A. I. MIKOYAN'S VISITS TO HANOI AND BEIJING

I. N. SELIVANOV

Doctor of Historical Sciences Kursk State University

Soviet-Vietnamese relations Keywords:, Soviet-Chinese relations, foreign policy of the USSR after the XX Congress of the CPSU, excesses in the construction of socialism

The XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held in February 1956, marked a milestone in relations between the Soviet Union and the socialist countries of East Asia, significantly weakening Soviet influence in this region. Although the absolute majority of the "fraternal parties", even some formally, supported his decisions, they were alarmed by reports about the debunking of the cult of personality of J. V. Stalin and the methods he used in carrying out the course of socialist construction both in the Soviet Union and in the "countries of people's democracy" in Eastern Europe and the United States. in East Asia.

The most negative reaction was observed in the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), which had never had any experience of democratic development in their history and perceived the "Stalinist model" of socialism as another "reincarnation" of the traditional Eastern political ^system1. Fearing to lose Soviet economic and military support, their leaders were still forced to publicly approve the decisions of the XX Congress of the CPSU.

For many of them, there was also a real threat of becoming victims of settling political scores and being removed from power, as was the case in 1948-1952 during the preparation of trials of imaginary and genuine supporters of Tito in a number of Eastern European countries.

An unsuccessful attempt to remove Kim Il Sung from power under the pretext of criticizing his personality cult took place in the summer of 1956 in the DPRK during the plenum of the ruling Workers ' Party. On the eve of this plenum, Kim Il Sung traveled to almost all the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, as well as to the USSR and the MNR2 in ^an effort to enlist support for his course. The PRC and DRV for some reason fell out of this chain ³.

As for the leaders of the People's Republic of China, by that time they had already clearly defined their support for a single leader - Mao Zedong - and at first limited themselves to a general statement of the "negative consequences" of the personality cult, trying to reduce them to the subjective "mistakes" of J. V. Stalin, primarily in matters concerning their country.

VIOLENT "KINKS" AND A RESTLESS AMBASSADOR

Perhaps the most difficult situation was faced by North Vietnam, whose undisputed leader Ho Chi Minh, relying on broad popular support, sought to carry out large-scale transformations in agriculture in his country on the basis of the "agrarian program of the Vietnam Workers 'Party"agreed in 1952 personally with I. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov⁴. The law on its implementation on the territory of areas controlled by the DRV government was adopted in December 1953. The main slogan of the reform - "Land for those who cultivate it" - was supposed to be implemented mainly through the gratuitous confiscation of agricultural land owned by the French and their loyal landlords. But, as often happened in such cases, the local authorities, especially after the division of Vietnam in 1954 into two parts along the 17th parallel, gradually began to include in the category of landlords and "enemies" middle peasants and even poor people who expressed dissatisfaction with the new regime.

Since the beginning of 1956, large-scale repressions against the "enemies of socialism" were carried out in the country, which were precisely the result of ongoing transformations in rural areas. Then residents of cities, including members of the ruling party, began to fall under this flywheel. At the same time, the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam were also guided by their intentions to "accelerate" the progress of the northern part of Vietnam along the path of socialism and set an example for the "southerners".

The decisions of the XX Congress of the CPSU caused a real shock to the leadership of the DRV. The future political development of the country that Ho Chi Minh wanted to see united and indivisible was called into question. A general election was scheduled for 1956, and as a result, the-

It was put to many observers, where PTV, led by its proven leader, was to win an unconditional victory over the supporters of the American protege, South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. And against this background, the supporters of the latter had an "ironclad" argument: a united Vietnam will turn into a "totalitarian dictatorship of the Stalinist type" with all the ensuing consequences for the people.

