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PRICE REFORM AS A KEY ELEMENT OF THE "CHINESE WAY". PRACTICES AND THEORIES OF "TWO-TRACK" PRICING

1systemic transformation in the People's Republic of China has been going on for more than three decades. The origins of the" Chinese way", its direction and dynamics, the ratio of spontaneous and calculated, radical and gradual, the criteria of success and failure, the applicability in other countries, and even the " world-historical significance "of the" Chinese miracle " invariably arouse great interest, various discussions, and have long been the object of widespread, sometimes unrestrained theorizing. Meanwhile, I think that the lines written by the famous Chinese economist Sheng Hong a decade and a half ago still remain relevant: "Up to the present time, research (reforms. - M. K.) remain at the stage of an ordinary theory, which is extremely lacking in empirical foundations. With regard to such significant systemic developments as are taking place in China, the first priority is to describe them. First of all, people need to know what is actually happening. One can get a general idea of such meaningful changes in the field of human relations and social norms only by perceiving them at the micro level " [Sheng Hong, 1996, p. 80].

Keywords: "Chinese way", pricing reform, "two-track" pricing model, "multi-track" pricing model.

The reform of the pricing system in China is key in terms of understanding the socio-economic processes in China at the micro level. On the one hand, there is an acute shortage of empiricism in this area, primarily from the lowest level. On the other hand, the Chinese economic literature is replete with far-reaching theoretical constructions (Li Huizhong, 1998; Fan Gang, 1995, 1996; Sheng Hong, 2003).'

1 I will give here only some of the main approaches and the lines of discussion formed by them.

Against the background of the generally existing consensus in the expert circles of the PRC that the reforms in China were and are still being implemented through "trial and error" - "crossing the river, groping for stones", some Russian observers are dominated by the opinion that the strategy of reforms in the PRC is deeply thought out from the very beginning...It should be emphasized that the development strategy of the PRC was very well thought out. Before accepting it, Deng Xiaoping's entourage studied the experience of NEP, Kosygin's reforms, reforms in Hungary, in the "new industrial countries "and even invited M. Friedman, the" godfather " of neoliberalism, to Beijing. And only then did it develop its own original model of reform and openness... " [Kiva, 2009, p. 29].

There is considerable disagreement about the relationship between the radical and the gradual in the nature of the "Chinese way". On the one hand, the vast majority of Chinese experts believe that the reforms in the PRC were and are gradual and partial in nature [Lin Yifu, 1994; Zhang Jun, 2003; Fan Gang, 1996; Sheng Hong, 2006; Miao Zhuang, 1992; Hu Ruyin, 1992], fundamentally different in this respect from "shock " systemic transformations in a number of former socialist countries of Eastern Europe and in Russia. At the same time, Fan Gang believes that it is more correct to speak of "partial reforms", because the term "partial reforms" is used in the context of the "partial reforms".

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"gradual reforms" presupposes the existence of a consistently implemented plan, which in the Chinese case still did not exist [Fan Gang, 1993, 1996]. On the other hand, a well-known supporter of neoliberal approaches John. Sachs and some of his colleagues are convinced that in a number of areas the reforms in the PRC were not gradual and partial, but rather quite radical in agriculture and in the sphere of small-scale privatization (Sachs and Woo, 1994).

In its own way, the correspondence discussion on the applicability of the experience of reforms in China in other countries, in particular in Russia, is interesting. Authors such as J. R. R. Tolkien Sachs [Sachs, Woo, 1994], M. Chanadi [Csanadi, 2006], E. Gaidar [Gaidar, 1997], A. Aslund [Aslund, 1995, 2007], and M. Karpov [Karpov, 1999] believe that there were no socio-economic, institutional, and cultural prerequisites for implementation in our country the "Chinese model" of transformations. A number of Russian specialists - S. Glazyev, A. Volsky, and Yu. Maslyukov-hold the opposite point of view [Gaidar, 1997, p.40]. Most Chinese colleagues note the "successes" of Chinese reforms and the "failures" of Russian ones. As a rule, politically correct silence is maintained on the question of applicability, because it is doubtful to declare applicability - in the absence of convincing empirical evidence - and to assert inapplicability - to question the "international significance" of the Chinese experience and a number of ideologemes of official Beijing, in particular, the idea that Mikhail Gorbachev's course, which allegedly began transformations, is "fundamentally erroneous" in China in the USSR with political reform. At the same time, Zhang Jun comes to the conclusion about the "missed opportunity opportunities" for the former USSR to move along the "Chinese path", comparing the actions of the Chinese and Soviet leaders in the field of price reform and political control in the public sector and pointing out what he considers the "inconsistency" of Moscow reformers [Zhang Jun, 2006]. Interestingly, he makes extensive use of the research on economic reforms in the USSR during the period of "perestroika", written by well-known neoliberalist proponents K. Murphy, A. Schleifer, and R. Vishny (Murphy, Schleifer, and Vishny, 1992). A similar point of view about the "missed opportunity"is shared by P. Nolan [Nolan, 1995], who in his works of the last decade admits the prospect of the evolution of the "Chinese model" into a "third way" society that is still not realized anywhere and by no one - different from both Leninism and liberal capitalism [Nolan, 2004]. The well-known Russian sinologist M. L. Titarenko also believes that the model of organization of society and production in the PRC "objectively represents an alternative to the traditional Western liberal version of development" [Titarenko, 2009, p. 5]. At the same time, the author apparently does not share the idea of the "third way" and is inclined to agree with the official conclusion of the Chinese leadership that "only socialism can save China, only reforms and openness can develop China" [Titarenko, 2009, p. 5; People's Daily, 18.12.2008]. Most Chinese economic researchers, such as Fan Gang, Sheng Hong, Miao Zhuang, Lin Yifu, Wu Jinglian, Zhang Jun, prefer not to theorize about the nature of the social system of the PRC during the reform period, but devote their work to specific problems. For more information, see O. Borokh's monograph "Modern Chinese Economic Thought" (Borokh, 1998).

A number of Western sinologists and specialists in other fields - economists, historians, and political scientists-tend to view the transformations in the PRC over the past three decades in the context of "Leninist-type" reforms [McCormick, 1990; Naughton, 1994; Kornai, 1995; Winckler, 1999; Lardy, 1998; Lieberthal, 2003, etc.]. In Chinese studies, this methodological approach is consistently defended in the works of M. Karpov [Karpov, 1997, 2007]. Hungarian political scientist M. Csanadi believes that due to a number of features of the "Chinese way", in particular, due to the rapid development of the non-state sector of the economy and significant foreign investment, the current state of transformation in China can already be considered in the context of" post-communist transformation " (Csanadi, 2006). A similar point of view was initially expressed by the German sinologist S. Heilmann (1998). However, later, judging by the comparative statement of a number of problems of development of the late USSR and modern China, he considered it premature to characterize the current stage of reforms in the PRC as "post-communist" (Heilmann, 2000).

In the last decade, the West has published a very significant number of works devoted to the impact of economic globalization on China [Globalization of the Chinese Economy, 2003; Dittmer and Liu, 2006; Guthrie, 2009; Kelly, Rajan, Goh, 2006; Liu, 2004; Sullivan, 1995; Zheng, 2004; White, 1993]. The authors of these studies do not ask about the typology of the socio-economic system both in the pre-reform period and in the era of "reforms and openness", stating only the "irreversible nature" of reforms in the PRC, the processes of integrating the Chinese economy and society into the world economic system that are gaining momentum, and the high rates of economic growth in the country. Recognition of the existence of a one-party system and a "Leviathan state" in the PRC pales before the bright canvas of impressive success in economic, technological and social transformation. Proponents of this approach state that" political reforms "in the PRC are lagging behind economic ones (V. Mikheev, for example, believes that in the West China is now perceived both as" our own "economically and as" foreign " politically), but they proceed from the fact that this is a temporary phenomenon and a gradual political transformation is not far off. Moreover, keeping key management levers in the hands of the state (high state capacity) is interpreted as an advantage that contributes to further deepening of reforms. It is no exaggeration to say that such approaches have dominated Chinese studies in recent years. Without delving into the polemic on specific subjects, I would like to note that, from my point of view, the proponents of this position fall into a methodological trap known from the history of Western Sovietology. In the 60s and 80s of the 20th century, liberal trends in Sovietology abandoned their theories

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Zhang Jun, 2006], which had a significant impact on some foreign experts, primarily on B. Naughton (1994) and M. Chanadi (2006) 2.

Getting as detailed an understanding of China's price reform as possible is fundamentally important and relevant for the following interrelated reasons:

First, the price reform in the PRC has de facto turned out to be a priority economic transformation initiated "from above". After the transition to the policy of "settlement" in 1979, that is, since the actual removal from the agenda of the course of "4 modernizations"-the Chinese equivalent of Gorbachev's "acceleration" - Deng Xiaoping and his supporters begin to focus on structural reforms. The dissolution of the "people's communes" in the countryside, which was already gaining momentum in those days, began as a peasant initiative "from below", largely forcibly sanctioned by the local, and then by the highest political leadership. The price reform, which began in the same period, was, in fact, the first purposeful structural reform of a market nature, implemented "from above" on the initiative of the supporters of transformation invested with power. Thus, the price reform in China from the very beginning outstripped a number of other "perestroika" - the reform of planning, taxation, property, banking, administrative, etc. Over the next 30 years of reforms, it consistently "ran ahead"of other transformations, to a great extent determined their dynamics and nature, and contributed to the fact that many of them became irreversible. 3 The heated discussions among Chinese economists in the mid-to-late 1980s about the choice of priorities-price reform or property reform-occurred at a time when de facto primacy at the top had long been given away

"social control "("totalitarianism "and" neotraditionalism " [Fainsod, 1953; Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1956; Inkeles, 1951; Inkeles and Bauer, 1959]), believing that they are not able to explain the evolutionary processes in the USSR and other European social countries after Stalin's death. They were replaced by "social contract theories" (modernization, stages of economic growth, and convergence) (Apter, 1965; Cohen, 1985; Goldman, 1968; Galbraith, 1967; Rostow, 1970; Tinbergen, 1959; Tucker, 1963). However, as the crisis escalated and the European system of socialism collapsed, post-Sovietology found itself forced to admit that social control theories largely adequately described the institutions and dynamics of the evolution of communist one-party rule, especially with regard to the structure and nature of relations between the party state and society. According to the apt remark of A. Motyl,"...by rejecting the so-called totalitarian model, Sovietologists have abandoned its sound theoretical claims, in fact, the theory in general" [Motyl, 1993, p. 80]. It seems that the fascination of many current observers with the active participation of modern China in global economic processes and the impressive pace of economic growth in this country without seriously raising the question of the typology of socio-political institutions may well lead away from the scientific and methodological foundations of the analysis of systemic transformation in the PRC. This, in turn, seriously complicates both an adequate assessment of the prospects for the evolution of modern China and a comparison of the "Chinese model" with other fast-growing economies. In my opinion, the processes of" reform and openness "in the PRC up to the present time should be understood in the systemic context of" adaptation of one-party revolutionary regimes "[Huntington and Moore, 1970], or "post-totalitarianism" [Stepan and Linz, 1996; Linz, 2000].: "In the post-totalitarian regime, both the party in power and the opposition have a starting point... it is a totalitarian regime. Of great importance is the existence of the previous totalitarian stage of this regime, which once eliminated all sources... organized pluralism. The leading role of the party is secured and legally fixed. The term "post-totalitarianism" suggests that this type of regime should not be understood as an independent type of political order from the point of view of its foundations. This type appears as a result of changes in the system that is commonly called "totalitarian". Because of this, "post-totalitarianism" - in contrast to democracy, totalitarianism, and authoritarianism-is not a self-sufficient, genetic-forming, but a transitional, evolutionary type of regime. Empirical evidence suggests that... there is no direct continuous line of development from "totalitarianism" to authoritarianism " [1lpg, 2000, pp. 246-247, 252-253]. In this context, the assessments of modern China presented in the works of S. Goldstein, B. McCormick, and J. R. R. Tolkien are very fruitful. Studwell (Goldstein, 1995; MacCormick, 1990; Studwell, 2002, 2003).

2 In domestic Chinese studies, the most fundamental study of price reform in China is V. Zhiguleva's monograph "From Plan to Market: China's Experience in Price Reform" (Zhiguleva, 2006). Taking the approaches and main conclusions of the author of this book, my research focuses on the conceptual role of the "two-track model" of pricing in the practice and theory of transformation processes in the PRC.

3 Zhang Zhoyuan noted in the second half of the 1990s: "In the practice of reforms over the past 15 years, only price reform has flourished. Being on the cutting edge of transformation, it put aside many of the difficulties that some economists have contrived. A striking contrast here is the reform of enterprises, which many believed to be simple, but... the economic mechanism of state-owned enterprises has not yet changed for the better... " [Zhang Zhoyuan, 1996, p. 3]

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price reform (for more information, see [Zhiguleva, 2006, p. 53-56; Karpov, 1997, p. 62-64]). Moreover, these discussions themselves, which somewhat resembled the well-known "egg versus chicken" debate, were in fact caused by the consequences of already launched pricing reforms [Li Huizhong, 1998, p. 100-101]. Despite its fragmentary nature and inconsistency (which will be discussed later), the price reform in the PRC was and, strange as it may sound, is still the most consistent, radical and successful measure of the Chinese leadership to create elements of a market economy in the country.

Secondly, it is precisely the desire for a theoretical generalization of price reform that has led to the emergence in China of its own very interesting concepts of gradual transition from a command and administrative economy to a market economy with a certain claim to international scientific and practical significance. These concepts are worth trying to understand, first of all for their correlation with empirical reality.

Finally, all the circumstances mentioned above make it possible to raise the question of the applicability of the "Chinese way" in other socialist countries, primarily in the USSR during the period of Mikhail Gorbachev's "perestroika", not arbitrarily, but in a substantive way. The verdict on this problem depends crucially on the answer to the question of whether it was possible to prioritize the implementation of the Chinese-style pricing reform in the USSR at that time.4
The reader may have already noticed that in the title of the proposed article, the word "practice" precedes the word "theory". This is not accidental, because, firstly, the author does not share the thesis about the original theoretical thoughtfulness of reforms in the PRC and proceeds from the fact that the content and logic of the "Chinese way" went from practice to theory, and not vice versa.5 Second, Leninist-type systems6 in different countries have similar or identical institutional characteristics [Brzezinski and Friedrich, 1956, p. 63-69; Mueller, 1997, p. 12; Rabotyazhev and Solov'ev, 2005, p.72]. At the same time, the dynamic models of distribution of power over resource extraction and accumulation in different systems of the "Leninist type" differ significantly [Csanadi, 2006, p. 65-78]. Because of this, it is in principle impossible to determine in advance theoretically which reform strategy in this "Leninist - type" system will bring the greatest effect-"shock" or "partially gradual", because whatever strategy was originally laid down, it will inevitably and very rigidly be formatted by a real model of the distribution of power for withdrawaland accumulation resources [Csanadi, 2006, p. 111-112]7. This provision is convincing and fully applies to the pricing reform in the PRC.

4 According to J. Kornai, "price reform under market socialism is the most important direction [of the movement] in moving away from the classical socialist system" [Kornai, 1995, p.576].

