4. MARKET GROWTH FACTORS

Among the conjunctural factors, the commodity boom of the beginning of the new millennium is of particular importance for the prospects of economic growth in the periphery.

New level of commodity prices: impact on economic growth

As shown in Figure 8, at the beginning of the new millennium, global oil prices, both in nominal and real terms (in 2004 dollars), went up, dragging down the prices of most commodities. The growth of export revenues has had a positive effect on the economic dynamics of a large number of countries, especially in the NE, easing the situation with budget deficits, servicing external debt, and allowing them to increase current and capital expenditures. In addition, rising commodity prices have stimulated foreign direct investment in developing countries that have commercial reserves of minerals that are in demand on the global market.

Figure 8

Chart of world oil prices in 1861-2004, US$ per barrel

-----

A source: [BP Statistical Review..., 2005].

Ending. For the beginning, see: East (Oriens). 2006, No. 6, pp. 64-82.

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Figure 9

World price indices for oil, wheat, cotton, and gold (1990=100, using the World Bank's industrial product import unit value as a deflator)

At the same time, the positive impact of rising commodity prices on the economic dynamics of the periphery should not be overestimated. As the world experience shows, the price gains received by exporters of raw materials are quickly "eaten up" by the retaliatory increase in prices for the products of the manufacturing industry, of which they are importers. Figure 9 shows the world price indices for oil, wheat, cotton, and gold obtained by deflating the current prices of these commodities by the World Bank's Industrial Product Unit Import Value Index. Calculations clearly show that the global economy is quickly adjusting for oil price spikes. After the 1979/1980 price spike, when the oil price index reached 120, it took less than three years for the real price of oil to fall to less than 100. Up to and including 1999, oil prices remained below the 1990 level and only in 2001-2004 did they exceed this level. Cotton prices have remained consistently below the base year level since 1985.

Actually stable, but in the long run declining, commodity prices (in real terms) mean that the impetus for the development of commodity exporters due to the possible release of commodity prices to a new, higher price level will be minimal. But this is good news for some EPIS that are clean energy importers. Rough estimates show that the oil intensity per unit of GDP (PPP 2004) in China is at a low level compared to other exporters of industrial products. Only India and the Philippines are better off. Brazil's oil-intensive GDP is 1.31 times higher than China's. For Turkey, the corresponding indicator was 1.34, Mexico-1.94, Malaysia-2.19. This means that the negative shock of rising oil prices China will digest less painfully compared to its competitors.

It is possible that in 2004 - 2005 oil prices broke the margin of safety of the world economy, and the latter will experience the first recession of the beginning of globalization, which will spread through monetary and financial flows around the world. However, even in this case, we are in a better position compared to other developing countries

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Figure Share of various groups of countries in world oil consumption ( % ), 1990-2025

-----

Source: [International Energy..., 2003, 2004].

Figure 3. Share of various groups of countries in global oil production (%)

-----

Calculated from: [BP Statistical Review..., 2005].

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Table 3

Share of developed and developing countries in exports and value added of manufacturing products (%)

Export

Production

1980

2000

1980

2000

Developed economies

82.3

67.7

64.5

72.4

Emerging economies

10.6

29.5

16.6

24.5

Latin America

1.5

4.3

7.1

6.2

Argentina

0.2

0.2

0.9

0.8

Brazil

0.7

0.7

2.9

1.4

Mexico

0.2

3.0

1.9

1.8

South and East Asia

6.0 a

19.1

7.3

15.4

NIS

4.1

9.4

1.7

4.6

Hong Kong

0.2

0.5

0.3

0.2

South Korea

1.4

3.3

0.7

2.4

Singapore

0.9

2.5

0.1

0.4

Taiwan

1.6

3.0

0.6

1.6c

ASEAN-4

0.6

4.3

1.2

2.1

Indonesia

0.1

0.8

0.4

0.7

Malaysia

0.2

1.7

0.2

0.5

Philippines

0.1

0.7

0.3

0.3

Thailand

0.2

1.1

0.3

0.7

China

1.1b

4.7

3.3

6.2

India

0.4

0.6c

1.1

1.1c

Turkey

0.1

0.5c

0.4

0.5c

Transition economies

7.1

2.8

18.9

3.1

-----

Notes: a Without China; b 1984; c 1997

Compiled from: [Mayer, 2004, p. 11; UNCTAD. Trade and Development..., 2002, p. 81].

China will turn out, as private investors, seeking cost savings, will accelerate the movement of industrial capacity to countries with low labor costs.

5. MAIN CHALLENGES

Progressive globalization is an extremely asymmetric process. While it gives some countries good chances for development, it deprives others of opportunities for development. It is possible that there is a situation on the global periphery where "the winner gets everything".

A. The hierarchy of globalization

Development of international production cooperation based on intra-industry division of labor (production sharing)1 and the resulting shifts in the placement of MIRO-

1 In its original interpretation, when the production of any final products of consumer and production demand (destination) was based on the" intra-factory " division of labor and was considered as a separate industry.

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The growth of manufacturing and services, by expanding the economic horizons of developing countries, has helped to revive the hopes that many of them had lost to strengthen their positions in the world market and catch up to the standards of the world's economic vanguard. And at first it seemed that this hope was not without reason. Moreover, almost simultaneously with the liberalization of world economic relations, there was a tendency to ennoble the exports of developing countries on the basis of their saturation with industrial products and services, which contributed to an increase in their weight in international trade. In 1981-2003, the share of developing countries in world commodity exports (excluding oil) increased more than twofold (from 13.8 to 29.7%), including in the export of industrial products - 4.2 times (from 8.9 to 37.9%). At the same time, the share of industrial products in the exports of developing countries increased 3.5 times, coming close to the vanguard indicator, and the share of high-tech products increased almost 2.7 times [Control Indicators..., 2004; UNCTAD. Trade and Development..., 2002, p. 68, 81; Handbook of Trade..., 1989, Table Al; UNCTAD. Handbook of Statistics.... 2004, Table 3.2]. And the 1990s were marked by an increase in the share of these countries in trade in services, including high-tech ones. In 2003, their share in world service exports reached 21.9%, compared to 18.5% in 1990 [calculated from: UNCTAD. Handbook of Statistics..., 2004, Table 3.2].