Ho Chi Minh's authority in the eyes of the people of the South began to weaken. Moreover, there were no great successes in building socialism in the north of the country due to a number of reasons, both objective and subjective. According to some sources, every second member of the Workers 'Party was repressed during the "agrarian reform". Tens of thousands of people worked in extreme conditions in so-called re-education camps. The fanaticism of local "reformers"was fueled by numerous Chinese advisers who were sent to the DRV in 1953 with the consent of the Soviet Union and were hated by ordinary Vietnamese. ⁵

THE RESTLESS AMBASSADOR

And then the energetic new ambassador of the USSR appears with his ideas about what should and should not be done in building socialism in Vietnam.

Mikhail Vasilyevich Zimyanin presented his credentials to Ho Chi Minh in March 1953. The former Ambassador A. A. Lavrishchev either ignored the relevant information received by the Soviet Embassy, which opened in Hanoi in the summer of 1954, or his reports to Moscow (if there were any, of course) did not arouse interest there.⁶

While working as a diplomat in the DRV, Mikhail Vasilyevich Zimyanin showed himself in a positive way. He repeatedly sent alarming telegrams to Moscow about the situation in the host country, but in the Kremlin, busy preparing for the implementation of the decisions of the XX Congress of the CPSU, at first they tried not to notice his signals and even expressed a negative reaction about them. Apparently, the subjective attitude towards a person who stumbled, even if not by choice, on the way to the party Olympus was affected. Prior to his appointment to this post, Zimyanin, who was only 41 years old, served as secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party(b) of Belarus, and in 1952 was elected a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. But then the brilliantly started career went downhill, largely because after Stalin's death, his candidacy for the post of first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus for some reasons of its own, possibly related to Zimyanin's partisan past, was lobbied by ^L. P. Beria, who was arrested in June 1953.7 Zimyanin was then transferred to work in Moscow, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, where he took the position of head of the department. After the XX Congress of the CPSU, Zimyanin lost his membership in the Central Committee, but was elected to the Central Audit Commission of the CPSU. He held the post of ambassador to the DRV until 1958. Secretly, high-ranking party and state officials who went to countries far from the USSR were considered "disgraced". Having collected, with the help of embassy staff and foreign intelligence officers, a significant number of facts that did not characterize the North Vietnamese leadership in the best possible way, Zimyanin sent a corresponding cipher telegram to Moscow addressed to N. S. Khrushchev. According to eyewitnesses, he did not believe it and in a fit of passion exclaimed: "What kind of nonsense does this boy write?"⁸.

DEBRIEFING AND EXPLANATIONS

Nevertheless, the ambassador was persistent, and Khrushchev decided to send Mikoyan to Hanoi after completing his visits to South Asian countries in order to investigate the situation on the spot.⁹ This Soviet party and statesman in those years often carried out sensitive foreign policy assignments, and many remember his speech at the XX Congress of the CPSU. Even before the secret report of Khrushchev, speaking in the debate on the report, he, in particular, criticized the propaganda work of the party based on the" Short Course in the History of the CPSU(b)", as well as the deplorable state of Soviet Oriental studies, which did not correspond to the level of increasingly expanding relations between the USSR and the countries of ^the East10.

In order not to cause unnecessary questions and speculation, Mikoyan's "inspection and control" trip was disguised as an official visit of one of the top leaders of the USSR to a friendly state.

By the way, Mikoyan was

I know Ho Chi Minh personally. He attended his reception in Moscow during ^the secret visit of the Vietnamese leader in 1950,11 and disapproved in the circle of his associates that Stalin "forced" Ho Chi Minh to rename the Communist Party to the Workers ' Party, despite the latter's objections. "In fact, it is impossible to impose wording," Mikoyan said at one of the meetings of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee during an exchange of views on the draft report to the XX Party Congress.¹²

It is not known whether A. I. Mikoyan and Ho Chi Minh were in contact during Ho Chi Minh's second secret trip to the USSR, which took place in the fall of 1952, during the work of the XIX Congress of the CPSU, but in the summer of 1955, during the third official visit of the President of the DRV to Moscow, they met to discuss the prospects and DRV help.

It seems that Mikoyan and Ho Chi Minh had an even, if not friendly, relationship, especially since both were considered unsurpassed masters of political compromises.

