Libmonster ID: VN-1308

The historical stage that came after the end of the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union (1947-1991), contrary to forecasts of the long - awaited peace and the transition to broad international cooperation, unexpectedly turned out to be a stage of a sharply increased number of regional conflicts that required the active participation of the UN in their settlement. The number of peacekeeping operations has dramatically increased: if there were 43 of them during the more than 40-year period of East-West confrontation, then only in the 1990s there were more than 100 armed conflicts, 36 of which required the rapid intervention of international peacekeepers [The United Nations..., 2000, p. 3]. Conflicts were accompanied by numerous civilian casualties, increased brutality and violence in interpersonal relationships, which has become a matter of serious concern to the public and politicians in many countries. Under these circumstances, UN peacekeeping activities are particularly in demand as a complex and multidirectional work that includes a wide range of tasks, from the protection of civilians and the disarmament of belligerents to the formation of new political, economic, legal and social structures.

NEW UN APPROACHES TO POST-COLD WAR PEACEKEEPING

During the confrontation between the United States of America and the Soviet Union in 1945-1991, UN peacekeepers played an important stabilizing role in the system of international relations - their activities helped prevent direct intervention of superpowers in regional conflicts, and prevented them from escalating to the scale of a major war. From this point of view, successful UN peacekeeping missions during the Cold War can be recognized as operations in the Congo (1960-1964), in Kashmir (1965 - 1966), on the Golan Heights in Syria (1974), in the Suez Canal zone and on the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt (1967), in New Guinea (1962-1963) and in Yemen (1963-1964). The success of peacekeeping missions was due to their implementation within the framework of the mandate of the General Assembly, which was developed in 1953 by the then UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold. The principles of peacemaking developed by this prominent politician remained virtually unchanged until the end of the Cold War. They boiled down to the following: the warring parties should agree to the presence of UN peacekeepers on their territory; the peacekeepers themselves should not use weapons, except in self-defense; military personnel from third countries should be invited to participate in the peacekeeping forces; the UN Secretary-General should carry out the following tasks:

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regular monitoring of the observance of neutrality in the activities of peacekeepers [Report on the Work..., 1990, p. 14; Fetherston, 1994].

Without overestimating the positive role of UN peacekeepers during the Cold War as one of the means of conflict resolution, it should nevertheless be noted that they managed to "cool down the conflicting parties" and prepare the conditions for peaceful resolution of contradictions by political means. Peacekeeping operations did not replace, but significantly complemented, the process of resolving regional conflicts. However, even then there were cases when peacekeeping missions ended in failure and did not lead to the creation of favorable conditions for the transfer of the conflict to a peaceful course. This was the case, for example, in Lebanon in 1958 and Cyprus in 1964, where hotbeds of conflict were still smoldering for a long time. Of course, this outcome was not the fault of the UN peacekeepers. However, in most cases, during the Cold War, peacekeeping operations ended successfully. During that historical period, UN peacekeeping missions were favored by such factors as the respect of the conflicting parties themselves for the UN's activities, competition between permanent and non-permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), who are mostly interested in the peaceful settlement of conflicts. In other words, UN peacekeeping during the Cold War years was well adapted to the existing international conditions, to the bipolar system of international relations. All members of the international community were convinced that peacekeeping missions should play an important role in resolving international conflicts, as they managed to bring the conflicting parties to the negotiating table in a short time and with small forces. It was obvious that the international community needed this kind of UN activity, and this was well-deserved recognition: The UN was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1988 [International Studies, 2001, p. 209].

After the end of the cold war, the breakdown of the bipolar system of international relations and the chaos that emerged in it at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, the conditions in which UN peacekeeping was deployed have changed qualitatively. First, the number of conflicts has increased dramatically. Civil wars have engulfed not only the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but also the States of Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa and South-East Asia. Secondly, these conflicts have become particularly violent and genocidal. For example, in Rwanda, more than 500,000 people were killed in a few weeks. residents. Mass extermination of the civilian population took place in the republics of the former Yugoslavia, where interested external forces have strained interethnic relations between the Serbian and Albanian communities to the limit. Hundreds of thousands of civilians were victims of violence in the conflict in Iraq in 2003-2006. Such brutality was completely uncharacteristic of the Cold War period. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has openly acknowledged that armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War have claimed the lives of more than 5 million people. UN peacekeepers have never worked in such conditions. Third, the conflicting parties have openly and cynically ignored humanitarian aspects and norms of international law, attacking civilian objects and aid organizations. Weapons were distributed even to children. The leaders responsible for unleashing conflicts, hoping to receive considerable funds from external sources interested in destabilizing the situation, artificially incited ethnic and religious contradictions and organized armed clashes, purchased weapons through illegal channels, bringing fabulous revenues to arms exporters [Secretary-General's Millennium Report..., 2000, p. 193].