The problem, however, is that the dramatic jump in the saturation of developing countries ' exports with manufacturing products, which, in fact, provided an increase in their share of global commodity exports, is in many respects illusory. And not only because almost all of this growth was provided by a rather limited group of countries. The increase in the industrial component of exports is only partly due to the modernization and rise of local industry. The main generator and source of this growth was the connection of developing countries to international production networks, specializing in the simplest labor-intensive assembly-type operations, which create only a small fraction of their total added value. So the increase in the share of developing countries in world industrial exports recorded by statistics is not least due to its unusually large import component (representing the object of assembly and other pre-sale operations). As a result, with the exception of a few countries, primarily the NIS four, that have highly developed industries, developing world exports "still rely mainly on the exploitation of natural resources and the use of unskilled labor, which are characterized by low dynamism in world markets and have limited opportunities to increase productivity" [UNCTAD. Trade and Development..., 2002, p. V].

A well-known picture of the "divergences" between the development of industrial production and exports in developed and developing economies is provided by the UNCTAD expert compilations (Table 3). 2 By highlighting the historical differences in the levels and quality of industrial development in the two groups of countries, these compilations also help to understand how much more complex the process of bringing belated industrializing countries to technical, technological and economic standards of the world avant-garde.

It follows from the table that, despite and despite the fall in the share of vanguard countries in world industrial exports, their weight in value added by the manufacturing industry, on the contrary, increased. This apparent paradox is the result of outsourcing, which is the main driving force of industrial cooperation within the framework of intra-industry MRI. With all its benefits, such cooperation is more likely to occur.

2 In order to eliminate the influence of extraneous factors, the calculation is performed in current prices and in dollars, which are commonly used in international trade statistics and international comparisons.

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it pushes developing economies to the periphery of the global reproduction process of this key industry for their modernization, rather than helping them approach the vanguard in terms of technical, technological and economic criteria. The share of developing countries in manufacturing value added also increased.3 But this growth was much more modest than the increase in their weight in global industrial exports. First of all, because the majority of it is formed by the cost of components and parts imported to these countries for assembly. Under such circumstances, it is only a stretch to talk about deepening industrialization, as well as improving exports. Moreover, the connection of developing countries to international production networks operating under the auspices of TNCs, contrary to the popular propaganda cliche, is not accompanied by the transfer of any significant technological innovations to them and, with the free play of market forces, rather hinders than contributes to their technological rise, which turns out to be dependent primarily on the same TNCs.

This trend was particularly pronounced in Mexico, where even a 15-fold increase in industrial exports could not compensate for the slump in manufacturing that was caused by the shock liberalization of the early 1980s.The vast majority of other Latin American countries, due to the relatively expensive labor force as an object of outsourcing, did not arouse any noticeable interest. Their industrial development actually continued within the framework of the traditional paradigm and also stalled under the pressure of external competition.

The situation is largely different in the newly industrialized countries of Asia, and partly in the ASEAN countries following in their wake, which relied on full integration into the international industrial division of labor (including, if necessary, connection to the production networks of TNCs), considering industrial exports as an important lever and an indispensable condition for industrialization. Moreover, some NIS did not always accept foreign capital rushing to them, especially unconditionally. Fortunately, at that time there were no legal restrictions on regulating their flow. And by the time of the landslide liberalization, which thoroughly crippled the long-obsolete import-substituting model of Latin American industrialization, NIS had almost become full participants in the international industrial division of labor. This allowed them to liberalize in accordance with their capabilities and needs, paving the way for the completion of industrialization and subsequent export expansion. Having joined the ranks of industrialized countries, they created their own influential TNCs, which, taking advantage of outsourcing, initiated and pushed the processes of regional and sub-regional integration. The ASEAN countries (with the exception of the Philippines) have been particularly successful in taking advantage of this opportunity, as their share of global manufacturing value added has also increased, although not as significantly as that of the NIS.

In the early 1980s, China followed suit, and then India, which went especially far in import substitution, but managed to rebuild itself and increase its share in world industrial exports, unlike Brazil. Lagging behind NIS, ASEAN countries and China in developing the production and export of industrial products, India has surpassed many of them in the production and export of high-tech services, which also develops on the basis of outsourcing based on cheap local products.

3 The simultaneous increase in the share of both groups of countries in global industrial production is a consequence of the profound crisis of the socialist economic system, which resulted in an unprecedented collapse of the economy and industry of post - socialist countries.

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the labor force, but above all its educated and highly qualified contingent.

In itself, participation in transnational production networks obviously does not contain anything harmful or reprehensible. This is just one of the forms of development of the manufacturing industry in the era of globalization, linking together the economies of different countries in terms of their level of development in accordance with their comparative advantages. Industrial cooperation between developed and developing countries, which is based on the intra-industry division of labor, like any other, is based on mutually beneficial principles, and the benefits of each of the cooperating parties are determined by its contribution to joint production. However, these deposits often vary significantly. On the one hand, these are capital, technologies, know-how and highly qualified labor, including global organizational and managerial activities, on the other - the simplest assembly and similar labor-intensive operations that do not require special knowledge and qualifications. In accordance with the contribution of each individual, the total value added is also divided.

As a result, the bulk of developing countries, regardless of the nationality of the firms involved in their cooperation, whether they are subsidiaries of TNCs or local enterprises associated with TNCs through contracting and subcontracting relationships, get new jobs, while expanding and diversifying their export resources at the expense of industrial products with guaranteed, in fact, a sales market with all the associated benefits and resulting restrictions.

Meanwhile, the vanguard countries, which host the headquarters of the bulk of TNCs, as well as the production of basic components and components sent for pre-sale assembly to developing countries, reduce production costs, thereby increasing the competitiveness of their industries and increase the opportunities for concentrating efforts on R & D and high-tech segments of economic activity. In many ways, the situation is similar in the service sector. In the absence of corrective mechanisms and compensatory opportunities, all of these factors, taken together, contribute to deepening rather than smoothing the initial inequality of cooperation partners. Moreover, the majority of developing countries do not have any other alternatives to specialization in addition to raw materials.