Upon arriving in Hanoi on April 2, Mikoyan initially reacted negatively to Zimyanin, who met him at the airfield. According to the latter, "there was an argument, even swearing"¹³, but after the first frank conversation, Mikoyan realized that he was in the role of an "anti-crisis manager", which he had been accustomed to since Stalin's times.

In order not to take full responsibility and not to offend the Chinese leaders with distrust, he asked Ho Chi Minh to invite a representative of the CCP leadership to Hanoi to discuss the accumulated problems together. Since Chen Yun, a member of the political bureau of the CPC Central Committee, was in charge of economic issues, including those related to Vietnam, he was chosen. He promptly flew to Hanoi and, together with the Chinese Ambassador to the DRV, Lo Guibo, joined the Soviet representatives. ¹⁴

Those accompanying Mikoyan kept a detailed diary of his stay, which included the full texts of all his telegrams sent from Hanoi to Moscow. According to these records, Mikoyan took part, together with Chen Yun, in five meetings of the politburo of the Central Committee of the PTV and spoke at the 150-thousandth rally of Soviet-Vietnamese friendship organized in honor of his arrival in Hanoi's central square - Badinh.

The first meeting of the Politburo of the PTV Central Committee opened on the day of the arrival of Soviet representatives. According to a report to Moscow, A. I. Mikoyan and Chen Yun decided to speak at this meeting with a "united line on the development of the Vietnamese revolution" ¹⁵.

Expressing a common point of view, Chen Yun said that the Vietnamese comrades should not jump over the necessary stages of their country's development, and at the same time referred to Mao Zedong's statement: "We should talk less about socialism, and do more."

Then the floor was given to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of PTV Truong Tinh and Minister of Defense Vo Nguyen Ziap. According to Mikoyan's observations, they had a "tendency to force the construction of socialism." Truong Tinh, arguing his position, referred to the speeches of the leaders of the GDR and the DPRK, corresponding to his ideas on this issue, and Vo Nguyen Ziap expressed in the spirit that " with the completion of the agrarian revolution this year, the bourgeois-democratic revolution in the DRV will also end and the stage of development of the socialist revolution will begin." to Moscow: "These comrades, who feel a great interest in questions of theory, were given explanations in the spirit of the instructions of the Central Committee of the CPSU", after which "... all the comrades who spoke expressed unanimous approval of the ideas that were expressed by me and Comrade Chen Yun, and thanked them " ¹⁶.

The next day, the second meeting of the politburo of the PTV Central Committee was held, at which Mikoyan and Chen Yun pointed out to their North Vietnamese colleagues the need to "strengthen economic and cultural ties with South Vietnam and strengthen the influence of the DRV there in every possible way," since the struggle for the Geneva Agreements does not end with the French withdrawal from there. The withdrawal of the French expeditionary force from the southern part of the country, in their opinion, should be presented "as the result of the victory of the DRV, which defeated the colonialists","so that Diem does not reap the fruits of this victory" ¹⁷.

The Soviet and Chinese representatives supported the DRV leadership's intentions to improve relations with neighboring Kambod-

the Soviet Union has taken steps to establish diplomatic relations with that State. Regarding Laos, Mikoyan advised the Vietnamese comrades to "carefully understand the situation" and act in such a way as to avoid accusing the world community of violating the Geneva Agreements of 1954 in the part concerning this state.¹⁸

In the afternoon, a rally was held on Badinj Square on the occasion of A. I. Mikoyan's stay in the DRV, which was opened by Ho Chi Minh. In particular, he stated: "The XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union summed up the rich experience of the Soviet people over many years. Directives on the sixth five-year plan for the development of the national economy for the further development and prosperity of the country were approved. The Congress was a source of inspiration for the peoples of the whole world, illuminated the path to victory even more brightly for the Soviet people, and at the same time helped our people and the peoples of the whole world to clearly define the path of struggle for independence, democracy and peace." Not a word was said about criticism of the cult of personality.

