I. RUSSIA, EAST ASIA AND ASEAN FACING THE GLOBAL CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Globalization processes, which reached their peak at the turn of the millennium, cover all spheres of society, including the world economy as a whole, the economy of megaregions, individual states and their integration associations. They are most difficult on the vast Eurasian continent. Here, in a relatively close geographical neighborhood, countries with different levels of development and social life, with different values, ideologies and confessions, with different climatic conditions and demographic trends coexist. The main array of transformational transformations is concentrated at the junction of two parts of the Eurasian continent.

The European part of the continent is represented by three groups of countries - developed, transforming and completed transformation due to the completed or near accession to the EU, former Soviet republics that still remain in the poorly structured economic space of the CIS. The Asian part of the region is no less complex: several centers of economic power (China, Japan, India, and ASEAN) have formed here, the region is rapidly strengthening its position in the global economy and has become a leader in terms of economic growth (it accounts for about half of the annual increase in global value added production of $ 2 trillion).

Most of the Eurasian countries belong to the so-called peripheral countries (not included in the group of developed countries - members of the OECD). Peripheral countries, despite their best efforts, have failed to significantly reduce the nearly eight-fold gap with developed countries in basic economic indicators.1

A common feature of both peripheral parts of Eurasia is the presence of territories with a low level of economic development and mass poverty. Functioning economic integration groupings (EurAsEC, GUAM, and ASEAN) and bilateral agreements on free and preferential trade in goods and/or services do not yet have the expected impact on deepening integration cooperation and accelerating the fight against poverty. Therefore, the revival of integration processes is becoming one of the most urgent tasks in both parts of the continent.

Under these conditions, integration at the Periphery takes on a number of specific features. Along with the typical tasks of any integration association of mobilizaedit-

1 Calculated from: [World Economic Outlook, 2000, p. 69]. At the turn of the millennium, China lagged almost 7 times behind Japan and the EU, and 9 times behind the United States. India - by 13, 11 and 16 times, respectively; transition countries-by almost 4.5 times.

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In order to accelerate growth and improve the living conditions of the population, there is a need to address such urgent tasks as overcoming poverty and poverty, creating viable national economic complexes and protecting them from adverse external influences, and strengthening negotiating positions in relations with TNCs and international economic and financial organizations. It should be emphasized that in the period of globalization, participation in any integration process (bilateral and/or multilateral) is imperative for non-peripheral countries.

World experience confirms that only an economic space with a market capacity of 250-300 million or more consumers with an average endowment of natural factors can ensure the creation of viable structures that are resistant to external influences according to global criteria. By the end of the last century, the United States, the EU, China, India, Mercosur2, NAFTA, and ASEAN (and also, before its collapse, the Soviet Union) met these requirements. Relying on endogenous sources of growth makes such large structures quite stable even with a high degree of openness to the outside world.

Special attention should be paid to this provision. Endogenous development, understood as the need to protect itself with barriers from the outside world through duties, quotas, administrative restrictions and the like to create greenhouse conditions for domestic producers, is doomed to failure in the era of globalization and regionalization. But we should also avoid such an extreme, when the expansion of interaction is generated only by external impulses. Internal factors should play an increasingly important role: the development of domestic production, social sphere, science and education, own R & D, management and marketing, carried out within the national economy of the peripheral country and/or within the framework of an integration association with its participation.

At the beginning of the XXI century. Russia and its EurAsEC partners, on the one hand, and the 10 ASEAN countries, on the other, are faced with the need to determine their place in the complex interweaving of global and regional processes on the Eurasian continent, to find adequate responses to the increasingly strong challenges coming from outside. In the economic sphere, many of these challenges were common or similar for both groups of countries. These include the need to address issues such as:

reducing the differentiation of states in terms of per capita income, technological maturity, and information security. To date, regional integration groupings of peripheral countries, including the Eurasian continent, have not been able to stop the general tendency to increase the gap between the Center and the Periphery;

reducing unemployment and finding ways to ensure the sustainability of an acceptable level of employment. The currently prevailing outward-looking growth patterns in emerging market economies can at best maintain employment levels, but in practice they can also lead to lower employment levels. Highly developed countries are also sensitive to this problem, where unemployment is growing in a number of traditional industries (footwear, textile, clothing industry, agricultural sector, etc.).;

regulation of cross-border capital flows, which, while making a significant contribution to economic growth, simultaneously create financial and economic opportunities in host countries.-

2 After Venezuela's forthcoming accession to Mercosur, an integration grouping of five countries will emerge in South America, covering an area of about 12.7 million km2 with a population of 250 million people and a combined GDP of almost $ 1 trillion - about 3/4 of the gross product of all the countries of the South American continent [BIKI, 17.08.2006]. Joining Venezuela is unlikely to significantly change the indicator of the level of per capita income - 8.7 thousand dollars. (US CIA data) [Expert, 14-20.11.2005, p. 66].

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These are "sheds" that threaten the stability of their economy. At the end of the last century, a wave of financial, banking and currency crises swept through many peripheral countries of Eurasia;

the need to mitigate the negative impacts of uneven development of the globalization processes themselves. Worryingly, there are growing divergences in economic growth rates between individual countries and groups of countries, and the growing income gap between the poorest and richest countries, which peaked in the era of globalization. In this context, both the peripheral Asian countries and the CIS countries will have to solve a twofold task-to modernize their national economies and strengthen their positions in the global economy and the international division of labor.

The development of interregional cooperation, including between existing and emerging integration associations on the continent, can make a certain contribution to solving this complex problem. Analysis of the development of the world economy over the past three or four decades suggests that one of the most effective ways to adapt peripheral countries to economic globalization is the formation of regional integration groups.

