-pronged policy that combines a liberal-institutional strategy of" complete entanglement "(omni-enmeshment) of great powers and a quasi-realist strategy of" indirect balancing " between them.

By "complete entanglement", the author understands the deep involvement of as many extra-regional powers as possible in the non-confrontational regional community, immersing them in a network of exchanges and joint projects within regional institutions with the long-term goal of integration.17 It is assumed that during the process of" entanglement", the national interests of each of the powers, including the United States, are gradually modified, incorporating the collective values proposed by ASEAN. The ultimate goal of this strategy is to establish (at least) stable economic and political interdependence between the United States, China, and other major non-regional powers within the Southeast Asian region, in which military-military methods of resolving contradictions between them would simply become unprofitable.

The Asean strategy of" indirect balancing", in turn, involves using the US military and political potential as a counterweight to China. However, unlike the classical balance of power schemes, it does not involve the conclusion of any allied pacts with the United States directed against a third party( i.e., the PRC), recalling in this sense the concept of the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership. 18 As E. Guo notes, it is only about "borrowing" by the ASEAN member states American military support, the need for which is officially explained by the need to combat other threats to regional security, such as terrorism. It is characteristic that such a pretext was used not only by Indonesia, which is really exposed to the terrorist threat,

17 Goh E. Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia. Analyzing Regional Security Strategies. - "International Security", vol. 32, N 3 (Winter 2007/08).

18 Klimenko A. F. Strategic Partnership between Russia and China in Central Asia and some ways to improve the regional security system. - "Problems of the Far East", 2005, N 2.

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In 2005, it restored full-scale military-technical cooperation with the United States, but also with Vietnam, where the level of terrorist danger is one of the lowest in Asia.

It is extremely important that, against the background of expanding military-political and military-technical cooperation with the United States, in 2003, ASEAN simultaneously concluded a Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity with the PRC, which, in particular, implies the beginning of a new ASEAN - China dialogue on regional security issues. Similar bilateral documents on strategic partnership (or comprehensive cooperation) with the People's Republic of China were signed by each of the association's member countries19. Moreover, as E. Guo notes, the ASEAN countries, in particular Indonesia and the Philippines, making curtsies in the direction of Beijing, are pragmatically playing the "Chinese card" in order to get US support for the modernization of their own armed forces.20

All of this has allowed ASEAN to take a more selective approach to various American foreign policy initiatives, without fear of possible adverse consequences. In particular, none of the ASEAN countries, with the exception of Singapore, has yet officially joined the Proliferation Security Initiative put forward by the United States in mid-2003, citing its non-compliance with international law. In 2006, the Minister of Defense of Indonesia, H. Virayuda explained the country's refusal to participate in the event as follows: "If Indonesia becomes a party to the Initiative, the United States or other major Powers could detain and inspect ships (traveling through Indonesian territorial waters) for illegal transportation of materials related to WMD. In addition, the Initiative did not arise through multilateral consultations, but was proposed only by a group of countries with a common goal in implementing such initiatives... This proposal contradicts... United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 " 21. An even tougher reaction from the ASEAN countries was caused by the American Initiative for Regional Maritime Security, which involves the deployment of a permanent contingent of American Marines in the Strait of Malacca zone. It was rejected by Malaysia and Indonesia on the grounds that the deployment of US troops in the region would be counterproductive and would only lead to an increase in the number of terrorist attacks.

The public reaction of the United States itself to the changing strategic situation in the Southeast Asia sub-region was not made public until mid-2004, when the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Asia-Pacific Affairs, J. R. R. Tolkien, announced that the United States was ready to respond to the new strategic situation in the Southeast Asian region. Kelly said that China is "aggressively challenging the status quo," citing as the only example that Beijing is "strengthening its influence in Southeast Asia by expanding its diplomatic reach."

19 Haacke J. China and ASEAN. Setting Parameters for Future Cooperation. In: Contemporary China: The Dynamics of Change at the Start of the New Millennium. Ed. by P. Preston and J. Haacke. London, New York, 2003, pp. 261 - 290.

