The specifics of political processes in modern Indonesia are largely determined by the centuries-old historical and cultural past. Its main component is the political culture of Indonesia and the subcultures of the peoples inhabiting it, mainly Javanese-the dominant ethnic group in terms of numbers. The main historical stages of the formation and development of the political system of Indonesia are of particular interest in the light of traditional Indonesian views on power.

Over a long history, Javanese people have developed a special system of values, a peculiar idea of power and ruler. The cradle of Javanese civilization is a fertile arable land in central Java around the modern cities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta (Solo). The economic base of traditional Javanese culture is irrigation rice farming, while the social base is an economically independent and self-sufficient community. Irrigation rice farming required coordinated efforts by the entire village community, and a clear distribution of roles in the community. This implies the main features inherent in Javanese society: the principle of consensus and the cult of bureaucracy as the organizer of community activities.

The idea of power in Javanese culture is at odds with Western ideas. For the Javanese, power exists independently of its bearer and represents the intangible divine (cosmic) energy of sekti (skt. shakti), which permeates the universe and finds its embodiment in every manifestation of nature. Power is homogeneous in the sense that it all comes from a single source, and the power that an individual or group of people has is qualitatively no different from that of others. The amount of power in the universe is constant, only its distribution changes. Accordingly, the concentration of power in one place or in one person is associated with its reduction in another. The question of the legitimacy of the government for Javanese is illegitimate, at least in its Western sense. Since power comes from one source, it is "beyond good and evil": "Power cannot be legitimate or illegitimate. It simply exists" [Culture and Politics in Indonesia, 1972 p. 7-8].

Another interesting and well-preserved representation of the ancient Javanese people is a certain ratio of fate and secti. Decline and rebirth are preordained by fate. The first is due to the scattering of secti, the second is due to its new concentration. Secti supports the unity of the universe, giving it vitality and protecting it from disintegration. The concentration of secti characteristic of a particular person depends on the place in the genealogical system occupied by the owner of this energy, i.e. on its proximity to the source of the genealogy.

These perceptions have been reflected in the rule of Indonesia's modern leaders, especially the second President of Indonesia, Suharto. Many publications on this topic were published in January 2008, after Suharto's death. He believed that his right to power

page 86
He received it through his wife, a representative of the oldest Javanese family - Siti Hartini, better known as Ibu Tien [Los Angeles Times, 17.01.2008]. Many believe that Suharto needed a wife for a formal relationship with the ancient Javanese rulers, and her death in April 1996 caused the beginning of the collapse of his regime due to the fact that he lost his right to power. He tried to extend the connection with the source of power and for this purpose introduced his daughter to his last office, but it did not help. Two years after his wife's death, Suharto had to resign.

In addition to the influence of genealogy, there are objects that once belonged to the ancestors - the founders of the village, settlement, state - and are called by the Javanese pusaka, which are endowed with more secti than the same objects that belonged to their descendants. The concentration of sects in a subject also depends on the quality of the subject's or person's connection with the origins of genealogy. This connection is strongest among the ruler, weaker among representatives of noble families who are in certain relations with the ruler's family, and even weaker among commoners.

According to Javanese ideas, there are various ways to "pull" the sect from everywhere and concentrate it in one place. This includes first of all ascetic asceticism (tapa), yogic meditation (samadi) and visiting places endowed with secti (pepunden, kramat). Such, according to Javanese ideas, are certain mountains, caves, sacred graves, forests, and coasts. Another way is to collect objects that are inherent in sekti (pusaka), or contact people who possess it (palawija), with those who are marked with the seal of unusualness, often with some physical features (albinos, dwarfs, lame, hunchbacks), or with those who are engaged in sacred activities (blacksmiths, blacksmiths,etc.). wayang's puppeteers 1).

All six Indonesian presidents, being Muslims, simultaneously paid homage to the spirit world, visited places associated with mystical power, consulted with mentors, and collected artifacts [International Herald Tribune, 25.02.2008].

President Suharto was the most ardent follower of mysticism. He studied this science as a boy, performing ritual rituals during his presidency and after. He often visited sacred places, took ritual baths in the ocean and rivers in those places where, according to mystical beliefs, special magical power was contained. He also collected a huge amount of sacred artifacts in order to obtain magical energy. Among them, according to the local press, is a red stone with strong energy, called mirah delima, which, according to mediums, can protect its owner from a sword and bullets, as well as protect against diseases.

