"The problem of the Spratly Archipelago occupies an important place in the interstate relations of East Asian countries and in the foreign policy of ASEAN. Understanding the seriousness of the conflict over territories and water areas in the South China Sea, which will have negative consequences not only for the regional but also for the global economy, the ASEAN members are trying to find ways to resolve the problem through a negotiation process with all participants in the territorial dispute."

Omar Nessar:

"In the long run, Islamabad is in danger of India and Afghanistan coming closer together and even forming a kind of' anti-Pakistan alliance ' that could encircle Pakistani territory. In addition to transport and military problems, such an environment, according to the Pakistani leadership, can be used by their opponents to stimulate separatist movements both in the north of the IRP, in places where Pashtun tribes live, and in the east of the country. At the same time, separatist issues have become of particular concern to Islamabad after India opened new diplomatic missions in a number of Afghan cities bordering Pakistan."

Andrey Fedorchenko:

"The growing anti-monarchist sentiment in the east of the country should not be underestimated. If the demonstrations continue and people are killed, the Saudi army will have to throw all its might at suppressing these demonstrations. Consequently, less attention will be paid to the problematic situation on the border with Yemen, where a couple of years ago there was already a war with the Houthi tribes. Sunni opponents of the regime - Muslim Brotherhood activists on the one hand, and veterans of world jihad on the other-will also take advantage of the gap in the Saudi security network."

Yuri RAIKOV

Ambassador to the Lao PDR (2002-2007), Academician of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, Doctor of Historical Sciences

yaraikov@yandex.ru

Recently, serious passions have been raging in a number of capitals of the Asia-Pacific region, primarily Beijing and Tokyo, and bellicose rhetoric and drumming have not subsided. Politicians and military personnel compete in patriotism, incite nationalism. A recent example: the ASEAN countries reacted rather nervously to the regional policy of China, which recently began issuing new passports showing the disputed map of the South China Sea (SCM). Beijing also approved a new regulation that gives the Navy's leadership more freedom to detain foreign vessels passing in waters that the PRC considers its own1. According to the New York Times," China is upsetting India, Vietnam and Japan with its increasingly assertive actions in long-standing territorial disputes."². That is why the topic of conflicts in East Asia is still on the pages of the Internet.

international media, remains a constant source of information, causing concern of the world community for the state of affairs in one of the key regions of the planet.

Escalating disputes in the summer of 2012 between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands (Chinese for Diaoyu), Japan and South Korea over the Takeshima Islands (Korean for Dokdo) in the East China Sea, China and some ASEAN members (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei), and Taiwan in the South China Sea.-The Chinese Sea due to the Spratly Archipelago and the Paracel Islands has a number of objective and subjective reasons. Historical motifs here are closely intertwined with the modern practice of active development of the riches of the World's oceans.

Problems of the world ocean (development of the shelf and subsurface of the seabed, delimitation of water areas and island territories) are now taking an increasingly prominent place in international politics. Their importance, given that these problems affect the interests of almost all States, is constantly increasing. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, competition between coastal States over the legal regime of water areas and the development of seabed resources has noticeably increased in the Asia-Pacific region. Exploitation of high seas resources involves many activities. The extraction of bioresources and minerals within the 200-mile economic zone, primarily the use of oil and gas resources on the seabed, is of considerable interest to the coastal States of East Asia.

The intensification of the diplomatic struggle on these issues is associated with unilateral actions of some States aimed at extending national sovereignty not only over the coastal waters and water resources surrounding them, but also over the "no man's" islands remote from their shores, the establishment of control over which would significantly strengthen the political and strategic positions of these countries.

