When we talk about the issues that this issue focuses on, the case of Russia is relevant in two ways. On the one hand, Russia, located on the European periphery (and now referred to as "Eurasia" in the geographical and cultural sense), is one of the most characteristic examples of the constant combination of backwardness and desperate attempts to overcome it. In particular, the communist experiment undertaken in Russia in the 20th century was a completely new, unique and globally significant modernization project. Therefore, when discussing the question of "multiple modernities", it is impossible to avoid this Russian case.

At the same time, being a country where, on the one hand, historically the overwhelming majority has always been adherents of Orthodoxy, and on the other hand, a complex confessional mosaic has been preserved, Russia provides a wealth of material about the influence of the "religious factor" in national history (especially when tacitly or explicitly compared with the "Latin West"); about the division of the Russian Orthodox Church religious and secular, which culminated in the relentless secularization of the Soviet era; as well as the religious revival after the fall of the Soviet regime. In this respect, the Russian case is also quite appropriate when discussing another major topic that intersects with the topic of "multiple moderns" - the topic of"post-secularity".

This article is based on the results of the scientific seminar "Multiple Moderns and a global post - secular society", which was held on May 4-6, 2011 at the University of Tor Vergata (Rome). The English version of this article will appear in the collection: Multiple Modernities and Postsecular Societies / Eds. Massimo Rosati and Kristina Stoeckl. Farnham: Ashgate, 2012 (Forthcoming). The rights to publish the article are provided by Ashgate Publishing house.

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The "damned questions" of Russian history, at least since the nineteenth century, have been questions about how to"catch up with Modernity "1 without losing the Orthodox Christian" soul "or identity; questions about whether this" soul "can be sacrificed for the sake of Modernity and, in the case of such a sacrifice, whether it is possible to "catch up with Modernity". what new "soul" will replace it?

In this article, I will first give a brief overview of how Russia has faced the challenges of Modernity, and then try to speculate on how the theoretical models of "multiple modernities" and "post-secular" apply to Russian material. I assume, however, that these two models are not necessarily connected to each other: each particular religious tradition does not necessarily provide a conceptual clue to explain some other type of Modernity that corresponds to it. In other words, the modern "diversity" cannot be explained solely by the diversity of faiths. Furthermore, in my opinion, the Russian case points to a stronger link between Modernity and secularism than is generally accepted among current critics of classical theories of modernization and secularization. Finally, my understanding of "postsecondary", which I will focus on at the end of this article, is somewhat different from the understanding shared by some of the authors of this issue.

Russia's "Collision" with Modernity

At the most cursory glance at Russian history, we can easily find a whole series of attempts at reform, followed by counter-reforms-a kind of historical "push and pull". The most obvious examples of this kind (with a certain simplification) were the following: the reforms of Peter the Great at the beginning of the XVIII century; partial reforms under Catherine the Great; partial reforms in the reign of Alexander I-at the beginning of the XIX century; then decisive reforms under Alexander II in the middle of the XIX century; revolutionary reforms of the beginning of the XX century Bolshevik modernization; finally, the post-Soviet reforms of the late 20th century. Each of these reformation periods was followed by a setback, which can be seen as a manifestation of the inner dvoi-

1. Here and in the future, the concept of "Modernity" with a capital letter is analogous to the English Modernity. Sometimes the word "Modernity "in this sense in Russian academic usage is translated by the concept of" modern "("Modern"), which is also used in the title of the article and sometimes in the text.

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Russian culture, which, perhaps, in fact, was precisely programmed by the duality of contacts with the West themselves, a combination of attraction and repulsion.2
There is no doubt that the reformist impulses were generated precisely by the clash with Western experience; these impulses were a reaction to the realization of their own backwardness in comparison with the processes that were taking place in Europe; all reforms were conceived only within the framework of the paradigm of Western Modernity. Of course, the reformers always acted selectively, determining by selection what they wanted to follow and what to reject from the "cultural program of modernity" that was being formed in the West (cultural program of modernity, Sh. Eisenstadt). At the same time, it is important to remember that this selection itself was not made from a certain complete, complete program, which simply did not exist in any Western country in the XVIII or XIX century. However, each element of the reforms was a reaction to a certain impulse coming from the West, and the overall reform vector pointed specifically to the West.

Due to this selectivity, every attempt at serious reform turned out to be ambiguous in its content and consequences, and hence the inevitability of counter-reforms.3 Peter the Great promoted and introduced modern European technologies (starting with the military), management technologies, certain forms of state bureaucracy, and some values of work ethics for a part of society, but in other public spheres his reign was extremely conservative. It has promoted religious tolerance towards some groups and unprecedented religious intolerance towards others. The same ambiguity can be seen in the case of Catherine the Great's" enlightened monarchy "and Alexander II's" great reforms", as well as in the case of Bolshevik modernization and post-Soviet reforms4.

2. Lotman Yu. M., Uspenskiy B. A. Rol ' dualnykh modeli v dinamike russkoy kul'tury (do kontsa XVIII veka) [The role of dual models in the dynamics of Russian culture (until the end of the 18th century)]. Philology, vol. 28, Tartu, 1977; Akhiezer A. Russia. Kritika istoricheskogo opyta (sotsiokul'turnaya dinamika Rossii) [Criticism of Historical experience (socio-cultural dynamics of Russia)].

3. See, for example: Ilyin V. V., Panarin A. S., Akhiezer A. S. Reforms and Counter-reforms in Russia: Cycles of modernization of the process, Moscow: Moscow University Press, 1996.

4. For the Soviet period, see: Christian D. Imperial and Soviet Russia: Power, Privilege and the Challenge of Modernity. Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 1997; Suny R. The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States. London and New York:

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However, the choice of priorities was still made within the framework of the" cultural program of modernity", understood as a dynamic, changing repertoire of ideas and practices. It was European Modernity that ultimately served as a beacon for the state bureaucracy and the ruling elites of Romanov's Russia, and it was it that was used as a model for reforms, and it was the supporters of reforms who were identified only as "Westerners". The idea of imitation gave rise to the dominant discourse of backwardness and secondariness. These Westernizing Westerners were of two types: those who held more radical views were opposed to the ruling regime, and those who were more moderate were incorporated into that regime.

The "cursed questions" provoked a reaction, generating a romantic traditionalist response, usually based on religious arguments, as well as an alternative path discourse, often mixed with messianism, the essence of which was deeply anti-modern. The most striking example is the Slavophil intellectual movement of the mid-nineteenth century, which expressed a position of resolute romantic rejection of Modernity, which by that time had already been partially assimilated by the ruling elites.5
At the same time, the progressive movement of Modernity in Europe was itself a complex phenomenon; modern European society developed in a complex way, also with jerks and setbacks, gradually including all new elements in the "cultural program" .6 The romantic reaction to Modernity in Russia had parallels in the West; the Slavophiles who sought an Eastern Orthodox "soul" for Russian civilization were strongly influenced by German Romanticism and the French Catholic reaction in post-Napoleonic Europe. The discourse of backwardness was also widespread among nationalist intellectuals in Germany and Italy; anti-modern sentiments were also widespread in Europe. And in this respect, Russia was part of the European cultural and political space.

Oxford University Press, 1998; Рое М. The Russian Moment in World History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

5. Walitsky A. The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth- century Russian Thought. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

6. Wagner P. A Sociology of Modernity: Liberty and Discipline. London and New York: Routledge, 1994.

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What is the difference between the Russian case? Apparently, its meta-European, "eastern" imperial background, which was the reason that identity conflicts and corresponding social conflicts were more acute and of a different nature here compared to Europe; in this sense, Russian development is closer in content to Turkey, Mexico or China.7 (The imperial, colonial experience of the European powers was also of great importance, but its nature is quite different: this experience rather reinforced the "Western" identity of the colonial powers.) Slavophiles put forward as an alternative the idea of a special Russian civilization - one of the most powerful and widespread discourses of Russian culture, which can be distinguished both at the level of intellectual polemics and at the grassroots level of everyday cultural practices. It is interesting that the Slavophil vision eventually (for such "late Slavophiles" as Nikolai Danilevsky and Konstantin Leontiev) developed into what Eisenstadt calls a form of "modern totalism" based on the ontologization of collectivity (nation or civilization) .8 Therefore, paradoxically, the Slavophils were both anti-modern and implicitly modern; they represented a phase in the dialectic of Modernity.

The Communist Revolution has become a new alternative: an accelerated technocentric super-rational modernization combined with a radical communitarian, egalitarian, and universalist ethos. It was a different model of Modernity. According to Eisenstadt's classification, the Bolsheviks represented a different, Jacobin form of "modern totalism", highlighting the voluntaristic restructuring of society through its total mobilization9. This new model was perceived as a radical break with both European Modernity and the idea of "Russian civilization", although, in essence, it was an unintentional (and unexpected) combination of elements of both. There is an unquestionable and, at first glance, paradoxical consonance between the Marxist post-Soviet world and the Soviet world.

7. There is a striking similarity between national literatures that reflect the problem of Westernization; the characters of Turgenev and Dostoevsky are just as internally torn as the characters of, for example, Octavio Paz or Orhan Pamuk, as well as other authors of the colonial and post-colonial eras.

8. Eisenstadt S.N. Multiple Modernities // Daedalus. 2000. Vol.129 (1). Р.9.

9. Eisenstadt S.N. Multiple Modernities.

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capitalism (and post-democracy) and traditional non-capitalism (and non-democracy). In the Soviet era, especially towards its end, the tension between these cultural / political strategies-advanced rationalist Modernity and anti-Western traditional culturalism-was felt quite clearly, although under the shadow of the officially dominant" third " model - the Communist one. In this case, N. Berdyaev's analysis 10 still retains its significance. As J. R. R. Tolkien writes: Arnason, communism, "with all its terrible vices and irrationality, is perhaps a special, albeit ultimately self-destructive version of Modernity, but not a stable deviation from the main stream of modernization"11.

In the post - Soviet era, both ideological trends-rationalistic Westernization and "organic" anti-Western-came to light again and revived in public polemics and social practices. And both of these trends have taken a somewhat outdated, "scholastic" and largely speculative form. On the one hand, there was a desire for classical Modernity, which, as many believed, was missed (due to the"communist timelessness"). On the other hand, there was a desire to return to a special national tradition, understood mainly in civilizational and culturalist categories, which in turn were based on essentialist and religiously oriented ideas - to a tradition that, as many believed, was lost (for the same reason of "communist timelessness", a certain historical " failure", i.e. a kind of accident). There was also the phenomenon of "Soviet nostalgia" - nostalgia for the strange mixture of modernity and tradition that the Soviet Union actually was.

However, in the twenty-first century, these two historical ideological trends (follow the West or look for a special model) looked less and less adequate to the current Russian and global circumstances. Both the idea of catching up with Modernity (the classical secular and liberal program) and the idea of reviving a special cultural tradition based on religious values (classical anti-enlightenment relativism, which goes back to Slavophil historicism) seem simplistic in that world,

10. Berdyaev N. A. Istoki i smysl russkogo kommunizma [The origins and meaning of Russian Communism].

11. Arnason J. Communism and Modernity // Daedalus. 2000. Vol. 129 (4). P. 61 - 90.

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where the very metanarratives of "Modernity" and " tradition "are called into question; in a world of" global context, " transnational communities, permeable borders, and multiculturalism.