At one time, regionalism contributed to the development of globalization, but the first decade of the twenty - first century increasingly highlights a new trend-the use of regionalism as a tool to neutralize a number of negative manifestations of globalization. This is evidenced, in particular, by the failure of the WTO Doha Round, which is aimed at increasing the liberalization and universalization of the world trade regime, reviving sub-regional and regional cooperation - the expansion of the EU, Mercosur (Venezuela), and EurAsEC (Uzbekistan)., The project of economic unification of the Americas is being suspended, ASEAN is moving towards the ASEAN + 3 format (China, South Korea, and Japan), there is growing attention to the sphere of economic cooperation in the SCO, and so on.In other words, the sphere of economic activity is represented both by universal global processes and by private ones within large states and their economic groupings. Obviously, in the foreseeable future, these two processes will dominate, stimulating both the movement towards a globalizing economy and the relative isolation of some of its elements (regional and sub-regional groupings).

The use of economies of scale, increased competition within the association, and optimization of foreign trade flows in the event of a successful integration process gives additional impetus to economic growth, increases resilience to external influences, and strengthens negotiating positions in relations with leading regional partners and global structures. Equally important, the association provides additional opportunities to address such pressing issues as improving the quality of economic growth in the participating countries, maintaining and increasing employment, improving living standards, reducing poverty, and so on.

The EurAsEC and ASEAN, the two most viable groupings in parts of the former Soviet Union and Southeast Asia, are still in the early stages of development, despite their age differences, so for now interaction between their member countries is carried out almost exclusively on a bilateral basis according to the "EurAsEC country-ASEAN country"scheme. The only exception is the ongoing dialogue between Russia and ASEAN, which, it is hoped, will involve other EurAsEC countries to some extent - Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The population of the Eurasian Economic Community exceeds 200 million people. Market capacity, territory, endowment of natural resources, quality

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human capital allows us to start modernizing the economic structure of the national economies of the participating countries, and gives rise to impulses for activating foreign economic activity in the eastern direction. The EurAsEC accounted for 86.1% of the GDP of the entire CIS (2004), 83.7% of industrial output, 67.6% of agricultural output, and 85.7% of retail turnover through all sales channels, even before Uzbekistan joined it (2006) .3 Thus, the dominant partners of ASEAN in the post-Soviet space will most likely be the EurAsEC countries, where the vast majority of the CIS's economic potential is concentrated. The development of cooperation under the "ASEAN - Russia" scheme will also, to a certain extent, contribute to the activation of Russia's economic relations with ASEAN's closest neighbors.

In addition to the problems of integration associations of peripheral regions listed above, ASEAN and the CIS (the latter is represented by several economic groupings of various calibres) share a very worrying trend - a weakening of their positions in world exports, accompanied by a decrease in the share of intraregional exports (Table 1):

Table 1

Positions of major economic associations in global and regional exports

Year

Unification

AT

es

eu

NAFTA

ASEAN-10

Mercosur

CIS countries

1995

I

46.3

39.8

16.8

6.4

1.4

2.5

II

71.9

62.4

46.2

25.4

20.6

28.4

2000

I

37.5

29.6

15.6

5.5

1.1

1.7

II

72.6

62.4

54.2

24.0

20.5

19.1

2003

I

34.0

31.4

12.6

4.9

1.2

1.3

II

72.3

61.9

54.3

23.3

11.9

17.2

-----

Notes: I - share of world exports; II - share of intraregional exports in total exports of the association.

Calculated from: [World Development Indicators, 2003; Direction of Trade Statistics, 2004; Commonwealth of Independent States..., 2004; Panorama de la inversion internacional..., 2005].

These tables allow us to draw several conclusions.

First, both associations have a relatively large internal market, which, according to the generally accepted theory, should allow them to use the economies of scale - an important advantage opened up by the creation of an integration grouping. Unfortunately, in both associations, this resource does not yet bring any tangible effect and is not compensated by strengthening their positions outside their region. As noted above, there is a unidirectional trend in both economic territories under consideration - a decrease in the share of intraregional trade, accompanied by a weakening of positions in world exports. Table 1 shows the dynamics of the share of regional exports in its total volume (growth or stabilization in the regions of developed countries - the EU and NAFTA and in the APEC mixed megaregion, and decline in the regions of peripheral countries-ASEAN and the CIS), which allow us to draw another important conclusion: the stability and sustainability of intraregional trade growth requires at least, two conditions - achievement of an acceptable level of development according to global criteria and the availability of a capacious level of development according to the same global criteria.

3 Calculated according to the CIS Statistical Committee. Retail trade turnover in Russia and Kazakhstan - excluding the turnover of food companies.

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market criteria. Similar trends in Mercosur suggest that we are dealing with a global trend typical of large peripheral regional aggregations4.

Secondly, both ASEAN and the CIS (and the EurAsEC, respectively) focus their economic activities primarily on partners outside their region. Such an orientation in principle creates favorable conditions for the counter movement of the EurAsEC to the East and ASEAN to the West both on a bilateral basis in the "country-country" format, and (in the future) on a multilateral basis - in the "country-integration association" and "integration association-integration association" (EurAsEC-ACE) formats.).

Third, both economic spaces (ASEAN and EurAsEC) are strongly influenced by the world's economic power centers, primarily the United States, the EU, and China. In the foreseeable future, the latter will obviously remain the main trade and economic partners of both ASEAN and the EurAsEC.

Fourthly, this fact does not mean that both groups lack interest and incentives to establish economic cooperation in the framework of the association outside of sluggish trade. The countries of both groups are or are entering the industrial stage of development. Their immediate task is to modernize (and in some countries create) a number of basic industries in order to form viable national economic complexes and effectively organize the economic space of the integration association in order to carry out the process of expanded reproduction within the region mainly on their own basis. Otherwise, inclusion in the international division of labor, instead of stimulating industrial development, may become a factor in consolidating the participating countries and peripheral associations as a whole as resource-providing regions of the world economy and deindustrializing their own territories.

The possibility of such an outcome is evidenced by the experience of many developing and even relatively developed countries, in particular Russia, which tried to overcome the unfavorable development trends of the 1990s of the last century by reckless inclusion in the world economy, relying on its natural resources. Despite this, Russia is still able to restore its industrial potential, much of which it inherited from the Soviet Union. The country has natural resources, production facilities, including those that are still unloaded, scientific reserves, personnel and financial resources, but there is no sufficiently capacious market that would allow organizing large-scale production of modern machines and technologies in order to justify the costs of their development and adaptation to the needs of specific consumers. In this sense, Russia needs the ASEAN countries as an additional sales market and a means of restoring machine-building industries, including defense. ASEAN needs Russia as one of the alternative sources of obtaining industrial equipment for basic industries and forming optimal national economic complexes and groupings in general.

The scope of the proposed alternative is given some idea by the activities of foreign economic organizations of the Soviet Union before its collapse. By the beginning of 1990, Soviet enterprises and organizations had built enterprises in the "third world" countries and supplied sets of equipment with the following capacities: electricity production-40.9 million kW (installed capacity), annual coal production - 122 million tons and iron ore-22 million tons, steel smelting-22 million tons, and processing oil production - 39 million tons, mineral fertilizers production -1.3 million tons, irri-

4 The significant increase in the share of the CIS in world trade in 2004-2005 was mainly due to rising prices for energy and metals.

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irrigation and land reclamation - 2.5 million hectares, as well as various metallurgical equipment -192 thousand tons [From Confrontation..., 1991, p. 108-109] 5. If there is effective demand, Russia can restore a significant part of these and other capacities in a relatively short time.

Fifth, there are powerful geopolitical and geo-economic factors that favor the intensification of Russia's economic ties with the countries of East and South-East Asia (SEEA), including ASEAN. Most of this huge Eurasian country-from the Urals to the Pacific Ocean-is losing its population, and it lacks the structure-forming megacities around which the surrounding territories could be organized. Here, the most acute problem is the revival of the country's industrial potential. In the course of dynamic processes of globalization, regions rich in natural resources, but industrially undeveloped, inevitably become the object of expansion of regional and global economic megastructures. Therefore, in the next 10 to 15 years, we should expect an acceleration in the development of the regions of Siberia and the Far East, the construction of large infrastructure and industrial facilities and economic complexes there.6 The implementation of the planned large-scale projects is possible if three conditions are met: attracting domestic and foreign investment, labor from other regions of Russia and neighboring countries, and having a large sales market not only within the country, but also abroad. There is no doubt that ASEAN + 3 will not be left out of such a broad field of activity. Currently, Russia is developing measures to organize mass resettlement of people to the Russian Far East. We are talking about resettling up to 18 million people in this sparsely populated region and creating conditions for them that make changing their place of residence attractive. The" supplier " of labor will be densely populated regions of the central part of the country, neighboring countries, as well as China, South Korea, and even Japan [Izvestiya, 22.03.2006].

Sixth, optimism about the possibility of significant growth in trade and other forms of economic relations between Russia and the ASEAN countries is based on recent developments over the past decade and a half: Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines have significantly changed the structure of their economies and exports, and Singapore has become a financial and trade center not only of the association, but also of the international Brunei, which was backward in the past, is a successful, solvent oil-producing country; production and potentially large markets in Indonesia and Vietnam are becoming more active. All this opens up opportunities for a number of goods, services and investments of ASEAN countries to access the markets of Russia and other CIS countries. Both sides have a lot of work to do to find areas of overlapping interests in the current, medium and long term. An important consideration in this search, in our opinion, should be the common task for both sides-to prevent excessive asymmetric dependence on global and regional centers of economic power.

It should be noted that the rather intensive economic ties that were formed during the Soviet period with some of the countries that are now members of ASEAN were either destroyed or sharply weakened. Therefore, Russia is not among the leading economic partners of the ASEAN countries. The realization by both sides of the potential opportunities, the arguments in favor of which were formulated above, is obviously capable of intensifying economic interaction in the form of-

5 Much larger volumes of similar machines and equipment were produced for domestic consumption and export to the countries of the world socialist system.

6 See, for example, the interview of the Governor of the Krasnoyarsk Territory Alexander Khloponin to the newspaper Izvestia dated 22.12.2005.

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mate "Russia-ASEAN". However, this will not be enough to turn the parties into significant trade and economic partners. In our opinion, a major change in the situation can occur if the ASEAN + 3 project or a format close to it progresses. Currently, interested parties are conducting a series of studies, the final outcome of which is likely to be a decision to create a free trade zone in East Asia in the future [see for more details: Towards East Asian..., 2004, p. 74-80]. By the beginning of 2006, there were 11 regional trade agreements (RTAs) in force in this region with WTO notification, to which ASEAN, China, and South Korea were parties. Negotiations are underway to create new multi-and bilateral RTAs of various formats [see Potapov, 2006, p.59-73].

The emergence of a market with a huge number of consumers, represented by economies of various levels of development, including countries with which Russia has established ties, can in principle give a powerful impetus to trade and mutual investment flows in its relations with the countries of Southeast and East Asia. At the moment, it is hardly possible to speak more clearly about the future parameters of economic cooperation in the format under consideration, since the terms and conditions under which the ASEAN + 3 free trade zone will be created, the position of its creators in relation to Russia and the entire CIS space, are unclear. Much will also depend on the Russian side: whether it will be able to use its favorable geographical position between Europe and Asia in order to fit seamlessly into the system of relations between the two economic centers of the world economy and become, together with the PRC, a link between them. In the second half of the current decade, it is possible to implement two major network infrastructure projects. The first is to increase Russia's share in cargo transportation between Europe and Asia, which will require not only an increase in the capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway, but also the reconstruction of port facilities and an increase in the tonnage of the domestic cargo fleet. The second project is related to the upcoming construction of the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline (estimated investment of 11.5 billion rubles). $ ) with a capacity of 80 million tons after the construction is completed [Promyshlennyi Nedelnik, 2005, N 34, p. 13; Expert, 24-30.07.2006, p. 60], as well as the creation of two transport routes for the supply of Russian natural gas from Western and Eastern Siberia to China: their capacity will be about 80 billion cubic meters. m per year.

An analysis of the trends of the last 15 years and the consequences of the implementation of the two largest projects listed above suggests that if measures are not taken on both sides, an extremely strong concentration of economic cooperation between Russia and ASEAN may occur in the countries that are new members of the free trade area under discussion (ASEAN + 3) in SEEA, up to the emergence of a trade-related effect (trade diversion effect) in relation to ASEAN-10. Governments, the business community, and the scientific community should probably be looking for ways to counteract these impacts right now.

Along with the rapid development of relations with China, Japan, and South Korea, it is in the interests of Russia and its EurAsEC partners to step up and diversify trade and investment activities in other parts of the Southeast Asian region. Such a configuration of interaction between the post-Soviet states and the countries of Southeast and East Asia can make a significant contribution to strengthening integration associations on the continent and create conditions for the emergence of new integration structures, such as the expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Increased attention to Asia in the foreign economic strategy of Russia and most of the CIS countries is due to the development of globalization processes in the world economy. So far, the economic interaction of the post-Soviet space has been growing.

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space with the outside world is characterized by an excessive concentration on the Euro-Atlantic region, and within it-on Europe. At the same time, only two commodity groups are competitive - fuel and energy and metallurgy (more than 85% of Russian exports). The European region is growing at the slowest pace among the world's megaregions, and if we take into account that the rate of energy and raw material consumption lags about twice the rate of economic growth, then the inertial development of the process threatens exporting countries with a "foreign trade trap", when the demand lag will become a serious factor in slowing down economic growth.

Accelerated development of economic ties in the Asian direction seems to be the most effective method of eliminating the foreign trade impasse. The argument in favor of this proposal is also the fact that the Asian market is also in demand for products from industries that serve energy and raw material extraction, and other high-value - added products from industries in which Russia's traditional positions are quite strong (energy and transport engineering, including nuclear power, raw material processing, mineral fertilizers, petroleum products, weapons and special equipment, etc.).

The material basis of Russia's foreign trade maneuver in the Asian direction is the reorientation of investment that has begun in the country from restoring destroyed industries and supporting the fuel and energy sector to industrial-type investment growth. Institutional support for deepening economic cooperation, especially with SEEA countries, is facilitated by a certain similarity of economic regulation tools (for example, indicative planning - a program-oriented approach, industrial policy, public-private partnerships, national projects, etc.), which allows us to develop long-term economic cooperation projects along with the growth of traditional trade.

II. PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE ASEAN COUNTRIES

The previous section provides considerations and justifications for the existence of a certain potential interest in reviving economic cooperation both on the part of Russia, as well as on the part of ASEAN members and East Asian countries. As for the possibility of realizing this potential by Russia, it depends on the trends of its internal development, the ability to organize the post-Soviet economic space (or most of it), and the choice of priority areas for foreign economic orientation.

The Russian economy in the first quarter of the XXI century

Determining the state of the Russian economy during this period is the most difficult task. The scientific community, the business world and the entire Russian society live under the slogan "doubling GDP in ten years". The overwhelming majority supports a focus on accelerating economic growth, but the consensus ends there. There was a discussion about the nature of growth, its quality, the regulatory mechanisms used (through industrial policy or the "invisible hand of the market"), the role of science and education, social policy and"human capital". As the transition period nears its end, this discussion is crucial for the future of the country, its ability to preserve the integrity of its territory and restore its status as a great Power. In the context of this article, an attempt will be made, at least in a first approximation, to show how Russia's economic relations with ASEAN and ASEAN + 3 will develop depending on the chosen development paradigm of the Russian leadership and society.

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It seems that a more or less accurate answer to this question will not be received until the end of the first decade of the XXI century: the country's economy operates in the mode of three - year scenarios (current - 2007-2009), and the government is preparing to introduce a three-year state budget. Taking into account the one-year inertia, it is possible to predict with sufficient confidence that the current prevailing course will continue to maintain good macroeconomic indicators in recent years, in combination with maintaining the stability of growth and the stability of the socio-economic situation. The goals are quite real, but they are actually based on ensuring growth without any radical change in the current situation. Within the framework of economic policy, where the criterion is a quantitative indicator-GDP growth rates, the main requirement of the new economy remains out of sight - qualitative changes in order to implement the transition to a post-industrial development trajectory, fully use the potential of the "human factor" and spread the fruits of development to all segments of society.

Obviously, the fuel and energy sector and the first processing industries will remain the engine of growth in this decade. At the beginning of the current decade (2001), three commodity items (oil, gas, and petroleum products) accounted for more than half of all exports, five items (plus precious stones and precious metals, raw aluminum) - 60%, and ten items (plus semi-finished products made of non-alloy steel, untreated nickel, flat sawn wood, rolled steel products). non-alloy steel, untreated timber, hard coal) - more than 66%7. At the same time, the oil and gas industry employs only 2 million people out of the 67 million working-age population of Russia [MEiMO, 2004, p. 60]. These data show that the benefits of a favorable global environment are enjoyed by a small part of Russians and, as already noted, huge foreign exchange earnings from the export of fuel and raw materials are practically not directed to the modernization of other industries and the creation of new competitive industries.

A curious situation arises: the fuel and raw materials "flux" in the Russian economy - its most serious defect-simultaneously becomes the basis for a significant increase in economic cooperation with the ASEAN countries in the medium term, especially in the ASEAN + 3 format. According to available forecasts, the countries of Southeast and East Asia will be the main players in the world energy markets as a result of maintaining high growth rates. In the next ten years, according to a statement by Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russia will increase the share of the Asian direction in its oil and gas exports from the current 3% to 30% [Izvestia, 18.09.2006]. In other words, this time period provides a basis for increasing mutual trade and investment activities: ASEAN + 3 and India need these resources, while Russia is looking for opportunities to overcome the excessive attachment of its exports to the Euro-Atlantic area. However, it should be borne in mind that beyond the medium term, this resource will be close to exhaustion, and the parties will have to look for other factors that stimulate their economic cooperation.

There are serious problems on the Russian side: it is extremely poorly represented on the world market of mechanical engineering and modern technologies. In the 90-ies of the last century, the "Soviet reserve" allowed to keep the share of machinery, equipment, vehicles and other finished industrial products in exports to non-CIS countries at the level of about 25%, but at the turn of the century it decreased to 10-12% (including about 5% of weapons and military equipment) [Russia: trends and prospects. .., 2005, pp. 11-12]. This degradation process can't be stopped yet: in the first case,

7 These data are provided by the Russian researcher A. N. Spartak [see: BIKI. N 15, 8.02.2003].

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in the first half of 2006, the share of machinery and equipment, vehicles in total exports decreased to 4.8% [Foreign Economic Complex of Russia..., 2006, p. 12].

Unfortunately, the situation has not changed significantly so far. In 2001-2004, only 2.9% to 3.3% of total industrial investment was directed to the fixed capital of the machine - building and metalworking industries, while foreign direct investment in these industries decreased from 5.1% in 2000 to 2.8% in 2003. [Russia: trends and prospects..., 2005, p. 11]. During the period of perestroika, the share of fuel and energy sectors in the total volume of industrial investment has steadily increased, while mechanical engineering and metalworking have declined. The volume of investment in these two industries was 8 times less than in the fuel industry [WIKI, 2003, p. 3].

These data indicate that the active phase of the formation of a complex of machine-building and closely related industries that can supply the national economy with products that meet post-industrial criteria and are competitive in foreign markets has not yet begun in Russia (and if it has begun, then very slowly). The key to accelerating and improving the quality of Russia's economic growth lies in changing the state's policy towards stimulating the manufacturing industry, primarily mechanical engineering. This is the only way to create conditions for the transition to the post-industrial stage, the widespread use of innovative technologies, and improving the competitiveness of the entire Russian economy.

Currently, the hindering factors are:

relatively low prices (by the standards of the world market) for production resources for the modernization of fixed assets, which makes it economically unprofitable to use the latest technology;

The current Russian tax and customs systems and other restrictions (and incentives) make investment in the extractive industry more attractive than in the manufacturing industry. For more information, see Klinov, 2006, pp. 31-46].

The State needs to strongly increase investments in basic science as well, in order to boost applied research.

A breakthrough in relations with the ASEAN countries can occur only as progress is made in solving this main economic task of the country. Over the next 10 to 15 years, we are likely to witness at best a slow growth in the share of machine-building and high-tech industries (at worst - stagnation) in economic interaction with Southeast and East Asia. We can only hope that the Russian leadership will realize as soon as possible the need for an active industrial policy designed to modernize the economy in order to overcome the fuel and raw materials "flux" and turn Russia into a subject of the world economy. It has already been noted above that without solving this problem, the country will not be able to find "its" niche in the SEEA, where it should be represented by competitive products, and its socio-economic stability and even integrity will be threatened.

The implementation of the above scenario (the most likely one, in our opinion) suggests that in the medium term, the ASEAN and East Asian countries will not only be able to maintain their industrial positions in the Russian market, but also strengthen them. This trend will only strengthen mutual interest in maintaining and developing trade and investment cooperation. Developing countries are steadily increasing the production and export of machinery and equipment to developed countries: the latter increased their exports of machinery and equipment in 2004 by 2.2 times compared to 1990, and imports-by 2.5 times [WIKI, 2003, p. 45]. This means that competition in the global markets for machine products will be stronger-

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However, without taking decisive measures, Russia may be too late to divide the largest segment of world trade.

The situation may change significantly over the next two decades. In October 2005, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of the Russian Federation prepared a draft foreign economic strategy of Russia until 2025. The drafters of this document believe that by this time Russia will be among the seven largest trading powers in the world and the top ten largest exporters and importers of capital, and the share of high-tech products and services in its exports will be 25% [Vedomosti, 19.10.2005]. The achievement of these (or similar) indicators, combined with the expected changes in ASEAN and East Asia, will undoubtedly give new impetus to economic cooperation in the Russia - ASEAN format and bring its structure closer to the criteria of a globalizing world economy.

III. STARTING POSITIONS

In the previous section of the article, suggestions are made on possible directions for the development of economic relations with the ASEAN countries in the ASEAN-10 and ASEAN + 3 formats. In the next 10 to 15 years, they will be more of an evolutionary nature, i.e. they will grow quantitatively with a gradual increase in the share of high-value-added goods and more complex technologies. It seems that export diversification will cover both sides, but its quality characteristics will differ. The ASEAN countries will obviously focus on a variety of household appliances, information technologies, industrial products, some types of machinery and industrial equipment, while Russia, in accordance with the established specialization, will focus on products and services of the aviation and rocket and space industries, metallurgical equipment, hydro and thermal power, nuclear power, and other types of products heavy and transport engineering, biotechnologies, new materials, etc. A comparison of the two export structures shows that there is a high potential for complementarity, especially given the differences in the structures of not only industrial production, but also the agricultural sector. If both sides manage to agree on joining forces, then the road to a significant (at times) increase in trade, mutual investment, and technological cooperation will open up for them. In the meantime.

Table 2

Russia's trade with ASEAN countries in 1999-2004 (USD million)

A country

Import

Export

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

Thailand

94

78

81

150

274

300

332

376

315

503

584

1022

Vietnam

115

123

194

187

160

91

246

240

376

501

492

777

Malaysia

70

75

131

171

251

407

289

191

136

174

191

469

Indonesia

34

57

62

66

110

154

50

110

141

151

100

234

Singapore

139

135

133

174

250

375

132

227

291

318

276

323

Philippines

-

-

-

-

14

19

-

-

-

-

345

378

Myanmar

0.2

10

12

11.7

29

15

0.8

4.08

2.48

96.7

11.72

25.5

Laos

0.7

0.4

0.3

0.15

0.14

0.22

4.89

1.68

4.13

4.41

2.45

7.13

Cambodia

0.86

-

0.4

0.16

0.55

2.18

8.23

0.1

2.83

0.22

1.08

1.69

Brunei

-

-

-

-

0.25

-

0.11

-

-

-

-

-

-----

Note: I-1999; II-2000; III-2001; IV-2002; V-2003; VI-2004

Source: [Correction of Trade Statistical Yearbook, 2005. Cit. by: BIKI, 14.01.2006].

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the level of trade is far from the real, and even more so from the potential opportunities of the parties, and investment cooperation is waiting for its start (Table 2).:

The data shown in the table allow us to draw some conclusions:

After 11 years (1991-2001) of sluggish and uneven trade, since 2002 there has been a revival and a relatively clear trend towards growth: in 2001, the trade turnover was $ 1.9 billion, in 2002 - $ 2.1 billion, in 2003 - $ 3.3 billion, and in 2004 - $ 4.4 billion.

There is still a strong gap between Russia's exports and imports: the former steadily and very significantly exceeds imports. A significant chronic surplus can turn into a brake on the growth of economic interaction.

The achieved level of trade turnover cannot be considered satisfactory. The share of Russia in the foreign trade turnover of the ASEAN countries (2004) is 0.3%, and the share of ASEAN countries in the Russian foreign trade turnover is 1.7% (1.3% in 2001).

According to the intensity of trade relations with Russia, the ASEAN countries are divided into two groups - the larger "four" (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines) and the smaller and less developed "three" (Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia). Vietnam, Singapore and Brunei, for a number of reasons, occupy an intermediate position, gravitating rather in terms of trade volumes (with the exception of Brunei) to the "four".

Data on the structure of mutual trade are of particular interest (Table 3).

Table 3

Commodity structure of Russia's trade with ASEAN countries in 2002

A country

Total

Food products and agricultural raw materials (other than textiles)

Mineral products

Chemical industry products, rubber

Metals and articles made from them

Machinery, equipment and vehicles

Other products

Total

Including fuel and energy products

Export

Import

Export

Import

Export

Import

Export

Import

Export

Import

Export

Import

Export

Import

Export

Import

Indonesia

100

100

0.03

67.2

2.5

0.1

-

-

1.9

3.8

60.3

0.02

15.4

21.2

19.87

7.68

Malaysia

100

100

0

46.1

0

0.5

0

-

5.9

5.8

87.0

0.3

2.7

42.2

4.4

5.1

Thailand

100

100

0.4

56.9

0.9

0.5

-

-

5.6

4.3

83.3

0.9

0.7

31.8

9.1

5.6

Philippines

100

100

0

54.8

98.1

0.1

1.2

33.7

0.7

11.4

ASEAN-4

100

100

0.1

55.5

0.3

0.4

0

-

4.6

4.5

86.7

0.4

2.8

32.9

5.5

6.3

Vietnam

100

100

0.2

73

5.7

0.01

4.9

6.4

6.5

41.8

0.3

31.3

5.1

14.6

15.0

Singapore

100

100

-

20.2

61.73

0.2

61.7

0.2

1.3

7.2

9.2

3.3

27.27

66.9

0.5

2.2

ASEAN

Total*

100

100

0.1

53.4

24.1

0.3

23.8

0.02

3.8

5.0

47.9

0.7

18.3

33.8

5.8

6.8

-----

* No trade with Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar.

Source: [Customs Statistics..., 2003, p. 472, 476, 483, 484, 488, 489, 491, 494].

Leading positions in Russia's exports are occupied by metals and products made from them, fuel and energy products (71.7% of total exports to the ASEAN countries). Products with higher added value account for only 22.1%. It is impossible not to see that this figure is unacceptably low, given the level of development of the Russian economy and its potential. However, it significantly exceeds up to-

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It is important to note that Russia has a significant share of similar products, including machinery and equipment, in its exports to the Euro-Atlantic region and, more importantly, has better prospects. Analysis of the structure of Russian imports suggests that the ASEAN countries ' exports to Russia are more balanced: food products and agricultural raw materials (53.4%) dominate, but they are followed by machinery, equipment and vehicles (33.8%).

All this shows that there is a huge potential for both sides both to improve the structure of mutual trade and to significantly increase its volume. It seems that the solution of this problem should be given priority over the next one to two five-year periods. Its addition to investment and technological cooperation, the creation of the necessary transport infrastructure can bring the economic interaction of the parties to the frontiers that meet the requirements of the XXI century.

A special role in the development of economic relations with the ASEAN countries (especially in the ASEAN + 3 format) will belong to the East Siberian and Far Eastern regions of Russia. Even now, for example, the Far East is more focused on North-East Asia (NEA) than on the national market: only 4-5% of the region's GDP is directed to the latter, and 18% to the NEA market, the rest is consumed locally [Ishaev, 2003, p.166]. These two Russian regions will become active participants in the projects currently under consideration for the sustainable energy supply of eastern Russia and NEA and the development of transport infrastructure in Eurasia, including the container bridge between Europe and Asia.

There are very real prerequisites for the implementation of these megaprojects. According to some estimates, the NEA countries ' energy needs will double by 2010 compared to the beginning of this decade, and the Russian Far East region will become energy-surplus: primary energy production, primarily oil and gas, may reach 108 million tons of CU by the end of the decade, with domestic consumption of 50 million tons of CU., and the export resources of electricity will amount to 3 billion kWh [Ishaev, 2003, p. 52,222]. Using the Trans-Siberian Railway reduces cargo delivery time by 25-30%; the Russian side earns currency, while Asian and European suppliers reduce transport costs by speeding up deliveries.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that for the Russian side, the development of cooperation in the fuel and energy sector and in the field of transport infrastructure should not be an end in itself, but should take place within the framework of a strategy that combines inertial diversification (involving goods or products that do not fundamentally change the existing specialization) and evolutionary factor upgrading (improving the export structure by consistently involving more complex factors of production in the turnover, i.e. increasing the degree of processing of primary resources, moving up the chain of raw materials-intermediate products - finished products).

The future prospects of Russia's cooperation with the ASEAN + 3 countries, as well as the entire system of its foreign economic relations, depend on how soon it will be able to move to a new resource-innovative model of creating competitive advantages based on a combination of various competitive factors that co-exist in its economy (access to natural resources, relatively cheap and skilled labor, developed basic industrial infrastructure, intellectual and scientific-technical potential). The development of external relations within the framework of such a model implies innovative diversification of Russian exports, accompanied by modernization of the export range. Without a transition to such a model of interaction with ASEAN countries, trade growth will inevitably slow down: the framework is clear-

page 74

our structures are close to being exhausted. According to the World Bank, Russia exported 6 times less high - tech products in 2001 than the Philippines, 12 times less than Malaysia and South Korea, and 15 times less than China [World Development Indicators, 2003, p. 302-304]. These data confirm Russia's interest in importing a number of high-tech products and services from these countries, but at the same time indicate its unsatisfactory position as an exporter of such products and services. Obviously, the future of Russia's economic relations with ASEAN-10 and ASEAN + 3 will largely depend on its ability to differentiate the structure of its economy and exports, as well as establish investment cooperation with them. In relations with ASEAN, it is necessary to overcome the excessive specialization of Russian exports in armaments and military equipment, and switch to the supply of civil engineering products. In this context, the proposal of the Vietnamese side to jointly organize the production of equipment for small and medium-sized power plants in Vietnam deserves attention.

Russian companies do not take advantage of opportunities to develop industrial and investment cooperation with ASEAN countries, limiting this area of activity to Vietnam and a small sector of military-technical cooperation in Malaysia. Taking into account the state and development trends of the economies of the Southeast Asian countries, which are experiencing a shortage of foreign investment in the real sector, it is possible to cooperate widely, starting with geological exploration, in a number of manufacturing industries, for example, in setting up the production of modern equipment for small enterprises (possibly in cooperation with Western firms), acquiring assets of electronic and electrical engineering industry and organization of production of goods oriented to the Russian market, enterprises that produce clothing and related products (for example, the activities of the Rostov "Gloria Gine" in China, Brazil, Italy). There are also prospects for scientific and technical cooperation, including in the production of certain types of software for high-tech industries.

IV. POSSIBLE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE RUSSIAN SIDE TO DEVELOP COOPERATION WITH THE ASEAN COUNTRIES*

1. Significant differences between the ASEAN countries in terms of development levels, as well as the incomplete integration process, make it advisable to organize cooperation with them on a bilateral basis. At the same time, all this does not exclude the need to take into account the changes taking place in this association, which may in the future ensure the participation of the Russian side in a number of integration projects. Such an approach, as already noted, will also contribute to the establishment of relations between ASEAN and the EurAsEC.

2. The growing role of new participants in foreign economic activity - companies and corporations, professional communities, regions and smaller administrative-territorial entities-requires more complete consideration of the specific interests of economic entities when working out options for cooperation with ASEAN countries. To this end, it is important to increase the real impact of the participation of Russian officials, businessmen, representatives of regions and municipalities in formal and informal formations that bring together business circles, non-governmental organizations, regions and administrative-territorial units of the ASEAN countries.

3. The interests of regions and business entities, including representatives of medium and small businesses, require the creation of a reliable and accessible information system

* This section of the article was prepared jointly with Candidate of Economic Sciences N. A. Ushakova.

page 75

information about the economic, financial and legal conditions of economic activity in the ASEAN countries, trends in their economic and political development, specific firms and companies interested in cooperation, etc. Such a system should have a database of Russian companies and firms that can meet the needs of potential partners from the ASEAN countries. It is also advisable to establish a regular exchange of information on an equivalent basis with interested structures in the ASEAN countries, using the opportunities of the Russia - ASEAN Foundation, Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

4. The current level of trade and economic cooperation between Russia and the countries of East and South-East Asia does not correspond to Russia's strategic course of balanced development of foreign economic relations with the West and East. This imbalance primarily hinders the development of the economy of the Far East and Eastern Siberia. One of the ways to mobilize existing cooperation reserves is to diversify the geography of trade and economic ties, which are characterized by an excessively high concentration on a limited number of partners (more than 75% of trade turnover with APEC countries is accounted for by China, the United States and Japan; in trade with ASEAN countries, the geographical structure of which is somewhat more diversified, over 60% of Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia).

5. In the medium term, Russia's foreign economic strategy should focus on increasing traditional exports of goods and services for which Russia has competitive advantages in the Asia-Pacific mega-regional market and/or in the markets of individual countries. These are energy carriers, ferrous, non-ferrous and precious metals, fertilizers, business wood, pulp, as well as its spatial resource as a Eurasian state (transport corridors, recreation, etc.). Russia remains a major exporter of energy and power equipment supplied under agreements on the construction of energy facilities, including nuclear power plants, weapons and equipment. special equipment, products and services of the rocket and space industry, transport services. However, it is necessary to take into account the growing competition from developed and developing countries and China in almost all these areas, with the exception of energy exports.

6. Real prospects for a massive increase in energy exports are associated with large-scale projects in the Far Eastern and Eastern Siberian regions, focused not just on the growth of export-import operations, but on the development of cooperation with NEA countries in the energy sector. The first step in this direction could be the formation of a market for liquefied natural gas and the Russia-NEA electric power system. Sakhalin liquefied and natural gas has significant competitive advantages in the Asia-Pacific markets, where sales of this product are increasing by 5% per year. In Russia, it is produced at newly developed rich deposits, while similar enterprises in Brunei, Malaysia, and Australia no longer have serious opportunities to increase production volumes.

The implementation of two major projects - the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline and two gas routes from Western and Eastern Siberia to China-will bring fuel and energy cooperation between Russia and the NEA countries to a fundamentally new level, and will contribute to strengthening the energy security of both Russia and the NEA countries.

7. In Asian countries, a significant increase in electricity generation at nuclear power plants is expected. Only India and China, with which Russia signed early agreements on cooperation in the construction of nuclear power plants in the late 1990s, plan to build 15 more power units. In total, in the countries of East, South-East and South Asia, pre --

page 76

It is planned to build 39 nuclear reactors in the next decade. Taking into account the fact that successful operation in this highly competitive market requires huge investments and involves serious commercial and other risks, in the near future it is advisable to focus not so much on expanding the circle of partners, but on increasing the scale of cooperation with current partners - India, China, Vietnam - and improving its efficiency.

Credit support from the state plays an important role in promoting nuclear energy to foreign markets. In 2004, Russia provided loans to India in the amount of $ 382.5 million (in 2005 - $ 437.9 million), China - $ 401 million (in 2005 it was supposed to provide another $ 68 million), Vietnam - $ 86.9 million. [Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 16.07.2004; 27.08.2004], a significant part of which is intended to pay for equipment supplied from Russia. In general, the nuclear power industry has a chance to become the third position (after the fuel and energy complex and metallurgy) in Russian exports to NEA.

8. As for the increase in exports of other types of machinery products, radical changes can be achieved only if fundamental structural changes are made in the Russian industry itself. However, a certain increase in the share of machine-building products in exports to the ASEAN countries is possible due to more active use of such factors as the creation of a branded sales and service network by Russian enterprises, the organization of assembly plants. Until recently, the activity of Russian enterprises in this area was hindered by difficulties in obtaining permits for foreign investment within the framework of the current regime of currency regulation and currency control.

9. The most important item of high-tech exports in the near and, apparently, medium term will remain the export of weapons and special equipment. Russia's share in the global arms trade in recent years has been 20-30%, but more than half of Russia's arms exports go to China and India, whose share in the global arms trade is less than 10%. Recently, Russia has been increasingly entering new markets in Asia and Latin America. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines and Thailand may be among the participants in the military-technical cooperation, and other potential buyers of Russian aircraft and military equipment are also planned. Under favorable conditions, the volume of sales of Russian weapons and military equipment to the Southeast Asian countries may reach $ 1-1.5 billion.

10. Russia's participation as a Eurasian country in the Asian Development Bank could make a certain contribution to the expansion of economic cooperation with the ASEAN countries. Better awareness of the nature of economic processes on the continent, cooperation within the framework of programs and specific projects of the bank (as a donor and/or participant) would give an additional impetus to the search for new objects, forms and mechanisms of interaction.

list of literature

BIKI. 8.02.2003. N 15; 11.02.2003. N 16; 17.08.2006.

Vedomosti. 19.10.2005.

Foreign Economic Complex of Russia: Sovremennoe sostoyanie i perspektivy [Current state and prospects]. Ch. II. M.: VNIKI, 2006.

Izvestia. 22.12.2005; 22.03.2006; 18.09.2006.

Ishaev V. I. Russia in the global world. Khabarovsk, 2003.

Klinov V. Sovremennye tendentsii razvitiya mashinostroeniya [Modern trends in machine building development]. 2006. N 9.

World economy and International relations. 2004. N 10.

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Nezavisimaya gazeta. 16.07.2004; 27.08.2004.

Potapov M. Kuda iskhodya ekonomicheskaya integratsiya v Vostochnoi Azii [Where is the economic integration in East Asia going?]. 2006. N 9.

Industrial weekly. 2005. October 24-30. N 34.

Russia: trends and prospects of development. Yearbook. Issue 1. Moscow, 2005.

Customs statistics of foreign trade of the Russian Federation. Annual collection 2002. Moscow, 2003.

Expert. 2005. November 14-20; 2006. July 24 - 30, 2006. N 28.

From Confrontation to Cooperation, USA. 1991.

Towards East Asian Economic Community, The Gioi Publishers Institute of World Economics and Politics. VASS Vietnam, 2004.

World Development Indicators. The World Bank. N. Y., 2003.

World Economic Outlook. April 2000.

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