Specific examples of political maneuvers and attempts to carry out economic activities are the Spratly Archipelago and the Paracel Islands, which are also important in delineating territories and water areas in the South China Sea. The favorable geographical location at the crossroads of transit communications connecting the Middle East with East Asia and the South Pacific makes it possible to

The States that own these islands control maritime trade routes and transport corridors from the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea and beyond to the Pacific Ocean, and exploit the living and mineral resources of the sea.³

Map of the South China Sea region

The biggest source of tension has been the Spratly Archipelago, where China's efforts to develop the islands are increasingly facing opposition from Vietnam and the Philippines. In June 2012, the National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam adopted the Vietnamese Law of the Sea, which also extends the country's jurisdiction to the Spratly and Paracel Islands (Nanung and Xisha, as the Chinese call them). The Chinese Foreign Ministry issued an official statement to Vietnam's Ambassador to Beijing, Nguyen Van Tho, saying that " China strongly protests and firmly opposes such actions by Vietnam."⁴. President Aquino of the Philippines, addressing the states of the Asia-Pacific region, said in July 2012, during the period of the greatest aggravation of the situation around the islands of the South China Sea: "If someone enters your yard and says that this territory belongs to him, will you allow it?" ⁵

The Spratly Archipelago is uninhabited. It is located in the south-western part of the South China Sea and is formed by about 100 islands, coral reefs, rocks and shoals stretching from north to south for 1 thousand km. The archipelago is located 650 km east of the Vietnamese coast, 750 km south of the Paracel Islands, 1 thousand km south of the South China Sea. south-east of the Chinese island of Hainan, 250 km off the coast of Sabah (Malaysia), 160 km off the coast of Sarawak (Malaysia) and 400 km east of the westernmost Philippine island of Palawan.

Small islands, atolls and even shoals of the archipelago are claimed by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei. In the second half of the 20th century, these States had a tangible presence here. Vietnam controls a number of islands, including the Spratly Island of the same name. The largest of the islands of the Itu-Aba archipelago is occupied by the Taiwanese garrison. Malaysia holds and claims three islets, while Brunei claims Louisa Reef , one of the shoals in the south of the archipelago. Eight islands and atolls are controlled by Philippine units. China also occupies eight islands, but claims almost the entire area of the South China Sea.

Experts in the law of the sea note that the Middle Kingdom marks the boundaries of its claims on Chinese maps, referring to the so-called "nine-point demarcation line" (the border of the South China Sea disputed by China). This imaginary border includes 90% of the 3.5 million Chinese claims.

square km of the South China Sea. For the first time, the "nine-point line" was officially reflected on a map published by Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist government in 1947, and subsequently included in the maps of the PRC.⁶

In May 2009, in response to a joint application submitted by Vietnam and Malaysia to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, China attached a map with a "nine-point demarcation line" to its note verbale addressed to the World Organization, which caused serious concern among some ASEAN members.⁷

The dispute over the Spratly and Paracel Islands, or the territorial dispute in the South China Sea, due to their strategic position, turned in the second half of the 20th century, along with the Taiwan and Korean Peninsula issues, into one of the most complex and potentially explosive regional problems that indirectly affect the interests of most APR states, including the great powers. The situation in this area has repeatedly escalated. Twice it came to armed clashes between applicants. In 1974, in the area of the Paracel Islands, China used force against units of South Vietnam, and in 1988-against a united Vietnam already in the waters of the Spratly Islands. In 1995, Chinese troops occupied Mischief Reef, which is part of the Spratly Archipelago, which the Philippines considers its own.

With the exception of the PRC, which has taken an irreconcilable position on the ownership of the Spratly Archipelago, all other states claiming islands in the South China Sea have at various times expressed their readiness to discuss this issue and try to find acceptable solutions to it. As a confidence-building measure, Indonesia initiated a regular international seminar on "Resolving potential conflicts in the South China Sea"in early 1990. However, the discussion of this urgent problem at the seminar reached an impasse: its ASEAN participants were not yet ready for mutual compromise, and China during this period strictly adhered to the concept of "undisputed sovereignty".

The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the shrinking influence of the United States in Southeast Asia led to significant changes in the balance of power in the region: China, at the expense of the former USSR, largely filled the power vacuum that had been created. These changes have created a strong sense of insecurity in the ASEAN countries.