20 Goh E. Op. cit.

21 Cit. by: Xinhua News Agency, 17.03.2006.

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increase the volume of development assistance and sign new bilateral and multilateral agreements (with ASEAN)... agreements"22. It is obvious that earlier, in view of the active support of the PRC for American anti-terrorist actions in the Middle East and the most important, final phase of bilateral negotiations on the terms of China's accession to the WTO, it was not profitable for Washington to make such statements.

The subsequent changes in US-ASEAN relations, the largest since the end of the Cold War, were one of the results of a discussion between the White House, Congress, and the American expert community on the US attitude to integration processes in Greater East Asia and the growing role of the PRC in them. It was obvious that their continued disregard, which was observed throughout the first term of President George W. Bush, could lead to an irreversible loss of Washington's control over the development of the situation in the Asia-Pacific region. The question of whether the United States will continue to rely on traditional bilateral alliances and temporary negotiating formats, or whether it makes sense to support the development of self-sufficient regional groupings, has not been clearly resolved.

According to the researchers, in search of an adequate response to the new regional course of the PRC, the administration decided on an intermediate version of" extended bilaterality "(extended bilateralism), which goes back to the concept of "enriched bilaterality" (enriched bilateralism), voiced by American military experts since the end of 2001. 23 "Extended bilaterality" meant progressive development on the basis of US bilateral alliances with the United States. more extensive, three - and multilateral dialogue formats based not on common threats, but on similarity of interests, as well as Washington's increased attention to the problems of East Asian integration.

At the same time, there was a shift in Washington's emphasis in determining the significance of ASEAN itself. The Association began to be seen as a capable and, most importantly, interested partner for the gradual integration of the United States into regional economic structures.

The establishment of this course, which is, in fact, an attempt to make up for previously lost opportunities in regional competition with the PRC, assumed: 1) establishing more effective diplomatic cooperation and improving the image of the United States in the eyes of ASEAN member States; 2) equalizing the imbalance in relations between the United States and its "old" and " new " members; 3) providing substantive content to dialogue partnership programs and promoting the development of integration mechanisms of the Association; 4) creating conditions for the formation of a US free trade zone - ASEAN; 5) develop a more effective course on Myanmar.

22 Kelly J. An Overview of U.S. - East Asia Policy. Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, 2.06.2004 (http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/33064.htm).

23 Blair D., Hanley J. From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements. - "The Washington Quarterly", vol. 24, N 1 (Winter 2001).

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The implementation of this course was noticeably hindered by the lack of political will of the US leadership, which at the end of the second presidential term of George W. Bush was busy eliminating its mistakes in other regions of the world. Thus, during her tenure as Secretary of State, Ms. Rice skipped two sessions of the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Association's post-ministerial conferences, each time citing the urgent need for her presence in the Middle East. The cancellation of the first - ever US-ASEAN summit scheduled for September 2007 was a clear signal that J. R. R. Tolkien and the United States will continue to hold the summit. Bush leaves the development of relations with this organization to the next owner of the White House. As a result, the development of the US - ASEAN dialogue partnership between 2005 and 2008 had a touch of incompleteness, combining both obvious successes and weaknesses.

Establishing more effective diplomatic cooperation. The most important event that reflected a qualitative change in the Bush administration's approach to relations with ASEAN was the unprecedented appointment of an ambassador to the Association. The need to create an ambassador-at-large position within the State Department to coordinate relations with ASEAN as a regional organization has been actively promoted by a group of congressmen since the mid-first decade of the 2000s, which was officially announced in 2006 in the bill "On the appointment of the US Ambassador for Relations with ASEAN", prepared by Republican R. Lugar with the active assistance of groups of Democratic senators, which included the future President and Vice-President of the United States B. Obama and J. R. R. Tolkien Biden 24. In May 2007, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the Dialogue Partnership with ASEAN, the Senate adopted another document that also recommended that the State Department appoint an ambassador to the Association. 25 April 9, 2007. The Senate approved the appointment of career diplomat and Vietnam expert S. Marcel to this post.26 The United States was the first ASEAN dialogue partner to establish such a position. Despite the protocol nature of this appointment, it was enthusiastically received in ASEAN as a symbol of recognition by the United States of the association's status as a valuable and independent subject of international relations and the importance of multilateral cooperation in Southeast Asia.

