Relations between the USSR and the most powerful and largest country in Indochina - Vietnam during the Indochina War of 1965 - 1975 and later were generally allied and partner. These relations have always been not only interstate, but also inter-party in nature, which immediately predetermined a completely different level of relations and trust. The role and significance of Vietnam for the global goals of Soviet policy in Asia and in Southeast Asia were extremely great. Hanoi acted both as the center and nodal point of relations between the USSR and the countries of Indochina, and as a pillar of Soviet influence and presence in Southeast Asia, and as the main ally in the military-political confrontation between the United States and the ideological confrontation with China, and as a "bastion" demonstrating the effectiveness of the Soviet model of socialism in Asia. These factors determined the general nature of relations between Moscow and Hanoi from the second half of the 60s of the XX century, including the military-political, economic, cultural and ideological spheres.

The closest ties between the Vietnamese communists and their Soviet comrades can be traced back to the beginning of the 20s of the XX century, from the time of the Comintern, although diplomatic relations between the USSR and the DRV were established in January 1950. In the 1950s, Soviet-Vietnamese contacts developed quite quickly, especially in the economic and military spheres, however, despite the successful visit Vietnam's relations with the Soviet Union were significantly inferior to those of Vietnam and China, including the agreement to provide the USSR with significant gratuitous assistance to the DRW in economic recovery (Isaev and Pivovarov, 1983, p.16).

The reasons for this were that in the context of the resumption in the early 1960s of the armed struggle of the Vietnamese communists for the liberation of the South from the power of the pro-American regime of Ngo Dinh Diem, for the restoration of the unity of the country, which was broken as a result of the failure of the American administration and their South Vietnamese proteges to comply with the Geneva Agreements of 1954, Beijing's radical anti-imperialist appeals seemed more preferable than arguments of the Soviet leader N. S. Khrushchev about the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. The Vietnamese leaders also took into account the fact that Chinese economic and military assistance was then significantly greater than the Soviet one.

In this regard, the relations between Vietnam and the Soviet Union in the late 1950s and early 1960s were complex, and sometimes simply conflicting. The Soviet leadership did not yet see Vietnam as a strategic ally, either in the context of deteriorating relations with China or in the context of rivalry with the United States.

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A new stage in the development of relations between Moscow and Hanoi occurred in the mid-60s of the XX century, when after changes in the Soviet leadership - the removal of N. S. Khrushchev - the USSR's attitude towards Vietnam and the expanding American aggression changed significantly. At this time, in fact, the view of the DRV as the main Soviet strategic ally in East and Southeast Asia is being formed. The Soviet leadership began to see Vietnam, which had quite successfully resisted the American expeditionary army, as a promising front in the struggle against American imperialism, where it was possible to show the whole world its power and the importance of Soviet military and economic assistance, which could overturn the plans of the world's most powerful power. The active intervention of the USSR on the side of the North Vietnamese Communists gave Moscow an immediate propaganda effect, especially among the world communist movement, in which the struggle for organizational and ideological leadership between the USSR and the PRC became increasingly acute.

Thus, by the mid-1960s, the DRV had become almost the center of Soviet foreign policy efforts in Asia. At the XXIII Congress of the CPSU, it was stated that:" By escalating the shameful war against the Vietnamese people, the aggressors will meet with ever-increasing support for Vietnam from the Soviet Union and its other socialist friends and brothers "[Materials of the XXIII Congress of the CPSU, 1965, p. 25]. Moreover, the special statement of the Congress on the US aggression in Vietnam stated that "on behalf of the entire party, all Soviet people, the XXIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union resolutely demands an end to the US aggression against Vietnam and the withdrawal of all interventionist troops from this country... The XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union solemnly declares its fraternal solidarity with the heroic Vietnamese people " [Isaev and Pivovarov, 1983, p. 23].

Within the framework of the deepening and development of relations between the USSR and the DRV, issues of the Soviet-American confrontation, its rivalry with China, and issues of increasing the prestige of the USSR as a country fully devoted to the ideals of the anti-imperialist struggle began to be resolved. The results of the visit of the Soviet Prime Minister A. N. Kosygin to Hanoi in 1965, after which Soviet aid to the DRV began to increase rapidly, became evidence of the new place that Vietnam began to occupy in Soviet plans. If in 1967 the share of the USSR in all aid coming to Vietnam did not exceed 37%, then a year later it was equal to 50% [Gaiduk, 1996, p.58].