China's unilateral actions on disputed islands in the South China Sea have added fuel to the fire. In February 1992, the People's Republic of China adopted the Law on Territorial Waters and Adjacent Water Areas, which treats the Spratly and Paracel Islands as Chinese territory. This move provoked a strong reaction in the ASEAN countries-applicants for islands in the South China Sea - and was seen as Beijing's unwillingness to search for solutions to the territorial issue through reaching an acceptable compromise.

In countering Chinese claims to control the South China Sea, the Philippines-the most active participant in the territorial dispute - has taken steps to mobilize its ASEAN partners to condemn China's unilateral actions. The result of this active work was the adoption of the Declaration on the South China Sea at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers ' Conference in Manila in July 1992, which called on the contenders to exercise restraint and refrain from unilateral actions that could lead to armed conflict in a zone of intense international maritime traffic.

The ASEAN line of internationalization of the South China Sea issue met with strong opposition from China, which stated that it was impossible to discuss the territorial dispute on a multilateral basis, but at the same time expressed its readiness to talk to the contenders "one on one". In response to the Chinese challenge in the South China Sea, the ASEAN Regional Security Forum was established in 1994 with the participation of other major powers of the Asia-Pacific region, in order to contain Beijing's "aggressive" behavior towards individual Southeast Asian states and to bind the intractable challenger partner with formal procedures and common collective norms of behavior.

In order to encourage the PRC to adopt a multilateral format of negotiations, the ASEAN countries suggested that China move the discussion of the islands in the South China Sea to this platform. However, China, concerned about the possibility of involving the United States and Japan in the dispute, again flatly refused to hold multilateral negotiations. In the 1990s, the South China Sea theme was regularly featured on the agenda of the annual ASEAN Foreign Ministers ' Conferences.

At various international forums, the ASEAN diplomacy quite actively raised the issue of attracting international attention to this issue, involving the United States in it as an arbitrator, and announced its intention to transfer this issue to the international community.

The issue was referred to the International Maritime Court, and it was even suggested that the problem of the South China Sea should be brought to the level of the United Nations.

In July 1999, in Singapore, the ASEAN members tried to fix in the final documents the code of conduct prepared by the Philippines in the South China Sea. However, due to the objections of China and the restraint of a number of ASEAN states that are not parties to the territorial dispute, the PRC did not join it. The Chinese emphasized that it is a matter of reaching mutual understanding, and not of working out an international legal document. Beijing has made it clear that it is opposed to bringing the issue of the code to the discussion of the ASEAN Regional Security Forum and " considers the forum not as a mechanism for resolving international disputes, but only as a political arena for exchanging views."

It was only by the end of the 1990s that Beijing's position on the South China Sea underwent positive changes. Two factors contributed to the evolution of China's approach to resolving the South China Sea territorial dispute with the ASEAN countries : the recognition by the East Asian States of the ASEAN Regional Security Forum as an important and authoritative mechanism for multilateral diplomacy in the region, and the granting of China the status of a full-fledged ASEAN dialogue partner in 1996.

The conclusion of the Philippine-American Agreement on the temporary presence of American troops in the Philippines in December 1998 had a certain impact on the PRC: the presence of a US sea - based point in the region meant for China an increased risk of realizing its claims not only to the Spratly Islands, but more importantly for the PRC-in relation to Taiwan. Beijing also believed that its hard line could encourage other contenders for waters and territories in the South China Sea to follow the Philippine example.

As a result, China has become more flexible with its southern neighbors, softened its approach to the ASEAN bidders for the Spratly Islands, and adopted the Association's principles of dispute resolution: consultation, consensus, and cooperation.

Beijing finally agreed to adopt a declaration on a code of conduct in the South China Sea with ASEAN as an organization, marking a major shift in China's behavior towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict. In November 2002, in Phnom Penh, on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit, the parties

We have signed this important multilateral document. They pledged to " implement the purposes and principles of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, create an atmosphere of trust, ensure freedom of navigation, and resolve disputes through consultations without the use of force or the threat of its use."

