V. MAZYRIN

Candidate of Historical Sciences

While the progress of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) on the path of a market economy is generally recognized, customary to speak . As for the Western world led by the United States, Vietnam is still considered communist-type state. Is this really the case?

When considering the process of establishing democracy in Vietnam, it should be borne in mind that, along with other factors, its development has always been hindered by the lack of sufficient historical prerequisites.1
TRADITIONAL MECHANISMS AND NEW SECURITY MEASURES

Until the late 1980s, the formation of democratic consciousness and political institutions was hindered by economic backwardness and cultural and informational isolation from the rest of the world. State governance was conducted in accordance with the traditions and practices of socialism and the centuries-old traditions and norms enshrined in Confucian ethics and the model of interaction between citizens and society.

The transition to a market economy was accompanied by major changes in many areas of life. However, as far as political reforms are concerned, they were carried out much more slowly than economic transformations, and this is one of the characteristic features of Vietnam's modern socio-political development.

In the face of serious external threats to the foundations of Vietnamese socialism, the ruling Communist Party relied on force methods and various prohibitions. Even today, she believes that the main elements of Western-style democracy, first of all political pluralism, contradict the existing system of government in the country and undermine the national culture and identity. And to think so, indeed, there are many good reasons.

A number of Western states not only encourage anti-communist sentiments in the vast expatriate community, primarily in the United States, but also provide a variety of support to local dissidents in Vietnam itself. Calling for democratic procedures to be observed, supporters of the liberal ideology strongly recommend that Hanoi should not be satisfied only with economic success, and strongly condemn it for what they consider to be a violation of human rights.

That is why the Vietnamese leadership resolutely suppresses attempts to create opposition political movements directed from abroad. Protective measures are taken taking into account the consequences of the "velvet" and "color" revolutions in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. In order to prevent the same scenario from unfolding, the Vietnamese authorities increased their control over public order and security in the early 1990s. Measures were tightened to manage the sphere of ideology and culture, restrictions were imposed on the activities of the media, and some civil liberties were curtailed. The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) continued its policy of developing "socialist democracy", emphasizing the strengthening of centralism and discipline, opposing "permissiveness, freedom of propaganda of anti-socialist ideas" 2.

In this work, the Vietnamese leadership used methods that were rooted in the war years and were typical of the administrative-command system. All this contributed to maintaining political stability and keeping the population under control. At the same time, actions of a prohibitive and punitive nature in the context of a weak mechanism of constitutional supervision over the observance of the rule of law led to violations of civil liberties, restricted the initiative of the masses, and delayed the construction of a state governed by the rule of law.

FORMS OF POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION

However, as Vietnam moved towards a market economy and opened up to the outside world, the political system that had previously developed there began to change. The revision of domestic and foreign policy has started the process of transformation of society. These changes were primarily determined by the country's integration into the global economy, the adoption of international norms and commitments in order to receive external assistance and ensure economic growth. Vietnam has become involved in the free exchange of ideas, people, information, advanced technologies, and new values.

Economic reforms inevitably led to a" political liberalization " of the regime, although not to the extent recommended by Western experts.3 Such changes as modernization of legislation, improvement of the electoral system, extensive personnel renewal, restoration of the constitutional role of elected authorities in the center and in the field, expansion of civil rights and transparency, simplification of the procedure for entering and leaving the country were considered acceptable and necessary. Work on improvement has begun

page 22
methods of party leadership in society, the rise of social activity and the role of public organizations.

In general, the new state policy is characterized by considerable flexibility and pragmatism. The authorities gave public players a certain opportunity to maneuver, freed up "living space"for them4. For example, while the center controls the development of a principled political course, the organization and conduct of elections, the management of the public sector and the economy, and the management of the media, a completely different approach is applied to solving local issues - problems of urbanization, regulation of employment and migration, and registration of residence. Here, the state is increasingly willing to take into account the preferences of ordinary citizens.

Along with certain disadvantages, this management method has its advantages. By providing an opportunity to implement decisions made by the central management, taking into account local conditions, the CPV gets an additional opportunity to clarify and adjust state policies. Thus, possible discontent and opposition on the ground is prevented, the formation of opposition is restrained, and management is made more open, which makes it possible to find more effective solutions both at the local and national levels.

Since the beginning of the 2000s, a legal reform aimed at ensuring the rule of law and legal education of the masses has been actively carried out. Instead of the numerous restrictions that were previously practiced, the main principle was to allow citizens to do everything that is not prohibited by law. As a result of this reform, despite its incompleteness, new, relatively modern legislation has actually been created, allowing for more effective regulation of social processes within the country and relations with the outside world. There were significant prerequisites for the democratization of society, parliamentary control over administrative bodies, and the separation of the judicial and executive branches of government.

The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (as amended in 2001) contains a number of additional provisions that re-define the management mechanisms of the company. Changes were made to its political organization, legal levers for regulating social relations were used, and a reorientation of foreign policy was fixed. Article 14 states that Vietnam seeks to expand relations with all countries of the world, regardless of their political and social structure. The Constitution clearly defines the rights and obligations of citizens. The basis of the state system in the country is declared to be people's power, associated with the development of electoral and parliamentary democracy. The change in approaches is evidenced by the refusal to define the state system of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam as a "dictatorship of the proletariat"5. By defining the role and place of non-governmental organizations in the political system, the Constitution provides them with the right to participate in the solution of political, economic, social and cultural tasks throughout the country and in each territorial unit, enterprise, institution.

While recognizing the important role of market mechanisms in regulating business, redistributing property, and developing commodity-money relations, Vietnamese leaders believe that Western-style democratic institutions are not fully capable of overcoming social contradictions and ensuring a purposeful movement along the path of progress. Therefore, they retain the highest functions of management, supervision, education and punishment for the State, which is led by the CPV. The Communist Party acts as the main guardian of moral and cultural values, high moral ideals, interpreted as an alternative to liberal democracy.

CHANGES WITHIN THE RULING PARTY

During its half-century in power, the Communist Party of Vietnam has become an integral part of the state machinery. After the ban of political organizations of the deposed Saigon regime in 1975, the actual abolition of possible opponents of the CPV took place. November 1988 was followed by the dissolution of the last potential competitors remaining since the 1945 revolution, the Socialist and Democratic Parties.

At the same time, within the CPV itself, broad discussions around the definition of a foreign policy course, ways and methods of implementing market reforms have become commonplace. Such discussions proved to be particularly important in the absence of civil society and public channels that would allow interested groups to discuss and develop a strategy for social development. The Communist Party, having monopolized the political arena, objectively needs the existence of various trends and platforms that would better reflect public opinion, provide a certain pluralism, and offer alternative solutions to problems.

page 23
Of exceptional importance is the ongoing renewal of the CPV itself, the revision of ideas about its place in the socio-political system of the country and the methods of party work. Thus, the separation of the party from state authorities was recognized as one of the important principles. In this regard, the CPV put forward a new slogan that explains the division of functions in a peculiar way: "The party leads, the people determine, the state governs." The policy is being implemented, although not consistently enough, to limit the direct influence of the Communist Party on the work of the administrative apparatus, and to provide legislative and executive bodies with greater freedom in implementing public policy.

The CPV, as it was again confirmed at the X Congress (April 2006), considers the most important task to increase the activity of its primary organizations. To this end, efforts have been strengthened to strengthen the links between all its links, especially the grassroots, with ordinary citizens, to overcome the party's separation from life, to ensure transparency, freedom in the work and elections of the highest bodies of the CPV. Ordinary members of the CPV were introduced in advance to the draft report of the Central Committee and the problems of the upcoming national congress, encouraged to participate in the discussion and make recommendations, and select worthy candidates. The delegates of the congress also began to actively debate the documents prepared in advance and influence the final decisions.

The procedure for elections to the governing bodies of the CPV has become more democratic. If earlier, by the time of the opening of the party congress, the composition of the Central Committee and the Politburo was usually already planned, then, for example, at the X Congress of the CPV, 207 people applied for 160 seats of members of the Central Committee, including two self - nominated candidates, and 56 people applied for 25 seats of candidates for members of the Central Committee. Elections to the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the party were held on a rating basis, and some candidates did not pass, as a result of which the composition of the highest bodies of the party was reduced for the first time compared to the planned 6.

The influx of fresh forces into the party and state bodies has been intensified. To this end, the rules for their renewal were introduced, including the Central Committee (at least 1/3 of every election), the age limit (for new members up to 55 years) and the term of service in leadership positions (at first it was limited to 10, and later to 5 consecutive years), the requirement to have a higher education. It has become common practice for high-ranking officials to retire after reaching the age of 60, and for people aged 40-50 to be appointed as ministers and heads of provincial administrations.7
The practice of regular rotation of top-level personnel has been expanded, which is designed to prevent managers from becoming overgrown with corrupt connections. The main focus is now on the business qualities of managers, which means a departure from the principle of "loyalty over competence"that has been practiced for many decades in their selection. Non-partisan people began to be appointed to various positions in the state apparatus, although for the time being, as a rule, at the middle and grassroots levels. There is a growing awareness of the need to promote capable and knowledgeable people who are not members of the CPV to the highest government posts as well.8
PARLIAMENTARY AND" LOCAL " DEMOCRACY

The work of state institutions in Vietnam is now based on the law, which has given an additional boost to the development of electoral and parliamentary democracy. Work has begun to transform the electoral process into a real referendum of people's wishes, establish deputies ' control over the actions of the executive branch, increase their responsibility to the voters, improve the structure and increase the capacity of elected bodies in the center and in the field. As a result, representative institutions have been given the opportunity to exercise their legal powers more fully, which makes them full-fledged subjects of political life. However, the idea of balancing and dividing the three branches of government in accordance with generally accepted democratic standards has not yet become dominant. 9
An example of the beginning of the effective functioning of these institutions is the National Assembly, which previously performed mainly decorative functions. It was possible to significantly raise its role as the main legislative and representative body of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which has broad constitutional powers. The Parliament was able to independently discuss the country's current problems, assess the effectiveness of the work of state bodies that are now responsible to it. Public debates are recognized as necessary, their status has increased - they actually serve as a substitute for the political opposition as such, play the role of a"safety valve". Even Western analysts recognize that the National Assembly has become the main platform for criticism of the CPV and the government, and point to positive changes in the coverage of the work of government bodies, including ensuring its transparency.10
The participation of citizens of the country in making socially important decisions is carried out through the mechanism of preliminary elaboration of laws. Proposals for new draft laws are collected during consultations and discussions in the media. Letters from the public are received on the websites of a number of State organizations, including the National Assembly itself. As a result, many projects submitted to the public are undergoing significant changes. Moreover, in the event of disagreements among the country's top leadership, the opinion of citizens began to become crucial.

An important prerequisite for such innovations was the gradual change in the political consciousness of the Vietnamese population and, above all, its upper strata. Time is inexorably working on reforms - after the war, a new generation of citizens has grown up, who are now 25-30 years old. Young people are not familiar with the old rules, are much better informed, learn quickly from the outside world, and are not connected with the CPV in everyday life. Young Vietnamese people are less ideologized and more open, in need-

page 24
They are interested in channels for showing their civic activism and are willing to use them.

The new intelligentsia, brought up in the USSR and Eastern European countries, acquired the experience of glasnost, and was able to independently comprehend the events associated with the collapse of the socialist system. Many Vietnamese were educated in the West, and with it they learned about democratic values. All this contributed to the creation of a broader and more diverse political elite and the strengthening of reformist forces.

Another notable innovation was the regulation on "local democracy" adopted in May 1998. Implemented under the slogan "the people know, discuss, implement, control", this provision complements and concretizes the principle of "collective management". It was considered to express the essence and form of socialist democracy, although in reality this principle was purely declarative. Measures to increase public participation and control are designed to ensure transparency in the work of local authorities, increase the participation of citizens in matters concerning their vital interests. This initiative is considered an alternative to Western recipes for democratizing society 11.

In recent years, the promotion of grassroots opinions and proposals on local infrastructure and other projects, as well as local budget expenditures, has been strongly encouraged. In special cases, referendums may be held on topical issues of a local nature. The law on requests and recall of deputies of local councils, designed to protect the rights of ordinary citizens, has been adopted.

A set of anti-corruption measures serves the same purpose. For example, administrative discipline, individual responsibility and accountability of officials have been strengthened, and citizens ' participation in identifying official violations has been stimulated. There is a strict procedure for making budgets and financial audits in state institutions. The level of officials held accountable for official crimes is gradually increasing, and the number of persons remaining "inviolable" is narrowing. So recently, quite a few heads of the central government apparatus and a number of secretaries of provincial party organizations who were also members of the CPV Central Committee were removed from high positions in the state apparatus and expelled from the party.

CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

At the same time, official Hanoi categorically rejects the criticism of international human rights organizations, pointing out the non-observance of civil liberties by the Government of Vietnam, serious abuses in the legal sphere. Thus, after every report of the NGO "Amnesty International", which constantly contains data on human rights violations in Vietnam, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam invariably refutes the evidence. The NGO Freedom House also ranks Vietnam at the lowest level in the regularly published world classification of the level of civil liberties and political rights in different countries. In the ranking, which covers almost 200 countries, Vietnam is included in the category of "not free"12. This classification, for all its conventionality in terms of estimates and comparisons, is still a cause for concern in Hanoi. Well-known NGO "Reporters without Borders" from-

Taking into account external criticism, but based primarily on internal needs, the leadership of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has recently adopted a number of laws providing for the expansion of constitutional rights of citizens and guaranteeing a more complete implementation of civil liberties. All these changes occurred as the country was preparing for WTO accession, which was repeatedly postponed due to accusations of non-compliance with civil rights. Hanoi has started a dialogue with representatives of other Governments on this issue, and a human rights research center has been established. At the same time, the authorities still do not allow foreign NGOs and human rights non-governmental organizations to work in the country, accusing them of interfering in internal affairs.

Puts Vietnam in the category of "enemies of the Internet", covering 58 countries13.

External observers have already noted a trend towards respect for personal integrity, increased freedom of speech and assembly, which has allowed citizens of Vietnam to express their opinions now, including in an organized manner. Statements made by individuals in private, other than official speeches, are no longer subject to censorship. Hanoi has become more tolerant of public discussions on a range of topics. Many other ways of expressing public sentiment are also allowed, first of all, rallies and pickets of patriotic orientation, condemning the violation of Vietnam's national interests. For example, in January 2008, mass protests were held against the inclusion of part of the disputed Spratly Archipelago under the administrative jurisdiction of the PRC. Many other unauthorized actions of citizens within informal groups are increasingly taking place without the intervention of the authorities. The police maintain order, but do not prevent peaceful actions.

There are signs of increased freedom of the press. Thus, media workers were given the right to use various foreign sources of information, and not just verified reports from the Vietnamese News Agency. Local publications willingly began to publish sharp materials on topical topics, letters of citizens with critical content. The English-language press is increasingly published and in demand, especially among the intelligentsia.14 The recent expansion of access to information is indicated by the appearance on sale of foreign publications, banned books by local authors, and foreign periodicals. Basically, bans and restrictions on listening to foreign "voices"have been lifted.

The censorship of national TV channels has been reduced, and satellite TV has become commonplace. New ideas and images also appeared in the cinema. Feature films began to move away from official stereotypes. They are increasingly raising acute social problems, criticizing negative phenomena in public life. -

page 25
a new life. More creative freedom has been granted to cultural, art and scientific workers, although the demonstration of works that criticize or ridicule the CPV and the government is still prohibited.

In general, Internet access is freely available. The number of subscribers is not regulated, as home use is constrained by computer prices significantly higher than the average income level of the population, and it is available mainly to government employees and visitors to Internet cafes. At the same time, the authorities inspect these outlets from time to time and close down sites that contain prohibited articles, and monitor correspondence.15
Emigration is no longer considered illegal. Organized departure of those who want to go abroad, including to the United States, has been established. Many former prisoners of re-education camps, employees of the Saigon regime, and people who want to reunite with their families (civil wives and children of American soldiers who fought in South Vietnam) were able to move there for permanent residence. Temporary labor migration and sending children to study abroad, as well as international tourism, have become widespread. We have also created the most favorable conditions for the return of Vietcieu emigrants to their homeland and their participation in the recovery of the national economy.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS

All public organizations in Vietnam are required to be members of the pro-government Fatherland Front (FEF), which makes it difficult for independent associations to operate legally. However, some groups successfully operate outside the FEV framework, without facing any restrictions or prohibitions, provided that their activities are aimed at meeting the socio-economic needs of citizens. In market conditions, public initiative inevitably required going beyond the previous narrow limits, which was facilitated by the emergence of its new form-non-governmental organizations. International humanitarian NGOs were allowed to enter Vietnam and started working. As a result, this has led to increased participation of citizens in solving the problems of the country's development and their own lives.16
The CPV leadership seems to have realized the need for new channels of social self-realization. Non-governmental organizations are "in a sense assigned the role of constructive opposition, a legal force for changing the established rules"17. Hanoi granted representative groups the right to act in the sphere of their positioning in exchange for agreeing to behave within the established framework and under the guidance of people recommended from above. Establishing links with new social forces generated by modernization and industrialization, in conditions of high economic dynamics, is aimed at preserving stability and peace in society. Of course, the mechanism of strict centralized management from above constrains public activity, but at the same time it is increasingly built on the basis of the law, using negotiations and consultations as the main methods of influence.

The gradual democratization of the system is also confirmed by attempts to form and consolidate internal political opposition representing different social strata of society. The most famous of these recent initiatives was the formation in 2006 of the so-called "Block 8406", which came out on the Internet demanding the democratization of the regime and the establishment of political parties. Although repressive measures were applied against the organizers, the cyber dissident movement gained wide popularity and public support. According to Western experts, it has united many previously disparate groups of dissidents18.

Religious organizations have gained a significant degree of autonomy - now their supporters can worship without much interference. The rights and obligations of believers have been clarified, including for the first time they are allowed to seek the return of land and other property confiscated from churches. Openly belonging to any permitted religion no longer has negative consequences for both economic activities and the secular life of citizens, and religious affiliation is not indicated in personal documents. The status of a believer has ceased to serve as an obstacle to membership in the CPV, which should be recognized.-

page 26
a radical shift in the personnel policy of the Communist Party.

From what has been said, it can be concluded with good reason that Vietnam, although slowly and taking into account local specifics, is in the process of establishing a democratic State. As market reforms are implemented, the legal space is being formed, civil liberties are being respected, and public activity is growing. Thus, institutional democracy is realized in its simplest forms, which contributes to the establishment of individualism, pluralism and other democratic principles.

This trend, in our opinion, is already irreversible. Even many Western experts are forced to admit that the process of democratization is gaining momentum in Vietnam and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is gradually turning into a parliamentary republic with a one-party system. Due to the introduction of market relations in the country, first of all, economic freedoms are realized, as the most popular among the Vietnamese population. Greater openness of the authorities has been achieved and the first prerequisites for the formation of a civil society have been created.

In the long run, Vietnam is evolving towards a well-known type of political system in East Asia, which is characterized by a combination of paternalism with the use of administrative resources in the presence of elements of the rule of law. The Vietnamese example confirms that the authoritarian system is not just a choice of the political elite, but an objective reflection of the level of development of the country. Authoritarian models are inherent in States that want to preserve their sovereignty in the face of radical changes and deadly threats from the external environment. Defining this phenomenon, foreign political scientists speak of a "semi-democratic system" that partially takes into account, among other things, the interests and demands of the people.19
In the face of increasing external pressure, the CPV is afraid to let go of the reins of control. Nevertheless, the process of political transformation will certainly continue, since the market requires the rule of law and the establishment of the foundations of a democratic system. It is possible that in order to facilitate the adoption of political decisions aimed at further democratization of the country, the so-called "barometric opposition" may be created in the country, loyal to the CPV and able to oppose it within the existing system.

When making such an assessment of the current state and prospects for the development of political democracy in Vietnam, we proceed from the fact that it cannot be approached with the standards of states that have a long peaceful experience of democratic development, or make too "high" demands that meet modern world standards. Many democratic norms that seem binding to citizens of other countries are still not perceived as de facto necessary by the majority of Vietnamese.

That is why radical political changes associated with the establishment of generally accepted modern ideas about democracy are still not in demand. To do this, the basic internal conditions must mature. It is clear that it will take many years and deep political reforms for Vietnam to establish such an order.

1 For a detailed analysis of the political processes associated with the transition of this country to a market economy, see: Reforms of the transition period in Vietnam (1986 - 2006): directions, dynamics, results. Moscow, 2007.

2 Nhan dan (Hanoi), 29.09.1989; 01.12.1989.

3 The famous Australian researcher of Vietnam K. Thayer called the ongoing reform process in Vietnam "political normalization", apparently referring to this trend. The Regularization of Politics: Continuity and Change in the Party's Central Committee (1951 - 1986) // Postwar Vietnam: Dilemmas in Socialist Development. New York, 1988, pp. 177-193.

4 См.: Kerkvliet B. T. An Approach for Analyzing State-society Relations in Vietnam // SOJOURN, ISEAS, vol. 16, N 2, October 2001, р. 238 - 278.

5 См.: Hien phap Nuoc cong hoa xa hoi chu nghia Viet Nam 1992. Hanoi, 1992.

6 Saigon Times Weekly (Ho-chi-minh city), 29.04.2006; Koh David. The Politics of Divided Party and Parkinson's State in Vietnam // Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 23, N 3, December 2001, p. 537; Nong Due Manh. Toi tin chung ta se day lui duoc tham nhung // VietNamNet, 25.04.2006.

7 Nhan dan, 28.06.1988; Taylor Ph. Social Inequalities in a Socialist State // Social Inequality in Vietnam and the Challenges to Reform. Ed. by Taylor Ph. Singapore, ISEAS, 2004, р. 5.

8 A corresponding proposal for ministerial posts was recently made by former Prime Minister of Vietnam Vo Van Kiet, who called potential candidates not just non-partisan, but patriotic emigrants.

9 The State in Vietnam, according to Confucian doctrine, is not considered a potentially dangerous force that requires counterweights. The law works selectively and is not applied neutrally and equally to all citizens. See: Vietnam Quarterly Forecast Report (Report on Political Risk, Economic Performance and Outlook, and Key Economic Sectors) / / Business Monitor International. London, Q3, 2002, p. 8.

10 See: Matthieu S. Les arcanes de la "democratie socialiste" vietnamienne (Evolution des assemblees populaires et du systeme juridique depuis le lancement du Doi moi // Les Etudes du CERI, 2003, N 104, p. 10; Thalemann A. Vietnam: Marketing Economy //Journal of Contemporary Asia, 1996, N 263, р. 35.

Koh D. 11 The Politics of Divided Party.., р. 547 - 548.

12 According to this classification, the share of non-free States is gradually decreasing globally (from 42% in 1974 to 26% in 2004). See Freedom in the World 2005. The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties.

13 Human Rights Watch World Report 2006: Overview of Human Rights Issues in Vietnam - hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/18/viet-nal2249_txt.htm

14 At the beginning of the 2000s, there were 712 local publications and media bodies operating in the country, and almost 9,000 radio and television employees. See: Man D. A Passion for Modernity: Intellectuals and the Media // Postwar Vietnam: Dynamics of a Transforming Society. Ed. by Ну V. Luong. Singapore, ISEAS, 2003, p. 282.

15 European Union Economic and Commercial Counselors. 2005 Report on Viet Nam. Hanoi, June, 2005, p. 65; U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2003. Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. Washington, February 25, 2004 // www.state.gov/g/drl/hrrpt/2003/27794.htm, р. 8.

16 For more information, see: Mazyrin V. M. Obshchestvennye organizatsii i formirovanie grazhdanskogo obshchestva v sovremennom Vietnamese [Public organizations and the formation of civil society in modern Vietnam]. Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta. Series of Oriental Studies, 2006, N 2, pp. 46-67.

WishermanJ. 17 and Nguyen Quang Vinh. The Relations between Civic and Governmental Organizations in Vietnam: Selected Findings // Getting Organized in Vietnam: Moving in and around the Socialist State. Ed. by Kerkvliet B. and Russel H. Singapore, 2003, р. 185.

Thayer CA. 18 Vietnam: The Tenth Party Congress and after. A Review for ISEAS. Singapore, 2007, pp. 6-7. For more information, see: Thayer With A. Political Dissent and Political Reform in Vietnam, 1997-2002. In The Power of Ideas: Intellectual Input and Political Change in East and Southeast Countries. Ed. by Derichs C. and Heberer T. // Asian Topics, NIAS, 2006, N 36, р. 115 - 132.

Womack B. 19 The Party and the People: Revolutionary and Post Revolutionary Politics in China and Vietnam // World Politics, 1987, N 4, р. 485.

Permanent link to this publication: