In the history of each nation, you can find periods of ups and downs. The time of the highest power of the Oirats in the post-Yuan period in the history of medieval Mongolia is the period of "Oirat hegemony", when the united Mongol-Oirat state was ruled in the first half of the XV century by prominent statesmen Togon-taishi (d. 1439) and his son Esen (1407-1455) [Sanchirov, 2002, p. 38 - 53]. Occupying the influential position of the first taishi minister at the court of the supreme Khan of Mongolia Togtobukha, Daisun Khan, Togon actually usurped the khan's power. As reported in the Chinese dynastic chronicle "Ming shi", " Togtobukha was appointed hagan (supreme khan. - B.C.) ... and he himself [=Togon] became cheng-hsiang (Minister. - B.C.). Outwardly, he seemed to receive his orders, but in reality he did not obey him (Togtobuhe. - B.C.) " [Ham-bis, 1969, p.29]. Active and energetic Oirat rulers Togon, and then Esen, had absolute control over all state affairs in the country, turning the "all-Mongol khan" into a simple puppet on the throne.

The centralizing policy of the Oirat Taishi, aimed at overcoming feudal fragmentation and creating a unified Mongol-Oirat state under the rule of Oirat rulers from the house of Choros, led to a sharp deterioration in relations with neighboring China, where the Ming Dynasty ruled (1368-1644). The root cause of this was disputes with the Minsk government over trade relations, in which the Mongol and Oirat rulers were extremely interested. Uninterrupted trade exchange with settled countries allowed nomads-Mongols and Oirats-to acquire the necessary products of agriculture and developed handicraft production and sell the products of their cattle-breeding economy. However, the Ming dynasty in China, remembering the lessons of the past, has always been guided in its trade practice with its neighbors by considerations not of an economic, but of a military-strategic order, and has not been at all interested in strengthening the power of a united state of warlike nomads near its borders. Therefore, the Minsk government in its relations with the Mongols and Oirats has always pursued a policy of "divide and rule", inciting hostility and pitting the Oirat and East Mongolian rulers against each other in order to weaken both opponents.

The development of events led to the great Oirato-Chinese war in 1449. It is interesting to note that Daisun Khan, the nominal ruler of Mongolia, was against open war with China. According to Chinese chroniclers, he tried to stop Esen and said to him: "Everything-our clothes and food were given to us by the great Ming, how can you show them such black ingratitude?" [Pokotilov, 1893, p. 65]. The plans of the Oirat Taishi included the restoration of the Yuan Empire, i.e. the establishment of power over China.

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In China, at this time, the young emperor Zhu Qizhen (November 27, 1427 - February 23, 1464) was on the throne. The name of the years of the first period of his reign was Zheng-tong (1436-1449), the posthumous temple name was Ying-zong [Lienche Tu Fang, Cha-oying Fang, 1976, p .289-294]. Having taken the throne in 1436 at a minor age, he became the sixth emperor of Minsk. The country at that time was ruled on his behalf by several high - ranking dignitaries, along with his grandmother, the Empress Dowager. From these dignitaries, the emperor's mentor, the chief eunuch of the Ritual Department, Wang Zhen, soon stood out. When Zhu Qizhen came of age in 1442, he was given full power, but the government continued to function as before. These years were marked by the further disintegration of the Minsk army (although spending on border defense absorbed a significant part of state revenues), general corruption and the dominance of eunuchs at the Minsk court.

In the summer of 1449, the twenty-thousandth Mongol-Oirat army under the command of Esen invaded China and, divided into three groups, moved towards Beijing. On August 3, 1449, Emperor Zhu Qizhen decided to personally march against the invading enemy forces. In the capital, he left his younger brother Zhu Qiyu as regent in his place. Top officials were appointed to assist him. The next day, an unprepared and poorly equipped half-million-strong Chinese army marched against the Oirats. Here we are dealing with the traditional exaggeration for medieval Chinese historiography, although there is no doubt that the Chinese army was several times larger than its opponent.

The command of the army was in the hands of incompetent generals, since all military operations were led by the poorly versed in military affairs Wang Zhen and other eunuchs. It was Wang Zhen who persuaded the young emperor, despite the objections of other courtiers, to personally lead the expedition against the "northern barbarians". Wang Zhen's plan to make a victorious march north, beyond the Great Wall, and defeat Esen in Mongolia was completely unrealistic, and the Chinese army was in a critical position from the very beginning. The general battle took place on September 1, 1449 in the Tumu area, southwest of the mountains. Huailai in present-day Hebei Province. (For a description of the Oirato-Chinese War of 1449, see: [Pokotilov, 1893, p. 65-70; Mote, 1974, p. 243-272, 361-369; BNMAU-yn tuuh..., 1966, p. 422-425). Here the Oirat troops managed to encircle the Minsk army together with the emperor and his retinue. The army was unable to repel the attacks of Esen's troops and suffered a crushing defeat. The winners got huge trophies and many prisoners. Many of the empire's top dignitaries died on the battlefield, including Wang Zhen. The Emperor and many courtiers were captured by the Oirats. N. I. Konrad (1974, p. 183) noted that the huge shock experienced by the Minsk power is evidenced at least by a very significant fact for Chinese historiography, which received the name tumu zhi bian ("catastrophe at the land-wooden fortifications"). This event is also called the "Tumus disaster". Tumu means "land and wood, land-wood" - hence the possibility of a double translation.

Esen believed that the captured emperor could be a trump card in future peace negotiations. So he stopped fighting and wasted time waiting for the embassy to arrive from the Chinese capital.

Meanwhile, the following events took place in Beijing. When the news of the army's defeat at the Battle of Tumus and the capture of the Emperor reached the Chinese capital, panic and confusion reigned in government circles. Some members of the Beijing ruling clique even suggested moving the capital from Beijing to the south of the country. However, the patriotic party prevailed at the court. Who compiled it

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Major dignitaries and military leaders stationed in Beijing rallied around the captured emperor's younger brother, Regent Zhu Qiyu. He was in his 22nd year, but he was a timid, weak-willed, and indecisive person (Franke, 1976, pp. 294-298). The main role in the subsequent events was played by the talented and energetic commander Yu Qian (see his biography [Franke, 1976, p. 1061-612]). In 1449, he was Deputy Minister of War and, fortunately, during the ill-fated military campaign, remained in the capital, acting as head of the military department. New people have been added to replace the high-ranking courtiers and military leaders who disappeared during this campaign. Yu Qian was appointed Minister of War on September 7, 1449, and became the most influential figure in the government.

In a critical situation, Yu Qian showed firmness and determination and categorically opposed the proposal to move the capital from Beijing to the south of the country. It was his idea to install the younger brother of the captive emperor, Prince Regent Zhu Qiyu, on the throne, in order to deprive the Oirat ruler Esen of the main means of exerting political pressure on China. September 22, 1449 Zhu Qiyu was officially proclaimed emperor with the motto of the Jingtai reign (1450-1456). At Yu Qian's insistence, the government decided not to leave the capital and defended the city with all available means. The Chinese capital was successfully prepared for a long siege, and work began on strengthening the defensive structures along the Great Wall of China. The new Minister of War managed to gather and significantly improve the combat effectiveness of the scattered and demoralized remnants of the former Chinese army.

Esen was completely unprepared for this turn of events. Assuming that the government in Beijing would accept all of his demands, he had hopelessly lost time: troops were drawn from the southern provinces of China to the capital, and the city itself was prepared for a long defense. Only two months later, at the end of October 1449, the Oirat army approached Beijing. Realizing that he would not be able to attack the well-fortified city, the Oirat ruler ordered the siege to be lifted four days later and returned to the Mongol steppes.

The new Chinese government has consistently rejected all proposals by Esen to release the captive Emperor Zhu Qizhen for ransom, thereby demonstrating its disinterest in his speedy return to the country. There is quite a lot of information about the Min emperor's stay in Oirat captivity in Chinese sources, which, unfortunately, has not yet been put into scientific circulation. This period in his life is described by American Sinologists in his biography, published in the Dictionary of Prominent Figures of the Minsk period, as follows: "While in captivity for twelve and a half months, Zhu Qizhen had the opportunity to live and roam in a separate yurt, use the services and communicate with Yuan Bin, an official captured at the same time as Nim, and Yang Ming, the translator. On several occasions, those who held him in captivity took the former emperor with them on their raids beyond the Great Wall of China so that he could demand gifts for them from the commanders of the (Chinese - B.C.) garrisons. One day, Esen reminded him of this good treatment and asked him what kind of torture he, Esen, would be subjected to if the situation changed. When Zhu was returned to China, he and the Oirats parted as friends" [Lienche Tu Fang, Chaoying Fang, 1976, p. 292].

It is quite clear that for political reasons Esen had to show signs of attention to his noble prisoner. It is known that he arranged magnificent feasts for the former Chinese sovereign, provided him with servants and even offered to give him his sister as a wife [Hambis, 1969, p. 101-102; Rossabi, 1969, p. 419]. At the same time, the Oirat ruler sent one after another of his po-

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words to the new emperor to negotiate the release of his royal captive.

Peace negotiations between the Oirat Taishi and the new Minsk government began in the summer of 1450. On the Chinese side, they were assigned to an experienced Chinese diplomat, Yang Shan [Hok-lam Chan, 1976, p. 1528-1531]. This was the official who had the longest service record (he was in the civil service for more than fifty years). As Yang Shan successfully rose through the ranks of the five emperors, he successfully passed through all the thorns and pitfalls in the life of a courtier. He had all the characteristics of a "crafty courtier", his cunning, shrewdness and rare ability to stay "afloat" in all circumstances of life are indicated by most biographers, but they also praise his skill as a diplomat. In the Battle of Tumus, he was in the retinue of Emperor Zhu Qizhen, but he was one of the few who managed to escape safely from the battlefield. He had a very thankless and delicate mission when, in August 1450, accompanied by a large retinue of officials, he went to Esen to negotiate the normalization of relations between Mongolia and the Ming Empire and to achieve the return of the captured emperor to his homeland. The new emperor had little interest in the speedy return of his elder brother from Oirat captivity and did not take care to provide his diplomatic representative with the necessary amount for his ransom. Therefore, Yang Shan even had to buy gifts for Esen and some everyday items for the captive emperor at his own expense.

He arrived at the headquarters of the Oirat ruler on September 5, 1450. Esen was out hunting at the time and was only able to receive the Chinese ambassador two days later. For details of the negotiations, see chapter 328 of the official Chinese dynastic history, Ming Shi, and Chapter 171 of Ming Shi, which contains a biography of Yang Shan. The first thing Esen asked him was what fate awaited the captive emperor in his homeland, especially since the letter that was provided to the Chinese ambassador in Beijing did not say anything at all about returning Zhu Qizhen from captivity. Esen seemed to ask: "The former emperor, once he returns, will he ascend the throne again as the Son of Heaven?" To this Yang Shan replied: "The heavenly throne is already occupied, nothing can be changed" (Hambis, 1969, p. 102). Heeding the pleas of the Chinese diplomat, the Oirat ruler agreed to release his prisoner without any conditions and without any ransom. According to Ming Shi, he then took the ambassador to the former emperor and held a feast in honor of his departure. At this feast, Esen himself sat on the ground and played a musical instrument, while his wives and concubines brought cups of wine to the distinguished guests [Hambis, 1969, p. 102; Pokotilov, 1893, p. 78]. "According to no doubt embellished Chinese reports," writes a contemporary American biographer of Esen, "Esen was so saddened by the departure of his captive that he accompanied the column of departing Chinese to a considerable distance, bowed and wept at the final farewell" (Rossabi, 1976, p.419). D. Pokotilov describes this farewell in an extremely embellished form in his book [Pokotilov, 1893, pp. 78-79].

After returning to China from the Oirat captivity, the former emperor Zhu Qizhen received the title of Tai-shang Huangdi, which was usually assigned in China to retired rulers, passing the throne to his son during his lifetime. He was imprisoned in strict isolation from the outside world in one of the palaces of the Forbidden City, where he spent over six and a half years while his younger brother was on the imperial throne. Then in 1457, during the illness of Emperor Zhu Qiyu, as a result of a palace coup, he regained the imperial throne and ruled the country until 1464.

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However, mutual trade issues were central to Esen's talks with the Chinese ambassador. Yang Shan's conversation on this subject with the Oirat taishi is given almost literally in the text of "Ming shi", this passage is translated from it and placed in the book by D. Pokotilov. At the talks, a Chinese diplomat reproached Esen for his attack on China, saying: "When Taishan-huang (i.e., the former emperor Zhu Chi-zhen. - B.C.) was still on the throne, you taishi sent twice a year embassies with tribute; the number of your messengers reached three thousand people, and all of them were rewarded with innumerable amounts of gold and silk fabrics; how could you show such black ingratitude?". In response, Esen put forward his claims to the Chinese side: "Why did you reduce the price of horses and why did you often sell bad, damaged silk?". The Chinese ambassador responded to these reproaches: "It's not our fault that we had to give you less than we should for the horses, but you yourself, because every year you brought more and more of them. We didn't want to turn down your offerings, but we couldn't pay for everything in full, so we had to reduce the price. As for the fact that you were often given damaged silk, the state suppliers are to blame for this, and when this abuse was discovered, they were executed" [Pokotilov, 1893, p. 76]. The above conversation between Esen and the Chinese ambassador sheds light on the nature of trade relations between Mongolia and China at the time described, and on the true background of the wars between them. Later, Yang Shan wrote memoirs about his journey to the Oirat Taishi, which have not survived to our time, but were used in the historiographical works of his contemporaries.
In the late autumn of 1450, peace was concluded between Mongolia and the Ming Empire. This peace suited primarily the Mongol and Oirat feudal lords, who, being the owners of huge herds of cattle and feudal rents from the farms of feudally dependent and exploited ordinary nomads, were thus legally able to satisfy their needs not only in grain and in simple items of clothing and household items, but also in the production of food and clothing. luxury goods, in gold and silk. The Chinese side, which was forced to accept many of the terms of the peace treaty imposed on it by the Esen after its defeat in the war with united Mongolia, did not accept the situation at all. The lessons of the lost war prompted the Minsk authorities to concentrate all military forces in the north-west and abandon foreign policy expansion in other directions. "China has turned its face to the northwest and its back to the sea," some researchers have repeatedly noted figuratively [History of China..., 1974, p. 131].

After all these events, Esen's relations with the Minsk court remained outwardly friendly, and he regularly sent envoys to the Minsk emperor, who presented him with a" tribute " of horses and at the same time engaged in trade. Thus, in 1453, the Oirat embassy, which arrived in Beijing in the number of three thousand people, received 26,432 silk scrolls, 91,227 crepe scrolls and other goods from the Minsk Empire [Bugd..., 1966, p. 429]. At the same time, the Minsk authorities, maintaining friendly relations with the Oirat ruler, were preparing to deal a crushing blow to the Oirats behind his back. On the one hand, they took a number of measures to strengthen their north-western border and increase the number of troops stationed here, and on the other, they showered rich and generous gifts on the Mongol Daisan Khan and other major Mongol and Oirat feudal lords. By courting the Mongol rulers, China's ruling circles sought to split them off from the Esen. Therefore, his relations with Daisun Khan soon deteriorated sharply, as Esen suspected the latter of secret relations and friendship with the Minsk court (Pokotilov, 1893, p.80). Probably, the Oirat taishi also became aware that Chinese officials offered him 50 thousand liang (1 liang = 37.3 g) of silver-

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pa, 10,000 taels of gold, and a Chinese official title for whoever kills Esen (Rossabi, 1976, p. 418).

In 1451, there was a final break between Esen and the nominal ruler of Mongolia, Daisun Khan. At one time, Esen's father Togon-taishi married his daughter, Esen's older sister, to the supreme khan of Mongolia. After the victorious war with China, in order to make his way to the Khan's throne, Esen, according to "Ming shi", began to strenuously press Daisun Khan to declare his son, born from the Oirat princess, Esen's sister, as his heir. Thus, Esen's nephew could find himself on the throne of the all-Mongol khan after the death of his father. However, Daisun Khan did not agree to this, and hostilities broke out between him and his all-powerful first minister. The Supreme Khan of Mongolia was defeated and killed. Esen became the sole and absolute ruler of the united Mongol-Oirat state, whose possessions stretched from the Liaodong Peninsula in the east to Central Asia in the west.

After the Oirat taishi succeeded in suppressing the Mongol feudal lords and eliminating other contenders for the Khan throne in Mongolia, he was at the zenith of his power, proclaiming himself the all-Mongol Khan and taking the title of "August Great Khagan of the great Yuan Dynasty" (Hambis, 1976, p.104). He appointed his son taishi. Academician N. I. Konrad wrote that "the specter of a great empire also hovered before the Oirat Khan Esen, who united Western and Eastern Mongolia, i.e. restored the Mongol state within its tribal borders" [Konrad, 1974, p. 183]. In Mongolian historiography, this state is called the State of Forty and Four, since in Mongolian sources it is said that " Forty and Four "(i.e., the eastern Mongols and Oirats) became the glory of one khan " [Bugd..., 1966, p. 426].

Esen sent an embassy to Beijing and officially notified the Minsk government that he had taken the throne of the Supreme Khan of Mongolia and declared himself the Mongolian khagan. However, the Minsk authorities did not recognize this title in their response letter and called him the "Oirat Khagan" (Pokotilov, 1893, p. 83). Medieval Chinese historians who were hostile to the Oirats write that "Esen was proud of his power, his arrogance grew from day to day, and he indulged in debauchery and drunkenness" (Hambis, 1969, p.104). Pursuing a policy of "restraining the barbarians by the hands of the barbarians themselves," the Minsk government did not abandon its attempts to win over not only the Mongol, but also the Oirat princes to its side and, by encouraging them to rebel against the central government, weaken the united Mongol-Oirat state.

In the Oirat society itself, there was also no unity among the ruling stratum. Esen also had to fight against the Oirat feudal lords, who were opponents of centralized power. Therefore, he did not remain Khan of united Mongolia for long. In 1455, two of his military leaders, Alag - chinsang and Temur-chinsang, large feudal lords who were at the head of the right and left wings, rebelled against the Oirat ruler [Pokotilov, 1893, p.84]. According to Mongolian sources, they were dissatisfied with Esen's desire to make his power hereditary and demanded that he transfer the position of taishi to one of them. At the same time, they seemed to be saying: "With the help of Alag-Temur and Khatan-Temur-bagatur, thanks to the wisdom of Abdar-setsen, you have seized the power of the Mongols and Oirats. You have achieved all this not by your own efforts, but by someone else's labor" [Mongol sources..., 1986, pp. 61-62]. In the civil war that broke out, Esen's troops were defeated, and he was forced to abandon his family and property and flee for his life, during which he was killed.

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With the death of Esen Khan, the relative unity of the united Mongol-Oirat state, headed by the Oirat Taishis, ended. Feudal fragmentation affected not only Eastern but also Western Mongolia. The country broke up into a number of independent, independent from each other small and large feudal khanates and principalities. 10 years after Esen's death, official contacts between the Minsk court and the rulers of the Oirat nomadic groups completely ceased. They were resumed only 170 years later under the Khoshut Gushi Khan, already in a completely different era, when China was conquered by the Manchus.

list of literature

History of China from ancient times to the present day, Moscow: Nauka, GRVL, 1974.
Konrad N. I. O rabote I. Ya. Zlatkina "Istoriya Dzungarskogo khanstva" [On the work of I. Ya. Zlatkin "The History of the Dzungarian Khanate"]. Istoriya [History], Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1974.
Mongolian sources about Dayan Khan. Introduction, introductory article, comm. by G. S. Gorokhova, Moscow: Nauka, GRVL, 1986.

Pokotilov D. History of the Eastern Mongols during the Ming Dynasty: 1368-1634 (according to Chinese sources). St. Petersburg, 1893.

Sanchirov V. P. Hegemony of the Oirats in Mongolia and Esen Khan (1407-1455) // Bulletin of the Kalmyk Institute for Humanitarian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, vol. 17. Elista, 2002.

Бугд Найрамдах Монгол Ард Улсын туух. Тэргуун ботъ. Nep ertnees XVII zuun. Улаанбаатар: Улсын хэвлэлийн хэрэг эрхлэх хороо, 1966.

Franke W. Yii Ch'ien // Goodrich L. Carrington and Chaoying Fang (ed.). Dictionary of Ming Biography, 1368 - 1644. Vol. 2. N. Y.: Columbia University Press, 1976.

Hambis L. Documents sur Vhistoire des Mongols a Vepoque des Ming. P.: Presses universitaires de France, 1969.

Hok-lam Chan. Yang Shan // Dictionary of Ming Biography. Vol. II.

Lienche Tu Fang, Chaoying Fang. Chu Ch'i-chen // Dictionary of Ming Biography. Vol. I.

Mote Frederic W. The T'umu incident of 1449 // Chinese Ways of Warfare. Cambridge (Mass): Harvard University Press, 1974.

Rossabi M. Esen // Dictionary of Ming Biography. Vol. 1.

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