The countries of Southeast Asia (SE) have many years of experience in combating various anti-government armed movements (left-wing, nationalist, religious) that pursue the goal of overthrowing existing regimes or achieving independence (autonomy) of the territories in which they operate.

It is obvious that the scope and effectiveness of any anti-government movement is ultimately determined by three main factors. First, its social base, the degree of support from the population, without which it cannot exist on any significant scale. Secondly, the unity and effectiveness of the rebel organization itself, its ability to combine military actions with actions of a political, ideological and propaganda nature. And, third, the assistance that the rebels are able to receive from abroad in the form of weapons, material resources, and finances from any organizations, movements, or individual States.

Experience shows that the fight against anti-government forces was most successful when, along with the armed suppression of their combat detachments, socio-economic, informational, psychological and other measures were widely carried out aimed at undermining the social base of the rebels, attracting the population to the side of the authorities and creating conditions for a peaceful settlement of the problem in a plan favorable to the government.

Moreover, the armed struggle against insurgent forces itself is specific in nature and significantly differs from conventional military operations. When conducting counterinsurgency operations, the main attention is paid to the activities of intelligence agencies, special forces, paramilitary police, and paramilitary formations, which form a single military-political complex aimed at performing a variety of tasks to neutralize anti-government forces.

POLYGON NAMED MALAYSIA

The main methods and tactics of counterinsurgency struggle currently used in Southeast Asia were developed and applied in practice in Malaya (since 1963 - Malaysia), where from 1948 to 1960, under the leadership of British military advisers, extensive complex operations were conducted against the armed formations of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). Along with the military actions, namely the blocking, isolation and defeat of the CPM detachments, the population was resettled in the so-called "new villages", the formation of the military-police security forces (over 100 thousand people), a paramilitary militia (about 200 thousand people), and joint management bodies were created, consisting of representatives of the army, police and military personnel. civil administration. Special attention was paid to the economic development of backward areas, conducting a propaganda campaign among the population and the rebels. As a result, the threat from armed groups was eliminated, and the state of emergency that had been in effect for 12 years was lifted.

THAILAND'S "NON-MILITARY METHODS"

Later, counterinsurgency techniques and tactics in Malaya were applied and improved in other countries of the region. Special attention should be paid to the experience of Thailand, the essence of which is the highly effective use of non-military methods of struggle. Since the beginning of the 60s, the territory of Thailand has been a kind of" laboratory " where various US organizations - the CIA, the Pentagon, the Office for International Development, and USIS - conducted detailed research in order to develop counterinsurgency concepts. Anti-government armed actions here were initiated by the Communist Party of Thailand. For several years, the Edgile project has hosted at least 100 scientists and experts in this country who have been engaged in social, economic, geographical, ethnic and religious research. The results of this work were used both in the development of civil counterinsurgency programs, and for the development of special methods for the violent suppression of anti-government forces, the creation and training of special army and police units, and new government bodies.

Thus, the Operational Command for Internal Security was organized, which coordinated the activities of the army, police and government agencies, with the aim of suppressing the armed anti-government movement that began in 1965. In 1977, when there was a sharp rise in this struggle and the number of insurgents reached 12,5 thousand, and their activity was noted in more than half of the country's territory, a new national security doctrine was adopted, in which the socio-economic development of backward areas and the eradication of corruption in administrative bodies were considered as the main means of strengthening internal stability in For implementation of accelerated agricultural development projects

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Significant amounts of money were allocated from the budget for the development of roads, irrigation facilities, hospitals, etc.

Under the leadership of General Prem Tinsulanon, then commander of the military district (he became Prime Minister in 1980), which covered the main area of rebel activity in the north-east of the country, a concept was developed called "The advantage of political methods over the military". In it, the main emphasis was placed on economic development and the conduct of psychological warfare from the position of strengthening the monarchy, reviving national spiritual values, and protecting religion. As part of the country's armed forces, two "development divisions" were formed, which were tasked with providing assistance to farmers in carrying out agricultural work, improving sanitary conditions, and building various facilities. For information and propaganda influence on the population, the army had at its disposal a quarter of the country's radio stations, a central television channel, as well as the material base for publishing newspapers, magazines, and producing films.