The Vietnamese leadership only welcomed the increase in Soviet support, because it weakened its military-political and economic dependence on the PRC, whose leadership exerted pressure on the DRV on domestic and foreign policy issues. In addition, in the context of the expanding war, increasingly fierce battles in the South and the American bombing of the North, Vietnam needed precisely Soviet weapons, which were much more effective than Chinese ones. The military-technical assistance of the USSR made it possible to significantly strengthen the Vietnamese People's Army, create new branches of the armed forces equipped with modern equipment. Of particular importance was the creation of anti-aircraft missile forces and aviation, which played a crucial role in repelling air raids on the DRV. Finally, Soviet economic assistance, especially the supply of fuel, spare parts for military and civilian equipment, and industrial equipment, increasingly emerged as the most important factor in the successful continuation of the armed struggle. All these considerations pushed the Vietnamese leadership to move closer to the USSR.

Thus, the interests of the Soviet Union-the transformation of Vietnam into its military - political and ideological outpost in Asia - and the interests of Vietnam - the transformation of the USSR into its main ally in the region-coincided, which ensured a rapid rapprochement between the two countries in all areas.

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The development of relations between Vietnam and the Soviet Union was also due to the fact that the beginning of the "cultural revolution" in China and attempts to spread it to neighboring countries were perceived with some disapproval in Vietnam and could not but lead to a noticeable cooling of relations between them, especially since the Vietnamese leaders had long cooperated with the repressed Chinese leaders - Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao.

The period when the Vietnamese leadership tried to balance between Moscow and Beijing lasted from about the end of the 1960s to 1973. In the context of the US-Chinese rapprochement in Hanoi, the final choice was made in favor of the USSR. The reason for this was also that after the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements, the Chinese leadership, not wanting to strengthen Vietnam, did everything possible to prevent the liberation of the South and the unification of the country, and the Soviet government was ready to support these plans with all its might. Tensions between Hanoi and Beijing have grown rapidly, and the rapprochement between Hanoi and Moscow has become more pronounced.

This was an important foreign policy success for Moscow, as Vietnam became a symbol of the effectiveness of the struggle for independence and national unity, which was supported by the USSR. His example, Moscow believed, would encourage other third-world regimes to rely more closely on Soviet support. According to L. I. Brezhnev, the victories of the Vietnamese people showed "how narrow the possibilities of imperialism have become in our days... and that there are now no means by which he can turn back history!" [Pravda, 31.01.1973].

No less significant was the fact that in the face of an increasingly acute and harsh ideological war with China, on the one hand, and the determination of the USSR to resist American expansion around the world, on the other, its interest in a strategic alliance with Vietnam increased more and more. Hanoi naturally became the closest military and political ally in Asia. This fully met the strategic goals of Soviet policy both in Asia as a whole, and especially in East and Southeast Asia.

A new stage of rapprochement between Hanoi and Moscow began in 1973. During a visit to Beijing, the Chinese authorities gave a vague answer regarding possible assistance to the North Vietnamese Communists in continuing the struggle for the liberation of the South. The Chinese said that the Vietnamese delegation had signed the Paris Peace Accords and should adhere to their terms, and that China was opposed to continuing the armed struggle to overthrow the South Vietnamese regime. In November 1972, through the Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade of the DRV, the Chinese leaders declared that Vietnam should make concessions on the issue of withdrawing its troops from the territory of South Vietnam and on the issue of North Vietnam's refusal of external military assistance [Murasheva, 1989, p.71].

This position turned out to be absolutely unacceptable for the Vietnamese leadership, which, after the evacuation of American troops from the territory of South Vietnam, sought to unite the entire country under its control as quickly as possible. In the new conditions, the Vietnamese leaders no longer had the opportunity to continue the policy of balancing between the PRC and the USSR. To unify the country - the main and long-standing goal of the North Vietnamese leadership-it was necessary to take a decisive step: to break this balance and choose one of the opposing sides. The choice in favor of the USSR opened the way for the unification of the country, so the Vietnamese leaders, after some hesitation, agreed to Soviet proposals for strategic partnership. Such a partnership provided, in addition to increasing Soviet supplies of modern weapons and ammunition to Vietnam, expanding the scale of economic integration with the United States.-

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close cooperation in the sphere of ideology, foreign policy, and military-political issues.