In parallel with the intensification of multilateral diplomacy, Washington is clearly trying to get rid of an excessively "militarized" image in the eyes of regional leaders. First of all, we should note the mutual agreement of the parties to cover up the ambiguous counterterrorism component of relations. So, in the official press release of the State Budget issued in 2007-

24 S. 2697 [109th]: U.S. Ambassador of ASEAN Affairs Act (http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?=s109 - 2697).

25 S. 110 [110th]: Expressing the Sense of the Senate Regarding the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN-United States Dialogue and Relationship (http://bulk.resourse.org/gpo.gov/bills/110/sr110rs.txt.pdf).

26 Statement by S. Marciel, Ambassador-designate, U.S. Ambassador for ASEAN Affairs, 9.04.2008 (http://www/docstoc.com/783264/Mr. -Scot-A-Marciel).

In the structure of the State Department, S. Marcel already served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Development of Relations with ASEAN. He received the post of ambassador on a part-time basis, but it did not involve his permanent presence at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta.

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The United States Department of State's report on the 30th anniversary of dialogue partnership relations mentions the term "terrorism" only in passing, and the section" Security cooperation " does not mention anti-terrorist programs. 27 Since then, the emphasis in multilateral military-political cooperation, at least at the declarative level, has been placed on the following issues:"soft security " - disaster relief and humanitarian operations. This was the focus of the 2008 US-Philippine exercise Balikatan and the multilateral exercise Cobra Gold, which had always been anti-terrorist in nature.28

Strengthening relations with the" new " ASEAN members. A much larger problem on the way to a qualitative improvement of the US - ASEAN dialogue partnership and more effective counteraction to the PRC's regional strategy was the issue of eliminating the historically existing disparity in the development of trade, economic, political, and military-political ties with the United States between the maritime (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore) and continental (Indochina) parts of the South China Sea.- East Asia. This is especially noticeable when analyzing foreign economic statistics: experts estimate that in 2007, the "senior" members of the association accounted for approximately 80% of all US-ASEAN trade turnover and about 90% of all US foreign direct investment in ASEAN countries.29

Based on this, starting from 2003-2004, the United States began to rapidly increase ties with the countries of Eastern Indochina. At the same time, a significant sequence was observed. Rapprochement with Vietnam was chosen as the basic task. This was due to its key geopolitical position, the status of an informal leader of the" new " ASEAN members, as well as its ambivalent relations with China. In general, having normalized relations with Vietnam by the beginning of 2001, from 2003 to 2004 the United States, using various economic levers, pushed the Vietnamese leadership to further rapprochement in the foreign and defense spheres. By the beginning of 2009, the countries that were once military adversaries were not only actively developing trade, economic and investment ties, but also maintaining constant interdepartmental contacts in the field of defense and security. Their level is eloquently evidenced by the fact that in 2008 the United States and Vietnam reached an agreement on the supply of spare parts to Vietnam for captured equipment (amphibious helicopters), which remained in the hands of the Vietnamese People's Army after the war of 1964-1973.

27 United States, ASEAN Mark 30th Anniversary of Relationship. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs. 31.07.2007 (http://www.america.gov/st/texttransenglish/2007/July/20070731115551 eaifas0.6514246.html).

28 Simon S. U.S. - Southeast Asia Relations. Indonesia as Exemplar of Southeast Asia's Importance. Comparative Connections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations. 1th Quarter, 2009 (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0901qus_seasia.pdf).

29 Limaye S. United States - ASEAN Relations on ASEAN's Fortieth Anniversary. - "Contemporary Southeast Asia", vol. 29, N 3 (2007).