New historical conditions have set the UN tasks that require constant readiness to resolve interethnic and interreligious conflicts in the international community-

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non-national and multi-confessional states that make up more than two-thirds of the UN membership. Such tasks include the need to ensure, in accordance with the laws of international law, the protection of sovereign States from their disintegration and subsequent colonization of territories and peoples by a superpower. The problem of developing and selecting means to ensure peace and stability in a new, essentially unipolar system of international relations has become an urgent task for UN leaders. The UN has at its disposal only an arsenal of tools and methods for resolving conflicts in the period of a bipolar system of international relations, but it does not yet fully possess a stock of new technologies for resolving them in the changed conditions. The Organization faces the need to reconsider its attitude to peacekeeping and adapt it to new challenges of stability and security.

The new challenges facing UN peacekeepers after the end of the Cold War were first announced in January 1992 by the then UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali [An Agenda for Peace..., 1995]. He stressed that, first, in the new historical conditions, UN peacekeepers should be ready to simultaneously participate in a large number of conflicts in different parts of the world-from El Salvador to East Timor, from Cambodia to Kosovo; secondly, the budget for conducting peacekeeping operations should be significantly increased in accordance with their increased number (only in the United States). 1990-2000, more than $ 20 billion was spent for these purposes); third, the number of military personnel, observers and civilian personnel involved in peacekeeping operations may increase to 500 thousand people; finally, the UN should be prepared for an increase in the number of victims among peacekeepers (it is significant that only in 10 years Since the end of the Cold War, 814 peacekeepers have been killed in operations, which is more than twice the number of peacekeepers killed during the entire 40-year period of the Cold War - 350 people) [James, 1999, p. 197-216; International Studies, 2001, p.211].

A new phenomenon in UN peacekeeping after the Cold War was the repeated deployment of peacekeepers to the same hot spots. This process has been observed in the resolution of conflicts in countries such as Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, Haiti, Sierra Leone and Somalia, where the UN Blue Helmets have been deployed a total of 19 times, i.e. several times in some countries. If in 1995 - 1997 the number of peacekeeping missions that led to the end of the conflict and the departure of the Blue Helmets exceeded the number of cases when UN peacekeepers were forced to stay, then after 1997 this trend was broken and the UN began to extend the mandate of its envoys more often. This abnormal situation was due to the increasingly complex nature of conflicts and the need for UN peacekeepers to participate in them at different stages several times.

At the present stage, there are five main levels, or stages, of involvement of UN peacekeepers in conflict resolution. First, crisis prevention or preventive diplomacy, which involves mainly mediation, as well as any other diplomatic efforts on the part of the United Nations that encourage potentially hostile parties to start negotiations and reconciliation. Sometimes this stage of UN involvement in the peace process is referred to more generally as peacemaking, or peace preparation efforts. Secondly, peacekeeping, using traditional UN actions to separate the warring parties after the conclusion of a truce. Third, defensive security measures, which involve mainly defensive operations of peacekeepers, but require them to partially deviate from the principles of neutrality in the region.-

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conflict (creating security zones for the civilian population, protecting borders, or protecting humanitarian aid convoys). At this level, UN peacekeepers may clash with one or more opposing sides. Fourth, peace enforcement, which involves a complete rejection of neutrality and direct confrontation with those parties to the conflict who do not obey UN decisions and become the main obstacle to achieving peace. The UN should have at its disposal a large set of means of forceful influence with various potential participants. Finally, the creation of prerequisites for maintaining and building peace (peace building), which implies the necessary actions in conditions of social chaos and the collapse of statehood in the country. Such measures are more police than military in nature. They include a whole set of elements, ranging from the fight against crime to the organization of elections and the formation of a civil administration. The UN's involvement in all five stages of the conflict's development has as its main goal to prevent it from spreading to cross-country clashes, to exclude the forceful involvement of great Powers in it.

The new approaches of the UN to the organization of peacekeeping activities after the Cold War are predetermined not only by the sharply increased number of regional conflicts in the new system of international relations that require the intervention of this international organization, but also by the fact that a departure from the fundamental principles of peacemaking of the past has become very common in peacekeeping practice. This was reflected in: the widespread use of force in conflict resolution; violation of the principles of neutrality and direct support for one of the conflicting parties; interference of peacekeepers in the internal affairs of sovereign States and their violation of the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity while protecting the rights of national minorities to self-determination.

UN peacekeeping activities at the present stage are unfolding in conditions of declining effectiveness of peacekeeping operations and conflict resolution. Among the factors contributing to this are the increased level of bureaucratization of UN activities and, as a result, the lag in making operational decisions on peacekeeping in conflict zones from the development of real events; disagreements among the permanent members of the UN Security Council on the organization of peacekeeping activities and the clear interest of the United States and Great Britain to give preference in this issue NATO forces, not peacekeepers; and finally, the UN budget deficit for peacekeeping activities, with a sharp increase in spending for these purposes.

Peacekeeping activities are accompanied by great difficulties in implementing the functions assigned to the UN in this area. The leadership of a leading international organization recognizes that it suffers defeat after defeat in the course of conducting peacekeeping missions and is unable to save civilians from genocide and suffering, when mass killings of citizens often occur right in front of the Blue Helmets. Peacekeepers are met with misunderstanding and lack of support for their activities on the part of local Governments, which often perceive these activities as hostile to national interests. Local authorities do not always give permission for the movement of peacekeepers on the territory of the country, violate the terms of the cease-fire, and sometimes are even the organizers of the attack on the "blue Helmets". Peacekeepers are forced to work in conditions of not only growing distrust of their mission on the part of the local population, but also hostility on the part of the country's authorities [Kofi, 2000, p.84].

In the new unfavorable and sometimes hostile conditions for UN peacekeeping, peacemaking takes on a new quality. Instead of traditional-

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In order to monitor the ceasefire and maintain peace, the Blue Helmets are forced to actively engage in the conflict, use weapons not only for self-defense, but also to protect the civilian population, disarm the belligerents by force, and destroy or store their weapons. They are also widely used to deal with mass riots in the conflict zone, search suspicious persons at checkpoints and detain them, monitor persons suspected of committing war crimes and then arrest them. Thus, the expansion of the functions of UN peacekeeping activities after the end of the cold war, on the one hand, and the departure from the letter of the Charter of this organization, on the other, predetermine new approaches to the organization of peacekeeping activities and impose new, more stringent requirements on it from the international community.

Along with a large number of problems and difficulties in the implementation of UN peacekeeping activities after the Cold war, it is necessary to recognize that positive experience is being accumulated in this area. This applies to the work of the new peacekeeping management, planning and monitoring bodies established in the 1990s, and above all to the work of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. This new unit is responsible for the implementation of complex tasks of providing humanitarian assistance, disarming conflicting parties, mine clearance, administrative management, holding elections and referendums, solving refugee problems, and organizing assistance in the restoration of the economy and civilian infrastructure.

Positive experience in the peacekeeping activities of the United Nations and its new units created after the Cold War can be seen in the example of the settlement of the conflict in Cambodia.

UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN CAMBODIA AS A POSITIVE EXPERIENCE OF THE UN IN POST-COLD WAR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The successful experience of the UN peacekeeping practice in the new historical conditions can be seen in the example of the peacekeeping operation in Cambodia in 1992-1993. The peacekeeping mission in Cambodia was the largest since the formation of the UN. It involved 22,000 peacekeepers, including military and civilian personnel, from 46 countries, as well as 1,000 trained national election specialists. The UN peacekeeping mission in Cambodia is a classic operation that brought security and stability to Cambodians after years of civil war and the deaths of millions of civilians. This mission was carried out on the basis of a UN Security Council resolution and involved peacekeepers from Asia, Europe, Latin America, Africa and Australia.

During the operation in Cambodia, all the main types of peacekeeping activities were worked out in modern conditions, namely: the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces on a permanent basis, the disarmament of warring parties, the demobilization of the military, the return of refugees, the clearance of arable land, the preparation and holding of general elections for new authorities. The peacekeepers used military force to repel armed attacks by the Khmer Rouge paramilitary groups, and to prevent abductions of military and civilian participants in a peacekeeping operation. The command of the "Blue Helmets" units was entrusted to an experienced French army general Loridon, who managed to seize more than 50 thousand units of military equipment from the conflicting parties just a few months after the start of the peacekeeping operation in February 1992.

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The UN's new approaches to resolving the conflict in Cambodia were characterized by a number of features. First of all, at the very beginning of the peace settlement process, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was established. The fact is that for the first time in its history, the UN has formed a governing body for the entire country, similar to which there was no previous one in any conflict zone. The UN Interim Authority in Cambodia was established on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution No. 745 of February 28, 1992 with an annual budget of $ 1.7 billion. These funds were intended to accommodate military personnel and civilians from around the world, including international election observers. The tacit consent of the Cambodian leaders and the Cambodian public to the formation of an external governing body in the face of the" UN transitional Administration " meant only one thing - an interest in stopping the civil war and violence as quickly as possible and starting peace construction. And if the interim administration promised to do it, then the people of Cambodia were ready to support it.

The UN mandate for the Transitional Administration in the country included the following tasks: 1) control, monitor and verify the withdrawal and re-non-return of military units of countries that have previously deployed their troops to Cambodia; 2) stationing international UN peacekeepers in the country to carry out tasks related to the disarmament and demobilization of military units of all four political forces; 3) holding free and fair elections; 4) ensuring human rights 5) clearing the territory of infantry mines; 6) providing assistance in the return and material support of refugees; 7) maintaining law and order, ensuring military security and the normal operation of civil administration; 8) restoring economic infrastructure and promoting sustainable development.