The problem of the Spratly Archipelago occupies an important place in the inter-state relations of East Asian countries and in the foreign policy of ASEAN. Understanding the seriousness of the conflict over territories and water areas in the South China Sea, which will have negative consequences not only for the regional but also for the global economy, the ASEAN members are trying to find ways to resolve the problem through a negotiation process with all participants in the territorial dispute. The Association's leadership sees the solution of the territorial issue as a way to combine the efforts of official and informal dialogue structures (the Conference of ASEAN Foreign Ministers and the Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation Council (APCSC)). At the same time, priority is given to multilateral interstate mechanisms, such as the ARF, the ASEAN - China Senior Political Affairs Meeting.

Unfortunately, the code is not legally binding, but a political agreement and does not guarantee that all countries participating in a territorial dispute will follow it. Its transformation into a document of international law is not yet visible mainly because of China's unwillingness to go further along the path of mutually acceptable agreements.

The following reasons explain the current situation. First, the contradictions between the ASEAN States themselves play a significant role there. They continue to watch each other's intentions with suspicion, especially with regard to practical actions in relation to territories and water areas in the South China Sea. The ASEAN island states (the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam, which shares their approach) are afraid of possible Chinese aggression in the southern direction. Indonesia, which claims to be the leader of ASEAN, wants to actively participate in the process of territorial settlement in the South China Sea, does not want to miss the opportunity to mediate in it and show itself as a core that unites the interests of the Association countries. Indochina states (Myanmar, Cambodia, Thailand

On the contrary, they are close partners of China and are more loyal to Beijing's policy in the South China Sea.

In confronting the ASEAN participants in the territorial dispute in the South China Sea, the PRC achieved diplomatic success, not allowing the Association's members to unite on an anti-Chinese basis. This split in ASEAN in July 2012 deprived the members of the " ten " of the opportunity to present a united front on the South China Sea issue. As mentioned above, the fact that the ASEAN countries are not equally involved in the territorial dispute has once again played a role. It got to the point that the ASEAN members could not even agree on the final communique.

Another reason lies in the reluctance of China, which is still hesitating and does not want to take on the obligations provided for in a legally binding document. Representatives of the Middle Kingdom declare their readiness to talk about the code when the conditions are ripe for this.

An important factor complicating the situation in the South China Sea is the recently increased activity of the applicant States in the economic development of the disputed waters. So, in June 2008, Vietnam launched an oil and gas project in the southern part of its continental shelf with the participation of Exxon Mobil. Companies such as Shell, British Petroleum, Chevron and Gazprom have joined the South China Sea (a memorandum of cooperation in the exploration and development of offshore gas fields was signed with Vietnamese companies). The pace of geological exploration in the South China Sea is accelerating. Oil and gas are found near the Spratly Islands and Cape Misfortune in the South China Sea.

Attempts at economic use of territories and water areas have caused many problems: the rights to offshore drilling, confirmed by the Governments of ASEAN member states, are not recognized by China. China's nervousness over the disputed area was reinforced by the US announcement in 2010 that it viewed the South China Sea, through which half of the world's trade passes, as an area of national interest.

In the spring and summer of 2012, the degree of tension in the South China Sea region increased sharply. China, sensing its strength and seeking to push the United States and Japan out of the area, has taken concrete steps to strengthen and expand its presence in the South China Sea. In July, Beijing declared the disputed Woody Island (Paracel Islands)

with an area of only 2.1 square kilometers owned by the PRC. In addition to China, the Paracel Islands are also subject to territorial claims by Vietnam and Taiwan.⁸ As a territorial unit, the city of Sanyin with a garrison of 1 thousand people became part of the southern Chinese province of Hainan, which is 350 km away from the island. ⁹ The Central Military Council in Beijing announced that a "divisional-level" military garrison is being created under the new municipality. He will be responsible for security in the waters of the three islands of the archipelago. At the end of June 2012, the Chinese Navy began patrolling the waters claimed by China.