Thus, the rise to the forefront of the globalizing economy of intra-industry MRI, based on post-operative, node-based, and part-time specialization and cooperation, has complicated the already difficult situation of developing countries. By connecting to the international production networks of TNCs, they seem to gain additional opportunities for industrial growth due to the accelerated introduction to some high-tech and dynamic segments of it. However, the form of this connection, as well as the scope of specialization, is determined by the same TNCs. The role of developing countries themselves in this regard is practically limited to creating an attractive environment for TNCs. Middle-level countries that have lost their competitiveness in terms of labor costs and have not found it in other parameters are in a particularly difficult situation. Moreover, due to the" de-energization "of the state, it has become much more difficult for them to create more" advanced " production facilities, not to mention any integral industrial complexes.

The increasing concentration of scientific and technical resources on the upper floors of the global economic pyramid, while the regulatory role of the state is weakening, also erodes the foundations of the previously established system of cascade industrialization of developing countries, based on the gradual movement of manufacturing industry to the periphery, as the necessary conditions for this maturation mature.-

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4. In short, by expanding the opportunities for peripheral countries to use their traditional comparative advantages, globalization simultaneously hinders the formation of their modern counterparts based on scientific and technological achievements.

As a result, the possibility of implementing the traditional paradigm of economic progress, which ensures that lagging countries are drawn to the economic parameters of the vanguard, has narrowed. The general situation has also changed. If earlier the achievement of industrial maturity was an indispensable condition and key link of industrialization in the broad sense of the word, which marks the transition from manual (tool) to machine production, now this problem can hardly be solved without introducing modern services, and even more so with a neglected agriculture. There is a need for a comprehensive approach to modernization, which requires, among other things, a radical improvement of the system of economic regulation at all its levels.

Freedom to choose goals and tools for achieving them is particularly important in such circumstances. Multi-populated countries with unusually large market and general economic potential, which provide relative independence in making key, strategically important decisions, as well as attract increased attention of external investors and force both market participants and the authorities of the vanguard countries to take these decisions into account, are in the preferred position.5 Some of these advantages can be offset only by creating economically significant and effective integration associations that make it possible to compensate for the weaknesses inherent in small countries. It is probably impossible to completely exclude the possibility of a "breakthrough" of individual countries, if suddenly influential adherents of neoliberal orthodoxy want to help them turn into a showcase of prosperity with "unlimited" freedom of market forces. More likely, however, is an additional adjustment of the mechanisms of globalization, taking into account the interests of developing countries to a greater extent (than at present).

B. Making China the industrial workshop of the world

The most significant economic event in the developing world since the 1980s has been the rapid development of the Chinese economy. China's transformation into one of the world's largest economies, its industrial workshop, has a contradictory impact on the dynamics of the global periphery. On the one hand, China has become a major consumer of raw materials, which not only increases demand, but also pushes up prices in the global commodity market. Both effects have a stimulating effect on the economy of commodity exporters. On the other hand, the transformation of the PRC into the world's industrial workshop relies on low labor costs, which poses a serious challenge for other manufacturers of industrial products. Termination of the multi-fiber agreement, co, effective January 1, 2005-

4 This relocation was carried out in two ways. On the one hand, it is the efforts of the countries of belated industrialization to develop their industries, and, on the other hand, the "pushing out" of the vanguard countries of industries that have passed the peak of their life cycle and are losing their competitiveness due to rising labor costs and/or environmental legislation.

5 This largely explains, in particular, the steady ennobling of China's industrial exports, which began in the mid-1990s by replacing imported raw materials with local production at enterprises of foreign branches. Thus, if the export of finished products exceeded the import of raw materials required for its production by 1.2 times, then in 1998-2001-by 1.5 times, and at the end of 2004 - by 1.7 times. It is characteristic that the electronics industry has made the greatest contribution to this import substitution due to the development of the production of the element base, which creates a particularly significant part of the added value [see: UNCTAD. Trade and development..., 2005, p. 67].

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Since 1974, China has been regulating the trade in textiles and clothing, and in just six months, China has significantly pushed manufacturers from other countries into the European and American markets. But this may be just the beginning.

In global competition, China relies not only on a relatively cheap and productive labor force, whose reserves are practically unlimited, but also on a fairly significant contingent of qualified technical and engineering personnel, the effect of economies of scale, a relatively diversified manufacturing complex, as well as a significant influx of foreign direct investment, as an increasing number of the world's leading corporations The company, which now uses China as an assembly site, expects to gain a foothold in the huge local market over time. All this suggests that in the near future, China is likely to become a competitor to developing countries in the markets of more technically complex industrial products.

The following summarizes the findings of several studies examining the impact of China's rise on the economic prospects of other developing countries. In the most general form, the conclusions drawn by various researchers are that China's accession to the WTO system and, in general, its expanding presence in world trade has a contradictory impact on the dynamics of the periphery. While this effect will be stimulating for exporters of raw materials and discouraging for exporters of manufactured goods, the overall balance will probably be negative. Latin American countries, with their traditionally relatively high wage levels, will be particularly affected.

Conclusions of research on the impact of China's economic rise on peripheral countries

Impact on prices and markets

Impact on countries and regions

V. Cerra, S. A. Rivera, S. H. Saxena (2005)

Lower prices for certain types of industrial products

India, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, as well as Latin America, will lose their market shares, especially in the textile market. GDP and economic well-being in these countries, but especially in Latin America, will decline

I. Coxhead (2004)

Lower prices for low-tech industrial goods (clothing, textiles) and medium-tech industrial goods (automobiles)

Decline in aggregate GDP in Southeast Asian countries. GDP decline in Vietnam and Indonesia. Positive impact on commodity exporters

S. Lall, M. Albaladejo (2004)

High-tech products - low risk. Products of medium technological level (machinery and equipment, cars, simple electronics - growing risks. Low-tech products (textiles and clothing) - high risk

NIS and potential NIS All developing countries

Z. Wang (2003)

Lower prices for certain types of industrial products

Relative decline in incomes of those employed in the export manufacturing industry. GDP contraction in Latin American industrial exporters, especially Mexico

Rising demand for raw materials

GDP growth in some African countries

-----

Sources: [Cerra, Rivera, Saxena, 2005; Lall, Albaladejo, 2004, vol. 32, N 9, p. 1441-1466; Wang, 2003, p. 1-41].