Yasushi Akashi, a Japanese national, was appointed Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for monitoring the peacekeeping operation in Cambodia and head of the Transitional Administration in January 1992. Lieutenant General of the Australian Army John Sanderson became commander of the armed forces of the Transitional Administration. Akasi was given such broad powers that he alone was often referred to as the "Interim UN Body." In particular, it had the sole right to determine whether decisions taken by the Supreme National Council of Cambodia conformed to the spirit and letter of the Paris Agreements. The United Nations Transitional Administration for Cambodia, under the leadership of Yasushi Akasi, began operations in February 1992, general elections were scheduled for April-May 1993, and the new Government of Cambodia, formed as a result of the elections, was to begin work in August 1993.

A new moment in the UN's work in Cambodia was the integration of all three main aspects of peacekeeping in one peacekeeping operation: peacekeeping, peacemaking и peace building. In Cambodia, peacekeeping contingents were deployed to conduct operations to disarm and demobilize the conflicting parties. The UN has done a lot of work on the return of Cambodian refugees, as well as on the clearance of areas suitable for agricultural cultivation. Finally, the Transitional Administration prepared general elections, compiled electoral lists, and registered candidates. All these activities were carried out against the background of solving everyday problems of the civilian population, maintaining law and order and security, and protecting human rights. To increase the level of effectiveness of the peacekeeping mission, the country was divided into 11 "zones of responsibility" under the control of peacekeepers from Bangladesh, Bulgaria, and Turkey.-

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Japan, France, Ghana, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Tunisia, Uruguay, and Australia (Fukui, 1993, p.118).

At the same time, the work of UN peacekeepers in Cambodia was complicated by a number of problems. They had to contain the penetration of Vietnamese military units into the country, resist the attacks of the Khmer Rouge and their attacks on Vietnamese settlements in Cambodia, and neutralize the consequences of the Pol Pot group's refusal to cooperate with the transitional administration. The Khmer Rouge's continued attempts to kidnap members of the Transitional Administration have hindered the work of peacekeepers in Cambodia. Moreover, incidents of violence were not unique to the Khmer Rouge. The Cambodian Government stepped up its repressive measures against members of the political opposition who also wanted to participate in the general elections scheduled for the summer of 1993.The UN Transitional Administration in Cambodia used military force to solve specific peacekeeping tasks. The French General Loridon was an active supporter of the use of force, especially in cases of resistance to the disarmament of military formations of the conflicting parties.

By September 1992, 52,000 people had been disarmed in Cambodia. military personnel-supporters of opposing political forces and 50 thousand units of military equipment were stored. At the same time, there were still many armed groups in the country that were well trained and ready to take part in combat operations. On October 13, 1992, the Transitional Administration decided to speed up the preparation of general elections and create favorable conditions for the completion of the peace process, without waiting for the end of the civil war. It was also decided to actively involve the Khmer Rouge in this process, using the diplomatic efforts of France, Indonesia, Japan and Thailand.

Finally, another important distinguishing feature of UN peacekeeping in Cambodia was the successful conduct of the election campaign for the election of government bodies. It started on April 7, 1993, with some delay in relation to the planned plan, which was due to the need to take additional measures to ensure the safety of its implementation. There were repeated attempts by the Khmer Rouge to disrupt the elections. Thus, in mid-April 1993, they unexpectedly closed their representative office in Phnom Penh and recalled their representatives. The calculation was made to disrupt the elections. Indeed, the Australian and Japanese authorities then officially expressed doubts about the need for the presence of peacekeepers in Cambodia.

In May 1993, multi-party elections to the Constitutional Assembly were held in Cambodia under the international supervision and control of the United Nations. Millions of Cambodians then showed interest in the successful end of the election campaign and wanted to cast their votes for representatives of the new government. As a result, the turnout at the polling stations was extremely high - 90% of the number of registered voters, and the elections themselves were characterized by full compliance with democratic norms and in this sense significantly differed from all previous election campaigns. Even supporters of the Khmer Rouge came to the polls, actively participated in voting and expressed support for the new government, despite the fact that representatives of Prince Sihanouk were included in it. The results of the vote were recognized by international observers and all four political forces in Cambodia.

Following the results of the elections and maneuvers of all political groups, the Legislative Assembly of Cambodia was formed, which on September 21, 1993 approved the draft of the new Constitution of the country. In fact, the UN peacekeeping mission in Cambodia was formally completed. Since none of the four bases are-

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However, the party did not win an overwhelming majority in the country's legislative assembly, and a coalition government was formed. It did not include only representatives of the Khmer Rouge.

The international community then highly appreciated the efforts of the UN to organize the largest-scale peacekeeping operation in its history. As a result, the country, which has been torn apart by conflicts for a long period, finally found stability and gained trust from other States.

Of all the countries of the international coalition that participated in the peacekeeping efforts in Cambodia, Japan was the most active, which was dictated by its special interests in resolving the Cambodian conflict. For the first time in its peacekeeping practice, the UN was involved as an active participant in the conflict resolution process.