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Currently, Vietnam, along with Indonesia, is characterized by American officials as a promising regional partner.

A little later, since 2005, there has been a warming of relations between the United States and Cambodia, partially curtailed after the domestic political crisis of 1997. In 2005, the United States lifted the ban on providing military assistance to Cambodia, in 2006 concluded a Framework Agreement on Trade and Investment, in February 2007 resumed the bilateral development assistance program and established a mechanism for regular consultations on trade and economic issues.

A third country in Eastern Indochina, Laos, whose freedom of action in foreign policy is significantly limited by the Thailand - China - Vietnam triangle, analysts say, "does not show any activity in improving relations with the United States." 30 This is largely due to Laos ' lack of economic interest: in 2006, the US-Lao trade turnover was only about $ 16 million. In addition, until very recently, Laos remained one of the few countries in the world that did not have the most-favored-nation status in trade with the United States. Nevertheless, there is some progress in this area: since the mid-2000s, the United States has slightly increased funding for development assistance programs in Laos, and in early 2008, a bilateral trade agreement was signed between the countries, under which Laos was granted the status of normal trade relations and expressed support for the country's early accession to the WTO.

Washington's desire to establish more trusting relations with the Lao People's Democratic Republic was reflected in the arrest by the FBI in California in July 2007 of a US citizen, one of the leaders of the international Hmong movement, Wang Pao, accused of planning a coup d'etat in Laos.31 The arrest of the former leader of ethnic Hmong guerrilla groups formed during the 1960 - 1973 Civil War with CIA money and operating against the Pathet Lao forces was generally welcomed in Vientiane. The exchange of military attaches between the two countries at the end of 2008 also testified to the maturity of relations between the two countries.32

Development of dialog partnership programs. Until very recently, multilateral projects have been a weak link in the dialogue partnership, significantly inferior to similar cooperation between ASEAN and other Western countries, as well as with China. Signed in August 2002. The cooperation plan provided for the implementation of only 20 small-scale projects with a total budget of $ 9 million. and clearly did not match the potential of the relationship.

In 2005 - 2006, the parties adopted a much more extensive "Enhanced Partnership" program, which currently implements more than 160 projects in various fields, from education

30 Ibidem.

31 Weiner T. Gen. Vang Pao's Last War. - "The New York Times", 11.05.2008.

32 Defense Attache Office Opening (http://laos.usembassy.gov/dao_dec5_2008.html).

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and protecting the environment to fighting high-tech crime.

An extremely important event reflecting the change in American attitudes towards ASEAN regionalism was the launch in 2007 of the United States Agency for International Development's "ASEAN Development Vision for Interstate Cooperation and Integration" ADVANCE initiative, which aims to promote the growth of trade turnover between ASEAN and the United States and, at the same time, create the ASEAN Economic Community by 201533.

The current issues of cooperation within the framework of the dialogue Partnership are being implemented by the United States Technical Support and Training Center under the ASEAN Secretariat established in 2004. In 2004-2007, the main task of the center was to provide advice to the Secretariat staff on such issues as the creation of a single product range, the development of the ASEAN Investment Agreement, etc. Since the end of 2007, the main task of the center has been to implement projects within the framework of the ADVANS program, including promoting the unification of customs procedures and rates, improving the competitiveness of the textile and tourism industries of the economies of the "new" ASEAN members, as well as a bilateral program to provide advice and technical assistance to the Government of the Lao

Initiatives in the trade and economic sphere. The key, and at the same time, the most problematic area of cooperation between the United States and ASEAN at the beginning of the XXI century should be recognized as relations in the field of trade and investment.

In the context of the global financial crisis of 2008, an event long predicted by analysts took place: China has overtaken the United States, pushing it from second (after Japan) to third place among the largest trading partners of ASEAN.35 This downward trend in the share of the United States in the ASEAN countries ' trade turnover, while the share of China has been increasing, has been observed since the mid-1990s (see Table 2).

In the future, experts estimate that with the establishment of KAFTA in 2010, ASEAN's exports to the US market will decline by at least $ 700 million per year36.

At the same time, in 2008, the volume of US-ASEAN trade turnover - $ 177 billion, or 4.07% of all US foreign trade (see Table 3)-was four times higher, for example, than the volume of US-Indian trade during the same period.

33 Marciel S. ASEAN-U.S. Cooperation in Building the ASEAN Economic Community (http//www.eastwestcenter.org/stored/pdfs/dialoge002.pdf).

34 For more information about the Center's activities, see: http://www.asean-us-partnership.org/asean_us_facility.htm.

35 According to the information network resource "China Daily.com.cn", in 2008, the total volume of trade turnover between China and the ASEAN countries amounted to $ 231 billion. See more: ASEAN May Become China's 3rd Largest Trade Partner (http://www 2.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009 - 04/10/content_7668908.htm).

36 Подробнее см.: Vaughn B., Morrison W. China- Southeast Asia Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications for the United States, CRS Report for Congress. Wash., 4.04.2006. Order Code RL32688, pp. 16 - 18.

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Table 2

Dynamics of ASEAN trade with the United States and China (1995-2006)

ASEAN imports (%)

1995

2000

2006

USA

14,6

14,0

9,8

China

2,2

5,2

11,5

ASEAN exports (%)

1995

2000

2006

USA

18,5

18,0

12,9

China

2D

3,5

8,7

ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2005. ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta. 2005, pp. 70~79; ASEAN Trade by Selected Partner Country/Region, 2006 (http://www.aseansec.org/Stat/Tablel9.pdf).

Investment cooperation has also been actively developing in recent years. As of the end of 2007, US companies invested about $ 100 billion in the economies of the 37 countries of the region, which was one-third higher than, for example, the total volume of FDI (foreign direct investment) attracted to the Chinese economy in 2007 ($74.8 billion).

In order to minimize losses from the creation of CAFTA and other preferential trade agreements between ASEAN and its Asian partners, since 2002. The United States has stepped up efforts to conclude bilateral free trade agreements with some of the Association's countries, aiming to create a trans - regional ASEAN-US Free Trade Area (FTA) in the long term. Between 2002 and 2007, the United States signed preliminary so - called Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFA) with all ASEAN member countries (with the exception of Laos and Myanmar), as well as a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with ASEAN as a whole .38

In parallel with a number of countries - Singapore, Thailand (since the end of 2003) and Malaysia (since the beginning of 2006), negotiations were conducted directly on the creation of bilateral free trade zones. However, apart from Singapore, which was most interested in the FTA due to its exceptional integration into the global economy, other ASEAN countries were less enthusiastic about the US proposals. This was due to their unwillingness to reform their economy and legislation in accordance with American requirements, which are often unprofitable for local producers. A stumbling block in the negotiations with Thailand was the size of tariffs on imports of American agricultural products, with Malaysia - issues of intellectual property protection (production of generic drugs, etc.), access of American companies to the service sector, as well as disagreements over the conduct of agricultural products.-

37 Bureau of Economic Analysis. U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: Selected Items by Detailed Country, 2004 - 2007 (http://www.bea.gov/international/xls/longctry.xls).

38 Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement between the United States of America and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (http://www.bilaterals.orgflMG/pdf/US-ASEAN_TIFA_2006.pdf).

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Table 3

ASEAN-US foreign Trade in 2008

Country / Region

US foreign trade (USD million)

Import

Export

Brunei

114,3

111,5

Vietnam

12.901,1

2.789,4

Indonesia

15.799,1

5.644,5

Laos

42,4

18,3

Malaysia

30.736,1

12.949,5

Myanmar

10,8

0,0

Singapore

15.884,9

27.853,6

Thailand

23.538,3

9.066,6

Philippines

8.713,3

8.294,9

ASEAN as a whole

110.141,1

66.893,2

U.S. Census Bureau. Foreign Trade Statistics. Exhibit 13. Exports, Imports and Trade Balance by Country and Area: 2008 (http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/2008pr/final_revisions/exh13tl.pdf).