The most important step in the decisive transition of Vietnam to the camp of the USSR was the visit to Moscow of the delegation of the Workers ' Party of Vietnam (PTV) and the Government of the DRV, headed by First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PTV Le Duan and member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the PTV, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, which took place on July 9-16, 1973. Even before this visit, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev said that " to seek the elimination of the hotbed of war in Indochina is one of the central tasks of the Soviet Union's foreign policy. That is why we are actively assisting our Vietnamese friends in their efforts to achieve a just peace settlement. In short, our international solidarity with the people of Vietnam is being translated into concrete actions along all lines. And we will spare no effort to preserve and strengthen the Soviet-Vietnamese friendship "[Brezhnev, 1972, p. 31]. These words of the Soviet leader were a signal to the Vietnamese leadership: The USSR is ready to continue to resolutely support Vietnam. During the negotiations in Moscow, this position of the Soviet Union was already quite concrete: all the plans of the Vietnamese leadership to continue the armed struggle for the unification of the country received full support and approval from the USSR. The Soviet Union promised further increases in military and economic aid, new loans, and new groups of military and civilian advisers. Moreover, it was officially announced that the Soviet leadership had decided to consider the loans provided by the Soviet Union in previous years for economic development as gratuitous assistance [However, 17.07.1983].

It should be noted that for the most part, Soviet injections into Vietnam were economically ineffective and quite costly for the USSR, but their obvious inefficiency was more than covered by political successes, the growth of the political and military presence and influence of the USSR in strategically important regions of East and Southeast Asia. This became especially evident after the military and political support of the USSR finally defeated the South Vietnamese regime during the offensive of the North Vietnamese troops in the spring of 1975. The capture of Saigon by the North Vietnamese meant that now the whole of Vietnam was under the rule of the Communists, who won a historic victory, relying on the support of their ally. The importance of Soviet aid was highly appreciated by Vietnamese leaders. Thus, in his speech at the XXV Congress of the CPSU on February 25, 1976, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PTV Le Duan stated that " the Vietnamese people deeply understand that both before and now every step forward, every victory of the Vietnamese revolution is inextricably linked with the most important historical events taking place in the Soviet Union. Special mention should be made of the complete victory in the war of Resistance against US aggression, for the salvation of the motherland, which is inseparable from the powerful support, comprehensive, huge, valuable and effective assistance of the Soviet Union." On behalf of the party, the Government and the people of Vietnam, Le Zuan expressed his sincere and deep gratitude to the CPSU, the Government of the USSR and the Soviet people for considering the cause of supporting and helping the Vietnamese people as a matter of their heart and conscience [Pravda, 26.02.1976].

There, at the XXV Congress of the CPSU, in the report of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, L. I. Brezhnev, Vietnam and its victories were for the first time placed at the top of the list of achievements in the communist world during the time between the two congresses of the CPSU. The Soviet leader said that over the past five years, the countries of socialism have managed to solve major problems: "First of all, we must mention the victory won by the Vietnamese people. The biggest attempt of imperialism to crack down on the socialist state with an armed hand since the Second World War has failed.

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crush the national liberation revolution. The heroism and dedication of the Vietnamese people, combined with the strong support of their countries for socialism and the progressive public around the world, proved to be stronger than the armies of the interventionists and their accomplices. The cause of freedom and independence has won." "The Soviet people," he continued, " are proud to have given Vietnam considerable help in its struggle against the imperialist invaders. The people of Vietnam, who have won independence and national unity at a high price, are now facing the difficult task of rebuilding the country and building a socialist future. Vietnam's victory opened up new horizons for the whole of Southeast Asia. This is a glorious victory. It will forever go down in the history of the peoples 'struggle for freedom and socialism" [Materials of the XXV Congress of the CPSU, 1976, p.6].

In the words of the Soviet leader, many observers highlighted the opening of new horizons for the whole of Southeast Asia. This meant that the USSR was determined not only to continue supporting Vietnam, but also to expand its presence throughout the region. The Soviet leaders ' understanding of the strategic goals of the Soviet Union's policy in Southeast Asia was confirmed by an even greater increase in Soviet aid after the official unification of Vietnam into a single state in 1976.

The main directions of cooperation between the USSR and the DRV in the post-war period were determined during the visit to the Soviet Union of the PTV delegation and the DRV government at the highest level in October 1975. As a result of this visit, a joint declaration was signed, which "defined the main directions for deepening comprehensive ties between the two parties and peoples, their close cooperation in the construction of socialism and communism" [Cit. by: Isaev and Pivovarov, 1983, p. 29]. At the same time, an official document following the talks indicated that, taking into account the urgent needs of Vietnam related to the task of full restoration and further development of the national economy, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Government of the USSR decided to grant the Vietnamese side a loan on preferential terms in order to implement the socialist industrialization of the country, plan for 1976-1980 [Isaev and Pivovarov, 1983, p. 29]. During the negotiations in Moscow, an Agreement on providing economic assistance to the DRW was also signed, and for the first time a special protocol on the results of coordination of the national economic plans of the DRW and the USSR for 1976-1980 was agreed upon. [Isaev and Pivovarov, 1983, p. 29].

Thus, after the military victory and unification of the country, the Vietnamese leadership secured commitments from the Soviet Union to provide ever-increasing assistance both in nation-building and in rearmament of the army. The USSR's willingness to accept numerous political and economic obligations was explained by the fact that even after the victory of the Vietnamese Communists, the global plans of the Soviet leadership did not change much. Interests of a purely propagandistic nature-support for a just anti-imperialist struggle-have, of course, receded into the background, and issues of strengthening military-strategic and ideological partnership and alliance have come to the fore. Within the framework of these goals, the Soviet leadership set the task of turning Vietnam into a powerful ally in Asia, a stronghold of socialism, where the Soviet model would be successfully implemented. Moscow also took into account the fact that a strong Vietnam would be able to create a threat in the event of a Soviet-Chinese conflict on the southern borders of the PRC.

It should also be said that the armed struggle of the pro-Chinese regime in Cambodia, led by Polon, against the pro-Soviet regime in Hanoi, which began in 1977, had a certain impact on Moscow's determination to develop and further expand multilateral relations with the latter. In the USSR, they rightly believed,

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that the front of the struggle between Moscow and Beijing with Chinese ideological and geopolitical influence in the communist world also runs along the Vietnam-Cambodia border. In this regard, the possibility of defeating the Chinese proteges with the help of Vietnamese troops was undoubtedly very attractive to the Soviet leaders.

All these factors gave an additional impetus to further rapprochement between the two countries. A new stage in the development of Soviet-Vietnamese relations was formalized in the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and Vietnam signed in November 1978. This document in terms of strategic alliance went much further than the Declaration of 1975. The treaty laid the foundation for a new stage of Soviet-Vietnamese relations.

As noted in the official communique, " as a result of the steady expansion and deepening of fraternal ties between the two states, the treaty puts them on a firm international legal basis and defines the main directions for the further development of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation in all spheres, including in international affairs." The document stated that " the parties will continue to make every effort to protect international peace and security of peoples, actively oppose all the machinations of imperialism and the forces of reaction, support the just struggle for the final eradication of colonialism and racism in all forms and manifestations, support the struggle of non-aligned countries, the struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America." America is against colonialism and neocolonialism, for strengthening independence, for defending sovereignty, for the right to freely dispose of its natural resources, and for establishing new international economic relations free from inequality, dictate, and exploitation." It was stated that the Soviet Union and Vietnam "will support the desire of the peoples of Southeast Asia for peace, independence and cooperation between them. They will steadily advocate the development of relations between countries with different social systems based on the principle of peaceful coexistence, for expanding and deepening the process of detente in international relations, for the final exclusion of aggression and wars of conquest from the life of peoples in the name of peace, national independence, democracy and socialism" [USSR-Vietnam..., 1982, p. 495 - 496].

The signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation meant in fact the final formalization of the Soviet-Vietnamese strategic alliance. After all, in addition to all the agreements in the economic and political spheres, it was of great importance for the USSR that, in accordance with it, the Vietnamese government granted the Soviet Pacific Fleet the right to use the sea bay of Cam Ranh (the former American naval base) as a temporary point of its material and technical support - for refueling, repairs, and replenishment of food supplies [Interstate regional organizations..., 1991, p. 158]. In return, the Soviet Union agreed to provide diplomatic and military-political support to Vietnam in the planned invasion of Cambodia to overthrow the Khmer Rouge regime, which launched a real war on Vietnam's borders. When this brutal pro-Chinese regime was overthrown in January 1979 as a result of the offensive of the Vietnamese armies, it was the articles of the 1978 Treaty that provided for mutual assistance in the event of aggression against one of the parties that became almost the main obstacle for Chinese troops conducting an operation to "punish" Vietnam for its invasion of Cambodia. During this operation, Chinese leaders always feared that the expansion of aggression or the penetration of Chinese troops deep into Vietnamese territory could provoke the entry of the USSR into the conflict.

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After the liberation of Cambodia from the power of Pol Pot and his repressive regime and the formation of a pro-Vietnamese government there, the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance became even stronger. Vietnam became convinced that with Soviet support, it could achieve outstanding success in the military and political sphere (unification of the country, victory in Cambodia, and repelling Chinese attacks in the North). The continuation of the strategic partnership allowed Hanoi not to be afraid of new serious military actions on the part of China and to strengthen its dominant position in two other Indochina countries-Laos and Cambodia.

In the early 1980s, the Soviet-Vietnamese political alliance was at its highest stage of development. The scale of Soviet support continued to increase. Thus, only in the period 1978-1983, various and costly agreements were signed for the USSR on a long-term program for the development of economic, scientific and technical cooperation between the USSR and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (October 31, 1983); on economic, scientific and technical cooperation of July 24, 1981; on providing assistance to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in ensuring railway traffic Hanoi-Ho Chi Minh City Railway, on providing technical assistance to Vietnam in completing the construction of the Thanglong Bridge across the Red River; on the reconstruction of the Hanoi railway junction and widening the gauge of the Hanoi-Haiphong Railway; on cooperation in geological exploration and oil and gas production on the continental shelf of the South of Vietnam (July 3, 1980); on the establishment of a joint Soviet- the Vietnamese enterprise for geological exploration and production of oil and gas on the continental shelf of Southern Vietnam (June 19, 1981); on trade turnover and payments for the period 1981-1985 (July 30, 1981) [see: Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 1985, p. 243 - 244]. If we add to this the less expensive, but rather tangible economic agreements with Laos and Cambodia, it turns out that the USSR paid very significant sums for its military and military-political presence in Southeast Asia, which became increasingly sensitive as the USSR was drawn into the war in Afghanistan, especially due to the general slowdown in growth rates the Soviet economy. Nevertheless, until the beginning of "perestroika" in the Soviet Union, relations between the two states and the two communist parties seemed unshakable.

Indeed, until the mid-1980s, we can talk about the era of increasing the Soviet military presence in Southeast Asia, when a powerful naval grouping was created at the Cam Ranh base, which included about 25 warships of various classes, 24 bombers, a squadron of MIG-23 fighters, and much more. In the Cambodian port of Ream, there were torpedo boats that could easily paralyze all coastal trade in Thai and Malaysian waters [Vostok i Sovremennost, 1991, p. 41]. The Soviet naval and air forces in this region, although inferior to the American ones, still could not be ignored in the global confrontation.

At the same time, Vietnamese troops were stationed in Cambodia and Laos, where pro-Vietnamese political regimes were in power. Vietnam, backed by Soviet aid, controlled all of Eastern Indochina, a long-standing goal of the Vietnamese Communists. All attempts to create an "anti-Vietnam front" in the international arena and to exert any serious military, political and economic pressure on Vietnam from the United States, China and the ASEAN countries were ineffective in the face of expanding Soviet military, economic and diplomatic support.

Thus, the strategic alliance was based on quite clear and significant political interests of the two countries, and this was perfectly understood by their leaders. Thus, in the final document following the visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Nguyen Koh That to the USSR in October 1984, it was noted that during the negotiations "the importance of further close cooperation between the USSR and the Socialist Republic in the international arena was emphasized, which makes a significant contribution to the common struggle of the countries of the socialist commonwealth, socialism" [Pravda, 30.10. 1984].

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Earlier, at the Fifth Congress of the CPSU in 1983, the head of the CPSU delegation, Mikhail Gorbachev, said: "The solidarity of the three countries of the Indochina Peninsula is an influential factor of peace and stability in Southeast Asia. The progressive public of the world is on the side of your just cause, dear comrades, and the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist states are with you" [V Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, 1983, p. 275]

The unity of the approaches of the CPSU and the Vietnamese Communists, the USSR and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (the Socialist Republic of Vietnam - as the country became known after the unification of the North and South in 1976) to the problems of the current situation in the world was also confirmed in the Joint Soviet-Vietnamese Declaration signed in Moscow on June 28, 1985. This was probably the last foreign policy document that affirmed the idea of preserving and developing a strong military-strategic alliance. The Soviet Union and Vietnam, it was noted in this document, called for further close coordination of the two countries ' efforts in the interests of peace and socialism. They gave a unified assessment of the current complex international situation and pointed out that there is no more important and urgent task now than to prevent the world from sliding into a nuclear catastrophe, to preserve peace on Earth. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to turning Asia into a zone of peace and equal cooperation and called for intensifying the search for constructive and mutually acceptable solutions to the problems of ensuring peace and security on this continent.

In the Joint Soviet-Vietnamese Declaration, it was emphasized that the basis of the continuing tension in the region is the hostile policy of external forces towards Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea (Cambodia), and the incessant interference from outside in the affairs of the countries of this region. The Soviet Union, the declaration noted, "strongly supports the struggle of the Indochinese States aimed at thwarting the machinations of these forces, in defense of their sovereignty and territorial integrity." The Soviet side expressed "full support for the constructive course and practical steps taken by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of Korea to improve the situation in Southeast Asia and establish an atmosphere of good neighborliness, trust and cooperation in this area" [Pravda, 30.06.1985].

However, soon after the signing of this declaration, the military-political alliance of Vietnam and the USSR began to collapse. This was primarily due to the dramatic changes that began to occur in the Soviet Union with the beginning of "perestroika" and the proclamation of a new foreign policy course by the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Its focus on a complete revision of the previous strategies of the USSR, on the transition from global confrontation to global cooperation with all its opponents, dramatically changed the status, role and significance of Vietnam in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The Soviet leader's speeches on the Soviet Union's Asian policy in Vladivostok in 1986 and Krasnoyarsk in 1987 virtually left no chance of continuing the strategic partnership with Vietnam, because in the conditions of abandoning the global Soviet confrontation with the United States and confrontation with China, such an ally as Vietnam was no longer particularly necessary for Moscow. Moreover, the cost of this friendship turned out to be prohibitively high for a country that had entered a deep crisis. In this regard, relations between the USSR and the countries of Indochina began to gradually change.

The first such signal was the visit of the new Soviet Foreign Minister E. A. Shevardnadze to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, which took place in March 1987. This was the first visit in the history of the United States, the documents of which did not mention anything about resolute opposition to the expansionist course of China, or about continuing the joint anti-imperialist struggle against the United States. In the official communique following the visit, it was only stated that "during the negotiations with the leaders of the three Indochina countries, the Soviet side confirmed its support for constructive proposals and practical steps of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea for Lake Baikal."-

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improving the political climate in Southeast Asia and turning it into a zone of peace, good neighborliness and cooperation, which is the common contribution of the three Indochina countries to the creation of a comprehensive system of universal security" [cit. by: Isaev, 1989, p. 75]. Moreover, from Vietnam, the Soviet minister went on a visit to the ASEAN countries.

The Vietnamese leadership, apparently not fully understanding the profound changes that were taking place in the USSR, continued to adhere to the traditional political course of supporting any Soviet initiatives, considering them not as strategic advances, but as tactical tricks in continuing the confrontation between the United States and China. Thus, when the Soviet-American treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles was concluded in Washington in December 1987, the new head of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Nguyen Van Linh, pointed out that the signing of this document is a new victory for the consistent foreign policy of the USSR and all peace-loving forces of the planet. The Vietnamese leader noted that "the CPV, the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the people of Vietnam express their full support for the peace initiatives put forward by the Soviet Union aimed at ending the arms race and creating a comprehensive system of international security" [Isaev, 1989, p.83]. A special statement in support of the treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles was also adopted at a joint meeting of the Politburo, the secretariat of the Central Committee of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party and the Standing Committee of the Lao Council of Ministers. The Cambodian leadership also expressed support for the treaty.

However, all these demonstrations could not hide the fact that the end of the global confrontation between the USSR and the United States, as well as the detente in relations with China, which became apparent after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, could not but cause an atmosphere of increasing uncertainty and anxiety in Soviet-Vietnamese, Soviet-Lao and Soviet-Cambodian relations. As already noted, Vietnam was considered in the system of Soviet foreign policy priorities through the prism of confrontation with the United States and China. This approach, in fact, made Vietnam a strategic ally and the main Soviet partner in the vast region of East and Southeast Asia. Within the framework of this concept, the entire policy of the USSR in this region, especially its trade and economic component, developed.