Immediately after the end of the Cold War, Japan unexpectedly officially expressed an increased interest in participating in the UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia. In his speech at the 126th Session of the Japanese Parliament in January 1993, Japanese Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Michio Watanabe drew the attention of lawmakers to the increased political importance of Japan's participation in UN peacekeeping and the impossibility for a country to remain aloof from this global practice if it considers itself a responsible member of the international community. He called on members of Parliament to show more flexibility when deciding on the participation of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in peacekeeping activities in Cambodia [The Japan Times, 23.01.1993]. In other words, Watanabe, a well-known advocate of strengthening the military component of Japanese foreign policy, in fact, strongly recommended that parliamentarians support the new role of the self-defense forces in the form of their participation in peacekeeping activities abroad.

In Cambodia, the UN was conducting the largest-scale peacekeeping operation since the end of the cold war, and it is clear that Japan decided to use the opportunity to realize its new political and strategic interests. These interests were grouped around three important tasks of the country's domestic and foreign policy: 1) make it legitimate to send Japanese military personnel abroad as part of UN peacekeeping missions; 2) sway the country's public opinion in favor of the need to pursue an active foreign policy befitting a responsible member of the world community who is applying for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council; 3) by participating in the peacekeeping mission in Cambodia, not only increase Japan's political authority in in the eyes of their neighbors in the region, but also to strengthen their self-confidence. At the same time, Japanese politicians and the military were not very confused by the fact that the acquisition of "combat experience" by Japanese military personnel is associated with a risk to their lives, with a real danger of becoming victims of warring parties. One of the leaders of the Japanese Police Department, Hiroto Yamazaki, speaking at the Japanese Journalists Club in July 1993. he directly called for refusing to send the military to hot spots. He emphasized that "peacekeeping is an extremely dangerous type of activity, involving great risks for military personnel and civilian personnel taking part in it" [The Japan Times, 29.07.1993]. However, the country's authorities paid little attention to such warnings from professionals. They sought first of all to realize their political and strategic interests, using for this purpose a convenient opportunity to participate in the settlement of the armed conflict in Cambodia.

The turn in Japanese foreign policy towards increasing its role in international affairs occurred after the Parliament approved the law on the participation of self-defense forces in peacekeeping activities in 1992 [Hiraiwa, 1991, p. 3]. Japanese politicians have been closely monitoring any developments in the UN's own position on peace issues.-

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The report of its Secretary - General Boutros Ghali - "An Agenda for Peace" of September 1992-was not ignored, especially his calls to move to the practice of creating special UN units for peace enforcement [Leitenberg, 1996, p. 28]. Japanese Foreign Minister Watanabe, speaking at the plenary session of the UN General Assembly in September 1992, emphasized:: "Japan believes that the principles and practices of UN peacekeeping operations for more than 40 years after the end of World War II still have an enduring value and significance for the cause of peace and will continue. At the same time, the idea of coercion by force, which was expressed by the UN Secretary-General in his last address, introduces new aspects to the organization of peacekeeping activities and therefore requires a deep and comprehensive study, fundamentally different from the traditional approaches of the UN in this area" [UN Document S/1992/132, 1992].

In February 1993, Boutros Ghali made an official visit to Japan, hoping to persuade the Japanese Government to send its military peacekeepers to Somalia. The Japanese authorities, however, refused, fearing that Japanese peacekeepers could be used as a force to enforce peace. Then Boutros Ghali suggested that Japan send its troops to Mozambique, where the ceasefire agreement was strictly implemented and the problem of resolving the conflict was reduced to solving the problem of returning refugees. Tokyo agreed to this proposal of the UN Secretary-General [Financial Times, 17.02.1993; Leitenberg, 1996, p. 20].

Neither in quantitative nor qualitative terms did the Japanese stand out as part of the peacekeeping contingent in Cambodia. In total, Japan sent 1,300 peacekeepers, including military observers and police officers, as well as 1,200 soldiers of the engineering troops, while only one police officer of other countries in Cambodia numbered about 20 thousand. At the same time, the very fact of sending military personnel abroad was indicative of the new foreign policy strategy of Japan: for the first time since the end of World War II, it sent such a large number of its military abroad [Wall Street Journal, 21.06.1992.] The Japanese authorities brought society very close to realizing that it was necessary to move from a traditional passive foreign policy to an active one diplomacy, which was understood as a new interpretation of the anti-war norms of the Japanese constitution.

The Japanese government did not respond to the demands of a number of opposition parties regarding compliance with the anti-militarist norms of the country's constitution. On the contrary, the Government actively considered allowing peacekeepers to use weapons to improve their own security in Cambodia, as well as to protect important strategic facilities. Akira Hiyoshi, Deputy Minister of State and Head of the Department of National Defense (UNO), noted, in particular, that in Cambodia, Japanese military personnel will be handed weapons and the range of persons who have the right to use them for security purposes will be significantly expanded [The Japan Times, 13.04.1993].

This decision was made during the preparation of the second group of peacekeepers, which included a large number of military engineers who traveled to remote areas of Cambodia [Yomiuri Shimbun, 13.04.1993]. The UNO's decision to issue weapons to peacekeepers was formally timed to coincide with the election campaign in Cambodia and was intended to ensure the protection of civilian observers at polling stations.

The initiative of the Japanese military circles was not limited to granting peacekeepers in Cambodia the right to use weapons. The UNO leadership enlisted the support of the Prime Minister regarding the formation of special detachments of Japanese military personnel to conduct intelligence operations in the Cambodian interior.-

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binke under the pretext of providing security during the preparation of the election campaign [The Japan Times, 22.05.1993].

The Japanese authorities always accompany the implementation of their foreign policy interests with the provision of economic assistance. Tokyo's participation in the peace process in Cambodia is no exception. Japan was far ahead of other major world powers in this regard, having allocated more than $ 36 million from March 1991 to November 1992. in the form of gratuitous aid directly to the Government of Cambodia and $ 71 million-through international organizations. At the International Conference on the Reconstruction of Cambodia in Paris in October 1991, Japan proposed to hold a special conference on the reconstruction and reconstruction of Cambodia in Tokyo at the level of Ministers of Economy and Trade. Such a conference was held in June 1992, and Japan presided over it. The Japanese delegation then offered Cambodia $ 880 million. as part of development assistance.

Such generosity of the Japanese side was appreciated by the world community and was considered as the most successful action of Japanese diplomacy for a number of years [Akashi Yoshinori, 1992, p. 7-11]. This proved once again that one of Tokyo's goals in connection with its participation in UN peacekeeping, namely, increasing international prestige, is being successfully implemented. As Professor Seki Tomoda of the Japanese University of Asia noted, "such a large financial assistance to Cambodia from Japan should be considered solely as proof of its ability to act as an active and responsible participant in the international community" (Seki Tomoda, 1993, p. 32).

Based on the 1992 Law on the Participation of Japanese Peacekeepers in Overseas Peacekeeping Operations, the Japanese Government actively promoted the work of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters in Cambodia (IPCHQ). Within this specialized body, Japan performed the following functions: first, its peacekeepers monitored the preparations for the general elections to be held in the country (May 23-28, 1993. 5 Japanese civil servants, 13 local government specialists and 23 volunteers for the implementation of the UN mandate participated in this work); second, the United Nations was responsible for the implementation of the United Nations GeneralSecond, 75 Japanese police officers were deployed to Cambodia from October 1992 to July 1993 to assist the Cambodian police in performing their law enforcement functions, as well as to train Cambodian police officers in operational investigative techniques; third, 600 military-technical units of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces were deployed to the United States. Cambodia for repair and restoration work, including the restoration of bridges and transport communications [MOFA homepage, 2002].

Public opinion polls conducted in Japan in the first half of the 1990s, hot on the heels of the end of the peacekeeping mission in Cambodia, clearly showed that the authorities managed to realize an important political task - to instill in the Japanese public the idea of the need for the country's participation in solving problems of world politics, including sending Japanese army units to remote areas of the world. The experience of Japanese military and civilian peacekeepers during operations in Cambodia has confirmed that Japan is capable of fulfilling the tasks set in this area - sending its military to conflict zones with weapons in their hands, participating in conflict resolution, as well as providing humanitarian assistance to the civilian population.

It is characteristic that the Japanese military themselves, who for many years did not take part in foreign operations and finally got such an opportunity, welcomed participation in peacekeeping operations in hot spots. Surveys of military peacekeepers from

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Self-defense force contingents in Cambodia showed that they performed their military duty with pride: 58% of the military personnel of peacekeepers believed that their presence in Cambodia was necessary, and only 11% expressed a negative opinion about it. In addition, 49% of Japanese military peacekeepers would like to take part in such a mission again, and 19% were against it. At the same time, most of the Japanese military, who would not want to take part in a peacekeeping mission in the future, complained of low wages, not exceeding 16 thousand yen per day. Only 11% were satisfied with the salary they received (Maeda, 1996, pp. 47-49).

The findings of the Japanese peacekeeping mission in Cambodia were published in a special report of the Group of Security Advisers to the Prime Minister, compiled in September 1994 and called "Japan's Security and Defense Capabilities: A View to the 21st Century". This document was known to the general public as the Hirotaro Higuchi Report, after the president of Asahi Biru Corporation, who headed the working group. The report emphasized the idea that in the twenty-first century, It will be difficult for Japan to stay out of big world politics the way it did during the Cold War. Therefore, Japan's participation in UN peacekeeping is extremely important for it. It should continue to expand this activity. "First of all," the report stressed, " it is important for Japan to step up its participation in various international peacekeeping operations conducted by the UN in order to strengthen international security. At the same time, the Japanese self-Defense Forces should play an active role, which, along with performing their tasks to protect national security, should also perform international functions. As for the Law on the participation of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in peacekeeping operations in the part where it concerns the use of weapons, it should be adapted to the general norms for the participation of military units of other countries in such operations, according to the UN Charter. Japan cannot be an exception" [Nihon no anzen..., 1994, pp. 13-15.]

This conclusion of the report frankly called into question the validity of the traditional interpretation of the use of the Japanese armed forces only for self-defense purposes and when threatening national interests within the territory of the Japanese Islands. He explicitly called for expanding the range of actions of the Japanese army to include operations to maintain peace and stability in various hot spots around the world. In other words, the authors of the report, having studied the experience of the participation of peacekeeping contingents of the self-defense forces in Cambodia, came to the conclusion that Japan is successfully coping with the tasks assigned to it, and therefore the role of the Japanese military in the post-cold war world can be significantly intensified. Moreover, the authors of the report expressed confidence that this role should be realized in the form of Japan's participation in multilateral military peacekeeping operations in different parts of the world [Nihon no anzen..., 1994, pp. 16-17].

The experience of Japan's participation in the peacekeeping operation in Cambodia has shown that the international prestige of a country increases if it has its own representative in the leadership of the UN administration in the conflict zone. Such a representative of Japan in Cambodia was Yasushi Akashi, who ensured the country's communication with international organizations and strengthened Japan's position in the UN, as well as guided the Japanese authorities in which areas it is most effective to expand peacekeeping activities in order to avoid political or strategic miscalculations. Yasushi Akashi has always stressed that " if Japan becomes a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it will be forced to pursue a policy in accordance with the responsibility assigned to other permanent members of the UN Security Council in maintaining peace and security. This means that Japan will have to send

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send your troops to various hot spots on the planet just like other members of the UN Security Council do" [The Japan Times, 4.01.1994].

LESSONS AND PROSPECTS FOR UN PEACEKEEPING AFTER THE COLD WAR

Despite the fact that the peacekeeping operation in Cambodia was generally successful, the experience of UN peacekeeping accumulated after the Cold War suggests to its leadership that peacekeeping at all its stages is in urgent need of reform.

First of all, this concerns the procedure for issuing a UN mandate for conducting peacekeeping missions. During the period of bipolar peace, such a mandate was issued on the basis of a compromise reached between all five permanent members of the UN Security Council on the methods of conflict resolution. Today, however, in the vast majority of cases, the mandate for a peacekeeping operation is issued not on the basis of balancing the political interests of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, but on the basis of their subordination to the political will of the United States. The Security Council ceases to be a body that makes objective decisions on conflict resolution, it becomes an instrument for implementing the political, economic and strategic interests of the only superpower. It is significant that when the United States experiences any difficulties in implementing its plans in the UN Security Council (for example, in the case of resistance from Russia or China), Washington generally dispenses with the mandate of this organization and uses armed force at its discretion, as was the case with Yugoslavia. At the same time, the US authorities take into account that the UN will not only not condemn, but will not stop America's actions, no matter how defiant they may be in relation to the norms of international law. Reform of UN peacekeeping is necessary to force a superpower to respect the sovereignty of other states and build a new world order not "according to concepts", but in accordance with the norms of international law.

The reform of peacekeeping is also necessary in order to restore the confidence of sovereign States in it, which it enjoyed during the Cold war. In the new historical conditions, UN peacekeepers, unfortunately, allow themselves to leave conflict zones, abandoning the civilian population to their fate, as was the case in Rwanda. Sometimes they themselves become murderers of civilians, as was the case with the Dutch peacekeepers in Srebrenica. Such cases not only cast a shadow on peacekeepers, but also undermine the foundations of peacekeeping in general.

The reform is necessary to provide the Blue Helmets with additional political, economic and military capabilities to contain the armed conflict, better guarantee the terms of the ceasefire, and ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian aid. In addition, such a reform should include additional guarantees for the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes, for the disarmament of warring parties, and for creating more favorable internal and external conditions for political reconciliation and free elections. Such UN peacekeeping operations, carefully designed, constantly improved and successfully conducted, represent a justified "investment" in the cause of peace. These operations can contribute to the emergence of new democratic States, reduce the flow of refugees in the world, and reduce the likelihood of violent interference by strong regional powers in the affairs of their neighbors. Ultimately, the reform of peacekeeping activities should prevent small wars from escalating into large-scale wars, which are much more expensive in terms of human losses and destruction of material values.

page 104

The reform of peacekeeping activities will make it possible to qualitatively improve the planning of peacekeeping operations, increase the effectiveness of peace enforcement operations, and protect peacekeepers working in a hostile environment of conflicting parties. To this end, it is possible to organize an early warning mechanism on the development of a conflict, so that the UN Security Council can adopt a resolution on the beginning of a peacekeeping operation within 30 days, develop its tasks and identify priority areas, including norms for interference in internal affairs, etc.

The reform of peacekeeping activities is also important from the point of view of a gradual departure from the traditional concept of neutrality of peacekeepers in relation to the parties to the conflict. In the new historical conditions, peacekeepers are forced to face a situation where, on the one hand, they need to comply with the UN resolution on ensuring peace and stability, and on the other, it is difficult to maintain neutrality in the face of a demonstrative violation of the armistice agreement by any of the parties to the conflict. It is obvious that in these circumstances, it is not easy for peacekeepers to remain impartial and neutral towards the parties to the conflict, since at best this will be fraught with inefficient waste of time and effort, and at worst - loss of life for the peacekeepers themselves. Peacekeepers can only avoid the development of a situation in this scenario if they develop new approaches to the legal justification of the concepts of "victim of violence"and " aggressor".

Of course, the neutrality of peacekeepers should not mean neglecting to protect civilians from violence on both sides. Peacekeepers can use force not only to punish the aggressor, but also to fulfill their moral obligations to the victim of violence and aggression in order to restore justice. Although this can be considered a departure from the traditions of classical peacemaking, the new international conditions require UN peacekeepers to take tougher actions in relation to the aggressor. Otherwise, peacekeepers can easily embark on the path of appeasement of the aggressor, which should not be allowed under any circumstances. The use of armed force by peacekeepers in peacekeeping operations becomes an objective necessity: when the UN sends its peacekeepers to maintain peace, they must be prepared for an open clash with the forces of war and violence and be determined to overcome the resistance of these forces.

The reform of peacekeeping activities in relation to the new historical conditions should make it easier to protect the lives of peacekeepers in the performance of their peacekeeping functions. It is natural that peacekeepers who witness violence against the civilian population should be able to effectively stop it within the limits of their capabilities and following the principles of UN peacekeeping.

Reforming peacekeeping involves mastering the technique of rapid deployment of peacekeeping forces. For this purpose, each country should prepare in advance special rapid response peacekeeping contingents that have the skills to coordinate actions with peacekeepers from other countries, know foreign languages and local traditions, are able to organize preliminary collection of operational information, and also have special analytical units that monitor changes in the situation. Peacekeeping contingents should be staffed by experienced and qualified military and civilian specialists who have received prior approval from UN representatives.

The UN's peacemaking role in the world will increase in the twenty-first century. Of course, this does not mean that the UN alone will be able to solve all the problems of stabilizing the system of international relations. Such well-established factors for ensuring international stability should not be ignored.-

page 105

threats such as building up national military power, as well as forming a new balance of power. Therefore, it is obvious that the UN's peacekeeping role will increase simultaneously with the increase in the potential of resistance of sovereign States.

list of literature

Akashi Yoshinori. Nihonjin-e, RKO-o gokai surenakare (The Japanese, do not deceive the UN peacekeepers) / / Foresight. 1992. July.

The Yomiuri shimbun. 13.04.1993.

Maeda E. Kensho: RKO to jieitai (Obvious facts: peacemaking and self-defense forces). Tokyo, 1996.

Nihon no anzen jose to boeyreku no arikata: XXI-e mukete no tembo (Japan's Security and Defense Capabilities: A View into the XXI century). Tokyo, 1994.

Tomoda Seki. Kanbojia enjo seisaku no atarashisa (New moments in Japanese development Assistance in Cambodia) / / Gaiko Forum. 1993. March.

Fukui Ya. Cambodia RKO hokoku: heiwa hotiku-e no kokuren no yakuvari wa okii UNTAC no ichin toshiete mita Cambodia (Report of the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Cambodia: the Role of the UN in the Peace Settlement process) / / Gekkan ju minshu. 1993. July.

An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, Peace-keeping / A Report of Secretary-General presented to the First Summit of Security Council Held in January 1992. UN Doc. S/24111, 17 June 1992 and S/1995/1, 3 January 1995.

Financial Times. 17.02.1993.

Fetherston A. Towards a Theory of UN Peacekeeping. L., 1994.

Hiraiwa G. In this Uncertain World Japan must Carve out its own Future // Keidanren Review. 1991. August. N130.

International Studies. 2001. Vol. 38. N 3.

James A. Problems of International Peacekeeping // New Globalism and the State / Ed. by S. Kumar. New Delhi, 1999.

The Japan Times. 23.01.1993; 13.04.1993; 22.05.1993; 29.07.1993; 4.01.1994.

Kofi A. Annan. Common Destiny, New Resolve / Annual Report on the Work of the Organization, 2000. N.Y., 2000.

Leitenberg M. The Participation of Japanese Military Forces in UN Peacekeeping Operations // Asian Perspective. 1996. Vol. 20. N1.

MOFA homepage (http://www.mofa.go.jp/pko/02_2.html)

Report on the Work of the Organization, 1990. N.Y., 1990.

Secretary-General's Millennium Report to the Millennium Session of the General Assembly: We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-first Century II UN Doc. A/54/2000, 27 March 2000.

UN Document S/1992/132. 1992. 22 September.

The United Nations in its Second Half Century. N.Y., 2000.

Wall Street Journal. 21.06.1992.


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