The Malaysian government has adopted a policy that excludes foreign (including American) companies from the highly profitable public procurement sector. Additional negative factors that delayed the conclusion of FTA agreements indefinitely were the coup d'etat in Thailand and the expiration of the Bush administration's trade negotiations mandate in April 2008.

Another, no less serious problem coming from China for strengthening the US economic position in Southeast Asia is the process of internationalization of the yuan. In December 2008, the State Council of the People's Republic of China authorized the use of the yuan as an exchange currency in trade between Yunnan Province and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and ASEAN countries (primarily with Vietnam, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Myanmar, and Thailand), as well as in payments between Guangdong Province and Hong Kong and Macao, through which large volumes of RMB. Despite the fact that the yuan is not yet a freely convertible currency, the strengthening of the exchange rate has led to its widespread use by ASEAN countries as a savings currency. Moreover, the central banks of a number of the Association's member countries (Malaysia and the Philippines) have been using the yuan, along with the US dollar, as their official reserve currency since the mid - first decade of the 2000s. It can be assumed that in the context of the global financial crisis, the PRC will take additional measures to expand the use of the yuan in Southeast Asia and consolidate the results obtained by allocating additional loans in yuan to ASEAN countries, which may lead to a further weakening of the US dollar's position in the region39.

39 China Offers Funding, Loan Credits to Southeast Asia (http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/china-offers-funding-loan-credits/story.aspx?).

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Myanmar policy. By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, it became obvious to the American expert community that the policy of introducing new sanctions against the military regime of Myanmar is not only ineffective, but also counterproductive for ensuring long-term American interests both in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

According to a number of researchers, since the late 1990s, the situation around Myanmar has developed according to the "North Korean" scenario, when China became a key political, trade and economic partner of this state under the conditions of isolation of the regime by Western countries (including Japan). By strengthening its influence in Myanmar, the PRC gained access to both the country's geostrategic resources (access to the Indian Ocean bypassing the Strait of Malacca, the coast of Arakan and the islands of the Andaman Sea for the construction of naval bases and electronic intelligence centers) and its minerals (oil, gas, uranium ore), which significantly strengthened the country's economy. China's military and energy security. Given Beijing's plans to build an ocean-going military fleet and qualitatively expand its naval presence in the Indian Ocean, the Myanmar-China rapprochement is extremely unfavorable for the United States.

The Bush administration's harsh stance and continued criticism of Myanmar has also affected US-ASEAN relations in general, hindering the development of the dialogue process. In particular, it has become the main declared political obstacle to the holding of the US-ASEAN summit, and in the long term it can seriously hinder the creation of the aforementioned trans-regional free trade zone.

At the same time, the situation is not completely deadlocked: in recent years, American diplomats have begun to meet more actively with representatives of the regime, which should contribute to the development of a more effective policy in this area.

The Obama Administration and ASEAN: on the cusp of big changes?

Considering the current situation in the development of the US - ASEAN dialogue partnership, especially the signing of the Bali Treaty by the United States, it can be assumed that the new democratic Obama administration will step up its policy of strengthening cooperation with the association, the contours of which were outlined by George Bush's diplomacy.

Although the subject of ASEAN was not mentioned in the pre-election speeches of B. Obama and J. Trump. They stressed the absolute need to reevaluate the process of regionalism in Greater East Asia and adapt to it. B. Obama warned the public against one-sided consideration of this process only as a challenge to APEC and other pro-American international institutions. Noting its objective nature, the future president of the United States emphasized: "Asia is moving - with or without us - to a new one

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This is a regional architecture, and we need to tap into it to ensure reliable trans-Pacific connectivity." The restoration of trust as regional rivals (i.e., China) is also important for the United States, according to Barack Obama. - R. S.) and friends (including ASEAN - R. S.), which weakened during the Bush presidency.40

The growing role of ASEAN in the hierarchy of United States foreign policy priorities under the democratic Obama administration was clearly evident in February 2009, when Indonesia became the second destination after Japan on the first international tour (outside the North American continent) of the new Secretary of State X. Clinton. It seems like visiting Jakarta (after Tokyo, but before Beijing and Seoul!) in this case, it was far from accidental. The visit to the Indonesian capital, where the ASEAN Secretariat is located, reflected the new administration's more thorough approach to the problem of re-adapting the course towards ASEAN, symbolically combining the bilateral, regional and global levels of American foreign policy.

The central event of the visit was a visit to X. Clinton of the ASEAN Secretariat, the first dialogue partnership in 32 years. It was made historic by her announcement that Washington had made a principled decision to join the Bali Treaty of 1976.

No less important for the development of relations between ASEAN and the United States is the "Indonesian" side of X's visit. Clinton. As stated by the results of the visit, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia X. Virayuda, February 12, the head of the State Department made a proposal to establish a "strategic partnership"between the countries, 41 which could be the beginning of a partial dismantling of the outdated system of defense alliances with the Philippines and Thailand. The probability of this is also confirmed by the fact that X. Clinton declined Mr. Arroyo's urgent request to visit the Philippines as well.42 Visit to Indonesia, demonstrating, according to H. Clinton, "that Islam, democracy and modernity can very successfully co-exist"43, also signaled Washington's desire for reconciliation with the Muslim world, proclaimed in the inaugural speech of Barack Obama on January 20, 2009.Indonesia and ASEAN itself, adhering to the principles of inter-civilizational dialogue, can become the basis for peaceful and mutually beneficial cooperation between the United States and the Islamic world.

40 Obama B. Strengthening U.S. Relations with Asia, August 2008. Цит. по: Occasional Analysis: U.S. Presidential Candidates' Views on Relations with Asia Comparative Connections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations. 4th Quarter, 2008 (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0803qprescandidate_views.pdf).

41 Clinton in Jakarta to Seek New Strategic Partnership (http://www.aseanaffairs.com/clinton_in_jakarta_to_seek_new_strategic_partnership).

42 Manila Not Part of Clinton's Asian Trip. Philippines, 11.02.2009 (http://globalnation.inquirer.net/news/news/view/20090211 - 188624/Manila-not-part-of-Clintons-Asian-trip).

43 Цит по: U.S. Vows to Deepen Partnership in Southeast Asia to Jointly Face Crisis, Security Challenges. Xinhua, 19.02.2009.

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The high-profile Cairo speech of Barack Obama in early June 2009, which became a further "declaration of intent" in this direction, caused a generally positive reaction among the public of the Muslim countries of ASEAN. Kuala Lumpur was clearly pleased with the reference to Malaysia as a country demonstrating "amazing progress", and local analysts recommended that the government co-organize the US-Islamic States Business Summit proposed by the American president.44 Obama's call for "exercising power through consent, not violence," which echoed the "ASEAN approach," was also positively received, and Malaysian experts were quick to interpret it as a rejection of the "export of democracy" policy of previous administrations.45

At the same time, there were also critical comments. So, the authoritative Indonesian newspaper "Jakarta Post" was very restrained in its assessments, noting that the speech in Cairo was more focused on the Arab world than the Islamic world as a whole. In particular, according to the authors of the publication, it was incorrect in Obama's speech to attribute to all Islamic countries, without exception, from the least developed Somalia and Yemen to Indonesia, problems related to the underdevelopment of democratic institutions, ensuring religious freedom and women's rights.46

Thus, we can say that by the end of the first decade of the XXI century, serious changes were observed in relations between the United States and ASEAN. The recent accession of the United States to the Bali Treaty demonstrates the realization in Washington that deepening multilateral cooperation with ASEAN as a regional organization and a pragmatic restructuring of military and military ties with the Southeast Asian countries are the only possible way to counter the rise of the PRC in the region.

44 Malaysia Can Ride on Obama's Speech. - "The New Straits Times" (Kuala Lumpur), 6.06.2009.

45 Ibidem.

46 Obama Speaks to the Arabs, Not The Muslim World. - "The Jakarta Post", 5.06.2009.

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