Now everything has changed. As E. V. Kobelev, who worked for many years in the Central Committee of the CPSU and was directly involved in the development and implementation of the Soviet foreign policy in Indochina, notes in his research, " the huge amount of material assistance to Vietnam from the USSR, the extreme imbalance of economic cooperation, which was very unprofitable for our country, gradually began to be perceived by the pro-Western part of the Soviet political elite, especially with the beginning of perestroika, as an unnecessary "burden" that must be removed as soon as possible. The constant mention in the Russian mass media of such a serious irritant in relations between Moscow and Hanoi as the presence of a large Vietnamese community in Russia played a certain role in the formation of an increasingly negative public atmosphere in relation to Vietnam in the USSR. Its main part was made up of former workers who arrived in the USSR under an intergovernmental agreement and remained "ownerless" after its expiration." As a result, even during the period of perestroika, the Soviet political elite began to show signs of a peculiar allergy to cooperation with Vietnam, and the gradual curtailment of trade and economic ties with this country began. Since 1991, this process has acquired a landslide character [Kobelev, 1999, p. 85].

At the same time, it is impossible not to say that in Vietnam, as in other countries of Indochina, the illusions that the strategic alliance is inviolable were quickly dispelled. Since 1988, Vietnam has become more and more active in advocating the formation of its own foreign policy course, the main points of which are:

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These included the withdrawal of troops from Cambodia and Laos, normalization of relations with China and the United States, and rapprochement with the ASEAN countries. In 1989-1990, the Soviet leadership did not have to persuade the Vietnamese leaders to withdraw their troops and achieve conditions for a political settlement in Cambodia that were acceptable to all interested parties. Vietnamese diplomacy actively cooperated with the UN administration in Cambodia, which was sent to the country to hold free elections. The joint actions of the USSR and Vietnam on the Cambodian issue were perhaps the last example of strategic cooperation between the two countries. It is characteristic that, despite the movement in the general direction, each of the parties was already pursuing its own goals. By this time, the USSR, which had lost its allies in Europe and was gripped by a deep economic and socio-political crisis, began to rapidly reduce its presence in the vast expanses of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In this regard, and in the absence of any clear goals and interests in this region, the importance of the Soviet military base in Cam Ranh sharply fell, which, in the context of the cessation of global confrontation, began to lose all meaning for the USSR. Both the Navy and the air Force were gradually being withdrawn from Cam Ranh. Following this, most Soviet-Vietnamese economic projects are also frozen, and the supply of Soviet goods and materials on a gratuitous basis is stopped. In the USSR itself, the voices of those who consider it necessary to force Vietnam to pay its huge debt (about $ 10 billion) are growing louder.

The strategic partnership and strategic alliance of the two countries, however, as well as other Indochina countries, retreated to the periphery of the Soviet foreign policy, however, as well as to the periphery of the foreign policy of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, which also increasingly sought ways to develop regional cooperation with the ASEAN countries, and also set a course for normalization of relations with China and from the USA. No new ideas were put forward that could give a new impetus to the fading union. Therefore, the collapse of the USSR in December 1991 was only a formal reason to consider an entire era in Soviet-Vietnamese and Soviet-Indochina relations as a whole to have ended. The inertia of the collapse was so great that in a few years there was an almost complete curtailment of political and trade and economic relations between the successor of the USSR-Russia and Vietnam. It took many years to somehow revive Russian-Vietnamese relations and fill them with new content.

list of literature

Brezhnev L. I. On the fiftieth anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow, 1972. Vostok i sovremennost ' [East and Modernity], Moscow, 1991.

Kobelev E. V. Modern Vietnam: Reforms, Renewal, Modernization (1986-1997). Moscow, 1999. Isaev M. P., Pivovarov Ya. N. Foreign Policy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Moscow, 1983. Isaev M. P. Foreign policy of the Indochina countries. Moscow, 1989. Materials of the XXIII Congress of the CPSU. Moscow, 1965. Materials of the XXV Congress of the CPSU. Moscow, 1976.

Interstate Regional Organizations of Asia in International Relations, Moscow, 1991. Murasheva G. F. Global'nye i regional'nye interesy v indokitayskoi politike SSHA (1950 - 1975) [Global and regional interests in the Indochina policy of the United States (1950-1975)]. 1945-1989. Moscow, 1989. Pravda. M.

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Moscow, 1985. USSR-Vietnam. 30 years of relationships (1950-1980). Moscow, 1982. V Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Moscow, 1983. Gaiduk V. The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War. Chicago, 1996.

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