In the Javanese concept, power is closely related to the concepts of "concentration"and " exclusivity". The scattering of sects indicates the moral impurity of the ruler. To prove their right to leadership, Javanese leaders sought to centralize power, unite as large territories and segments of society as possible under their leadership, and form a single idea of the state. The search for harmony is a key principle of Javanese social and political life. Javanese people absorb new ideas, choose suitable ones for their way of life, adapt these ideas to the existing culture, and thus rejuvenate it and create a new syncretic one. Javanese people are more tolerant of other cultures and religions and accept new ideas if they do not contradict their main ideas.

An important aspect of the Javanese understanding of the collapse of the ruler's power is pamir2. A ruler had a pamphlet if he refused to perform his state duties or hesitated out of sympathy or sympathy for friends or family members. Pamrich was also felt if the ruler committed certain actions for himself or for the benefit of partners or family members, in other words, participated in corruption. Henry was a sign

1 Wayang-traditional shadow theater.

Pamrih - 2 hidden personal power, according to other sources-self-interest.

page 87
the fact that the ruler's power has weakened and his removal is inevitable. Many believe that it was Henry who caused the collapse of the Suharu regime, since his entire family, many relatives and close associates were involved in the largest economic structures in Indonesia. The management of companies, the accumulation of family wealth rather than state wealth, and corruption all led to the fall of the Suharto regime.

Drugov pointed out that " ... in the approach to the origin and nature of power, formational and civilizational factors affecting political culture are very closely intertwined. In any formation and civilization, it is common for a person to seek an answer to the question of the source of power. The choice of answers is small - the recognition that the ruler is given his prerogatives voluntarily or involuntarily, actively or passively by society, or, if the individual has not yet realized himself as a subject of the socio-historical process, the vision of power as a heavenly gift, and its bearer as God's chosen one "[Drugov, 1997, p. 18].

The historical experience of Indonesians has influenced the formation of modern Indonesian attitudes towards democracy.

Modern Indonesia was a Dutch colony for more than 300 years until the middle of the 20th century. Recently, a Singapore newspaper published an article about four elderly Indonesians who participated in the struggle for independence and the process of establishing a new state [The Straits Times, 20.11.07]. In their opinion, Dutch colonialism sought to preserve and strengthen the traditionalist foundations of power and traditional political culture in the colony. At the same time, the local population was minimally involved in the management of the Territory, and the economic policy of the Netherlands led to the strengthening and consolidation of community relations, preventing the individualization of Indonesians. Thus, the Dutch did not prepare Indonesia for independence, which is why so many problems later arose in the country's political development.

Indonesia's independence was declared in 1945. From this moment, the development of the modern political system of the country begins. Under the first Constitution of 1945, enormous powers were vested in the President, who also became the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and head of the executive branch, the only authority to which the ministers were accountable. The first President of the Republic of Indonesia was then unanimously elected Sukarno, Vice-President-M. Hatta.

In 1950, an attempt was made to switch to parliamentary democracy. Under the new Constitution of 1950 Indonesia became a unitary parliamentary republic. Sukarno was against the transition to parliamentarism, it was done in circumvention of it. He was just a supporter of a strong authoritarian government.

The majority of Indonesians have never lived in a democracy, not during the colonial rule of the Netherlands Indies , and certainly not during the Japanese occupation regime in 1942-1945. In addition, not all the forces that claimed power in the country shared democratic principles. The military establishment in independent Indonesia, which was becoming an increasingly cohesive and influential autonomous force, treated statesmen and politicians with contempt. Sukarno himself was concerned about the restriction of his powers under the new constitution and questioned the suitability for Indonesia of Western forms of democracy introduced under the influence of the pro-Western liberal wing of the national movement.

The lack of experience in parliamentary democracy, the large number of political parties, the proliferation of bureaucracy and related corruption, and frequent cabinet changes have led to growing public disillusionment with the parliamentary system. These five years of a parliamentary republic showed that Indonesia, or rather its political elite, was not ready for parliamentary democracy.

Some experts cite the peculiarities of the Javanese personality as one of the reasons for the failure of this first experience of democracy [Jakarta Post, 29.01.2008]. Widely used-

page 88
The term used to describe the essence of Javanese culture is "non-confrontational culture". Its main feature is that it does not involve open expression of opinions, criticism of others and disputes. This cultural barrier especially hinders political development, as it is not customary for voters to discuss the government's actions and openly criticize it.

Even leftist forces were dissatisfied with the introduction of parliamentary democracy. The rising Communist Party of Indonesia considered it an attribute of bourgeois political life and did not treat it as an absolute value.