It is necessary to take into account the fundamental fact that, unlike the developed core of the globalizing world economy, China does not represent a single country.

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an autonomous source of economic and even more so technological progress. Despite all the success of this country, its economic dynamics is quite strongly dependent on exports to the markets of developed countries, primarily the United States, and the technologies they create, and therefore on their economic policies and dynamics.

B. Poverty

Unlike the challenge posed by the unprecedented industrial expansion of the world's largest (by population) country, the problem of poverty has its roots in the economic history of each country. This is primarily the result of unacceptably low dynamics and / or narrow-focus development. But we should not discount the historical distribution of property and income, as well as the presence of a conscious beginning in the choice of development strategy. The World Bank estimated that 2.9 billion people were living below the poverty line in the year of the Millennium Declaration, which was later revised slightly to reflect the Millennium Development Goals. people, including those below the poverty threshold of 1.3 billion. human.

Apparently, having realized all the threats and dangers associated with this, the UN has largely revised its approaches to development. If in the era of confrontation between the two systems, it usually developed so-called development decades, in which the idea of forcing developing countries to meet the economic standards of developed countries was implicitly present, and in the midst of neoliberal euphoria, it prevailed

Table 4

People living below the poverty line in developing countries*

Region / Country

1990

2001

2015

millions of people.

%

millions of people.

%

millions of people.

%

East Asia

1116

69.9

864

47.4

230

11.3

China

825

72.6

594

46.7

134

9.7

Southeast Asia

292

63.2

271

49.2

95

14.7

South Asia

958

85.5

1064

77.2

912

54.2

Middle East and North Africa

51

21.4

70

23.2

46

11.9

Sub-Saharan Africa

382

75.0

516

76.6

612

69.2

Latin America

125

28.4

128

24.5

122

19.6

Total

2924

60.8

2913

52.9

2017

32.0

including those below the poverty threshold

East Asia

472

29.6

271

14.9

19

0.9

China

375

33.0

212

16.6

16

1.2

Southeast Asia

97

21.1

60

10.8

2

0.4

South Asia

462

41.3

431

31.3

216

12.8

Middle East and North Africa

6

2.3

7

2.4

4

0.9

Sub-Saharan Africa

227

44.6

313

46.4

340

38.4

Latin America

49

11.3

50

9.5

43

6.9

Total

1313

27.9

1132

21.1

624

10.2

* Excluding the post-socialist countries of Europe and Central Asia. According to generally accepted international criteria, the poverty line is below $ 2, and the poverty threshold is below $ 1. (PPP) per person per day [calculated and compiled by: The World Bank. Global Economic..., 2005, p. 21 - 22]. (The above estimates for the three Asian regions differ slightly from the Report presented at the 60th Anniversary Session of the General Assembly in September 2005 [U. N. Millennium Development..., 2005, p. 7], but do not in any way reflect the order of the values they represent.)

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Relying on market forces, the Millennium Declaration is based on a conceptually different, more pragmatic framework. While reaffirming the commitment of the international community to the principles and values enshrined in the UN Charter, it puts at the forefront the task of reducing extreme poverty and poverty and calls on all countries to engage in a global partnership for development, declaring it an indispensable condition for achieving this task.

The main component of this historic goal is to reduce the number of people below the poverty threshold by at least 2/5 and their share in the total population of the developing world by more than 2 times over the 25 years ending in 2015. Plans to reduce the number of people living below the poverty line are much more modest. And this is natural. For all or almost all those who left the poverty zone before 2005 are unlikely to get out of the category of poor, as happened in 1991-2001.

The huge inter-regional and cross-country differences behind them are obviously caused by a variety of reasons, the most important among which, along with the level of development, are the historically formed specifics of the socio-economic structure, the system of income distribution and the structure of employment. According to World Bank data, in 2003, the richest 10% of the population in Asia outnumbered the poorest 10% by 16 times, in the Middle East and North Africa by 22 times, and in Latin America and sub - Saharan Africa by 57 and 59 times. dimensions [see: World Economy and International Relations, 2005, N 7].

Progress in overcoming poverty, as well as the struggle for development in general, is extremely uneven not only in the cross-country context, but also within the borders of individual countries. China and India have been particularly successful in implementing the Millennium Development Goals for poverty reduction (in absolute terms). There is also a positive shift in other countries in East, South-East and South Asia. In Latin America, on the other hand, which was just beginning to emerge from the deepest crisis in its history, the total number of people living below the poverty threshold did not decrease in 1991-2001, but even slightly increased. According to experts, not very bright prospects are expected for this region in the years remaining until the end of the target twenty-fifth anniversary. But the situation is particularly dire in sub-Saharan Africa, where, in addition to the 86 million people who joined the ranks of the poorest in 1991-2001, at least 27 million more people are expected to be added in 14 years (which together accounts for almost half of the total number of poor people in 1990 d.) 6.

Along with plans to reduce the general area of poverty, traditionally measured by the size of the population cut off by a given standard of per capita income, the Declaration also outlines the contours of improvements in education, health and a number of other areas, the development of which is associated with the overall improvement of life and the increase in the "human capital" of peripheral countries. In particular, it was decided to ensure universal primary education and eliminate gender inequality at all levels, halve the number of people suffering from hunger and not having access to clean drinking water, reduce the mortality rate of children under the age of 5 by 2/3 and reduce the maternal mortality rate by 3/4, and stop the spread of HIV/HIV / AIDS, as well as the rise of malaria and other diseases that particularly affect the health and lives of the poor, reverse the depletion of flora and fauna in these countries and improve the living conditions of 100 million urban slum dwellers by 2020. To begin with, as the first steps towards eliminating naibo-

6 According to estimates presented at the 60th Anniversary Session of the United Nations General Assembly, between 1991 and 2001, the per capita income of those living on less than $ 1 per day in sub-Saharan Africa fell from $ 0.62 to $ 0.6, while in all other regions of the developing world combined, it increased on average for the same 2 cents - from 0.80 to 0.82 dollars. [Millennium Development..., 2005, p. 7].

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In addition to the most egregious manifestations of poverty, perhaps this is not so small. Moreover, the vast majority of developing countries need these improvements in one way or another. However, the implementation of the planned plans, despite some acceleration of their aggregate economic growth, is seriously doubtful due to its extreme unevenness and various delays.