How plural are "multiple modernities"? Critical experience

Now let's leave the Russian case for a while. With this in mind, I will turn to the theoretical optics of"multiple modernities". I will consider one aspect of the theory of multiple modernities, namely the distinction of secular vs. religious content. I will then return to Russia to focus on this aspect and the role of religion in Russia's attempts at modernization.

My main thesis in assessing the theoretical perspective given by the theory of "multiple modernities" is - in contrast to the widespread interpretations-that Modernity is a single project, it is a historically and culturally special phenomenon associated with a certain system of temporal and spatial coordinates. The ambiguity of the term "modernity" stems from the temporal meaning of the word "modern": this meaning implies that we are talking about all spaces placed at a certain specific time; but this shift in meaning leads to distortion. Modernity, in its origins and implementation, refers not only to a certain time, but also to a certain, limited space-to Europe. As Russian history shows, the " cultural program of modernity "(not as something uniform, but as a dynamic set of movements, impulses, and reforms) was the only known form of Modernity, and in other parts of the world we see certain combinations of elements, a certain "game" with elements of this particular "program". In my opinion, Modernity should be understood as something different.one, and initially it was a European product (even if Europe's clashes with the rest of the world had the opposite effect on the evolution of European Modernity itself).

So, if we are talking about a more or less unique "program", then what do we mean when we talk about "multiplicity"? In essence, this is nothing more than - like the Russian case - selectivity of reactions, adaptation to the national context, attempts at traditionalist legitimation-

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variations of Western Modernity: different forms - but forms of a single, dominant content.

It should be noted that Eisenstadt himself does not deny the existence of a single core of content in all "multiple moderns"; rather, he emphasizes the multiplicity of responses to similar challenges of our time. In this case, I am not speaking out against the very framework idea of "multiple modernities", but against some very common simplifications and false interpretations of it. First, Eisenstadt constantly speaks about the multiplicity of ideological and institutional patterns, but at the same time points out the clear, fundamental and dominant features and characteristics of the "cultural program of modernity" as a single and definitely European/Western one. These fundamental principles or shifts (in comparison with axial civilizations) are as follows:: "a new view of human action - the autonomous self"; "intense reflexivity"12; multiplicity of roles beyond narrow, stable, cohesive communities (translocal communities); blurring of distinctions between the center and the periphery; inclusion in the cultural core of themes and symbols of protest, "equality and freedom, justice and autonomy, solidarity and identity"; the idea of progress and understanding of history as a "project" (domination over nature)13. To this can be added the characteristics found in Arnason's simpler list: capitalist economy; nation - state; democracy; scientific rationality 14. All these features taken together form the "cultural program of Modernity" as an ideal type. A lot of reactions, a lot of adaptations of Modernity, and the "playing" of this program give us Modernity as an "interpretive space", as P. calls it. Wagner 15; however, there is no set of" special " moderns as different cultural programs.

Second, Eisenstadt refers to Marx, Durkheim, and Weber as proponents of the classical idea of lines-

12. This is best described by Anthony Giddens: Giddens A. Modernity and Self-identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991.

13. Eisenstadt S.N. Multiple Modernities // Daedalus. 2000. Vol.129 (1). Р.3.

14. Arnason J. Communism and Modernity // Daedalus. 2000. Vol. 129 (4). P. 63.

15. Wagner P. Modernity as Experience and Interpretation. A New Sociology of Modernity. Oxford: Polity Press, 2008.

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He has repeatedly said that post-war history has not confirmed this classic view. I, on the contrary, argue that the globalizing world and the continued spread of the main elements/values of Modernity through dense communication networks and migration flows confirm the fact of expanding the scope of Western Modernity and its deeper penetration. Trends towards what is called the "legitimation" of life (i.e., the all-encompassing influence of legal procedures), as well as the trend towards the dominance of "consumer culture", have become ubiquitous. What has not really been confirmed is the complete homogenization of the world, the expected triumph of homogeneity-due to the growing diversity of postcolonial reactions, the significant heterogeneity of the "West" itself, and other reasons. However, in spite of everything, Western Modernity continues to dominate, although the ways of this domination in the postcolonial era have changed.

Third, Eisenstadt points to many anti-modern themes and movements that reject the hegemonic patterns of Western Modernity as proof that there are many moderns. This idea raises serious objections or requires clarification. Eisenstadt himself talks a lot about the internal conflicts inherent in Western Modernity as such. These conflicts correspond to the following oppositions: pluralism versus totalism, creativity versus bureaucratization, freedom versus control. 16 Arnason, with reference to Castoriades, adds "the problematic relationship between capitalism and democracy" and the conflict "between two equally important cultural presuppositions-the idea of the infinitely growing dominance of rationality on the one hand, and the individual and collective desire for freedom." autonomy and creativity, on the other hand. " 17 Indeed, Western Modernity is a tangle of internal contradictions and tensions. These tensions are even stronger than the contradictions that Eisenstadt rightly points out. If we take the oppositions pluralism - totalism, freedom - control, then these pairs of opposites relate not only to the divisions between specific groups of people, social forces and / or discourses;

16. Eisenstadt S.N. Multiple Modernities. P. 7 - 8.

17. Arnason J. Communism and Modernity. P. 65.

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these opposites become entangled, intertwined, and intrude on each other like yin and yang. For example, the very concept of plurality can become, paradoxically, a totalist dogma; the value of freedom can be imposed as a disciplinary rule, etc. In this sense, say, the extreme but explicit rationalization that took place during the Soviet (and Nazi) experiment should not hide from us a frightening "mystical" rationalism It is also present in European democracies. This line of thought, which is critical of liberal democracy, goes from Nietzsche and Marx to Foucault and Agamben. 18 The obvious ideological discipline of totalitarian systems should not obscure the less obvious " structural violence "that lies behind the strict demands of liberal regimes (Eisenstadt points to" political correctness "as an example of such"structural violence"). At the same time, this identification of rationalist alienation and repressive control in liberal democracies should not be understood as relativizing the differences between them and the extremely totalitarian variants of modern rationalism.

In any case, the complexity of the "cultural program of modernity" made it possible for active groups in other societies to use its internal tensions in order to justify their choice and borrow those elements, such variants of this program, that seemed appropriate and attractive to them. The reactions of non-Western societies are a series of attempts to accept Modernity to a certain extent and in various combinations with some local elements (cases of complete rejection of Modernity and self-isolation are extremely rare). What appears to be anti-modern movements in non-Western societies are, in fact, mostly different ways, consciously or unconsciously, to respond to the achievements of Western Modernity, using (often not consciously) its internal contradictions. Therefore, multiplicity should not be understood as the emergence of different moderns, but rather as the multiplicity of ways to adapt to Western Modernity, as well as to the cultural hegemony of the West on a global scale.

18. See Foucault M. To supervise and punish. The Birth of a Prison, Moscow: Ad Marginem, 1999; Agamben J. Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Naked Life, Moscow: Europe, 2011.

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Eisenstadt does not seem to have fully understood the extent and consequences of this cultural hegemony: it seems that the main goal of his theorizing was to get rid of the postulation of this hegemony as an illusion. He points out the tendencies towards excessive rationalization and total control inherent in Western Modernity, but believes that these trends will be balanced by the principles of pluralism and autonomy, which are also an integral part of the "cultural program of Modernity". He speaks of an internal opposition, which results in the pluralization of Modernity itself, so to speak, and which manifests itself in many forms. For Eisenstadt, hegemonic universalism is balanced by" authentic traditional localism, " which Modernity itself allows and encourages. Yet, in my opinion, modern universalism only "pretends" to be inclusive, inclusive, and inclusive, and in fact it is exclusive in the sense that in the long run it excludes everything that is "non-modern," "non-dynamic," and "non-marketable." Local traditions, no matter how anti-global they may seem, actually strive to be included in the global regime and thereby accept its basic rules. Eisenstadt describes these local reactions as manifestations of outright confrontation with the West, and that they express a desire to "use the new international global scene and Modernity to their advantage, emphasizing their traditions and 'civilizations' ".19 However, the global scene is by default encoded in modern Western terms, and these anti-modern forces, while trying to use them as a tool for the development of the new global scene, Modernity for their own purposes, they cannot avoid modern Western semantics and, in fact, accept it, playing the same game and thereby becoming implicitly modern. These forces are taking over the very language of Modernity, and we know that, according to Bourdieu, those who control the language also control the speakers of it.20
Eisenstadt's idea of plurality most likely reflects, as Arnason puts it, a "shift in epistemology" over the past decades, namely: "A change in the view of the relation of unity and unity."-

19. Eisenstadt S.N. Multiple Modernities. P. 22.

20. Bourdieu P. Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991.

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a better understanding of the diverse configurations (different national, regional, and potentially global patterns of modernity) reflects a clearer understanding of the many levels and components involved in shaping modern societies..."21.

I can agree with the idea of multiplicity within the framework of this theoretical discovery and as a consequence of the rejection of simplified schemes. This idea can indeed serve as an antidote to vulgar Western-centric models, and this is its fruitful result. However, the same idea of multiplicity in its radical interpretation can lead to a different kind of error: to the illusory idea that different cultural programs of our Time are completely original. This illusion of originality (either consciously maintained or self - deceived) ignores the hegemonic structure of the global world, in which a certain cultural program-the cultural program of Western secular Modernity-is dominant and supported through "legitimate violence" on the part of leading national States and supranational structures. It is true that this cultural program of Modernity is a complex and evolving phenomenon, and that it varies considerably in its forms and degree of implementation within the West itself; but on the whole, Modernity is still a single ideal type with several defining characteristics.

That is why I am not convinced by the radical followers of Eisenstadt when they try to deny that Western Modernity is (1) historically sui generis and (2) it dominates on a global scale - from about the eighteenth century to the present. The fact that this is so, we have seen on the Russian example in the first part of this article.

Religion and the secular

Now we will try to link the discussion of the theory of "multiple modernities" with the question of the relationship between religion and secularism. Talk about the religious traditions of the "axis" civilizations-

21. Arnason J. Communism and Modernity. P. 64.

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elk as the most important factors that determined multiplicity. The lingering influence of religious meanings is often presented as the main watershed separating non-Western versions of Modernity from Western ones. And, of course, everyone recognizes that secularism is one of the main characteristics of Western Modernity. Most Modern researchers point to this close connection between Modernity and secularism either directly or by analyzing the achievements of rationalism, reason based on an immanent, anthropocentric epistemology - as opposed to systems that refer to a transcendent, religious (in the European case, Christian) worldview.

This connection between secularism and Western Modernity is sometimes called into question. The corresponding trend of thought is particularly evident in recent scientific works, which partly appear within the framework of postmodern approaches and in connection with the concept of "post-secular"22. What are the grounds for such doubts? It is argued that religion( first of all, meaning Christianity again), a religious worldview, has always been an integral part of Modernity, and not at all a ballast rejected by it; that religion has continued to evolve along with Modernity - either adapting to it, or even actively participating in it. This statement is illustrated by many examples. Max Weber's thesis on Protestant ethics remains, of course, the locus classicus of such reflections. Another strong argument is the active role of religion in American history in the seventeenth and twentieth centuries.23 There are studies that point to the important role that evangelical revivals and evangelical networks played in the English and American modernization of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as well as the role of German pietism. Another example is the phenomenon of "religious Enlightenment", which does not coincide with the usual view of Enlightenment as a purely secular phenomenon.24
22. Connolly W. Why I Am Not a Secularist. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.