The United States has unequivocally spoken out against the Chinese action, describing it as" subversive actions " in the region. Thus, the policy of "strategic persuasion" towards China pursued by the Americans in 2009 - 2011 proved to be untenable. One of its leaders, former US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, told CNN that "strategic persuasion" is based on a fundamental, though not expressed in words, deal. We and our allies must make it clear that we are ready to welcome the emergence of China ... as a prosperous and successful power. China, on the other hand, must convince the rest of the world that its development and increasing its role in the world will not be carried out at the expense of the security and well-being of others."¹⁰ "Strategic persuasion", CNN emphasizes, has been replaced by what is now called either linking to Asia or rebalancing. In other words, the United States will use all the tools at its disposal to preserve security, peace, and prosperity in Asia.11

The role and importance of America in the Asia-Pacific region is also raised by the attempts of a number of East Asian countries to ensure that it serves as a counterweight to the growing power of China. Political analysts in the ASEAN countries note that while Beijing verbally welcomes the US presence in Asia, in reality it does not respond to Washington's calls for resolving territorial conflicts through international mechanisms and consistently criticizes the conduct of joint exercises between the Americans and their regional allies.

Shifting the center of gravity of the Obama administration's foreign policy to the Asia-Pacific region and its emphasis on containing China has only increased tensions in the region and made the region more prone to conflict. Building up the military presence in Eastern Ukraine

By doubling down on previous American governments and providing political support to the Philippines and Vietnam in defiance of China, the United States is increasing the risk of being drawn into a standoff over territories and waters in the South China Sea. The American magazine "Foreign Affairs" in this regard calls on the US leadership "in no case to take the side of one of the claimants to the islands in the South China Sea" and emphasizes "the need to establish a multilateral structure in the Asia-Pacific region that can prevent possible actions by China to destabilize the status quo in East Asia.""¹².

China, for its part, reacting to the above-mentioned US statement, for the first time publicly sharply laid siege to Washington. On August 6, 2012, the People's Daily, an organ of the CPC Central Committee, told the Americans to "shut up" and reproached them for "trying to add fuel to the conflict."¹³ China's Xinhua news agency followed up by accusing the United States of trying to sow discord and confusion between the PRC and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, so that the United States could so that you can then resolve all disputes as the highest judge with the maximum benefit for yourself.

However, China is irritated not only by the statements and actions of its geopolitical rivals, the United States and Japan, who claim the island territories from among the ASEAN states, but also by the actions of other states in the South China Sea in general. So, in June 2008, the Chinese expressed dissatisfaction with the conduct of a Russian research vessel seismic survey near the coast of Vietnam. The Chinese side has expressed its negative attitude to Russian intentions to conduct exploration work in the South China Sea at the request of Vietnam. Beijing is not satisfied with the research, economic and any other activities of non-regional powers in the South China Sea region.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov noted in this regard that Russian-Vietnamese cooperation in the field of exploration and production of resources on the continental shelf of Vietnam has been active and transparent since 1981 (when the Russian oil company Zarubezhneft and the Vietnamese state oil and gas company Petrovietnam created a joint venture Vietsovpetro). and exclusively outside the disputed areas. He also drew attention to the fact that in the area of the South China Sea, the activity of-

There are other countries that show considerable interest in energy extraction ¹⁴.

In April 2012, Russia's Gazprom and Vietnam's Petrovietnam signed a gas development agreement, which provides for joint development of two oil and gas fields in the South China Sea. And although both are not located in the disputed waters of China and Vietnam, Beijing still gave Russia a mild warning.

First, according to the Chinese version, these sections - the Huanqiu Shibao newspaper calls them license blocks 05.2 and 05.3 - "are located inside the Chinese 'nine-point line'. If we analyze the cooperation between Russia and Vietnam in the field of oil and gas production in recent years, we can find that the exploration and production activities that Russia conducts in the South China Sea partially go inside the "nine-point line"¹⁵. Secondly, the Chinese Foreign Ministry made it clear that enterprises of non-regional powers should not support specific states in resolving disputed issues through bilateral negotiations and thereby get involved in the conflict in the South China Sea. In this regard, the People's Daily quotes a political worker from Hainan Province, Li Peng, who outlined, although personal, but really close to the official approach to non-regions: "It is well known that due to the arrival of large states... The issue of the South China Sea is becoming increasingly complex and complex. It is impractical to resist Russia's return to Southeast Asia, but it is also impossible to let this process take its course, it is necessary to follow the diplomatic principles of pragmatism and maximum benefit, and make efforts to limit Russia's participation in Southeast Asian affairs. " ¹⁶