5 Sheng Hong points out that there were two stages in understanding the transformation process. At the first stage, Chinese scientists, business managers and politicians were not engaged in "conscious analytical and theoretical generalization" of the issues of transformation of the socio-economic system of the PRC, being absorbed in the development of practical measures. It was only at the second stage , in the 1990s, that the problems of "systemic changes" became an independent object of research and generalization [Sheng Hong, 1996, p. 69]. This, of course, does not negate the well-known fact of the most acute scientific-theoretical and ideological-political struggle around the need for market reforms as such, the role of the commodity economy under socialism, the rehabilitation of price theory, etc., which took place in the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s [Zhiguleva, 2006, pp. 41-50].

6 "Lenin-type system", "totalitarian system", "one-party revolutionary system" - typologically generalizing terms for the socio-economic and political systems of the countries of "real socialism", used with various connotations in world social studies for more than half a century [Arendt, 1951; Brzezinski, Friedrich, 1956; Fainsod, 1953; Huntington, Moore, 1970; Inkeles, Bauer, 1959; Linz, 2000; Winckler, 1999; Aron, 1993; Rabotyazhev and Solov'ev, 2005, etc.].

7 In the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev's planned gradual reforms shattered the Soviet economic model, and they had to be radically accelerated in the winter of 1991-1992 in order to avoid a total economic collapse, and the" shock package " of E. Gaidar's reforms, on the contrary, was "put on the brakes" by the summer of 1992 (Aslund, 1995; Nechaev, 2010]. In the PRC, attempts to implement radical market-based pricing reforms in the face of resistance from local elites and broad segments of the population failed twice - in 1986 and 1988, in the second case becoming a catalyst for the acute and, as a result, bloody socio-political crisis of 1989 (Shirk, 1993; Karpov, 1997).

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FORMATION OF THE "TWO-TRACK MODEL" OF PRICING

The key stages in the development of a new pricing model in China, which includes elements of market regulation, are as follows.

In 1979, the State Council of the People's Republic of China adopted the decree "Some provisions on expanding the economic and managerial independence of enterprises", which for the first time states that state-owned industrial enterprises have the right to sell their products. This right extended to all types of raw materials and final products provided for in the planned distribution. Thus, even before determining the parameters for the formation of non-directive prices, non-directive resource turnover was in principle sanctioned. In 1981, the State Council granted oil producers the right to export extra-planned crude oil at world market prices. Each individual enterprise found itself in two different price-forming fields. In 1983, the state authorities of the People's Republic of China decided on the possibility of processing part of the crude oil intended for export in the country, followed by the sale of petroleum products on the domestic market at world prices. This was the first step towards creating a "two-track" pricing system in the country. In 1984. The State Council makes a "Decision on further expansion of the economic independence of enterprises", which authorizes the sale or contractual exchange of an over-planned part of the extracted raw materials or manufactured final products at prices set by the enterprise, but only within 20% fluctuations from the directive price. Finally, in January 1985, the Departments of pricing and Material Resources, on the recommendation of the State Council, published a "Report on the release of prices for independently sold over-planned industrial products", which abolished the 20% limit on the amplitude of price fluctuations. Now all over-planned products could be sold on the domestic market of the country at the prices set by the manufacturer [Zhang Jun, 2006, p. 118-129].

The new pricing system developed in China by the mid-1980s was called "two-track" in the Chinese literature in the sense of the parallel existence of "directive" and "non-directive" prices in the economy. The term "two-track model" as applied to pricing in the PRC was first coined by the Chinese economist Chen Xiu in an article on prices for steel products published on June 30, 1985 [Chen Xiu, 1985]. In the early 1990s, some Chinese economists pointed out that "two-track" pricing in various forms existed in various countries: in Soviet Russia during the NEP 8 period, in India and Pakistan in the 1960s and 1970s. The statement of this was not accompanied, however,by any in-depth analysis and comparison of various types of price "two-track". It was only noted that by the second half of the 1980s, it was in China that such a pricing model reached a historically unprecedented scale, covering the entire national economy [Yang Shengming, Li Jun, 1993, p. 138-153].

However, it is not foreign experience that is crucial for understanding the logic of prioritizing price reform in the PRC at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s. The practice of "two-track" pricing for agricultural products, primarily for cereals, was mastered by Chinese business owners since 1953. If between 1949 and 1953 there was a free grain market in the PRC, then as the socialist construction accelerated and the deficit worsened, in November 1953 a government decree was adopted on the beginning of planned purchases and deliveries of grain, which, however, left up to 20% of production to the free market. Here, it seems, lie the roots of "two-track" pricing in the economy of socialist China. This line was extended in the early 1960s, during the period of struggle with the disastrous consequences of the Great Leap Forward,

8 For more information about the domestic version of the "two-track model"(see: [Goland, 1998; Discussions on Economic Policy..., 2006; Grik, 2002].

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and even during the years of the cultural revolution, when market relations were banned, "free trade at free prices did not completely turn into the ashes of a mad fire, but continued to live, blown by the spring breeze" [Yang Shengming, Li Jun, 1993, p.141]. In the first half and mid-1980s, when implementing price reforms in industry, the key principles were, for example, those that were close and understandable to Chinese business managers, such as " the reform of prices for industrial products should go "along the road of grain and oil" and "by [structuring the prices of] livestock pigs". This meant the withdrawal of over-planned products from the sphere of directive pricing [Jiage lilun..., 1985, N 4, p. 58]. In the words of Peking University Professor Li Yuankai, "in our country, the reform of prices for raw materials and final products of industry has always moved forward along the' path of grain and oil '" 9. Later, as early as the 1990s and the "zero" years, some Chinese experts-both apologetically and critically-pointed out the proximity of the" two - track " pricing model to the traditional methods of regulating the domestic market used in imperial China and, more broadly, to some features of the Chinese mentality.10
Be that as it may, it is safe to say that the priority nature of the price reform in the PRC at the turn of the 1970s - 1980s, as well as its "two-track" specifics, were at first a quantitative expansion of the methods of overcoming crisis deficits in the domestic market, which were quite familiar from the past decades. That reform, despite the ideological resistance of some political and intellectual elites, nevertheless fully fit into the model of distribution of power for the extraction and accumulation of resources that had developed by that time in the PRC. This model differed significantly from that in the USSR and European social countries, primarily in the degree of its decentralization [Bastid, 1973, p. 162-163; Goldstein, 1995, p. 1105-1131; Lyons, 1986, p. 209-236; Ross, 1987; Shirk, 1993, p. 346 - 360; Schurmann, 1971, p. 88-90]. According to M. Changdi, in China, on the eve of reforms, " there were strong economic feedbacks from various levels of the system, and the ability to withdraw resources was partially decentralized. Thus, due to these feedbacks, there was an increased ability to resist [centralized] withdrawal of resources and a reduced dependence on higher levels due to the availability of alternative resources.

9 From an interview with the author in March 2009 at Peking University.

10 Thus, Yang Shengming and Li Jun write: "The traditional system of grain turnover used in old China, formally giving priority to "single purchase and single sale", was actually "two-track". The fact is, however, that the second [market] track was so small that many [authors] did not even mention its existence. But today, after carefully studying the historical facts... it is impossible not to notice it" [Yang Shengming, Li Jun, 1993, p. 141]. Sheng Hong also points out the traditional origins of approaches to reforms and their study in China: "Of course, the practice and study of economic transformation in China has a deeper and more fundamental basis - Chinese traditional culture. Despite the fact that Chinese traditional cultural orthodoxy suffered numerous blows after the May 4 movement (1919), it still existed...at the level of upbringing in the family and implicitly influenced people, including Chinese economists " [Sheng Hong, 1996, p. 71]. Zhang Guanyuan attributes the relative speed and success of the introduction of the" two-track " price model in China in the 1980s. with the traditional values of the " middle way "("golden mean") in the Chinese mentality, at the same time critically pointing out the half-hearted nature of the decisions made: "The fierce pressure of the commodity economy made the continued existence of the old system impossible. The elites were eager for change, but the forces were sorely lacking. Therefore, we remembered the ancient wisdom, dug up the "new old flowers" of the "two-track system", and moved along the roundabout path of least resistance. Outside the field of planned prices, a zone of market regulation was fenced off. Such a dual system goes back to the dual consciousness, the extreme manifestation of which is the doctrine of the "golden mean". If we strive for real progress, then we must get rid of the unity of mutually exclusive ones. Otherwise, there will only be a jostling of elbows and nothing will grow together" [Zhang Guanyuan, 2003, p. 653-654]. Interestingly, some Russian authors, on the contrary, are clearly inclined to apologize for what they consider to be manifestations of the Chinese mentality and their influence on the course of reforms in the PRC [Prosekov, 2009].