In his speech, the North Vietnamese leader diplomatically played down the unpleasant conversation about agrarian reform and the "peaceful" unification of the country that took place the day before: "This year we must successfully complete the agrarian reform, transfer the land into the hands of the peasants of North Vietnam. We must fulfill the state plan, restore the economy and start developing culture", as well as "fight on the basis of the Geneva Agreements for the unification of our country in a peaceful way"¹⁹.

In the evening, the third meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of PTV was held. On the eve of its holding, Mikoyan sent his next message to Moscow, from the content of which it followed that "the line will be taken not for inflating capital construction in the DRV, but for some of its reductions." The Chinese, according to him, agreed to this proposal ²⁰.

At the meeting, Mikoyan had to answer in detail a number of previously formulated unpleasant questions that Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Ziap asked him.

They were as follows: why was the question of Stalin's personality cult raised unexpectedly, without any prior preparation, during the XX Congress of the CPSU, which took many communist leaders of Vietnam by surprise and caused misunderstandings?"; how did the Soviet Union react to the report on the personality cult and why this report was not balanced, why were the following statements made about the cult of were the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU aware of Stalin's mistakes, or did they become aware only now?; how could it happen that "much of the content of this report was published in the bourgeois press even before the comrades from the DRV received this report?". They are doubtful, Mikoyan wrote further, and ask for advice on whether it is possible to translate this report into Vietnamese and make it available to the Central Committee members. "I answered positively... and gave appropriate explanations on other issues. " ²¹

On April 5, with a break, the fourth and fifth meetings of the Politburo of the PTV Central Committee were held. First, together with Mikoyan, the leaders of the Far Eastern Federal District discussed the draft plan for the development of the national economy of the Far Eastern Federal District for 1957-1959. Once again, a formal unity of opinion was demonstrated with the representatives of the People's Republic of China, together with whom comments on the plan were developed.

During the fifth session, the leaders of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea again asked for "additional clarifications" on the following questions: why did the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Congress not contain criticism of the Central Committee of the CPSU?; whether Stalin's mistakes were known to the members of the Central Committee before and was it really impossible to find opportunities to correct them in a timely manner? Ho Chi Minh said that because of Stalin's great authority, it was difficult to explain all this to members of the Workers ' Party. "After my explanations," Mikoyan stressed, "Ho Chi Minh and other members of the Politburo said that everything was clear to them,and they were satisfied with these explanations." ²²

"By the end of the meeting," A. I. Mikoyan further reported in his message, " Ho Chi Minh said that the Soviet gratuitous aid was actually exhausted. They will need help in the distance-

neisham. They, of course, preferred that it would be free of charge in the future, but if this is difficult, they would ask for a repayment loan. ...I said that we thought that after receiving so much gratuitous aid from us and other countries, they should have been able to get back on their feet and do without it in the future. To this, they said that, unfortunately, they would not be able to do without further assistance. Comrade Ziap raised the issue of assistance with the supply of weapons from the USSR, which are not produced in the PRC. I replied that their application was being considered in Moscow, but it wasn't finished yet."

Further, the Soviet leader drew the attention of those present to the following circumstances.

First. In the DRV, 40 thousand people were excluded from the party. It is necessary to pay attention to whether there are any excesses at this scale of exceptions, since " this may strengthen the camp of opponents of the democratic government." Second. The leaders of the Far Eastern Military District in their speeches and periodicals "make a lot of noise about suppressing sabotage and subversive elements." They were advised: "to suppress sabotage and eliminate subversive elements, but not to shout about it, because this can be used in the south of Vietnam against democratic elements and members of the Workers' Party. In addition, it can create uncertainty about the strength of the regime."

According to Mikoyan, " the Vietnamese comrades agreed with these remarks." On the same day, Ho Chi Minh handed the head of the Soviet delegation a letter addressed to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in which it was noted that " Com. Mikoyan helped us resolve many important issues, " and expressed regret that "his stay with us was too brief." ²³

Mikoyan made it clear to his North Vietnamese interlocutors that terror against the internal opposition to their regime should continue, but it should be done carefully and without public disclosure. As a result, a plenum of the PTV Central Committee was held in Hanoi "hot on the heels"; it formally condemned the "excesses" and instead of their initiator Truong Tin, Le Zuan was appointed responsible for the reforms, who was not directly related to the repressions, since at that time he was working illegally in South Vietnam.²⁴ The persecution of "those who disagree" with the policy pursued by PTV continued, but, as Mikoyan advised, "without publicity."