Thus, the current situation on the territorial issue retains the potential for possible deterioration of the situation around the islands in the South China Sea by escalating it into a full-fledged armed conflict. The situation in East Asia shows that the multilateral diplomacy of the ASEAN Regional Security Forum has not yet worked properly. The situation with the code of conduct in the South China Sea reflects the existence of restrictions in the development of confidence-building measures and reaching agreement between the parties to the dispute.

The US-China geopolitical contradictions that have come to the surface in the Asia-Pacific region, which were not previously marked by such intense rivalry and the scale of the arms race,

they are bringing regional leaders to a dangerous point. China's desire to establish control over a strategically important and economically viable part of the East Asian periphery and the United States ' desire to form a belt of friendly Asian states with an anti-Chinese orientation collide here.

One gets the impression that the current surge in conflict is nothing more than a test of strength, clarifying each other's strategic intentions and capabilities by defrosting the territorial dispute in the South China Sea. Increasingly frequent attempts to use military actions by its participants (strengthening garrisons, introducing patrols of water areas and conducting naval exercises, including with the participation of the United States) form a favorable environment for military-political confrontation, turning the region into a "powder keg". In addition, uncontrolled military and political rivalry between the leading states can cause great damage to economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, slow down or even temporarily suspend the development of economic integration here, and lead to a decrease in economic growth in the countries of the region.

To remedy the situation, it is not so much the institutionalized structures of multilateral political interaction that are problematic in the current conditions that are important, but rather the built-up system of consultations and the development of common approaches to solving key regional problems. Their alignment with national interests would ensure the support of most East Asian States.

It seems that a multilateral agreement on joint economic development of the disputed waters and territories could defuse the situation in certain areas of the South China Sea and reduce the risk of a regional conflict. To conclude such an agreement, it is necessary to develop a single formula for resolving counterclaims and then resolving conflicts and manifestations of hostility that may arise as a result of joint economic activities.

The States claiming territories and waters in the South China Sea and the great Powers should strengthen their joint search for solutions acceptable to the countries of the region, based on past territorial conflicts. The main thing at the moment is to show a responsible approach and the will to compromise. After all, reliance on force, and this should never be forgotten , is the antithesis of dialogue.-

This is being done now to reduce tensions and reach agreements between the parties to the dispute in the South China Sea, even if only intermediate ones. The first step in this direction could be political consultations of interested parties at the expert level on the most significant aspects of the situation in the South China Sea.

Keywords: South China Sea (SCM), Spratly Archipelago, Paracel Islands, Hainan Province, SCM code of conduct.

¹ Reuters. 07.12.2012.

² The New York Times. 24.12.2012.

³ The sea near the Spratly Islands is rich in fish. This makes it possible to extract 500 thousand tons of various seafood annually. And on the shelf discovered huge reserves of oil - 35 billion tons and natural gas-8300 billion cubic meters (Arguments of the week, 2012. N31. August 16).

⁴ Website of the Far Eastern Research, Design and Survey and Design and Technological Institute of the Navy. 07.01.2013 // http: // www.dniimf.ru

^{Callick Rowan.} 5 Powder Keg in the Pacific // Foreign Policy. 22.08.2012.

⁶ Reuters. 25.05.2012. ⁷ Project Syndicate. 10.08.2012.

⁸ Asia-Pacific region: Regional issues, international organizations and economic groupings. Handbook, Moscow: Vostok-Zapad Publ., 2010, p. 81.

⁹ Nezavisimaya gazeta. 08.08.2012.

¹⁰ CNN. 07.09.2012.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Foreign Affairs. 2012. July/August.

¹³ Nezavisimaya gazeta. 08.08.2012.

¹⁴ Asia-Pacific region: Regional problems ... p. 95.

¹⁵ Huanyu shibao. 08.08. 2012.

¹⁶ People's Daily. 21.08.2012.

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