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local resources" [Csanadi, 2006, p. 70] 11. Much has been written about the absence of the Soviet - Stalinist system of economic management in the PRC at the time of the beginning of the reforms, even by those who are basically apologetic about the reforms in China and tend to consider them "a missed chance for Gorbachev" 12. Regarding the area of pricing that interests us, V. Zhiguleva's research leaves the impression that, although Although pre-reform China had a ranked and centralized system of price regulation, in reality the practice of this regulation was very confusing. The author, describing in detail in his monograph the history of the formation of this system and its structure, comes to the conclusion: "For 28 years (1949-1977), a comprehensive price control system was not created" [Zhiguleva, 2006, pp. 66-81, 83].

Both Chinese and foreign authors point to the lack of conditions for a more radical pricing reform in the first half of the 1980s. They note, as a rule, the absolute and structural scarcity of the domestic market, the lack of financial resources of the state, the irrational nature of pricing mechanisms in the pre-reform period, the low adaptation of society to price increases, ideological and political resistance of part of the population [Yang Shengming and Li Jun, 1993, pp. 15-17; Zhiguleva, 2006, pp. 37-38; He Xiaodong, 2000, pp. 30-35]. All this is perfectly true. However, in the context of the proposed study, it is necessary to emphasize the following. A decentralized, regionally linked, and not very transparent model of the authorities ' powers to seize and accumulate resources ("systemic Chinese corporatism" according to Shirk [Shirk, 1993]) made integral and one-time price liberalization not so much ideologically unacceptable as technically unrealistic. Virtually every political-administrative or economic element of the system, both horizontally and vertically, lobbied with all available means to obtain the most favorable conditions for its own "expanded reproduction". The top of the party-state pyramid in Beijing and the conceptual reformers associated with it simply did not have sufficient political, administrative, or economic levers at their disposal to "impose" any uniform reform on the entire country,

11 In this regard, it is advisable to refer again to the monograph of V. Zhiguleva: "One of the features of economic policy in the first half of the 1970s is the struggle between the center (strengthening centralized management) and places that require decentralization. In the end, the latter won. Thus, in 1970 - 1976, more than 2,600 key industrial enterprises were transferred to the local government. However, although the planned system was decentralized, the changes did not affect the centralized pricing system... To overcome the shortcomings of planning and improve the management of commodity flows and price levels in the first half of the 1970s, a quasi-market mechanism began to be used in the form of so-called meetings on the distribution of material resources. Initially, these meetings were organized by industry ministries, and later by regional authorities. These meetings, usually held 1-2 times a year, brought together suppliers of the most important raw materials and semi-finished products and their main consumers to coordinate production and investment plans " [Zhiguleva, 2006, p. 80].

12 According to Wang Zhigang of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the influence of the Soviet model was most noticeable in the organization of heavy industry, in capital construction, in the logistics system, and in payroll schemes. In the areas of monetary circulation, fiscal management, pricing, and agriculture, the CPC's experience in the liberated areas in 1946-1949, as well as during the Reconstruction period of 1949-1953, dominated [Wang Zhigang, 1984, pp. 216-217]. A similar point of view was expressed by Zhang Jun [Zhang Jun, 1997, p. 129] and Sheng Hong [Sheng Hong, 2003, p. 207] . L. Molodtsova notes: "It should be taken into account that in the conditions of China: 1. The system of centralized planning had not yet been established by the early 1980s, 2. With extensive state intervention, many areas of economic activity were nevertheless getting out of state control. 3. Most enterprises were under local control" [Molodtsova, 1988, p. 126]. Another Russian sinologist, V. Remyga, writes about two sectors in the economy of pre-reform China-central and local subordination, which were "two economic systems with almost closed reproduction processes" [Remyga, 1989, p. 11].

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and not only in the field of pricing. However, subsequent attempts to implement something similar invariably resulted in either quiet failures (the 1986 price liberalization project) or high - profile crises (the 1988-1989 price liberalization project).

It seems that such a systemic context has led Chinese reformers to think seriously about the "costs of reform" 13. This, according to Sheng Hong, distinguishes their approaches from those of the proponents of" neoclassical transformations " in the West (Sheng Hong, 1996). In other words, reform practitioners and theorists in the PRC, regardless of their political, administrative, or research roles, have been faced from the very beginning with the need to take into account a very diverse local specifics, both in regional-geographical and regional-systemic aspects. Given, on the one hand, the impossibility of preserving the pre - reform reality and, on the other, the lack of sufficient political and technical levers for radical liberalization of pricing, the "two-track route" looked both understandable and acceptable.

Two-track pricing options

However, "two-track" from its first steps did not sin with uniformity. At the end of 1981, the political and economic circles of the People's Republic of China began to discuss the preferred varieties of the "two-track model", which later received the names of the sector and proportional variants in the Chinese literature-the sector variant, which a number of economists in the People's Republic of China consider to be the "two-track pricing model in the broad sense" [Dai Guiju, 2007; Li Huizhong, 1998, 2000; He Xiaodong, 2000; Yang Shengming, Li Jun, 1993], suggests the division of the entire economic space of the country into two different sectors, in one of which directive pricing functions, and in the other - market pricing. Natural monopolies, mining and defense industries, infrastructure, transport, communications, etc. remain in the directive pricing sector, while everything else belongs to the second - market sector. Perfect ratio (in theory!)- 20-30% by 70-80%. It goes without saying that in

13 In this regard, the work of such Chinese economists as Fan Gang and Lin Yifu is interesting. Fan Gang proposed the concept of" frictional costs "when implementing reforms and "reform costs". In the first case, we mean the costs of the clash of different interest groups, in the second - the technical costs of developing and implementing reforms [Fan Gang, 1993] Lin Yifu devoted a significant part of his research to preserving the balance of interests of various social groups at the initial stage of reforms. [Lin Yifu, 1994]. At the same time, in his generalization of modern Chinese economic thought, Sheng Hong states that there are no common views on determining the costs of reforms among specialists in the PRC [Sheng Hong, 1996, p.72].

14 V. Zhiguleva in her research identifies the sector, regional and product models of the market, as well as the model of a single standard. The sector model assumes the introduction of a market in those sectors of the economy that are related to working for the consumer. The regional model is free economic zones (FEZs) and those regions (provinces) of the country where there has been a significant reduction in the policy plan and the transfer of more powers to local governments. The model of the market for individual goods assumes a complete or partial withdrawal of a part of heavy industry products from directive planning. The single standard model means setting a limit for a single market share in all types of products. The author associates the "two-track model" only with the model of the market of individual goods [Zhiguleva, 2006, p. 35-36]. It seems that this classification requires clarification, both in essence and in chronology. First, all these models existed on the basis of "two-track" principles. There was no complete price liberalization in any economic sector, region or industry. Second, the reduction of the central government's decision-making powers did not automatically mean that local Governments had less power. Equally, the stated rejection of directive pricing for any part of the product did not mean that the "free market"was coming into its own. Empirical evidence suggests that the" non-directive " zone was dominated by the multiplicity of contractual prices. Third, the single standard model has been applied in subsequent stages of reform. It is characteristic that Chinese experts focus on the sectoral and proportional variants of the "two-track system" as typologically basic, including all other varieties of such pricing practices [Yang Shengming, Li Jun, 1993, p. 108-113; Li Huizhong, 1998, p. 99].

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The actual ratio of sectors will vary significantly between different regions of the country.

Yang Shengming explains the content of the proportional option as follows: "Another way is to introduce market mechanisms at each enterprise, introducing them into the price of various factors of production. To make market mechanisms work first in the sphere of selling over-planned products, and then gradually penetrate into the part of products that is regulated by the plan, expanding the share of market prices and reducing the share of directive prices in order to subsequently make a radical turn in the pricing mechanism "[Yang Shengming, Li Jun, 1993, p. 28]

My familiarity with numerous Chinese sources and literature, as well as my interviews with scientists, economists, business practitioners and entrepreneurs in China, give every reason to conclude that the realities of the "two-track model" of prices in this country are a bizarre and multidimensional combination of both sectoral and proportional mechanisms.

In order to understand how "two-track" pricing works in practice, and to adequately assess its role in the process of market reforms in the PRC, it is necessary, in my opinion, to answer the following questions:: 1) What criteria are used to determine the boundary between the spaces of directive and non-directive pricing in both the sector and proportional models? 2) What is the volume ratio of these spaces in both models?

Empirical evidence shows that this boundary has always been very mobile, periodically shifting depending on socio-economic and political circumstances in the direction of both "directive" and "market", quite often not giving in to a clear localization. In addition, such shifts were often non-transparent, i.e. where the monopoly of the plan was officially declared, "unscheduled" mechanisms could well be present, and vice versa. The boundary between the "directive" and the "market" has thus almost always been a kind of"grey area". I think it is appropriate to use in this context the concept of "frontier", known from American history and meaning a conventionally delineated border between developed and undeveloped lands of immigrants. The characteristic of the " directive-market frontier "is of key importance for understanding the logic and dynamics of" two-track " pricing. When answering the first question, it is precisely the bizarre multi-dimensionality and low transparency that are revealed in the combination of sector and proportional variants of the"two-track" system. For both options, Chinese experts list essentially the same criteria for dividing into "directive" and "market" spaces. Natural monopolies, large and super-large state-owned enterprises, infrastructure, transport, communications, raw materials and products that are historically at the disposal of the center, as well as all the scarce commodity and raw material nomenclature, basic agricultural products (such as grain and vegetable oil) - all this can and should be regulated by directive pricing. Products of medium and small state, collective and private enterprises, goods and raw materials that are not in short supply, as well as the entire commodity and raw material nomenclature, the prices of which were historically regulated by local governments, as well as production processes in FEZs-all this can and should be regulated by the "market". Prices for the part of raw materials and products that are required to fulfill priority state tasks (and these can be set by both the central government and local authorities) are regulated by directive. The rest should belong to the "market element" (Li Jun and Yang Guanghua, 1994, pp. 109-110).

From this list, it follows that the sector and proportional variants of the" two-track model " of pricing were applied simultaneously both in the center and in the field.

Enterprises of both central and local subordination, both large and small, whose activities, according to the logic of the sector option, should have been determined by planned pricing, could well implement a proportional option, i.e., at least, sell over-planned products at "unscheduled" prices. Let me remind you that ex-

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experiments on the introduction of a proportional version of "two-track" pricing have begun in the Chinese "oil industry" - the most" state-directed " mining industry. At the same time, many enterprises of local subordination of various forms of ownership, even small and ultra-small, but producing products or raw materials that are scarce or important for a given region, could well remain in the field of directive price regulation by local governments. These conclusions are fully supported by empirical data (see, for example, [Zhongguo Jining bao, 16.03.2009]). Manufacturers of certain types of products that are fundamentally important for the state and therefore called upon to be in the "planned field", were burdened by directive pricing and sought to achieve at least partial commercialization of their activities. Conversely, a number of producers called upon to "go free", reasonably fearing market unpredictability, lobbied in every possible way to keep their prices within the limits of the directive. Thus, the criteria for dividing into "directive" and "market" in both the sector and proportional versions of the "two-track" system were very numerous and they depended on very diverse economic and socio-political circumstances. However, my familiarity with the literature and the interviews I have conducted allow me to identify one fundamental pattern here: both the producer of raw materials and the manufacturer of finished products equally sought to obtain equipment and raw materials at "planned" prices, and to sell their product at "unscheduled" prices. In addition, enterprises could easily have illegally commercialized their activities, sometimes making superprofits when selling scarce equipment and raw materials obtained at fixed prices to both their subcontractors and potential competitors. Such "intermediary activity" very soon became an integral part of the" two - track model " [Kornai, 1995, pp. 576-57].

As for the ratio of "planned" and "unscheduled" pricing volumes, Chinese observers in the early 1990s recognized: "Since currently market prices are much higher than planned prices, manufacturers tend to sell their products at market prices, and buy raw materials at planned prices. The proportions in the use of planned and market prices are mostly subject to bargaining between enterprises and the government, and therefore it is extremely difficult to say what the criteria are " [Yang Shengming, Li Jun, 1993, p. 111].

Here, however, a third crucial question arises: in whose hands are the powers to define the "directive-market frontier"? The answer is clear: the vertical of party and state bodies is in the hands of the central government, the governing bodies of provinces and autonomous regions, as well as other lower-level regional leadership at the level of counties, volosts, cities and districts. According to a comprehensive survey conducted by the Research Institute of Structural Economic Reforms of the People's Republic of China in the second half of the 1980s, democratic methods were practically not used in the formation of senior management in state-owned enterprises, direct appointment and co-optation dominated. 60% of the director's staff was appointed over, 30.7% - as a result of"public consultations". Democratic procedures (elections in the labor collective, etc.) led to these positions no more than 4% of managers [Zhongguo Jingji Tizhi Gaige Yanjiusuo; Zonghe Diancha, 1987, p. 273].

According to a number of Chinese experts, " the administration and vertical nature of personnel policy at state-owned enterprises, although they had many disadvantages, allowed the government to exercise effective control over prices at the initial stages of reforms and, in the conditions of "two-track" pricing, provided a systematic guarantee for planned distribution. Confusion and interpenetration between price "tracks" led only to violations of the two-track system, and not to its disintegration " [Zhang Jun, 2006, p. 166]. In other words, if it were not for the watchful eye of the party's personnel policy, the "directive" and "market" sectors of pricing would be completely mixed up and the question of their proportional correlation would lose all meaning.

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meaning. This, in turn, would lead to the loss of state control over the country's economy.15
As has been repeatedly noted above, the power to seize and accumulate resources in the case of the PRC was noticeably decentralized, which from the first steps of the "two-track model" made the party-state bodies of the provincial level and below active participants in the process of determining the "directive-market frontier". Moreover, the expansion and deepening of "two-track" pricing practices went synchronously with the course (fangquan) - the expansion of the powers of local authorities and the introduction of various contracting relationships. So the role of local party-state authorities in defining the "frontier" has steadily grown. At the same time, the confusion with micro-level pricing regulation powers inherited from pre-reform times only grew. The central government remained unclear about the division of responsibility for price regulation between the top management of the State Council, the pricing department of the State Council, the State Council's economic management bodies, and the State Pricing Department, separate from the State Council. In addition, central authorities had a real opportunity to regulate prices only in very limited sectors

15 According to Zhang Jun, something similar happened in the USSR during the period of perestroika, especially in 1988-1991, after the adoption of the" Enterprise Law", which seriously weakened the party-state control over the director corps, while maintaining the monopoly of state-owned enterprises and directive pricing. In the non-state sector, prices were already practically released, which contributed to the shadow redistribution of commodity flows to the free market, spurred price growth and general shortages [Zhang Jun, 2006, p. 111]. Technically, Zhang Jun is probably right. However, his assumption that a constructive alternative to reforms modeled on the Chinese "two-track" pricing model was possible in the USSR raises serious objections. The nature and scale of Soviet industry, the historical stereotypes of centralized management of it within the framework of a "single national economic complex", the ratio of urban and rural population and other demographic features, the volume and structure of the state social security system, and the nature of the national question did not allow us, in my opinion, to fill in the content of the national economy. a" non-directive " track with significant socio-economic content. The fate of the" cooperative movement " in the USSR during the years of perestroika is a guarantee of that. Mikhail Gorbachev's calls to "use the experience of NEP in new conditions" were more like a historical and political excursion than a real reform program. At the initial stage of perestroika, the reform program of economist D. Gvishiani, which is very close in spirit and letter to the "two-track model", was rejected by the country's leadership [Skvortsov]. Priority was given to the quite traditional proposals of E. Ligachev for the reconstruction of the machine-building complex, which should entail the reconstruction of the entire economy on the basis of large capital investments. This setup is called "acceleration". After its apparent failure in the spring of 1987, the Soviet leadership again returned to discussing the concept of reforms. Before the Council of Ministers, N. Ryzhkov was already ready to accept a number of "market" points of the program of D. Gvishiani, but he conceded in his own way to the rational objections of the chairman of the State Committee of Prices V. Pavlov, who pointed out the impossibility of introducing self-financing in the conditions of unprofitable fuel production and low labor prices in industry [Pihoya, Sokolov, 2008, p. 185]. As a result, a "solomonic" decision was made to gradually increase prices and gradually introduce self-financing. The "Enterprise Law", adopted in the USSR in 1988, was one of the key measures to implement this option of gradual reforms. The very adoption of this law, as well as its consequences for the Soviet socio-economic system, were as inevitable as they were destructive.

In Hungary, where at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s the most profound reform among COMECON member countries was carried out to reduce the volume of directive pricing, the Chinese version of the "two - track" also failed. First, the planners of the "goulash socialism" era of Janos Kadar could not refuse to set upper limits for fluctuations in "non-directive" prices. Chinese reformers, as noted, removed the 20% limit on the amplitude of price fluctuations in 1985. Secondly, in socialist Hungary, directive prices continued to apply to almost all types of raw materials, as well as to many services and goods, thus influencing other market sectors where directive pricing was formally absent [Kornai, 1995, S. 575-576]. As a result, it was not possible to implement either a sector-based or proportional version of the "two-track model". The main reasons for this lie, as far as can be judged, in the quite Soviet-style centralized model of economic management, demography, and the social security system, as well as in the external military and political circumstances of the defeat of the 1956 National Uprising. and the Soviet occupation, in membership in the Warsaw Pact and COMECON.

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and sectors of the national economy. A similar ambiguity with the scope of powers existed at the level of local governments. At the same time, both in the center and in the field, heterogeneous divisions were multiplying, claiming to participate in the control and regulation of pricing processes. Like mushrooms after a rainstorm, "price information centers", "pricing departments", and "centers for training specialists in the field of pricing"grew.

Observers noted that the companies themselves did not receive many rights in the price sphere. Most of the powers delegated by the central government ended up in the hands of local authorities at all levels [Zhang Guanyuan, 2003, p. 544]. Tough and opaque trading was conducted both vertically and horizontally. First, the lower-level party-state structures (provincial governments and other regional leaders) sought to get more rights from the higher-level ones (the central government) to regulate the price frontier in their subordinate territories. Secondly, at each of the administrative levels, there was a struggle for the possession of advantages between different divisions. Third, enterprises of both central and local subordination lobbied the party and state structures of the corresponding levels for optimal (in their understanding) ratios of the volumes of "planned" and "unscheduled" pricing.

REGIONAL VARIATIONS OF THE "TWO-TRACK MODEL"

The inevitable regionalization of "two-track" pricing practices was evaluated ambiguously, but it was recognized as a given by the absolute majority of Chinese experts. "In provinces such as Guangdong, Fujian, and Hainan, where reforms are progressing at a faster pace, market prices should be used more widely. But in the center of the country, in its northwest and southwest, in poor areas, the conditions for price relief are not yet ripe. Planned prices are still widely used here. Thus... the diversity of the "two-track" price model is unavoidable "[Yang Shengming, Li Jun, 1993, p. 135]. As far as I know, neither the Russian nor Western literature has considered the regional diversity of the "two-track model" even in the first approximation. And the available Chinese literature covers the "two-track model" rather poorly at the micro level. This is probably due to the opacity of the material: who and how forms prices and who gets how much from it is almost an intimate matter for such closed political and economic systems as the Chinese one. It is much easier and more prestigious to dismiss the topic of "two-track" prices altogether, declare the victory of the market, integration into the world economy, and be known as a wonderful government that does not succumb to the temptation of rent chasing. 16 Meanwhile, getting acquainted with this diversity is of fundamental importance for understanding the "Chinese way" of reforms. Here I will try to fill in this gap briefly, drawing on materials from the Chinese press, as well as from my field research in the PRC.

So, the Shijiazhuang model (Shijiazhuang city, the administrative center of Hebei Province) has become widespread in large cities of Hebei, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Liaoning, Heilongjiang and Jilin provinces, as well as partly in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and Xinjiang-

16 This is exactly what E. Zhuravskaya writes about the PRC: "The fact that the central government, whose unlimited power is determined by the autocratic nature of the Chinese Communist Party, acts in the interests of national economic growth, and not in its own interests, without succumbing to the temptation of rent-seeking, can only be interpreted as a miracle" [Zhuravskaya, 2011, p. 107]. It turns out that the central government is silverless, but what about the regional elites? The fact is that in a very expensive, semi-reformed economy, with an acute shortage of all imaginable resources, with the exception of labor, economic growth is the main source of rent formation for both the central government and regional elites. In China, there are many less risky and more capital-intensive ways of obtaining bureaucratic rent than, for example, the notorious "cutting" of investment funds of the budget. One of the most important ways to obtain such rents in the PRC is, in particular, manipulation of pricing mechanics in the domestic market. However, this is a separate big topic.

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zyan-Uyghur Autonomous Region, i.e. in the center, northeast and northwest of the PRC. Its first steps date back to the second half of 1984, when both planned and over-planned steel, cast iron, wood and soda began to be sold on the market at "non-directive" prices in Shijiazhuang. Enterprises that consume these products were able to freely purchase them both from the city government's supply agencies and from outside the city. Regardless of where and from whom the product was purchased, the city supply department compensated customers for 100% of the difference between the directive and" non-directive " price, based on the ratio of the quota of mandatory planned delivery and the actual volumes of the product purchased on the market and received. By the beginning of 1987, this practice had spread to copper, aluminum, graphite, rubber, urea, lime and products made from a number of non-ferrous metals. At the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, as this model was further expanded, compensation for consumer enterprises decreased to 90% of the price difference. The remaining 10% went to the formation of the "development fund", which is fully controlled by the financial department of the city government. In the future, the amount of direct compensation decreased even more. From the remaining funds, the city's financial authorities formed a "subsidy fund" to provide assistance to enterprises and organizations according to the criteria of the importance of this enterprise or organization, its (its) position on the "directive-market frontier", the amount of losses and profits, potential opportunities, economic or political-administrative significance ([Shi Zhantian, 1997, p. 93; Yang Shengming, Li Jun, 1993, p. 113-114]; author's interview at Peking University in spring 2009). Chinese observers remain silent, but there is every reason to believe that this practice has sharply exacerbated the non-transparent competition among economic and administrative entities of the city for access to the funds of the city government. In addition, the principles of calculating the ratio of mandatory quotas for planned deliveries and the volume of products purchased on the market became the subject of increasingly tough bargaining between enterprises and the government, since the amount of compensation directly depended on this.

The "aggregate average price" model was born in the Jiangsu Provincial Government's Office of Prices and has been adopted in Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan, and Anhui provinces.e. in central and eastern China. Since mid-1985, the Jiangsu Government has required all businesses in the province to sell and buy coal at a single price, calculated as the "cumulative arithmetic mean " between planned and" unscheduled " prices. In the future, this practice was extended to steel, wood, oil and petroleum products, and mineral fertilizers. The Provincial Office of Prices was required to calculate the costs and supply-demand ratio for a given type of raw material or product for a given period of time (maximum - six months) and bring the received amount closer to its planned price by deducing the "aggregate average price", as well as to develop and implement a mechanism for monitoring the execution of this price. In addition, the management was required to provide a calculated forecast of price changes for the next six months. The unavoidable difference between the projected and actual "average price" did not have the right to turn into a profit or loss of the enterprise, but was credited as a separate item to its bank account and could be used as a subsidy for this enterprise during the next half-year [Yang Shengming, Li Jun, 1993, p. 120-123, Liu Xiaoxuan, 2003, pp. 126-131].

In some regions of central, southwestern and northwestern China, in particular in the provinces of Gansu and Sichuan, in Tibet and Xinjiang, the authorities acted, at first glance, paradoxically, controlling the volume of raw materials and products supplied on a planned basis and introducing contractual pricing for their sale at the same time. This practice, meanwhile, allowed solving many acute financial issues of regional governments: consolidating the tax base, creating additional sources of bureaucratic rent, and maintaining political and administrative control over most economic entities (Li Huizhong, 1998; author's interview at Peking University in spring 2009).

Both the central government and local authorities introduced in a number of industries and regions, along with directive prices, "calculated prices", or "prices on which [individual] decisions are made" , Such prices, as a rule, applied to certain types of raw materials and finished products of mining and heavy industry, and to a greater extent than These guidelines reflected the realities of supply and demand and costs. Chinese experts also call these prices "self-supporting", "best planned",

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"shadowy" [Liu Guoguang, 1981, p. 336; Yang Shengming, Li Jun, 1993, p. 112, 123-130; Jingzi Guancha bao, 24.03.2009].

This is not a complete list of regional varieties of "two-track" pricing. There were many more of them. It also follows from the above that on the territory of one region (province), various territorial and production divisions simultaneously used a variety of variants of the "two-track" model.

THE PROBLEM OF OVERCOMING THE "TWO-TRACK MODEL"

Throughout the decade of the 1980s, the realities of the "two-track model" of pricing caused extremely heated discussions among economists, business executives, and the party and state leadership of the PRC, as well as in society as a whole. A number of the most important aspects of these discussions had a pronounced ideological and political component. In the first half of the decade, disagreements were less articulate, and elites and society got used to the new realities, assessing their attitude to them. However, since the middle of the decade, especially after the October 1984 "Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Structural Economic Reform", as the rapid spread of "two-track" practices, differences in political and economic assessments have come to the surface. Between 1984 and 1986, the main topic of discussion was the "fallacy" or, conversely, the "inevitability" of the introduction of the"two-track model". This period of discussion was very brief, because even the theoretical recognition of the "fallacy" could not in practice return the country's economy to pre-reform times. As noted above, the "two-track model" perfectly fit into the decentralized power structure of the party-state in the PRC and successfully solved a number of important economic tasks, primarily to overcome the deficit in the domestic market. At the same time, fearing the loss of control over economic processes in the country due to the regional diversity of the "two-track model", the top management represented by the triumvirate of Deng Xiaoping - Hu Yaobang - Zhao Ziyang, relying on reformers in the expert community, probed the ground for complete price liberation. The project caused a negative reaction from the majority of intra-elite groups and was put "under the cloth". The "two-track model" and its regional diversity began to be perceived as an inevitability, which nevertheless had to be managed in some way.

The second stage of discussions-between 1987 and 1989-turned out to be longer, much more acute, and primarily related to the problem of choosing control methods for the "two-track model". During this period, it became fully clear that "two-track" pricing gives rise to broad and diverse practices of "profit privatization" and "loss nationalization" and leads to serious macroeconomic imbalances. Familiarity with the opinion of the expert community of those years is amazing: the "two-track model" had almost no "lawyers", only "prosecutors". "Two-track" pricing was seen as the reason for the unprecedented heating up of all types of corruption, the loss of control over the distribution of working capital, the destruction of the state planning system, the shadow leakage of state capital, inflation and rising prices. A few advocates were forced to admit that "two-track" is good only when the gap between "planned" and "unscheduled" prices does not exceed 30% [U Ii, 1987, p.29]. The "prosecution camp", however, was quite clearly divided into two groups. The former argued for the resolute continuation of reforms and the transition to "single-track" market prices (Li Maosheng, 1989; Liu Boda, 1985; Xu Yi, 1989; Wu Jinglian, 1988; Chen Yizi, 1990, p. 86; Yang Shengming, 1989).

Here, for example, is the symptomatic opinion of Yang Shengming: "In practical terms, the" two-track model " is a huge challenge. Currently, it covers most of the production materials, that is, the price of one part of them is determined by the manufacturer-

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the other is an enterprise. It is extremely difficult to turn these two pricing mechanisms into a harmonious unity. There is a lack of ways to regulate the "market track". It is also extremely difficult to control the "planned track". Our country is so large that the state, of course, cannot determine all prices. Until the issue of a single price reaches the governing authorities, gets a decision, will be lowered down-it will take at least six months. In a rapidly changing commodity economy, this is simply unthinkable. The "planned track" cannot be maintained for any long time, it must be reduced. The less the state regulates prices, the better, more flexible, and more competitive they are. You can't let the" two-track model " crystallize, you can't idealize it and fetishize it! It is necessary to move forward, to turn the "two-track model" into a "single-track model!" " [Yang Shengming, 1989, p.126].

The second group of" accusers " saw salvation in the restoration of the pre-reform pricing model, calling for strict policy restrictions on credit issuance and the creation of effective mechanisms in the planned sector to combat inflation [Liao Lili, 1986; Yang Shujing, 1989]. The country's leaders were faced with macroeconomic confusion, a growing atmosphere in society, and a deep ideological, political, and personnel split in the highest echelon of the party and state leadership. Deng Xiaoping's attempt to accelerate market-based pricing reform in 1988 and thus radically resolve the entire complex of political and economic problems that were brewing turned out, as we know, to be a bloody crisis in the spring of 1989.

The author of these lines has already written that the development of the PRC in the conditions of the "two-track model" cyclically " generates a complex of problems expressed by socio-economic "overheating", which cannot be adequately solved within the framework of this model. This requires either a leap forward or an equally decisive retreat. The paradox and drama of the situation, however, lies in the fact that both recipes... in their "pure form" they turn out to be unsuitable" [Karpov, 1997a, p. 159-160]. The" two-track model "in Chinese turned out to be such a symbiosis of "plan and market", which was increasingly difficult to manage from the center and did not succumb to purposeful destruction either in the name of "plan" or in the name of "market". Chinese economist Diao Xinshen noted: "The biggest problem of the" two-track economy " is that it is impossible to fully separate the planned component from the market one. The traditional planning system is not preserved in the same closed framework, it very much interferes with the market component, and this intervention does not have certain principles. It is probably even more important that within the market component, it is impossible to spontaneously form system support for the market economy, and even more so, it is impossible to form the corresponding organizational structures" [Diao Xinshen, 1989, p. 14]. At the same time, under the influence of the market, the planned component is also changing, "as a result of which traditional methods of regulation are increasingly losing their effectiveness and the reliance on generally unregulated intervention [in the market] is becoming more important. As a result, both the plan and the market are inadequate" [ibid., p. 17]. Li Huizhong also points out the indistinctness of the boundaries between "plan" and "market" in the context of "two-track" pricing [Li Huizhong, 1998, pp. 130-131].

This contradictory, multidimensional, unregulated, but undifferentiated "symbiosis of plan and market" not only caused the failure of price liberalization and the political defeat of radical reformers in 1988-1989, but also contributed to the failure of conservative recentralization attempts in 1989-1991 and led to a return to" reform and openness " after Deng's famous trip and speeches Xiaoping in the south of the country, in Guangdong Province in January 1992.

What happened in the Chinese economy in 1990-1992 in terms of the state and dynamics of the "two - track model" of pricing, as far as I know, is not described anywhere in the foreign literature. The assessments contained in the Chinese materials are sketchy, often clearly superficial. It seems that the ideological and political situation after the 1989 crisis and the Tiananmen bloodshed did not allow for "deeper digging". Meanwhile, these years seem to be extremely important and very important.

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interesting, if only because, according to the official periodization of economic reforms in the PRC, the stage of "two-track" pricing is being completed by 1992. By this time, there is a "merging of ruts" - "bingui" This term, widely used in Chinese economic literature, can be understood in two ways: as a fait accompli and as a process. Thus, it is not very clear from the Chinese materials whether this "merger" ended by 1992 or, having only begun then, continues to this day.

The question of an early "merger of the tracks" was first raised at the November 1989 meeting. It was also motivated by the need to overcome the disproportions of the "two-track model"in the Plenum of the CPC Central Committee of the 13th convocation. However, the documents of the Plenum did not give a clear definition of which direction - the plan or the market - should be "merged". Obviously, the Plenum's "Decision of the CPC Central Committee on further regulation and Regulation and on deepening reform" was a political compromise. The conservatives were pushing, and Deng Xiaoping and his supporters in the central office of the party and state were on the defensive. As always, opinions in the expert community have diverged. Along with the traditional proponents of returning to the plan and skirmishers of the "liberal breakthrough", a proposal for "temporary restoration of directive pricing with subsequent gradual liberalization" was formed [Yang Shengming, Li Jun, 1993, p. 164]. At the same time, most experts, including those with a liberal orientation, recognized the lack of systemic and macroeconomic conditions in the country's economy for "merging" pricing mechanisms into a single "market track"[Zhang Guanyuan, 2003, pp. 233-235].

Be that as it may, the planners were on a roll at the time, and Beijing's efforts to "merge tracks" at the turn of 1989 and 1990 took the form of a directive recentralization of pricing in a number of heavy industry sectors. The implications of these efforts that I have identified in my research are so far-reaching that they allow us to consider 1989-1992 as really the period of completion of the "two - track model" in the form in which it existed for most of the 1980s. Directives of the State Council on the restoration of unified planned pricing for rubber and products made from it, cement, rolled steel, certain types of mineral fertilizers, etc. in practice have resulted in even greater fragmentation and localization of pricing mechanisms both in the industry and in the regional context. In particular, in the spring of 1990, instead of a single general price for cement for all producers and consumers in Henan Province alone, four prices appeared at once. A single state price was maintained (by the way, only the cement plant in Pingdingshan County adopted it). The largest factory in the province in Luoyang began shipping cement at a price that exceeds the unified state price by 20%. The price set by the provincial government for local cement plants was initially based on a single standard lowered from Beijing, but local producers de facto raised it by 10 yuan. At the same time, an "unscheduled" price was maintained for a number of local enterprises. With the approval of the provincial government's pricing department, it was determined by the producers themselves. Similar phenomena have occurred in other industries ([Chenben yu Jiage Zilao, 1991, N 13, pp. 29-35]; author's interview in the city government

17 Such periodization is found not only in propaganda and program materials about reforms, but also in a number of scientific and analytical publications, in particular in the works of Li Huizhong, Zhang Jun, Yang Shengming and Li Jun [Li Huizhong, 2003; Zhang Jun, 2006; Yang Shengming, Li Jun, 1993].

18 The results of a survey conducted by analysts of the State Council in April-May 1991 at 15 large and medium-sized enterprises of central and local subordination in various regions of the country are typical. When asked about the direction in which the "merger" should be carried out, the management of three enterprises spoke in favor of the "market", and two - in favor of the "plan". The traditional desire to get raw materials at planned prices and sell finished products at market prices prevailed in the rest markets [Yang Shengming, Li Jun, 1993, pp. 178-179].

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Xi'an (prov. Shaanxi) in 2007 and at Peking University in 2009). It is interesting that in the Chinese literature of this period, regional varieties of the "two-track model" - Shijiazhuang, Anhui, Jilin, etc. - were suddenly interpreted as "successful examples of price track mergers" (Li Huizhong, 1998; Zhang Guanyuan, 2003; Yang Shengming, Li Jun, 1993].

Here we should summarize some results.

The" two-track model " of pricing in the PRC as a single general economic system with a clear and transparent division into directive and non-directive spheres hardly ever existed 19. The size of the directive and non-directive segments varied significantly by industry and region, overlapping with the growing and often opaque powers of local (provincial and lower level) governments to regulate pricing. Moreover, by the mid-1980s it was almost impossible to separate the "plan" from the "market", at least at the micro level. In the second half of the decade, effective interest groups were formed at all levels of the party-state administration and among economic entities, organically connected with the" directive-market " symbiosis. At the same time, the term "two-track model" as a scientific and methodological generalization of the practice of price reform in the PRC in 1979 - 1992 seems to me correct. The fact is that during this period, the central government-the initiator of the widespread introduction of "two-track" pricing-sought to use accessible political, administrative and other methods20 regulate, monitor, and ultimately find a way to effectively manage the" directive-market frontier " from Beijing. An excellent illustration of this aspiration is the heated discussions about macrocontrol methods that unfolded in the expert and political community in 1986-1989. [Karpov, 1997, p. 24-40, 92-120]. "Two-track" here should be understood not only as a bizarre symbiosis of "plan" and "market", but also as a competition between central and local authorities for the preferential right to regulate the "directive-market frontier". However, the task of finding this method turned out to be excessively difficult and, obviously, impossible for the central authorities.

The acute socio-political crisis of 1989 against the background of serious macroeconomic imbalances became the apogee of the uncontrollability of the" two-track model " from a single center. The "counter-reformers" who came to power on its wake decided to dismantle the "two-track" system as much as possible, resorting to recentralizing pricing in a number of industries. The effect was exactly the opposite. The Beijing line has met with covert resistance and open sabotage by numerous regional administrative and economic lobbies genetically linked to" two-track " pricing. Institutionally, these lobbies were grouped around local party and state structures. It seems that the subsequent collapse in fragmentation and localization of "two-track" pricing has seriously undermined the position and potential of the central authorities in the field of price regulation. As a result, by 1993 in the PRC - largely spontaneously - the outlines of what I propose to call a "multi-track pricing model" were formed, in which regional party and state bodies and elites began to play a key role in determining the "directive-market frontier". For Chinese economic literature in the 1990s and "zero" years, it was almost common to say that most prices in the PRC are "exempt" (Fang kai le, Introduction to empirical material).-

19 It seems that the "two-track model" in this form could exist only at the level of a separate enterprise, at most - a production association, and even then only for a relatively short period of time.

20 The methods were diverse and contradictory. At the same time, there was a tightening of personnel policy at state-owned enterprises, the expansion of various contracting relationships, and attempts to radically liberalize pricing.

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scrap makes us doubt the validity of such an assessment. However, if we understand by "liberation" not the complete liberalization of pricing, but the forced agreement of the center to finally consolidate the rights of local authorities to regulate the majority of prices, while retaining a number of monopolies, then everything falls into place. The central government was faced with the need to use other mechanisms of control over socio-economic and political processes in the country that were not related to price directives.

A conceptual understanding of the experience of the "two-track model" in Chinese and foreign literature in the 1990s and "zero" years, as well as what are the main structural and dynamic parameters of the "multi-track model", will be discussed in the next article.

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