The report presented at the 60th Anniversary Session of the UN General Assembly highlights that five of the ten regions identified are already close to achieving universal primary education. However, the same report shows that in three regions (including South-East and East Asia), the proportion of children attending primary school declined slightly in 2001/2002 compared to 1990/1991, while in the developing world as a whole it increased by only 3 percentage points (from 80% to 83%). The improvement of the food ration is also clearly delayed in comparison with the targets for 2015. While the goal was to reduce the number of people living half-starved (from 20% to 10%), their share decreased to only 17% in the first 11 years. At the same time, in Africa (including the North), in West and South Asia, the number of people suffering from hunger increased not only in absolute, but also in relative terms. A similar pattern has developed with a decrease in the proportion of children with low weight. Although there seem to be no obvious failures anywhere, in 2003, compared to 1990, the share of such children decreased by only 5 percentage points (from 33% to 28%) [Millennium Development..., p. 7-8, 10].

The main reason for all these failures, obviously, lies in the low dynamics and narrow social base of economic growth, but much is also due to the lack of international solidarity on this issue. Especially if we take into account the repeated assurances of the vanguard countries of their readiness to fully contribute to the achievement of the goals of the Millennium Declaration. Not without conceptual overlays. With the need for a clear division of responsibilities between the two groups of countries, developing countries are fully responsible for achieving the goals of the Declaration. This seems to be the way it should be, as long as we are talking about helping them develop. However, the responsibility of one side, with its asymmetric dependence on the other, which is a "trendsetter" and a donor, threatens the hopes for their fruitful cooperation in this matter, and ultimately the cause itself, increasing the dependence of progress towards the goals proclaimed in the Declaration on the political, economic, ideological and world economic situation.

Despite repeated assurances from developed countries that they are committed to the goals of the Declaration, a number of urgent tasks related to its implementation are being met very slowly. In particular, specific issues related to promoting the eradication of the most egregious forms of poverty have been delayed for a very long time. At least to the extent that it can be measured and monitored, and without which the basic goals of the Declaration cannot be expected to be achieved, which, among other things, would help to mobilize forces for a further attack on poverty. These challenges include removing barriers that restrict access of agricultural and industrial products from the periphery to developed countries ' markets, reducing the debt burden of excessively indebted countries to an acceptable level, and significantly increasing "official development assistance" (ODA), which is vital for many countries, especially the least developed countries, and which, as a result, is considered to be the main priority for developing countries. it is known that it is provided on preferential terms.

Each of these problems has its own story. But perhaps the first one is particularly revealing. The agreement of the countries of the South to transform the GATT into the WTO, in fact, was connected with the promise of the North to weaken, and then eliminate, barriers that make it difficult for their exported goods to enter the markets of developed countries. However, the fulfillment of this promise did not go well. According to authoritative experts, at the 4th session of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha (Qatar, 2001), it was possible to create a good quality of the World Trade Organization.-

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This is a great launching pad for a new round of trade negotiations, called the "development round". But the scandalous failure of the WTO ministerial conference in Cancun, Mexico, in September 2003, overturned these calculations. And it took two more years of intense consultations to find the ground for the implementation of the Doha agreements. In December 2005, at the 6th WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, an agreement was reached in principle on the refusal of the United States and Western Europe from financial support for their agriculture, which is expected to be implemented in 2013, and on their readiness to continue searching for ways to facilitate access to their markets for non-agricultural products of developing countries [WT / MIN (05)/DEC, 22.12.2005].

The debt problem, which involves almost 1/4 of developing countries, is also being solved with a creak. Donor countries promised to resolve the debt crisis in poor countries caused by unaffordable payments for servicing previously accumulated debts back in 1996. And despite the fact that most of the loans provided fall into the vicious circle of "protective lending" (an endless series of postponements of old loans), the process is still far from complete.

At a time when the" clearing "of the two (out of three) main channels of promised assistance to achieving the Millennium Development Goals was delayed and their" capacity " was less than expected, the resulting losses could probably be partially offset by a significant increase in ODA, which noticeably shrank in the 1990s. But the progress in this area has also been much more modest than what is needed to achieve the goals of the Declaration. Moreover, for many countries caught in the debt trap, commercial loans are fraught with a new debt crisis.

The share of funds allocated by vanguard countries to support the development of poor countries decreased by more than 1/3 in the 1990s (from 0.34% to 0.22% of their total gross national income (GNI), although according to the 1970 recommendation of the UN General Assembly, this share should be at least 0.7% of GNI. After the adoption of the Millennium Declaration, ODA began to grow and in 2003 reached 0.25% of the total gross income of donor countries, and in 2006, according to the Monterrey Consensus, it should grow to 0.30% of their GNI [The World Bank. Global Development..., 2005]. Even if these agreements are implemented and ODA increases in the same proportion to the GNI of donor countries over the next three years, the total amount will be only 0.45% of their gross income in 2015. Whether this is sufficient to achieve the goals of the Declaration is unknown. The necessary costs were not estimated even in the first approximation. However, such an amount of ODA can be achieved only if the leading countries of the North, which allocate less than other donors for this purpose, change their approach to such expenditures. The share of the United States is particularly modest (in 2003 - 0.15% of GNI, while it was promised to increase to 0.19% in 2006). In fairness, it should be noted that part of the aid is simply stolen by the elite of recipient countries. Therefore, the public of donor countries sometimes objects to its increase. Nevertheless, this fact can hardly serve as an excuse for the endless delays of some countries in increasing its volume. After all, Scandinavians usually exceed their obligations in this area. As a result, even if lagging countries are brought up to the average level in terms of their ODA allocations, there is hardly enough time for them to be disbursed on time. Moreover, these funds are usually used with a significant time lag after the decision to allocate them 7.

7 Regardless of the vicissitudes of ODA, it is useful to know that, according to data from 2001, vanguard States allocated funds to developing countries, even in the most generous (Danish) version, on a per capita basis in the donor country, amounted to $ 34, and in a number of countries, including the United States, there was a significant increase in the number of funds allocated to developing countries. within $ 5. [World Development Indicators. 2003, p. 336].

page 113

All this calls into question the possibility of achieving the Millennium Development Goals within the target time frame. The high probability of such an outcome is due to the almost inevitable lack of resources, the necessary increment of which rests, among other things, on the artificially narrowed space for development, the unbearable debt burden of many countries, as well as insufficient financial, technical and organizational support for their efforts by world economic leaders.

Progress towards achieving the goals of the Declaration can be made mainly and primarily by building on the positive developments in the already fast-growing Asian countries. This hypothesis is also supported by the retention in this target of an inertial scenario based on the correlation of changes in the economic and demographic situation with a reduction in overall poverty, which was actually implemented in the 1990s8.

But even if the Millennium Development Goal of reducing the general area of poverty were to be met, more than 600 million people would still be in this state in 2015. Moreover, the struggle to raise their living standards will inevitably become more complicated. If only because its center of gravity will move to smaller countries that are much less prepared for this and require more thorough work. Given the current dynamics of progress towards the goals of the Declaration, a similar fate seems to await the solution of other problems related to the livelihood of the poorest people in developing countries, which are mentioned in the goals of the Declaration. The solution to these problems can be achieved at best 5 to 10 years later than the target date.

6. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

Thus, the analysis of both long-term and short-term factors of economic growth allows us to assume with high probability that in the forecast period the development of the global periphery, taken as a whole, will occur in relatively favorable conditions. Demographic shifts that stimulate growth, rapid accumulation of physical capital while simultaneously raising the technological level of developing economies, and unquestionable progress in the accumulation of "human capital", coupled with the expansion and deepening of participation in MRI, will ensure high dynamics of aggregate economic growth at the level of 5.3 - 5.4% per year. As a result, developing countries will surpass the developed group in total output, accounting for more than half of global GDP in 2020. In this regard, the rating of the world's 20 largest economies will also change slightly. China will move from second to first place, India from fourth to third, Brazil from ninth to eighth, South Korea from fourteenth to eleventh, Indonesia from fifteenth to thirteenth, Taiwan from seventeenth to sixteenth, and Thailand from twenty-first to seventeenth, while pushing the United States, Japan, Italy, Spain, Canada, and Australia. Thanks to faster economic dynamics and a weakening demographic pressure, the developing world will also make some progress in closing the gap in development levels with the world's vanguard. Over the 15 years ending in 2020, the ratio of the average per capita GDP of developing countries to that of developed countries is expected to increase from 14.7% to 18.8% (calculated in 2004 prices and PPP).

Nevertheless, no matter how impressive all these developments are, one should not be deceived by illusions. First, the fascinatingly high dynamics of economic growth in the periphery reflects, first and foremost, the process of economic uplift

8 Initially, a twofold reduction in the number of people living by less than $ 1 per day was planned to be achieved in 2008.

page 114

China and, increasingly, India, whose share of the total GDP of the developing world will increase from 45% to 54% in the forecast period. By the way, with the exclusion of these giants from our sample, the ratio of the average per capita GDP of the remaining 98 countries to the same indicator of the vanguard countries will change in the forecast period within the statistical error (from 15.1% to 15.5%). Secondly, due to the previously huge differences in the real content of each percentage of growth in the average per capita GDP of developed and developing countries, the absolute gap between them in this indicator will increase by at least $ 10,000 over the same 15 years and reach $ 39,000. This is a fate that even the most dynamic countries in the developing world cannot avoid. The absolute superiority of the vanguard countries, if we take them as a whole, in GDP per capita over China is expected to grow by more than $ 5 thousand, including the United States - by almost $ 10.5 thousand. An exception can only be made by NIS, which managed to join the ranks of the vanguard in terms of the level and quality of life in the last century. Third, having made room in the traditional spheres of economic activity, the countries of the current vanguard (or, in any case, the overwhelming majority of them) will gain a foothold in the more "advanced" areas of it, primarily located on the crest of the NTP. Fourth, the expected positive changes in the level of per capita GDP in the developing world will be provided, in addition to the two Asian giants, by a rather limited group of countries whose core is formed by the same EPI. The majority of developing countries will hardly find their niche in the global economy and will continue to develop in unstable regimes of situational adaptation to external and internal shocks.

An indispensable condition and result of the upcoming socio-economic transformation of developing countries is the intensification of competition, including related to the economic rise of Asian giants. In the forecast period, in contrast to the previous quarter-century, they will probably crowd out not only oil exporters and other developing countries, but also other exporters of industrial products and services. Even if the People's Republic of China goes for a significant revaluation of the yuan, low wages and, even more importantly, low costs of producing a unit of industrial output provide the Chinese economy with an indisputable long-term competitive advantage in comparison with the vast majority of EPI. A particular increase in competition should be expected in low-and medium-technological industries, as well as in some segments of the service sector, where the intellectual component plays a decisive role in the development of which. Given the huge economic potential in absolute terms, as well as the rapidly growing technical, technological and intellectual potential of China and India, we should not discount the possibility of connecting them to real competition at the highest levels of the global technological pyramid, primarily, apparently, in the military-technical sphere.

In principle, the same trends, but not in such a dramatic form and in a slightly different configuration, can be traced when calculating GDP at current exchange rates. The combined share of the two main groups of countries represented by EPI and NE will remain virtually unchanged. Only the relative rise of oil exporters is noteworthy, which is based on the strengthening of their national currencies due to the growth of global oil demand.

It is impossible to completely exclude the possibility of a scenario in which the prices of energy raw materials will reach a higher price level compared to the last fifteen years of the last century. Such a course of events would undoubtedly give a powerful positive impetus to the development of oil exporters, especially in the period 2006-2010. However, its stimulating effect is unlikely to be prolonged. Not only that, a significant portion of the growing export earnings in this group

page 115

Table 5

Ranking of the 100 most economically significant developing countries by GDP growth rate per capita*, %

1961-1980

1981-1990

1991-2005

2006-2020

Number of countries

Share in the population

Number of countries

Share in the population

Number of countries

Share in the population

Number of countries

Share in the population

more than 6

4

1.6

5

31.8

3

28.1

2

24.5

5 - 6

1

0.2

2

0.2

1

0.0

1

0.0

4 - 5

8

7.3

2

0.1

5

2.1

7

25.7

3 - 4

10

5.6

7

29.9

16

33.7

11

9.0

2 - 3

23

15.8

11

7.1

12

3.3

21

19.5

1 - 2

15

56.0

11

2.9

22

18.7

30

14.2

0 - 1

19

7.9

12

6.5

24

8.9

21

5.7

negative ratings

20

5.8

50

21.5

17

5.1

7

1.4

Compared to developed countries

Developed countries

3.1

2.4

1.7

2.4

Advanced users

20

14.0

18

63.8

40

68.0

27

70.4

Matching ones

7

3.0

8

3.9

11

7.9

10

6.7

Laggards

73

83.0

74

32.3

49

24.1

63

22.9

* Those countries of the developing world where this indicator is ±10% of the average per capita vanguard indicator (calculated up to two decimal places) are considered to coincide with the economic vanguard in terms of per capita GDP growth rates.

It will take time for developing economies to correct the imbalances accumulated over the previous period of development (repayment of external debt, restoration of gold and foreign exchange reserves), and the positive effect will obviously be quickly "eaten up" by the counter-growth of prices for manufacturing products and, possibly, services. In addition, since the second half of the 1990s, there has been a noticeable tendency to accumulate a significant part of export earnings in special funds, the funds of which are placed abroad, usually in developed economies. This, of course, helps to reduce the volatility of growth in commodity-based economies, but at the same time limits the mass of resources allocated for national development.

In any case, countries that have nothing to offer to globalize will find themselves in a particularly difficult position. This group of marginals consists of heterogeneous countries with poor geographical location (landlocked countries), difficult natural and climatic characteristics (with a predominant mountain or desert landscape, low natural precipitation, etc.), limited internal market sizes, etc. With regard to such countries, we can rely mainly on corrective actions of the international community of a non-market nature (assistance, regular debt cancellation).

Focusing on the dependence of economic growth in the periphery on the type of development, we should not lose sight of its "human dimension". Moreover, the degree of involvement of the population in the development process is crucial for its social results. This is clearly demonstrated by the crucial role of China in reducing the overall range of poverty in this region of the world.

page 116

In the 1990s, 9 This indicator also has an important impact on the process of implementing in developing countries the global trend towards enlarging the optimal size of the initial and final stages of production in the manufacturing industry. At the same time, changes in their ranking by per capita GDP growth rates when compared with the same indicator of developed countries help to understand the dynamics and real scale of changes on the economic map of the developing world in a global context (Table 5).

In view of the unprecedented economic failure of the 1980s, which was triggered by shock liberalization, the achievement for most countries in Africa and Latin America was obviously the very resumption (revival) of per capita economic growth.10 Under normal circumstances, in the absence of cataclysms, the generally accepted criterion for the economic success of peripheral countries is a higher dynamics of their per capita GDP in comparison with the United States and (or) all the countries of the economic vanguard combined. According to the second, milder criterion, if the growth rate of per capita GDP in the vanguard countries is expected to increase by 40% in the forecast period (from 1.7% to 2.4%), the number of developing countries ahead of it in this indicator (despite the general improvement in the world economic situation stimulated by it) is expected to decrease by one third, thereby confirming the increased problem catch-up development while reducing the regulatory capacity of the state. On the contrary, the share of successful countries in the total population of the developing world will increase even more, confirming the trend associated with globalization to consolidate the forces of growth in large economic spaces. The top performers will primarily include exporters of manufactured goods (with the possible exception of Mexico, whose GDP per capita is likely to grow at best at the same pace as the vanguard), as well as Burma, Iran, Chile, and several other small countries specializing in the production of mineral raw materials, which have noticeably revived in recent decades (including energy) and / or its primary processing (Trinidad and Tobago).

The concentration of economic growth in large economies obviously has its pros and cons. Such a dislocation will undoubtedly make it easier to solve the problem of poverty, just as it happened in the 1990s, but it is also fraught with slowing down stagnant and degrading economies with small populations and a general lack of resources for development, which represent hotbeds of extreme economic (and sometimes environmental) disadvantage and permanent socio-political tension, with all the consequences of which are this is not enough.

Due to differences in economic growth dynamics, by the end of the forecast period, the current picture of the developing world will undergo significant changes dating back to the 20th century. One of the perspectives of the expected changes, which largely determines the content of the rest, is clearly demonstrated by the grouping of catching-up economies by type of development, which is the basis of this forecast. A clear picture of all these changes is provided by grouping them by GDP per capita (Table 6).

The general direction of the socio-economic evolution of developing countries, as shown above, is determined by the process of establishing the unity of the world, and the pain of-

9 After deducting China's figures from the developing world summary, the total number of people living below the poverty threshold increases by 33 million instead of decreasing by 129 million [see Global Economic..., 2005, p. 21].

10 It should be borne in mind that regular revisions of GDP statistical series "improve" the retrospective dynamics of economic growth, including in the countries of the global periphery. For this reason, growth dips in the coordinate system of their time look more dramatic compared to the updated data.

page 117

Table 6

Grouping of developing countries by GDP per capita, thousand dollars, in prices and PPP 2004, 1950-2020

Years

less than $ 1,000.

1000-2000 dollars.

1950

1980

1990

2000

2005

2010

2020

1950

1980

1990

2000

2005

2010

2020

Number of countries

21

16

15

17

14

14

9

35

26

26

21

18

17

19

GDP, billion dollars

777.3

1041

180.7

222.0

239.9

275.6

186.1

295.6

1656.0

4255.5

1016.0

834.3

649.7

827.1

Share of global GDP, %

9.9

3.9

0.5

0.5

0.4

0.4

0.2

3.8

6.2

11.8

2.1

1.4

0.9

0.8

Population, million people

1140.0

1246.3

248.9

304.3

297.2

332.7

223.3

224.6

1207.6

2552.7

674.3

565.3

455.3

615.2

Share of the world's population, %

45.5

28.3

4.8

5.0

4.7

4.9

3.0

9.0

27.4

48.9

11.2

8.9

6.8

8.3

Average GDP per capita, $ 1,000

0.7

0.8

0.7

0.7

0.8

0.8

0.8

1.3

1.4

1.7

1.5

1.5

1.4

1.3

Years

2000-3000 dollars.

3000-5000 dollars.

1950

1980

1990

2000

2005

2010

2020

1950

1980

1990

2000

2005

2010

2020

Number of countries

19

10

11

10

14

12

9

13

17

18

14

15

15

12

GDP, billion dollars

340.9

357.1

654.3

3014.9

914.4

1129.4

578.5

363.0

759.3

1389.0

6806.5

5722.1

7170.3

1796.3

Share of global GDP, %

4.4

1.3

1.8

6.2

1.6

1.6

0.5

4.6

2.8

3.9

14.0

9.9

10.1

1.7

Population, million people

137.7

142.3

268.0

1163.0

370.5

474.2

220.6

97.0

183.3

336.7

1753.0

1620.8

1734.7

514.4

Share of the world's population, %

5.5

3.2

5.1

19.3

5.8

7.0

3.0

3.9

4.2

6.5

29.0

25.5

25.7

7.0

Average GDP per capita, $ 1,000

2.5

2.5

2.4

2.6

2.5

2.4

2.6

3.7

4.1

4.1

3.9

3.5

4.1

3.5

Years

$ 5,000 - $ 10,000.

over $ 10,000.

1950

1980

1990

2000

2005

2010

2020

1950

1980

1990

2000

2005

2010

2020

Number of countries

9

17

17

22

20

19

21

3

14

13

16

19

23

30

GDP, billion dollars

311.6

2653.4

3310.7

4906.0

13176.2

16261.2

14777.3

84.1

1279.8

1658.7

3223.0

4149.0

7118.5

36507.3

Share of global GDP, %

4.0

9.9

9.2

10.1

22.7

22.9

13.8

1.1

4.8

4.6

6.6

7.1

10.0

34.1

Population, million people

45.7

393.4

462.2

660.1

1963.7

1993.4

2200.0

3.5

99.8

135.0

212.5

254.4

450.7

2276.0

Share of the world's population, %

1.8

8.9

8.9

10.9

30.9

29.6

29.8

0.1

2.3

2.6

3.5

4.0

6.7

30.8

Average GDP per capita, $ 1,000

6.8

6.7

7.2

7.4

6.7

8.2

6.7

24.0

12.8

12.3

15.2

16.3

15.8

16.0

page 118

Table 6 (end)

Years

Developing countries in general

Developing countries without China and India

1950

1980

1990

2000

2005

2010

2020

1950

1980

1990

2000

2005

2010

2020

Number of countries

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

98

98

98

98

98

98

98

GDP, billion dollars

2172.6

7746.9

11449.1

19188.6

25036.0

32604.7

54672.4

1554.0

5999.2

7938.2

11402.8

13718.5

16783.2

25224.1

Share of global GDP, %

27.8

28.9

31.8

39.5

43.1

45.9

51.0

19.9

22.4

22.0

23.5

23.6

23.6

23.6

Population, million people

1648.5

3272.7

4003.5

4767.2

5071.8

5441.0

6049.5

732.5

1622.7

2014.2

2481.8

2681.1

2920.8

3339.02

Share of the world's population, %

65.8

74.2

76.7

79.0

79.8

80.7

81.8

29.2

36.8

38.6

41.1

42.2

43.3

45.2

Average GDP per capita, $ 1,000

1.3

2.4

2.9

4.0

4.9

6.0

9.0

2.1

3.7

3.9

4.6

5.1

5.7

7.6

Years

Developing countries excluding China, India, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong

Developing countries excluding China, India, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong and 20 oil exporting countries

1950

1980

1990

2000

2005

2010

2020

1950

1980

1990

2000

2005

2010

2020

Number of countries

94

94

94

94

94

94

94

74

74

74

74

74

74

74

GDP, billion dollars

1425.4

5593.8

7024.1

9774.0

11759.0

14309.6

21225.0

1150.8

4298.1

5390.2

7599.6

9014.3

10929.4

16148.5

Share of global GDP, %

18.2

20.8

19.5

20.1

20.2

20.1

19.8

14.7

16.0

15.0

15.7

15.5

15.4

15.1

Population, million people

692.3

1559.1

1941.9

2401.8

2598.3

2835.7

3250.8

532.0

1194.4

1493.8

1841.9

1980.3

2161.1

2469.8

Share of the world's population, %

27.6

35.4

37.2

39.8

40.9

42.0

44.0

21.2

27.1

28.6

30.5

31.2

32.0

33.4

Average GDP per capita, $ 1,000

2

4

4

4

5

5

7

2.2

3.6

3.6

4.1

4.6

5.1

6.5

page 119

most of them have already made, in fact, a huge step, incomparable in scale with the centuries of previous history, towards the formation of modern technological, economic and social structures similar to those that have developed and continue to develop in developed countries.

The prolonged structural crisis of the world economy that unfolded at the turn of the 1970s-1980s, provoked and supported by the acceleration of scientific and technological progress, the permanent restructuring of the structure of production and the international division of labor, the economic and social consequences of the increasingly complex entry of peripheral countries into the world market-all this served as a detonator for serious violations of the reproduction process in the bulk of them, once again confirming determining influence of external factors on the catching-up development. But the increased difficulties reflect not only, but perhaps not so much, the modification of the world economic situation. The current situation is the result of the combined effect of backwardness, which makes it difficult and often blocks the adaptation of countries with belated industrialization to the changed external conditions of development, accumulated technical, economic and socio-economic imbalances, miscalculations of national economic policies and spontaneous market forces, which, in conditions of disproportionate liberalization, undermine and often sweep away inefficient economic structures without replacing them. more viable.

All this brings to the fore the problem of improving and relentless readjustments of the economic mechanism on the basis of a rational combination of the regulatory activities of the state and the market, including its international component.

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Mayer J. Industrialization in Developing Countries: Some Evidence from a New Economic Geography Perspective // UNCTAD Discussion Papers. No. 174, August 2004.

UNCTAD. Trade and Development Report. 2005.

Cerra V., Rivera S. A., Saxena S. C. Crouching Tiger. Hidden Dragon: What Are the Consequences of China's WTO Entry for India's Trade I IMF Working Paper N 05/101. Wash. D. C.: IMF, May 2005.

Lall S., Albaladejo M. China's Competitive Performance: A Threat to East Asian Manufactured Exports? // World Development. Vol. 32. 2004. N 9.

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WTIMIN (05) I DEC. 22.12.2005.

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