This brought particular difficulties to the work of the Parliament. Parliamentarism in Indonesia has served not only as the sole platform for political discussion, but also as a catalyst for cross-party, not always conscientious, struggles for seats in government. And this directly contradicted the ideas of harmony, restraint, the inadmissibility of losing face and the desire to put the opponent in a disadvantageous, shameful position. All the above reasons have led to the fact that not only ordinary citizens, but also political leaders have become disillusioned with democracy. The provocation of September 30, 1965,3 was aimed precisely at presenting the left as violators of national harmony, which in reality did not exist. Mass repression, including by Muslim fanatics, has created a sense of collective guilt in the nation.

In 1966-1967, the "new order" regime led by General Suharto was established in Indonesia, which became one of the longest-lasting authoritarian regimes in the world.

The phenomenon of the longevity of the "new order" requires an explanation [Drugov, Tyurin, p. 273]. It obviously cannot do without taking into account the political culture of Indonesians. The new order's slogan "stability for development" meant a strict restriction on political activity. According to the American scientist Samuel Huntington, economic development and political stability are two independent goals, and progress towards one of them has no necessary connection with progress towards the other [Huntington, p.152]. In some cases, economic development programs can contribute to political stabilization, while in others they can significantly undermine stability. Similarly, some forms of political stability can promote economic growth, while others can hinder it.

The achievements of the "new order" in the economic sphere were significant. At the same time, economic growth was accompanied by significant deformations in the social sphere. Inequality in the distribution of national wealth has steadily increased. Accordingly, social tensions grew, combined with nationalist protest against the dominance of foreign monopolies in the economy and the destruction of traditional cultural values under the influence of Western influence.

Huntington argues that rapid socio-economic modernization creates political instability and political decline. By political modernization, he means first of all mass mobilization, expansion of political consciousness and activity, which ultimately generate instability. According to Huntington, ensuring stability in the context of modernizing authoritarianism requires limiting the role of political participation of the masses.

By developing the country's economic potential quantitatively and qualitatively, and promoting the development of private entrepreneurship, the leaders of the "new order" contributed to the emergence of a very significant amateur population in terms of its size and role, whose success and well-being, unlike the military and the bureaucracy, did not depend directly on the authorities. This stratum was not oppositional in the full sense of the word, because in the conditions of deep social inequality

3 Putsch of a group of army officers.

page 89
it depended on the protection of a strong government. But objectively, the so-called middle class needed the democratization of political life, the creation of a new rule of law, the observance of basic human rights, and the fight against corruption for its development. This was the main contradiction of the "new order". Some regime figures understood the need to modernize relations between the government and society, but even the most timid steps in this direction were met with opposition from the all-powerful special services, the majority of the generals and the overgrown bureaucracy.

The financial crisis that hit Southeast Asia in 1997 dealt a significant blow to the Indonesian economy. Indonesia was most vulnerable for a number of reasons, two of which should be highlighted: the excessive burden of public debt obligations, which were largely the fault of a corrupt and uncontrolled bureaucracy and oligarchy, and the loss of public confidence by the authorities. In the face of high inflation, a sharp drop in the standard of living of the population and the resulting mass discontent, Suharto was forced to resign on May 21, 1998, handing over power to Vice-President B. Y. Habibi.

Subsequent events have shown that after 32 years of rule by a repressive military-authoritarian regime, Indonesian society faces significant difficulties on the path to democratic transformation. Habibi's rule was supposed to be a transitional period, and parliamentary elections and the election of a new head of state were scheduled for 1999. It was assumed that after the elections, the country would embark on the path of democratizing the political system and, first of all, modernizing relations between the authorities and society, which would contribute to achieving internal political stability.

The elections held in Indonesia in June 1999 were considered by the public to be the first democratic elections in the last forty-four years. In the wake of widespread expectations of big changes, the Democratic Party of Indonesia (Fighting) (DPIb), led by the daughter of the first President of Indonesia, Sukarno - Megawati Sukarnoputri, won. Despite the fact that her party won the majority of seats in Parliament, Abdurahman Wahid was elected to the presidency by the National Consultative Congress (NCC). The subsequent mass protests by students and urban grassroots forced the NCC to appoint Megawati Sukarnoputri as the country's vice-president the next day.

Drugov explains the essence of these events as follows: "... the election in 1999 of a prominent Muslim figure, Abdurrahman Wahid, a half-blind and half-paralyzed man, whose own National Awakening Party won just over 10% of the vote in the general election, looked like a direct challenge to the DPIb supporters, who made up a third of the electorate. But this was not a challenge, and much worse-an arrogant disregard for the opinion of the population, especially since the leader of the former ruling party was running for the post of vice-president. The payback was immediate: DPIb supporters took to the streets of Java and Bali. By arson and rioting, they succeeded in getting party leader Megawati Sukarnoputri elected vice-president the next day. Society, and first of all its poorest strata, which make up the bulk of the DPIb electorate, has received a new opportunity to make sure that the authorities better understand the language of force..."[Drugov, 2004, p. 89-90].