23. См. обсуждение: Warner S. Work in Progress toward a New Paradigm for the Sociological Study of Religion in the United States // American Journal of Sociology. 1993. Vol.98 (5). P. 1044 - 1093; Calhoun G. Afterword: Religion's Many Powers // The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere (Eds. E. Mendieta and J. Van Antwerpen). N. Y.: Columbia University Press, 2011. P. 118 - 134.

24. Sorkin D. The Religious Enlightenment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.

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In addition, there are works whose authors try to find the roots of modern secular rationalism in the theological trends of late medieval Christianity, 25 i.e., to show that, in essence, the formation of Modernity was a certain mutation of religious meanings.

In sociology, the theory of secularization has recently come under head-on attack: it is believed that this theory has reached a dead end, and the previously indisputable connection between Modernity and secularism looks increasingly problematic. The main reason for this revision was, of course, the increasing role of religions in the public sphere around the world, and especially in post-colonial non-Western societies, to which there is ample evidence.26 In my opinion, the religious upsurge in these societies also encourages historians to take a different view of the role of Christianity in the process of Western modernization, thereby projecting (perhaps unconsciously) the processes taking place before our eyes to the interpretation of the historical past.

All these considerations, which call into question the link between secularism and Western Modernity, should be taken seriously. However, I am sure that in general, secularism was and remains an important part of the"cultural program of Modernity". This connection is both historical and logical. It is also easily illustrated by many examples that reflect Western experience. Even if we take into account all the phenomena mentioned above and take into account all the reverse movements, we can still say that secularism is the main vector in the course of Western modernization. Protestant ethics and evangelical revivals may have been "sacred intermediaries" and even worked to establish new modern values and behavioral models, but then these values and models were deeply secularized. Religious Enlightenment may have been an important phenomenon of religious "mediation" for modern forms of thought,

25. Gillespie G. The Theological Origins of Modernity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.

26. См.: Casanova J. Public Religion in the Modern World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994; Casanova J. Rethinking Secularization: a Global Comparative Perspective // Hedgehog Review. 2006. Vol.8 (1 - 2). P.7 - 22; Berger P. (ed.) The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics. NY: Wm.B.Erdmans Publishing Company, 1999; Martin D. On Secularization: Toward a Revised General Theory. London: Ashgate, 2005.

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but the main direction was precisely the secular Enlightenment. The principles of rationalism may trace back to the Christian theological arguments of the nominalist revolution that preceded the Reformation, but ultimately the main trend was the secularization of reason. Perhaps there were serious differences between the ideas of the separation of religious and secular in the Latin Catholic and Anglo-Protestant cultural spaces (Jose Casanova 27 calls the former collision, and the latter collusion, "collusion" between religious and secular forces). But in both cases, religion has been displaced and, so to speak, "localized" in the course of modern social differentiation.

It is also very important that with the advance of Modernity, the very concept of "religion" as such has changed: it has become perceived differently, or, one might say, it has been "invented" as a new phenomenon in a distinctly modern spirit. 28 Casanova agrees with Assad and develops his idea that the secular as a whole is a new phenomenon. It originated in the Judeo-Christian tradition, 29 an idea that has been expressed by some theologians, from Johann Metz to John Milbank.30 This approach, in fact, does not contradict what was mentioned above - the theological roots of Modernity or religious Enlightenment: it turns out that both were part of the main movement, and not some parallel development. Ultimately, this means that the secular as a newly emerged episteme existed alongside and in conjunction with other European processes, in order to finally form the "cultural program of Modernity". Religion was rationalized and disenchanted; religion was objectified (becoming an object that can be accepted or rejected, used, manipulated, etc.). For example, R. Hefner, speaking about Islam and then moving on to other religions, uses the expression Bourdieu".-

27. Casanova J. Rethinking Secularization: a Global Comparative Perspective // Hedgehog Review. 2006. Vol.8 (1 - 2). P.7 - 22.

28. Asad T. Genealogies of Religion. Disciplines and Reasons of Power in Christianity in Islam. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.

29. Casanova J. Rethinking Secularization: a Global Comparative Perspective. P. 10.

30. Metz J. Christliche Anthropozentrik: fiber die Denkform des Thomas von Aquin. Munich: Kozel Verlag, 1962; Levingston J., Fiorenza F. Modern Christian Thought. Vol. II, Twentieth Century. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2000. Political theology and the New Science of Politics // Logo. 2008. N4. P. 33_54.

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interpretation of religious knowledge " to describe how Muslims "came to think of their religion as something complete, self - contained, and objective-a system (minhaj) that can be clearly distinguished from other ideologies and belief systems."31
This is the main direction of secularization brilliantly described by Ch. Taylor in his book The Secular Age. Pointing out all the obvious and hidden, complex and intricate connections between the processes of modern development and Christian meanings in the course of Western history since 1500, he also emphasizes that the dominant factor was emancipation from the "enchanted cosmos" (emancipation that began, however, in the "axial" era and the emergence of an "exclusive humanism" - a worldview that relies entirely on the capabilities and activities of man-excludes any transcendent arguments that would set as the goal something more than "human flourishing" here and now (human flourishing here and now)32.

So, as I have tried to show, secularism is undoubtedly an essential condition of Western Modernity. Let us now return to the topic of "multiple moderns". I said in the previous section that, despite the many local forms and combinations, Modernity is a single ideal model of development. Therefore, secularism (as a major trend) is definitely an integral part of all modern projects both in the West and abroad. Secularism came to Japan, China, India, Turkey, Russia, and Mexico in a single "package" with modern technology, modern work ethic, modern art, modern bureaucracy, modern democratic politics, modern discipline, modern clothing style, modern hygiene standards, and medical practices, and so on. In each specific case, the set of these elements may vary, and not all of them come at the same time, but it is exactly the perfect, complete "package". Reactions to these elements may also differ in different non-Western societies.-

31. Hefner R. Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism in a Globalizing Age // Annual Review of Anthropology. 1998. Vol.27. P.84 - 104.

32. Taylor Ch. A Secular Age. Cambridge, MA, and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007.

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and their combinations with local cultural elements were and still are complex and specific, and this is precisely what manifests the multiplicity of forms, their "interweaving"33. However, the basic set of elements of Modernity remains mostly the same, and it always includes secularism. During the last three centuries of world history - a period when a set of elements of Western Modernity were exported outside the West - secularism, however, did not become mainstream in non-Western societies: and this fact must be recognized and understood. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that in all non-Western societies, secularism was the most serious intellectual challenge, initiated structural changes and contributed to the emergence of special social agents/groups that were receptive to secular ideas and became their carriers. These groups, especially secular elites, have played a leading role in the history of these societies. To illustrate this, let's return to the Russian case.

Religion and Modernization in Russia: achievements and paradoxes of secularism

In Eastern Christianity (Orthodoxy), elements that could serve as symbolic or institutional legitimization of Modernity were rarely found. Rather, on the contrary: in this religious tradition, obstacles to modernization were often found. Or religion was seen as something neutral in relation to modern processes, as a separate, semi-separate, parallel culture, far removed from the social forces that were behind modernization. However, the real picture is more complex.

It is true that the aristocratic and bureaucratic elites, the intelligentsia and the entrepreneurial elite, oriented towards modern European forms of culture and social behavior, were for the most part divorced from the traditional forms of Orthodoxy. However, this gap was not as simple as it might seem. The Russian religious tradition is not an unchanging, closed subculture, not a ghetto or a traditional one

33. About "Entangled modernities" see: Therborn G. Entangled Modernities / / European Journal of Social Theory. 2003. Vol.6 (3). P.293 - 305; Stoeckl K. Europe's Entangled Modernities // Borders Constructed and Deconstructed - Orthodox Christianity in Europe (Ed. Alfons Bruning). Leuven: Peeters, 2011 (Forthcoming).

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an enclave within the rest of society, making an impulsive but inevitable transition to Modernity. The Russian religious tradition has experienced several stages of change, which can be considered as a process parallel to modernization, as a movement in step with society as a whole. There were strong influences from the Western churches, Catholic and Protestant, influences that were already noticeable in the middle of the XVII century. The split of the seventeenth century was ultimately the result of a traumatic experience of modernization. It is well known that, paradoxically, it was the "reactionary" Old Believers, who opposed modernization during the split, who later developed a work ethic that undoubtedly became one of the factors of their successful economic activity.34
The process of religious modernization continued at the beginning of the 18th century, when a new system of church-state relations was introduced in the image of the European confessional model. 35 "Religion" was gradually understood more and more in accordance with the modern paradigm - as a "denomination" (religion), as a special cultural subsystem (for example, the same Old Believers-schismatics were one of the same faiths). one of these subsystems, different from the dominant Church, even if it is stubbornly not officially recognized as a full-fledged "denomination"). In the nineteenth century, Slavophil Orthodoxy was precisely a newly constructed modern "religion" in the sense of a certain system, the core of a particular civilization. The same is true of Russian religious philosophy at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries: it was, in fact, a new, newly created intellectual movement that contained a response to the challenge of Modernity. At the beginning of the 20th century, society was rapidly changing towards an increasingly secular society, although the confessional principle remained the basis for managing imperial diversity and the binding role of religion was not questioned at all by the ruling elites.36
34. Zhuk S. Russia's Lost Reformation. Peasants, Millenialism, and Radical Sects in Southern Russia and Ukraine, 1830 - 1917. Washington, D. C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004; Robson R. Old Believers in Modern Russia. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2007.

35. Lavrov A. Koldovstvo i religiya v Rossii (1700-1740) [Witchcraft and Religion in Russia (1700-1740)]. Moscow: Drevnekhranilishche, 2000, pp. 60-74.

36. Vert P. Pravoslavie, inoslavie, inoverie: ocherki po istorii religioznogo raznoobraziya rossiiskoi imperii [Orthodoxy, Inoslavie, inoverie: essays on the history of religious diversity of the Russian Empire]. Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2012, pp. 124-27, 138-39.

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Modernization impulses in the dominant Church followed changes in society. The All-Russian Church Council of 1917-1918 was, by and large, a compromise: it sought both to end the subordination of the Church to the state (through the acquisition of autonomy by the Church), and to resist the purely secular model of complete religious neutrality of the state.

Despite some modernization impulses within Russian Orthodoxy, and partly because of their low effectiveness, the newly created image of" Orthodoxy " in the eyes of modern social forces was generally painted in negative tones; such Orthodoxy was conceived as a force opposed to Modernity. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the narratives within Russian Orthodoxy itself were openly anti-modern and thus coincided with the public image of religion: during the nineteenth century, Orthodoxy (like other religions rooted in the Empire) was clearly associated with anti-modern principles of social and political organization. This conflict was sharply felt from the very beginning of Peter's reforms, then its severity increased, and it reached its peak in the conditions of radicalization of public sentiment, during the fifteen-year revolutionary period (1905-1920).

In turn, the Soviet forced secularization was a logical consequence of this old conflict. If we consider the Soviet "project" a version of Modernity, then it was an extremely secular version; but we remember that secularity is an integral element of any modernization program. In this respect, the Soviet case remains within the framework of the main direction of global modern development: secularization in the Soviet Union coincides with similar, though not so radical, processes in many societies - from European to colonial, where the ruling and intellectual elites, the "bearers" of Modernity, were quite secular. In this respect, the Soviet experience turned out to be quite unusual in that it gave rise, by virtue of its totalitarian claims, to an alternative system of sacralised ideals and practices, a kind of "atheistic religion" with corresponding dogmas, mythology, hagiography and practices - a "religion" partly based on the heritage of traditional religions.37
37. Berdyaev N. A. Istoki i smysl russkogo kommunizma [The Origins and Meaning of Russian Communism]. Moscow: Nauka, 1990; Lane S. The Rites of Rulers: Ritual in Industrial Society - The Soviet Case. Cambridge: Cambridge

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Post-secular in Russia and beyond

We will now briefly focus on the latest Russian processes in order to return to more general theoretical considerations concerning a relatively new theoretical paradigm that has been rapidly developing over the past decade and a half - the "post-secular"paradigm.

Since 1989 -1991, the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, two processes have paradoxically taken place simultaneously in Russian society: further secularization and religious revival (desecularization). Both processes had specific causes.

The idea of building a civil society and European democracy, which was very popular in the first post-Soviet decade both at the elite level and at the broader level, implied religious neutrality, a new multicultural approach and a kind of technocratic naivety, that is, the idea that it is possible and necessary to refrain from any ideology at all (after that " ideological fatigue", which accumulated during the Soviet era). Essentially, the post-Soviet regime was trying to put into practice a new, European type of moderate secularism; this was the first real experience of laicite in Russian history. In addition, since Russian society was oriented towards modernization, it was assumed that secularity would be its natural consequence. (This is reflected in the first law on religious freedom, adopted in 1990, and in the 1993 Constitution.)

At the same time, completely opposite processes were taking place. The cultural status of religion has increased, according to the" law of the pendulum": the glorification of what was previously repressed or forbidden. For many people, religion was a certain spiritual and emotional compensation, mitigating the trauma of the abrupt collapse of the old social system. Finally, religion was perceived as a repository of cultural arguments, collective memory, and symbolic energy needed to build new identities - national, group, and individual. Religious considerations, among others, were used to create a new Russian nationalism.-

University Press, 1981; Besanqon A. Les Origines intellectuelles du leninisme. Paris: Gallimard, 1977.

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ma. As a result, religion was objectified either as (1) a "genre of identity" - a way of identifying people, one among many others, being part of a mobile complex of identities (what is called bricolage); or as (2) an ideology (a system of representations and behavioral models), which can be, in one way or another, instrumentalized in the public sphere 39.

As I have already said, the main paradox of this situation is the simultaneous nature of two opposite processes: the first real experience of secularism and the growth of the public significance of religion. What can we say about this combination? This paradox needs to be explained in some way, and it is here that we can introduce a new theoretical framework - "postsecular". In what sense can this framework be used?

From a purely historical point of view, this new period of Russian history is literally post-secular, that is, it has emerged after secularism (meaning by secularism, in this case, the seventy-year Soviet atheist project, but also partly earlier processes). In this direct sense, Russia found itself in the same conditions of post-secularism as other post-Soviet states, as well as, in a certain sense, mutatis mutandis, such countries as Turkey, India, Indonesia, Israel and some others. At a deeper level, we can speak of the post-secular (and not just the hyphenated post-secular) - already in a structural sense, and not in a purely temporary sense: the very configuration of the religious and secular in society has changed. On the one hand, we see how social forces, although they confirm their commitment to secularism, become much more tolerant of religion and sometimes tend to incorporate religion into their social projects. On the other hand, when we see a partial "return of religion", it is a return to a different type of religion, which is thematized in a new way. For example, we discover new religious forms, which we can call "religious modernism"; we find, on the other hand, that "religious fundamentalism", despite its anti-modern rito-

38. Robertson R. Globalization, Modernization, and Postmodernization. The Ambiguous Position of Religion // Religion and Global Order. (Eds. R. Robertson and W.Garrett). N.Y.: Paragon House Publishers, 1991. P. 282.

39. См. Agadjanian A., Rousselet K. Globalization and Identity Discourse in Russian Orthodoxy // Eastern Orthodoxy in a Global Age (Eds.V. Roudometof, A. Agadjanian and J. Pankhurst). Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press, 2005. P. 29 - 57.

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By its very structure, riku is a modern phenomenon; and we find implicit modernity (despite explicit conservatism) in the discourse of ecclesiastical intellectuals who are active in the public sphere.

Let me leave aside the examples of " religious modernism "and" religious fundamentalism "and focus on the latter example - "implicit religious modernity", since I believe that this phenomenon is the most significant. Examples of such implicit Modernity in the Russian Orthodox context can be found in official church documents, such as "Fundamentals of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church"40 (2000) and "Fundamentals of the teaching of the Russian Orthodox Church on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights"41 (2008). They attempt to enter into a dialogue with secular Modernity by accepting the so-called "translation proviso", or translation proviso, proposed by John Rawls [42] and developed by Jurgen Habermas [43]. As we know, these two authors recognize the right of any "comprehensive doctrine", or any "Weltanschauung" (including a religious doctrine or worldview), to be part of the public sphere, to have a voice in it; however, the condition is(proviso) of such a presence should be a translation of this "comprehensive doctrine" from a special, special, largely esoteric language to a common, neutral, secular language that is intelligible to all citizens. The Church documents I have mentioned show an example of just such a translation.44 And here we are faced with the paradox of acceptance-through-rejection, which I mentioned earlier.-

40. Fundamentals of the social concept of the Russian Orthodox Church (http://www.mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/, accessed 10.11. 2011).

41. Fundamentals of the Russian Orthodox Church's Teaching on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights (http://www.mospat.ru/index.php?page=41597, accessed 10.11.2011).

42. Rawls J. The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus // Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. 1987. Vol. 7 (1). P. 1 - 25.

43. Habermas Yu. Vera i znanie [Faith and Knowledge]. The Future of Human Nature, Moscow: Vse mir Publ., 2002; Habermas Yu. Religion and publicity. "Cognitive prerequisites for the ' public use of reason' of religious and secular citizens", Habermas Yu. Between naturalism and religion. Philosophical Articles, Moscow: Vse mir Publ., 2011.

44. Agadjanian A. Breakthrough to Modernity, Apologia for Traditionalism: the Russian Orthodox View of Society and Culture in Comparative Perspective // Religion, State and Society. 2003. Vol.31 (4). P.327 - 46; Agadjanian A. Liberal Individual and Christian Culture: Russian Orthodox Teaching on Human Rights in Social Theory Perspective // Religion, State and Society. 2010. Vol.38 (2). P.97 - 113.

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voril above: while the Church's discourse and attitude towards Modernity can be critical and " reactionary,"the very process of translating from a religious language into a general (secular) one means accepting the latter as a universal language. Even if the program of Modernity (for example, the idea of individual human rights-the theme of the second church document) is explicitly rejected, nevertheless, the rules of the modern semantic universe are implicitly accepted. I will repeat Bourdieu's point, which I have already referred to above: ultimately, language is an instrument of domination.

It is precisely this complex, contradictory situation that can be called post-secular: there is no complete, public secularism, nor a mass return of the old forms of religiosity. To unravel this tangle, I suggest paying attention to one interesting fact. Some Russian Orthodox intellectuals find the postmodern critique of secularism useful and fair. They believe that secularism should be rejected as one of the hegemonic meta-narratives of Modernity.45 The "secular monoculture", precisely as an example of cultural hegemony, has been systematically criticized by the current patriarch and his main staff. However, the same church elites can put forward the idea of the supremacy of the Orthodox tradition in the cultural life of Russia. They reject the secular metanarrative, but support the metanarrative of " traditional religion." This ambivalence is very revealing: Russian Orthodoxy, if it can claim hegemony, can only claim local hegemony, its predominance in a certain territory, but not universal - because it is precisely Western secular Modernity that is recognized as claiming universality, and it is precisely this universality of the "secular" that is rejected, because the same postmodern discourse welcomes the idea of the "secular" world. relativistic pluralism and the same value of any choice, any local particular phenomenon. Any reference to the hegemony of a particular religious tradition within the framework of "local and particular" is both an affirmation and a rejection of such pluralism, and this contradiction is also part of the paradoxical and dynamic post-secular situation.

45. Kyrlezhev A. The Postsecular Age: Religion and Culture Today // Religion, State, and Society. 2008. Vol.36 (1). P.21 - 31.

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Final considerations

So how can we apply a post-secular approach to the Russian case? All the major aspirations for Modernity in Russian history have been initiated and implemented by secular forces. Moreover, as we have seen, Orthodoxy has provided several examples of reactive implicit modernization, even if its results were not as significant as in Western Christianity. The driving force behind modernization in the post-Soviet period is also, without a doubt, a secular force. Secularism is assumed by default, and in this respect Russia is no different from most European societies. "Immanent frame" - a term proposed by Ch. Taylor 46-unquestionably dominates. At the same time, as in Europe, religion is returning to the public sphere; but, as in Europe, it is a question of recognizing a minority, not of creating an equal competitor. We can say this: secularism, which has established its dominance, is changing in the direction of greater flexibility in relation to the religious minority. In this sense, I would prefer to talk about a certain phase of the evolution of secular Modernity, rather than a completely new era. The transformed, modernized phenomenon of religion tends rather to be incorporated into the late modern secularism regime, no longer being thought of as the main opposing force (as was the case in communist Russia, as well as earlier in Europe, at least during the continental "culture wars").

There is, however, a significant difference between the Russian case and the Western situation. Habermas and Taylor recently discussed the new place of religion and the mutation of secularity47. They differed on several points, but were unanimous in their perception of liberal-democratic Modernity as a natural and neutral living environment rather than a"program". This perception seems logical in the West, where Modernity has become mainstream, and therefore seems to be just an environment, an" air " that everyone breathes. In Russia, as in many other countries

46. Taylor Ch. A Secular Age. Cambridge, MA, and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007.

47. The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere/Eds. E.Mendieta and J. Van Antwerpen. N. Y.: Columbia University Press, 2011.

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In non-Western societies, "Modernity "is still perceived as a" program " that needs to be implemented. In Russia, or in India, or in China, "pluralistic democracy" or "market economy" is by no means a natural living environment; there is something more behind these terms, namely, a concrete content, an expressed set of ideas, values, and so on. These ideas and values can be accepted or rejected, but they cannot be considered "natural or neutral" and need to be interpreted and evaluated. Of course, the fact remains that Modernity is the dominant global program, which continues to define local discourses, practices, social differentiation, and social movements as the main coordinate system. The multiplicity of responses to Modernity should not distract us from recognizing this dominant ideal type-accepted, rejected, or, as I have tried to show, accepted-through-rejection. Modernity is being transformed, but it still remains unshakable.

Essential secularism remains, in my opinion, part of this program. As we record the changes, we find again that secularism as such does not disappear; it can abandon its ideological hegemonic claims, but it does not cease to be a "silent condition" of the Western type of Modernity (or even late modernity). At least in the Russian situation, religion in any new form that it may take cannot serve as a justification for any specifically Russian type of Modernity. Indeed, religion is no longer rejected, as it was in the classical period of modernity, and it is no longer attributed exclusively to the private sphere. But this does not mean that the project of Modernity is rejected as a fundamentally secular phenomenon, because modernization impulses come from secular classes and forces; they are inspired by secular goals; their arrangement is based on secular legal and ethical norms. Religious meanings may be allowed and even incorporated in the public sphere, but structurally they are not included in the core of the still dominant program of Modernity.In this sense, the term "postsecular" opens up a new perspective for discussion and sets a new research agenda, but it does not indicate a new era of some new, non-secular modernity.

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