These active actions of the government, aimed at attracting the population to their side, and coinciding with a sharp decrease in external assistance to the rebels (mainly from China), as well as ideological confusion in their leadership, led to the disintegration of the anti-government movement and a massive transition of insurgents to the side of the authorities. Interestingly, for the surrendered rebels, solemn meeting ceremonies were arranged, they were paid a reward for the surrendered weapons, land plots and cash loans were provided. By the mid-1980s, the number of insurgents in the north-east and north of the country had decreased many times and no longer posed a threat to the Bangkok regime.

In the south of Thailand, where Muslim separatist groups that were part of the Pattani National Patriotic Front and later the United Liberation Organization of Pattani operated and sought the independence of four southern provinces inhabited mainly by Muslim Malays, non-military measures proved ineffective. The information and psychological war was not successful here, and separatist Muslim organizations firmly supported the introduction of Islamic, i.e. Sharia, norms in all spheres of life and the creation of an independent state in the end. Therefore, troops and police were mainly used to subdue the rebels. Recently, radical Islamic groups have become more active in the border areas of Thailand with Malaysia, forcing the Bangkok authorities to take additional measures to strengthen the military and police forces in the area.

In general, the Thai Government has managed to neutralize insurgency in most parts of the country thanks to its extensive and effective use of mostly non-military methods. The success of these methods of struggle was primarily due to the dynamic development of the economy, which made it possible to allocate significant funds for the development of backward areas and undermining the social base of the insurgency.

MYANMAR: DRUG - FUELED "IDEAS OF FREEDOM"

In Myanmar (Burma), the fight against numerous anti-government movements was conducted according to a different scenario. The military authorities, in order to prevent the collapse of the Burmese Union, were forced to focus their main efforts on military operations.-

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weapons-based suppression of insurgents. The bloody struggle, which began almost immediately after the country gained independence in 1948, took on a protracted character, and huge material and financial resources were spent on it.

Only by the end of the 80s did the government manage to inflict a serious defeat on the detachments of the Communist Party of Burma, which led to the erosion of its military and political structures. In particular, in 1989, the most numerous Wa insurgent organization (the United Army of the State of Wa, numbering about 20 thousand people), operating under the leadership of the Communist Party, concluded a peace agreement with the Government, according to which it refused to fight, but retained control over the areas where the Wa people live.

The defeat of the Communist Party was made possible largely due to the fact that China stopped providing it with assistance and support, moreover, even established large-scale military-technical cooperation with the Myanmar authorities. The supply of weapons and military equipment from China allowed Myanmar to rearm the army and increase its strength from 170 to 265,000 people.

By the mid-1990s, government forces conducted a series of serious operations against nationalist rebel groups of Shan, Kachin, Karen and other ethnic groups, and forced many of them to stop fighting. The Government negotiated and compromised with the largest organizations - the National Democratic Union of Myanmar, the Kachin Defense Army, the Shan Khun Sa Joint Army, and others-concluding agreements on their legalization. They were temporarily allowed to maintain their organizational structures, including the self-defense forces, and control over the territories where they operated.

In 2000, only small groups of ethnic minorities in the area of the famous "Golden Triangle" at the junction of Myanmar's borders with Thailand and Laos, engaged in drug trafficking, as well as remnants of Karen rebels in the south of the country, continued to fight the central authorities. To finally undermine the insurgency's base, Myanmar's military authorities have launched an extensive program to relocate mountain tribes from traditional poppy-growing areas. The villages of the Wa people mentioned above, which accounts for most of the distribution of heavy opium-based drugs to Thailand, have also been resettled. Reducing subversive activities in this area also contributes to the fact that a significant part of the former rebels are involved in the construction of a road that is being laid from the border with the PRC (and with its direct participation) to the south of Myanmar, to the coast.

Military pressure on the rebels and subsequent negotiations with them were accompanied by increased information and psychological warfare, in which the main emphasis was shifted from promoting the ideas of "Burmese socialism" to reviving the historical spiritual heritage of the ancient Burmese kingdoms, strengthening the unity of the multinational union, using symbols and attributes of the past in art, holidays, festivals, official ceremonies, etc. etc.

Thus, after a long period of armed struggle, during which the insurgents were seriously damaged, Myanmar's leaders have adopted mainly non - military methods-negotiations, amnesties, socio - economic measures, propaganda campaigns-in order to finally resolve the insurgency problem.

PHILIPPINES: POVERTY OF THE POPULATION IS A "BREEDING GROUND" FOR THE INSURGENCY

Only the Philippines can compare the duration and intensity of the insurgency with Myanmar. The government was simultaneously opposed by two major organizations: the Moro National Liberation Front (FLN), which sought to grant autonomy to Muslim-populated areas (Mindanao Island), and the New People's Army (NPA), which operated under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines. For more than three decades, its units have been fighting for the creation of an "independent state with a communist ideology"in the southern Philippine archipelago. Repeated attempts by the authorities to resolve the rebel problem peacefully ended in failure. It was only after government forces conducted successful combat operations against the rebels in their main areas of operation in the early 1990s that negotiations were initiated. To the President F. In 1996, Ramos managed to conclude a peace treaty with the FLN, according to which, in four countries,

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An autonomous Muslim region was created in the provinces of Mindanao Island. This put an end to the 25 - year-old bloody struggle, in which the total losses of the FNL and government troops exceeded 50 thousand people. But the so-called Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), whose eight thousand fighters continued to fight for the creation of an independent Islamic state throughout Mindanao, did not join the treaty, even though Muslims make up the majority in only four of the 14 provinces mentioned on the island.

Negotiations with the Communist Party of the Philippines, which began in 1992, did not lead to anything concrete. In 1999, the NPA announced its intention to continue the armed struggle. However, by this time, as a result of major defeats from government forces and ideological differences in the party leadership, the number of its armed detachments had been reduced to five thousand people (in 1992 it was 18 thousand), and it no longer posed a special danger to the government.

Unfortunately, the successes achieved during the rule of General Fidel Ramos (1992-1998) were not consolidated under the President who succeeded him. Estrada has been blamed for the weakening of Manila's control over the situation in the provinces, the growth of government corruption, and eventually the resignation of Estrada himself, who was accused of embezzling large sums of money. As a result, in 2000, the activities of the MILF became more active and began to take extremist and terrorist forms. At the end of December last year, front militants carried out a series of bombings in Manila, which killed 22 people. In the southern islands (Sulu Archipelago), the Islamic extremist organization "Abu Sayyaf. It became known all over the world after members of this group in April 2000 seized more than two dozen hostages of various nationalities on a nearby Malaysian resort island and held them for several months to obtain ransom. Due to the increase in terrorist attacks, in September 2000, the Philippines and the United States signed an agreement on the creation of an anti-terrorist squad consisting of elite units of the Philippine army and American instructors.

It is noteworthy that Islamic groups are most active in areas where the standard of living of the population is extremely low, and it is constantly harassed by local authorities. Therefore, Islamists who speak out under the slogans of establishing equality and justice in accordance with Sharia, find support among local residents.

At the end of March this year, it became known that the authorities agreed with the leadership of the NPA to hold peace talks, interrupted after the resignation of Joseph Estrada. The resumption of dialogue was made possible after a number of influential rebel warlords announced their recognition of the new Manila administration headed by Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. A similar proposal was made by the MILF. At the same time, the President of the Philippines ordered the armed forces to launch an "all-out war" against the extremists of the Abu Sayyaf group. This was done in response to the militants ' threat to behead their hostage, American citizen Jeffrey Schilling. Arroyo announced that the insurgency problem in the country should be resolved by October 2002.

INDONESIA: "CHECHEN TACTICS" IN THE MOLUCCAS

In Indonesia, the intensification of insurgent separatist movements was directly related to the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, which was followed by a radical restructuring of state and political structures and a weakening of control over the situation in the country, especially in the peripheral areas. Under Suharto, strict control over potential anti-government forces was carried out through an extensive unified military - police apparatus headed by the army command. This centralized management system was disrupted. The police, which was part of the armed forces, was transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and was entrusted with the task of ensuring internal security in the country. At the same time, the main special bodies for combating insurgents and opponents of the regime - the intelligence service, counterintelligence, security and others - remained subordinate to the army leadership. One of the most effective organs in the fight against the separatists, the six - thousand - strong Red Beret special forces, formerly under the command of Suharto's son - in-law Prabowo Subianto, were involved in some subversive actions against the new Government. Therefore, in the summer of 2000, President A. Wahid decided to significantly reduce them.

The Indonesian authorities are particularly concerned about the situation in the provinces of Aceh and Irian Jaya, where insurgents are fighting for the declaration of independence of these provinces.-

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and in the Moluccas, where a bloody religious war broke out between Muslims and Christians. Realizing that there was a real threat to the sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity of the country, the Wahid Government, seeking to resolve the problem of separatist movements in a peaceful way, concluded a truce with the Free Aceh Movement in May 2000 and began negotiations with its leadership to grant greater autonomy to this resource-rich province. The Jakarta authorities conducted similar negotiations with the Free Papua movement, which in 1999-2000 intensified the armed struggle for the secession of Irian Jaya province. As for the conflict in the Moluccas, the military command was forced to concentrate large military contingents here-over 19 infantry battalions-and establish a naval blockade of the islands. But despite these efforts and the introduction of a state of emergency, the extremist organization leading the fight against Muslims, the Jihad Army, has been replenished with two thousand more fighters who have arrived from other parts of the country and from abroad and are operating in small sabotage and terrorist groups-just as it is happening in Chechnya. It is not possible to stop the bloodshed on the islands, and both Christians and Muslims are being killed.

It is quite obvious that due to the difficult political and economic situation in the country, the success of the fight against separatist movements and religious conflicts directly depends on the ability of the government to restore reliable control over the army, recreate a centralized system of command and control of troops, police, special services, and paramilitary formations, because without military pressure on the rebels and the active use of It will be very difficult or even impossible to solve the problem of separatism on the population and the rebels.

BIN LADEN'S BLOOD TRAIL IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Special attention should be paid to the problem of activation of radical Islamic groups and movements in Southeast Asia. Most of them can be classified as extremist or even terrorist, because their goals and methods of action are significantly different from ordinary rebel organizations. The latter, although resorting to terrorist acts, pay the main attention to working among the population, attracting it to their side. Armed struggle is only one aspect of their activities, just as combat detachments are only part of a broader political organization (front or party). Terrorist groups, using violent methods (bombings, murders, kidnappings, hostage-taking, blackmail), want to achieve primarily a psychological effect, to introduce a sense of fear and confusion in the government and among the population, and thereby create conditions for achieving their goals. Out of all the Islamic movements and groups currently operating in Southeast Asia, only the Philippine Abu Sayyaf group is still considered purely terrorist, while the rest of the organizations can be defined as radical or extremist, periodically resorting to methods of violence or terror.

Speaking under religious slogans, Islamist groups seek not just the liberation of a certain territory, but above all the triumph of their ideology. Most of them are associated with international Islamist centers. One of these centers for Islamists operating in Southeast Asia is increasingly Afghanistan, where bases, training camps for "warriors of Islam", weapons depots have been established and mercenaries are sent to different countries to participate in combat operations and terrorist actions as part of local anti-government Muslim groups. Only in the camps held with the money of the millionaire terrorist Osama bin Laden, at least five thousand militants have been trained in recent years. Leaders of Islamist groups in the Philippines and Indonesia have long-standing ties to leaders of Middle Eastern Islamist organizations, as well as bin Laden, as many of them fought together in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan also serves as a focal point for channeling huge amounts of financial resources to hot spots through the channels of international Islamist structures. In September 2000, Taliban leaders met in Kabul with representatives of Islamist movements from other countries, including Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand. In particular, it set the task of ensuring coordination of the activities of all Islamist forces, whose declared goal is to create a single global Islamic state in the end.

Currently, Islamist movements and groups, although they are destabilizing the situation in certain areas of Southeast Asia, do not yet pose an immediate threat to the regimes of the countries of this region. Nevertheless, given the connection of local extremists with the international Islamist radical movement, they expect not only the use of tough, decisive measures, but also close cooperation between Asian countries, as well as coordination of actions with international anti-terrorist centers and organizations.

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