President A. Wahid is an interesting and tragic figure. It was under his leadership that the most radical reforms were carried out, including those affecting the army, and changes were made to the constitution. This hereditary Islamic theologian proved that religious traditionalism and democracy are compatible. Unfortunately, A. Vahid's radical actions were not to everyone's liking, and on July 23, 2001, he was released. The NCC removed A. Wahid from his post, which passed to Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri. The daughter of Indonesia's first president enjoyed great popular support. Basically, they were

page 90
urban poor and students. M. Sukarnoputri carried out her political reforms carefully, with an eye to the financial and political elite. Despite all the success of her Government in stabilizing the situation in Indonesia and continuing economic and political development, M. Sukarnoputri lost the next election.

The 2004 parliamentary elections were won by the former party in power - Golkar 4 (21.58%). The victory is relative, as the main opponent, the DPIb party, received only 3% less (18.53%), but compared to the results of 1999. (Golkar - 22.44%, DPIb-33.74%) Golkar managed to retain its electorate. The DPIb, which represented opposition to the "new order", lost its appeal to some" impatient " voters who had too high hopes for a rapid improvement in life. The party's losses in the 2004 elections are largely the result of unrealistic and inflated expectations of the electorate. Golkar, who lost the first democratic election because she had served as the personification of power for the previous three decades, became leader in 2004 for the same reason. It attracted the voices of people who had not yet tasted the fruits of democracy, but were already disillusioned with the reforms, who quickly forgot about the repressions of the authoritarian regime and were nostalgic for"stability at all costs".

As noted by S. S. Kuznetsova, in order to understand the specifics of the modern political system of Indonesia, it should be remembered that its roots go back to the traditional concept of power. In the Javanese historical tradition, the supreme ruler - the monarch-acted as a mediator who united the world of people around him and connected it with the other world of gods and spirits. Without it, society was in danger of disintegration and chaos [Kuznetsova, 1989: 112]. Echoes of the deification of the ruler, the perception of him as an unearthly being, in our opinion, are also present in the ideas of modern Indonesians. In 2004, direct presidential elections were held for the first time. Previously, the head of state was chosen by the highest authority - the NCC. Observers noted that the elections were held very calmly, without any public unrest. This is the difference between the behavior of the Indonesian electorate: when elections are held freely, without any pressure from the authorities, the voters behave peacefully. The election results clearly showed that the government in Indonesia is very personalized.

The 2004 presidential election was won by the leader of the newly formed Democratic Party, retired General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who received 4.5 times more votes than his party in the parliamentary elections.5 This once again confirmed that in Indonesia, the individual is much more important than the party or movement behind the candidate. S. B. Yudhoyono was a relatively new figure in the political scene, and ordinary voters wanted to see in him the "just sovereign", the savior, whose image lives in folk lore.6
Such ideas lead to the fact that the president-elect is seen not as the head of state, who was entrusted with the post for five years, but as a "savior" from the sins and miscalculations of the previous "reign". It is as if the society is not responsible for its previous choice. Electoral preferences are almost always driven by high expectations, which soon leads to disillusionment among voters. This is one of the reasons for the skeptical attitude towards democracy.

In 2009, regular elections were held in Indonesia. President S. B. Yudhoyono was re-elected for a second term, receiving more than 60% of the vote in the first round. And again by-

4 Has been in existence since 1959.

5 His party received 7%.

6 The just Sovereign (ratu adil) is a mythological hero who, according to popular beliefs, must come in the most difficult times and save the people. According to legend, ratu adil comes from a poor and unknown family. This image has been repeatedly used by the leaders of traditional and modern Indonesia to establish themselves on the political stage.

page 91
The president's popularity was three times higher than that of his party. The Democratic Party won the election with 20.58%. The victory of the president's party can be explained by several reasons. On the one hand, the popularity of the president influenced the sympathy of voters, on the other hand, over the five years of its existence, the party performed well in parliament and became more well known to voters. Golkar and DPIb, the two parties that have alternately held the lead in Parliament over the past 10 years, lost a significant part of the electorate, receiving 14.45 and 14.03% of the vote, respectively.