HOLODOMOR IN CHINESE

On April 6, Mikoyan flew to Beijing, where he was expected to have another important meeting - with the chairman of the CPC Central Committee Mao Zedong, his deputy Liu Shaoqi, and the head of the government Zhou Enlai.

After Stalin's death, Mao Zedong repeatedly made initiatives to accelerate the pace of cooperation in China's agriculture. As in Vietnam, seizures of agricultural products from direct producers began throughout China in the fall of 1953. The motive was the same as in the Soviet Union in the late 1920s and early 1930s: the transformation of the country into a powerful power. The authorities ideally wanted to leave the peasants as much rice as is necessary for physiological survival - the so-called "basic food" in the amount of 200 kg of grain per year per person with the prospect of reducing it to 110-140 kg. If the peasants refused to give up their "surplus", local authorities were encouraged to use violence, as Mao Zedong instructed Chen Yun on October 1, 1953.

A year and a half after the "expropriation" began, famine broke out across the country. In some places, people lived on tree bark, leaves, forest grasses, and left their children to fend for themselves, because they could not feed them. Many peasants were starving to death. Mao had only one answer to the disturbing information coming in from the field:"Marxism is quite a tough thing." From mid-1955, in order to further increase the dependence of the peasantry on the authorities, they were forcibly united into cooperatives similar to the Soviet collective farms. Reprisals were applied to dissenters.

In January 1956, the People's Republic of China developed a draft 12-year agricultural development plan, which outlined a significant increase in rice production. At the same time, no modernization of agriculture or even an increase in fertilizer production was envisaged. By that time, more than 90% of the peasants were already employed in various types of cooperatives.²⁵

Mao was met with the dissent of virtually the entire political bureau of the CPC Central Committee, including his closest associates, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai. During these days, the chief Soviet economic adviser to the People's Republic of China, I. V. Arkhipov, reported to Moscow that Mao Zedong, in his opinion, had no idea about the economy. At the same time, the Chinese leader, using diplomatic channels, promoted his "agrarian" ideas to the leadership of a number of socialist countries in Eastern Europe. Thus, according to the memoirs of the Hungarian communist leader M. Rakoshi, the Chinese ambassador at the beginning of 1956, on behalf of Mao Zedong, informed him in detail about the progress of agrarian reform, in particular, asked him to take a closer look at such a "progressive" initiative as preserving small plots of land for former large landowners to cultivate with their own hands ²⁶. The socialist reforms were extended to industry as well.

These ideas were most clearly reflected in Mao Zedong's December 6, 1955 speech "On the Struggle against Right-Wing Bias and Conservatism" and in his preface to the collection "The Socialist Upsurge in the Chinese Countryside". In January 1956, the Chinese leader publicly stated that within the next three years, the Chinese government would be able to

²⁷ years of "socialist transformation" will be completed in the entire territory of the People's Republic of China. Slogans about building socialism on the principle of "bigger, faster, better and more economical" and " poverty is good!" etc.

BEIJING'S COMPLAINTS

It was against this background that Beijing learned about the decisions of the XX Congress of the CPSU, and then-about the dissatisfaction of the Soviet leadership with the agrarian reform in the DRV, carried out under the patronage of the PRC, and began to adapt to new trends from Moscow.

The day before Mikoyan's arrival, an editorial in the main party organ, the People's Daily, pointed out that 30% of Stalin's activities were mistakes, and 70% were due to his merits*. At the same time, the CPSU leadership was praised for its "selfless" criticism of the mistakes of the past.

During the first meeting, Mao Zedong directly pointed out to Mikoyan Stalin's mistakes related to his cult of personality. He reduced them mainly to the Soviet leader's unwillingness to meet the CCP halfway and the negative role of the Comintern in the history of the Chinese Communist movement. So, according to him, because of the mistakes of the Comintern and Stalin personally, the CCP suffered greatly in the first half of the 1930s, during the civil war with supporters of Chiang Kai-shek. The Red Army at this time was reduced from 300 thousand to 25 thousand fighters. "Things were going downhill," Mao said. In addition, he noted that at that time he received incorrect directives from his main political opponent, Wang Ming, who managed to use his good knowledge of the Russian language and his qualities of a "big sycophant" to ingratiate himself with Stalin and thus negatively influence the situation in the CCP.²⁸

Then Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai joined the conversation. According to him, while in Moscow in 1939-1940, he was never able to get a personal meeting with Stalin.²⁹ Mao Zedong added that when he was in Moscow in late 1949 and early 1950, he felt that Stalin did not trust him, and his discontent towards him was evident in everything. The Soviet leader compared the Chinese to the Yugoslavs and initially did not want to sign a treaty of friendship with the PRC. In Xinjiang, Soviet representatives sowed distrust of the new regime.³⁰

Mikoyan, reporting on the complaints of the CCP leaders to Moscow, noted that he tried to defuse the situation: "I said that Stalin's suspiciousness had gone so far in recent years that he not only sometimes expressed distrust of Mao Zedong, but also distrusted even us, his closest comrades." ³¹

Mao Zedong replied that " now, after the 20th Congress, it is easier for them to call a spade a spade." When it came to the prospects of Cominform, the Chinese leader stated that this organization "does not bring benefits, but rather harm" and should not be replaced by a Contact Bureau, as suggested by representatives of the CPSU.

Zhou Enlai recalled that during their stay in Moscow in 1949 and early 1950, together with Mao Zedong, they asked Stalin about the possibility of Mongolia's return to the PRC and that they were given the "wrong" answer at that time. In turn, Liu Shaoqi, developing this topic, focused on the psychological trauma that the Chinese people "deeply experience" due to the secession of Outer Mongolia from China. Mikoyan replied that it is best to ask the opinion of the residents of the MPR ³² about this issue. Of course, such a reaction from one of the top Soviet leaders clearly could not satisfy the Chinese Communist leaders.³³

Chinese leaders might have been somewhat encouraged by the fact that on April 7, 1956, A. I. Mikoyan signed an agreement on providing additional economic assistance to the PRC on behalf of the USSR. It provided for the construction of new civilian and military facilities, including factories for the production ^of armaments34.

* * *

In general, the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam were more blunt and direct in their assessments of the negative consequences of exposing the cult of personality than their Chinese counterparts, who reacted with their usual pragmatism.

Mikoyan made it clear that in the event of a public expression of agreement with the decisions of the XX Congress, large-scale Soviet economic and military assistance to the DRV and the PRC will continue. As a result, North Vietnam and China soon announced the "liberalization" of the domestic political course, some "opposition" was allowed on a limited scale, in particular, an ideological campaign was launched in China under the slogan "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools compete". Subsequently, their participants, who believed in the seriousness of Ho Chi Minh and Mao Zedong's intentions, were repressed.³⁵

But, having won some intermediate victory, the Soviet Union lost the initiative in this region, which gradually passed to the leaders of the PRC, who put almost all the communist parties in Southeast Asia under their control.

The last illusions about the revival of the Stalinist model of socialism in the Soviet Union among the leaders of China and North Vietnam disappeared in the summer of 1957, when the so-called "anti-party group"was removed from power. ³⁶ In a few years, a split in the international communist movement will begin, and for many years relations between the USSR and the socialist states of East Asia will

* Subsequently, this proportion was adopted by the CPC leadership for the official assessment of Mao Zedong's activities (ed. by E. Rusakov).

¹ In modern historical studies, it is increasingly referred to as "national Stalinism" (see, for example, A. M. Lankov August, 1956: The Crisis in North Korea. M, ROSSPEN, 2009, p. 4).

² Now in the official propaganda of the DPRK, these visits are combined under the headings "In the struggle against the heresy of Khrushchevism", "The first battle against Khrushchevite revisionism", etc. and are characterized as an important contribution of Kim Il Sung to the practice of the international communist movement (Meetings of President Kim Il Sung: Part 1 (March 1949-November 1966) / / website Juche-songun - http.://www.juche-songun. ru

³ We do not touch on this subject due to the limited scope of the article and the relatively complete coverage in A. N. Lankov's monograph of all the vicissitudes of Soviet-North Korean relations in 1956 (including those that took place with the active participation of A. I. Mikoyan).

^{Selivanov I. N.} 4 Moscow - Ho Chi Minh City. Contacts 1950-1952 // Voprosy istorii, 2012, No. 8.

⁵ In 2001, the collective work "The Black Book of Communism" (French edition - 1997) was published in Russian translation. In the section devoted to Vietnam, with references to studies published in the second half of the 1990s by D. Marr, J. Boudarel and Nguyen Van Key, the appalling fanaticism with which North Vietnamese party activists, state security officials and army units implemented the provisions of the "agrarian program of the Workers 'Party of Vietnam"is presented. When the nominal enemies "ran out", they began to take on members of the PTV, some of whom went to the execution with toast in honor of the party and its leader (Cartois S. et al. "Black Book" of Communism, Moscow, Three Centuries of History, 2001, pp. 526-529).

⁶ While preparing this article, the author got acquainted with the declassified materials of the reference book on Vietnam in the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, but did not find any mention of possible alarm signals from employees of the Soviet embassy in the USSR Foreign Ministry. The materials of the corresponding fund in the former archive of the Central Committee of the CPSU (now the Russian State Archive of Modern History)are still classified.

⁷ The Beria case. The verdict is not subject to appeal. Russia. XX century. Dokumenty [Documents], Moscow, MFD Publ., 2012, pp. 93-95.

^{Bubleev M.} 8 From the generation of winners. Moscow, Golodets, 2007, p. 35.

⁹ A. I. Mikoyan has traveled to Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Burma since March 20, 1956.

¹⁰ XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Stenographic report, vol. 1. Moscow, Politizdat Publ., 1956, pp. 324-325.

^{Konoreva I. A., Selivanov I. N.} 11 Secret trips of Uncle Ho. Vietnamese leader in Moscow (1950-1952) / / Rodina, 2008, N 7.

¹² Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1954-1964. Volume 1. Draft minutes of meetings. Stenogrammy [Transcripts], Moscow, ROSSPEN Publ., 2004, p. 90.

¹³ Ibid., p. 36.

¹⁴ In addition to A. I. Mikoyan and M. V. Zimyanin, the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR, Sh.R. Rashidov, who accompanied Mikoyan on a trip to South Asia, took part in the consultations (apparently to give credibility to the version about the "official" visit of the Soviet delegation to the DRV). For more information on the new trends in Soviet policy towards Asian states in the mid-1950s, see: Vasiliev A.M. From Messianism to Pragmatism. Russia in the Middle East, Moscow, Nauka Publ., 1993.

¹⁵ GARF, f. 5446, op. 98 s, d. 704, l. 101. Chen Yun was considered a leading expert in the leadership of the PRC on economic construction issues and from the end of 1953 supervised both the agricultural transformations in China and the activities of Chinese advisers in the DRV.

¹⁶ Ibid., l. 102.

¹⁷ Ibid., l. 104-105.

¹⁸ Ibid., l. 105.

¹⁹ Ibid., l. 106-108.

²⁰ GARF, f. 5446, op. 98 s, d. 704, l. 115.

²¹ Ibid., l. 116. In his memoirs, Mikoyan bluntly wrote:: "I repeat, it was I who proposed to make a report to the XX Congress (although I did propose to make it to Pospelov). But Khrushchev was probably right that the report should have been made to the First Secretary. I suggested that we all join the commission. But even here Khrushchev was probably right that we were too close to Stalin ourselves, and it would be better for us not to join the commission. Be that as it may, the report and exposure of Stalin's crimes were necessary for the recovery of both the party and society as a whole, for the revival of democracy and legality" (Mikoyan A. I. So it was / / Military Literature website - http://militera.lib.ru/memo/ russian/mikoyan/05.html).

²² GARF, f. 5446, op. 98 s, d. 704, l. 117.

²³ Ibid., l. 118.

^{2 4} The plenum of the Central Committee of the PTV was held from 19 to 24 April 1956

²⁵ For more information, see: Yun Zhang, Holliday J. Unknown Mao, Moscow, Tsentrpoligraf Publ., 2006, pp. 416-418; Pantsov A.V. Mao Zedong, Moscow, Molodaya gvardiya publ., 2007, pp. 564-575.

²⁶ " I have seen a cult of personality arise." Matyash Rakosi o Stalinu i sebe [About Stalin and himself] / / Bulletin of the Presidential Archive of the Russian Federation, 1997, No. 1.

²⁷ Pravda, 27.01.1956. The collection "The Socialist Rise in the Chinese Countryside" was translated into Russian in early 1956 and published in the USSR.

²⁸ The fate of this Chinese politician, who was a member of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern from the mid-1930s, is also interesting. In September 1956, at the eighth Congress of the CPC, he was elected to the Central Committee, but was forced to stay (under the pretext of "treatment") in the USSR. During the Soviet-Chinese controversy, he actively supported the CPSU line. He died in 1974 and was buried in Moscow at the Novodevichy Cemetery.

²⁹ If we take into account the information provided by P. P. Vladimirov, a Soviet career intelligence officer, journalist and diplomat who was stationed at the headquarters of the Communist Party of China in Yan'yaan during the Great Patriotic War, Zhou Enlai came to Moscow in the fall of 1939 under the pretext of treating a sore hand, but in fact, fulfilling the instructions of Mao Zedong, he wanted to Assistance to the government of Chiang Kai-shek, whose capital was then located in Chongqing (See: Vladimirov P. P. Special Region of China. 1942-1945. Moscow, 1973, p. 451). Apparently, J. V. Stalin, having the relevant data (possibly obtained from the same Wang Ming), understood that the CCP leaders were primarily guided only by their own interests, without taking into account possible problems for the USSR from such a step, and under various pretexts refused this meeting.

³⁰ During the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, separatist sentiments intensified in Xinjiang, which led, largely at the initiative of Moscow, to the creation of the "East Turkestan Republic" there, whose leaders repeatedly requested its admission to the USSR. For more information, see: Barmin V. A. Xinjiang in Soviet-Chinese Relations 1941-1949. Barnaul, BSPU Publ., 1999.

³¹ GARF, f. R-5446, on. 98 s, d. 704, l. 125.

³² GARF, f. R-5446, op. 98 s, d. 704, l. 130.

³³ By the way, A. I. Mikoyan flew from Beijing to Ulaanbaatar, where he probably informed the leadership of the MNR about his conversation with the leadership of the People's Republic of China in Beijing and the claims they made against the territorial integrity of their state. Thus, the Mongolian leaders, also dissatisfied with the decisions of the XX Congress of the CPSU, were forced to approve them, proceeding not only from economic benefits, but also seeing the USSR as a guarantor of their independence.

^{Kapitsa M. S.} 34 Na raznykh parallelyakh [On different parallels]. Moscow, Kniga i biznes, 1996, p. 63.

³⁵ Подробнее см.: Boudarel G. Cent fleurs ecloses dans la nuit du Vietnam: communisme et dissidence 1954 - 1956. Paris, 1991; Pantsov A.V. Decree. op., pp. 597-599.

³⁶ In the spring of 1957, China, Vietnam, and the MNR received the nominal head of the Soviet state, Konstantin Voroshilov, with unprecedented honors, apparently hoping that he would be one of the politicians who, along with other representatives of the "old guard", would be able to remove N. S. Khrushchev from power and restore the USSR to its former position., the "Stalinist" way of development.

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