It is also interesting that "natural phenomena" are still associated with the activity of rulers. In some Indonesian media, there are peculiar examples of explaining natural disasters [www: / / news.sbs.com.au]. For example, many believe that the 2006 Java earthquake is part of a chain of natural disasters that began in 2003. These disasters, including the infamous 2004 tsunami, were caused because the then President of Indonesia did not have the divine grace of Wahew7. This kind of belief suggests that if a nation is led by a ruler who does not have power, then regardless of his other qualities, the people will not live in harmony with nature. Some attribute the series of natural disasters to the fact that many Javanese people have forgotten ancient traditions. Political leaders are also to blame for what is happening. For example, the Sultan of Yogyakarta is supposed to be a guardian of spiritual power, but people believe that he ignores traditional Javanese culture, leaning towards modern culture. Recently, a shopping center was built on the land of his ancestors, and many believed that the sultan thereby angered the Goddess of the South Seas. The Sultan understands that many blame him for the earthquake, but finds it impossible to conform to the categories of a century ago.

Javanese beliefs are based on the belief in nature spirits that existed on the island before the advent of Hinduism and Islam. Islam is the most popular religion in the country, but its special feature is the inclusion of elements of animism, since the majority of Javanese Muslims do not abandon traditional local beliefs.

In Indonesia, mysticism is a frequent cause of discrediting political figures. It is believed that any natural phenomena are caused by the disfavor of the gods for certain political events in the country. Such arguments are valid even in the capital. The main target of such attacks in recent years is President S. B. Yudhoyono. In 2004, after his election, a series of natural disasters swept through Indonesia, and opponents of the president claimed that this was his fault. In 2009, on the eve of his inauguration, a major earthquake struck West Sumatra. Even The Jakarta Post, a leading English-language publication, published "The Gods Must be Angry", which presented the president and his multi-million dollar inauguration as the probable cause of the tragedy [The gods..., 2009]. In other publications, the blame for the earthquake is also laid on the president, in particular, information is given from the Javanese mystical almanac "Primbon", which states that the date of birth of the president 09.09.1949 brings misfortunes, so the longer he is in power, the more misfortunes he will bring. All this shows the strength and significance of various superstitions in Indonesian society.

So, following the various stages of socio-economic and political development of Indonesia since independence, the author came to the conclusion that Western-style democratization remains alien to Indonesians. The past 10 years after the fall of the authoritarian regime have shown that the process of changing the system of values is very slow. This is not least due to the underdevelopment of the middle class and the "creeping Islamization".

7 The Javanese believed that power was obtained either by inheritance or through the divine power of wahyu. Such power is believed to be bestowed on rulers of relatively low birth who come to power after a period of coups and bloodshed. Wahyu is a kind of approval of the gods.

page 92
The middle class is seen by experts as the bearer of democracy, but in Indonesia, those who could represent it are too dependent on the authorities or the military. Entrepreneurs, as the main representatives of the middle class, are not free, because in conditions of corruption, bribes are needed to develop business. Success depends not so much on the talent of the entrepreneur, but on his ability to make the right acquaintances and the ability to negotiate with the authorities.

"Creeping Islamization" is the process of introducing Sharia law at the lowest levels of territorial and administrative divisions. Sharia law in villages and kabupatens (districts) creates conditional stability during periods of political instability. This phenomenon is ambivalent: on the one hand, order is organized at the local level, on the other, religious laws are very archaic and hinder progress.

It is impossible to understand the essence of the events and processes taking place in Indonesia without taking into account the historical and cultural heritage of a huge and so diverse country. In this context, the re-election of President S. B. Yudhoyono for a second term shows that Indonesian society primarily wants stability and further development of the country within the global economic system. Some segments of the population are leaning towards a strong, rigid central government, but the majority of the population has already tasted the fruits of free development, and there will not be a complete rollback towards authoritarianism. Some priorities and value orientations are likely to be shifted. There will be a slow modernization of Javanese political culture as the main brake on the democratization process in Indonesia.

list of literature

Drugov A. Y. Indonesia: Political Culture and Political regime, Moscow, 1997.
Drugov A. Y. Obshchestvo i vlast ' v sovremennoi Ekonomii [Society and Power in modern Indonesia]. 2004. N 1.

Drugov A. Yu., Tyurin V. A. Istoriya Ekonomiki XX vek [History of Indonesia in the XX century]. Moscow, 2005.

Kuznetsova S. S. At the origins of Indonesian culture, Moscow, 1989.
Huntington S. Political Order in Changing Societies, Moscow, 2004.
Culture and Politics in Indonesia. Ithaca & London, 1972.

International Herald Tribune.

Jakarta Post.

Los Angeles Times. 17.01.2008.

The gods must be angry // Jakarta Post. 04.10.2009.

The Straits Times.

www://news.sbs.com.au

Permanent link to this publication: